Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 1 of 29
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-665-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-667-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-668-ADA
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC., and
`WHATSAPP, INC.
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`AMAZON.COM, INC.,
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, and
`AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 2 of 29
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-672-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-674-ADA
`
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a VERIZON
`WIRELESS,
`VERIZON SERVICES, CORP., and
`VERIZON BUSINESS NETWORK
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`T-MOBILE US, INC., and
`T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 3 of 29
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................1 
`
`THE MOBILE GATEWAY PATENTS ..............................................................................3 
`
`A. 
`
`Overview ................................................................................................................. 3 
`
`
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`IV. 
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4 
`
`A. 
`
`“roaming” (’234 patent claims 1, 19, 28, 30, 46, 62; ’721 patent claims 34,
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`49) ........................................................................................................................... 4 
`
`“callee identifier” (’234 patent claims 1, 11, 20, 25, 28, 30, 46, 62) ...................... 7 
`
`“access code” (’234 patent claims 1, 10, 11, 19-21, 25, 28, 30-33, 38, 40,
`
`43, 45-48, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 72, 75; ’721 patent claims 1, 14, 16, 20,
`
`34, 38, 39, 46, 49-51, 57, 63, 77, 103, 104, 109, 110, 124, 130, 135, 138-40) ...... 9 
`
`D. 
`
`“access code request message” (’234 claims 1, 10, 11, 19-21, 28, 30, 31, 40,
`
`46, 47, 62, 72; ’721 claims 1, 16, 20, 34, 38, 39, 49-51, 77, 103, 104, 135) ........ 10 
`
`E. 
`
`“pool of access codes” (’234 patent claims 1, 11, 20, 30, 38, 46, 54, 57, 62,
`
`70; ’721 patent claims 63, 109) ............................................................................. 11 
`
`“local call” (’234 patent, claims 1, 11, 20) ........................................................... 13 
`
`“means for initiating a call using said access code to identify the callee”
`
`F. 
`
`G. 
`
`(’234 patent claim 11) ........................................................................................... 15 
`
`H. 
`
`“means for selecting said access code from a pool of access codes” (’234
`
`patent claim 46)..................................................................................................... 17 
`
`I. 
`
`“gateway” (’721 patent, claims 1, 20, 38, 51, 77, 103, 133) ................................ 18 
`
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 4 of 29
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`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................20 
`
`V. 
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`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 5 of 29
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Asetek Holdings, Inc. v. Coolit Sys., No. C-12-4498 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170488 (N.D.
`
`Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) ..................................................................................................................... 10
`
`Atser Research Techs., Inc. v. Raba-Kistner Consultants, Inc., No. SA-07-CA-93-H, 2009 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 25294 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2009) ......................................................................... 10
`
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................... 8
`
`Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 3:11-cv-00481-RCJ-VPC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17536 (D.
`
`Nev. Feb. 6, 2013)..................................................................................................................... 10
`
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). ........................................ 17
`
`Hand Held Prods., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 12-768, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85345 (D. Del.
`
`June 24, 2014) ........................................................................................................................... 15
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................... 2, 7
`
`Hyperion Solution Corp. v. Outlooksoft Corp., 422 F. Supp. 2d 760 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ........... 9, 10
`
`IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................... 5
`
`Interdigital Commuc’ns., Inc. v. ZTE Corp., 1:13-cv-00009-RG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113316
`
`(D. Del. Aug. 8, 2014) .............................................................................................................. 10
`
`Kara Tech Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................. 8, 12, 13
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................... 2
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ...................................................... 1
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ......................................... 2
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) ................................................................ 15
`
`Modine Mfg Co. v. US. Int 'l Trade Comm 'n, 75 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................... 3
`
`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 6 of 29
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`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................ 9
`
`Osram GmbHv. Int 'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................... 3
`
`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .... 6
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 'per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ........................... 3
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) .................................................. 1, 2
`
`Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................ 5
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ........................................... 2
`
`
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`iii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 7 of 29
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`ABBREVIATION
`
`TERM
`
`VoIP-Pal
`
`Facebook
`
`WhatsApp
`
`Google
`
`Amazon
`
`
`Verizon
`
`T-Mobile
`
`Defendants
`
`
`The ’606 patent
`
`The ’234 patent
`
`The ’721 patent
`
`The Mobile Gateway patents or the patents-
`in-suit
`
`RBR
`
`POSITA
`
`Defendant VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.
`
`Facebook, Inc.
`
`WhatsApp, Inc.
`
`Google LLC
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services,
`LLC, and Amazon Web Services, Inc.
`
`Verizon Communications, Inc.,
`Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless,
`Verizon Services, Corp., and
`Verizon Business Network Services, Inc.
`
`T-Mobile USA, Inc.
`
`Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Amazon,
`Verizon, T-Mobile
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,218,606
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,630,234
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,880,721
`
`The ’234 and ’721 patents
`
`
`Routing, Billing, Rating
`
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 8 of 29
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Rather than cease their unlawful use of VoIP-Pal’s intellectual property, Defendants
`
`attempt to misuse the claim construction process to invalidate the patents-in-suit and escape patent
`
`infringement liability. Most if not all of the disputed terms are plain English words that are readily
`
`understandable to a POSITA and to potential jurors. Defendants’ proposed constructions,
`
`however, import improper and unnecessary limitations into the disputed claim terms. Their self-
`
`serving constructions seeks to limit the asserted claims to the preferred embodiment disclosed in
`
`the specification and in many instances violate basic claim construction principles. The motive
`
`behind Defendants’ proposed constructions is clear—when properly construed, the asserted claims
`
`are valid over the prior art and Defendants’ accused products literally infringe the patent-in-suit.
`
`VoIP-Pal’s proposed constructions of the disputed claim terms, on the other hand, are consistent
`
`with the plain claim language and the intrinsic record. Accordingly, VoIP-Pal respectfully requests
`
`that the Court adopt its proposed constructions and reject Defendants’ proposed constructions.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Ultimately, the proper construction of a patent is a question of law.1 “[T]he words of a
`
`claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning ... [which is] the meaning that the
`
`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e.,
`
`as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”2 “[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term
`
`is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.”3 The patent “specification is
`
`always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
`
`
`1 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015) (citing Markman v.
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996)).
`2 Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
`3 Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`1
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 9 of 29
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`best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”4 While “the claims themselves provide substantial
`
`guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” the context of the surrounding words of the
`
`claim also must be considered.5 Furthermore, “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both
`
`asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment ... [b]ecause claim terms
`
`are normally used consistently throughout the patent.”6
`
`“[T]he specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee
`
`that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s
`
`lexicography governs.”7 “Even when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the
`
`claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear
`
`intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”8
`
`A court “should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.”9
`
`“In some cases, ... the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence
`
`and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or
`
`the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.”10 “Extrinsic evidence
`
`consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
`
`inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”11
`
`
`4 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`5 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
`6 Id. (internal citation omitted).
`7 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
`8 Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liebel-
`Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original) (internal
`quotation marks omitted).
`9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
`(1996).
`10 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
`11 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980.
`
`
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`2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 10 of 29
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`Finally, “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns
`
`with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction,”12 thus
`
`“a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor’s device is rarely the correct
`
`interpretation.”13
`
`III. THE MOBILE GATEWAY PATENTS
`A.
`
`Overview
`
`The Mobile Gateway patent describe novel systems, apparatuses and methods for
`
`providing an access code to roaming mobile communication devices such as smartphones, to
`
`enable access to suitable communication routing infrastructure, wherein the selection of the
`
`communication channel for a call can be optimized based on the calling device’s current location.
`
`An embodiment enabling a mobile device to initiate a call to a callee is shown in Figure 1 at 10.
`
`In one embodiment, in response to a call being placed, a mobile device 12 transmits an
`
`access code request message including a location identifier to an access server 14 in
`
`communication with a routing controller (“RC”) 30. The RC identifies a geographical area
`
`associated with the mobile device 12, generates an access code based on request message,
`
`including the location identifier, and causes an access code to be transmitted to the mobile device.
`
`The mobile device 12 uses the access code it received to initiate a call using a channel identified
`
`by the access code, which could be a phone number or IP address. For example, the mobile device
`
`12 could initiate a call to a phone number 20-24 associated with a (PSTN-based) gateway 18 to
`
`reach the IP network 26. In some embodiments, the access code is not a PSTN phone number but
`
`could be an IP address such that an (IP-based) gateway (e.g., 18) could provide a channel or the
`
`
`12 Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa 'per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`13 Osram GmbHv. Int 'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Modine
`Mfg Co. v. US. Int 'l Trade Comm 'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
`3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 11 of 29
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`call could proceed via IP network 26.14 Thus, the infrastructure used to connect the call is
`
`optimized to the location of the mobile device 12.
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`“roaming” (’234 patent claims 1, 19, 28, 30, 46, 62; ’721 patent claims 34, 49)
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Preamble is limiting. Plain and ordinary
`meaning of “roaming” is “being in another
`mobile telephone service provider’s network
`and not the mobile telephone’s home network”
`
`
`Defendants are deliberately imprecise as to which aspect of the preamble of these claims
`
`
`
`they assert are limiting. Claims 19, 28, 30, 46, and 62 of the ’234 patent and claims 34 and 49 of
`
`the ’721 patent are not directed to a mobile telephone or a wireless apparatus. Rather, they are
`
`directed to system or method for transmitting to and receiving communications from a such a
`
`device. For example, claim 19 of the ’234 patent recites “means for receiving from the mobile
`
`telephone said access code request message,” and “means for transmitting said access code reply
`
`message including said access code to the mobile telephone.”15 The preamble of these claim is
`
`limiting only to the extent that the claims require communication with a mobile telephone or a
`
`wireless apparatus, not that the claim in its entirety is limited to a mobile telephone or a wireless
`
`apparatus. Only claim 1 of the ’234 patent is directed to a method where the steps are performed
`
`by a mobile telephone. Thus, the Court should only construe the preamble of claim 1 of the ’234
`
`patent as limiting the entirety of the claim to a mobile telephone.
`
`
`14 See Dkt. No. 41-3 9:9-47, 13:49-57, Figs. 1-8. All Dkt. Nos. refer to Case No. 6:21-cv-665-
`ADA unless otherwise indicated.
`15 Dkt. No. 41-2 at claim 19.
`
`
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`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 12 of 29
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`None of these claims, however, is limited by the preamble due the term “roaming.”
`
`“Roaming” “merely gives a descriptive name to the set of limitations in the body of the claim that
`
`completely set forth the invention” and therefore is not limiting.16 Indeed, the term “roaming”
`
`does not appear anywhere in the body of these claims. Contrary to what Defendants’ contend,
`
`claim 1 of the ’234 patent, which recites “[a] method of roaming with a mobile telephone” is not
`
`representative of the other claims in this regard.17 All the other asserted claims either recite a
`
`system or method for “enabling roaming by a mobile telephone (wireless apparatus),” or “enabling
`
`mobile telephone roaming.”18 The use of the term “enabling roaming” is significant because the
`
`claims provide an alternative to conventional roaming as discussed further below.
`
`Defendants’ contention that deleting the “initiating a call to a callee” language in the
`
`preamble of claim 1 of the ’234 patent during prosecution constitutes a limiting disclaimer is
`
`erroneous.19 Prosecution disclaimer requires a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during
`
`prosecution.20 Defendants point to no evidence as to why the applicant amended the claims in this
`
`manner, nor to any evidence in the prosecution history that the applicant amended the preamble to
`
`overcome prior art. Instead, Defendants rely on the following passage from the specification as
`
`evidence of a disclaimer: “[m]obile telephone service providers often charge significant fees for
`
`long distance telephone calls, particularly when the mobile telephone is roaming in another mobile
`
`telephone service provider’s network.”21 But the statement is merely a general description of the
`
`field of the invention and not a clear attempt to distinguish prior art.
`
`
`16 See IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`17 Dkt. No. 41 at 3.
`18 Dkt. No. 41-2 at claims 19, 28, 30, 46, 62; Dkt. No. 41-3 at claims 34, 49.
`19 Dkt. No. 41 at 3.
`20 See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`21 Dkt. No. 41 at 3; Dkt. No. 41-2 at 15-19.
`
`
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`5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 13 of 29
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`Defendants’ definition of “roaming” also misses the mark. Defendants define what the
`
`applicant referred to during prosecution as “conventional roaming”—engaging mobile telephone
`
`service provider other than the user’s home service provider. Indeed, the evidence that Defendants
`
`cite in support of their construction use “roaming” in the conventional sense.22 The intrinsic
`
`record, however, shows that the invention does not concern “roaming” in the conventional sense.
`
`Rather, the invention concerns using an access code to facilitate a form of “roaming” that avoids
`
`that charges incurred by placing call in another mobile telephone service provider’s network:
`
`It will be appreciated that use of the access code facilitates avoidance of long
`distance or roaming charges that a mobile telephone service provider would charge
`for a call placed directly using the callee identifier using conventional calling
`processes, for example.23
`
`
`The applicant expressly directed the Examiner to this portion of the specification during
`
`prosecution and distinguished “‘roaming’” as used in the claims from “conventional roaming”: :
`
`Furthermore, the methods and systems claimed easily facilitate “roaming” of the
`mobile telephone … subscribers are bound to the same service provider, which
`avoids engaging other mobile telephone service providers directly with the
`subscriber as in conventional roaming and avoids the associated loss of revenue by
`the home service provider.24
`By adopting what they claim is the recognized understanding of roaming, Defendants
`
`fundamentally misunderstand the invention and effectively read the invention out of the claims.25
`
`The invention does not require the use of “conventional calling processes” nor conventional
`
`roaming in other service providers’ networks.26
`
`
`
`22 Dkt. No. 41 at 4.
`23 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 13:4-9.
`24 Dkt. No. 41-4 at 36 (emphasis added).
`25 See PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir.
`2016) (“a construction which excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever correct.”).
`26 See, e.g., Dkt. No. 41-3 at 13:13-17.
`
`
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`6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 14 of 29
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`Although “roaming” may have a recognized meaning outside the patents, the plain and
`
`ordinary use of the term in the patents is different and readily understandable as denoting an
`
`alternative to conventional roaming. Notwithstanding, to avoid any confusion, VoIP-Pal proposes
`
`that “roaming” alternatively be construed, in the context of these claims, to simply mean “use [of
`
`a communication device] over a geographical area.”
`
`B.
`
`“callee identifier” (’234 patent claims 1, 11, 20, 25, 28, 30, 46, 62)
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`telephone number, and not a username
`
`
`
`The meaning of term “callee identifier” is self-explanatory and does not require any further
`
`construction beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as used in the claims. Even
`
`Google agrees.27 Yet the other Defendants propose to limit the claims to a single embodiment by
`
`construing “callee identifier” to be “a telephone number and not a username.” This construction
`
`violates basic claim construction principles. As noted above, “[e]ven when the specification
`
`describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless
`
`the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions
`
`of manifest exclusion or restriction.”28 No such evidence of a clear intent to limit the claims to a
`
`single embodiment exists in the intrinsic record.
`
`Contrary to what Defendants claim, the applicant did not repeatedly define the callee
`
`identifier as a “number” through the use of “i.e.” during prosecution.29 Defendants rely on only
`
`one portion of one statement from one response to an office action where the applicant allegedly
`
`defined the callee identifier as a “number,” not repeated statements. The complete statement reads:
`
`
`
`27 Dkt. No. 41 at 5 n.6.
`28 Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1372.
`29 Dkt. No. 41 at 5.
`
`
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`7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 15 of 29
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`“[t]he Examiner indicates Elliott describes at paragraph 738 the callee identifier (i.e., dialed
`
`number) is stored in table entry, table 14.”30 But this statement merely repeats, almost verbatim,
`
`the Examiner’s contention that the dialed number referred to in paragraph 738 of Elliott discloses
`
`the claimed callee identifier and is not an attempt by the applicant to define the callee identifier.31
`
`Defendants’ claim that the specification contains a disavowal of claim scope is incorrect.
`
`The language cited by Defendants makes clear that the specification merely describes a telephone
`
`number in one embodiment of the invention, not that it limits the scope of the invention:
`
`In alternative embodiments … an additional block … may determine whether the
`callee identifier is a valid username. However, in the embodiment disclosed herein,
`the callee identifier is assumed to be a telephone number of the callee, and not a
`username.32
`
`
`In fact, the specification discloses, and also incorporates by reference, multiple alternative
`
`embodiments and expressly states that the disclosed embodiments are not intended to be limiting.33
`
`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred
`
`embodiment described in the specification.”34 In any event, Defendants’ proposed construction
`
`contradicts the specification’s repeated, express disclosures that the “callee identifier” may include
`
`the callee’s username (see Dkt. No. 41-2 at 27:14-17, 60-62, 32:47-51, Fig. 18B (404)).
`
`Finally, Defendants point to no language in the claims that limits a callee identifier to a
`
`telephone number. Thus, the Court also should reject Defendants’ proposed construction because
`
`
`
`30 Dkt. No. 41-4 at 32.
`31 Ex. 1 at 25; Ex. 2 at ¶738.
`32 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 29:61-67; see also id. 8:36-37, incorporating WO 2008/052340’s embodiments.
`33 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 34:30-33; see also id. at 9:1-5, 9:13-17, 15:3-6, 19:6-12, 22:30-32, 22:45-48,
`22:56-61.
`34 See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Kara Tech Inc.
`v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full
`scope of his claims, and we will not limit him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation
`from the specification into the claims.”).
`
`
`
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 16 of 29
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`it seeks to import a negative limitation into the claims, which is inappropriate especially when it
`
`is not supported by the claim language.35
`
`C.
`
`“access code” (’234 patent claims 1, 10, 11, 19-21, 25, 28, 30-33, 38, 40, 43, 45-
`48, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 72, 75; ’721 patent claims 1, 14, 16, 20, 34, 38, 39, 46,
`49-51, 57, 63, 77, 103, 104, 109, 110, 124, 130, 135, 138-40)
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“code used by the [mobile telephone / wireless
`device / wireless apparatus] in place of the
`callee identifier”
`
`The term “access code” also is self-explanatory and does not require any further
`
`
`
`
`construction beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as used in the claims. Defendants
`
`appear to agree, at least in part, because they do not dispute that an “access code” is a “code.” The
`
`dispute, however, concerns the portion of Defendants’ construction that requires that the access
`
`code be used “in place of the callee identifier.” This portion of Defendants’ construction injects
`
`unnecessary ambiguity into the claims and should be rejected.
`
`
`
`Defendants’ construction is problematic because it seeks to define “access code” by how
`
`it is used rather than what it is—an access code. Under Defendants’ construction, if the access
`
`code is not used in place of the callee identifier, then is it is no longer an access code, which makes
`
`no sense. Moreover, there is no need to distinguish an access code from a callee identifier in the
`
`definition of “access code.” The plain claim language of each asserted claims of the ’234 patent
`
`already expressly recites “an access code being different from said callee identifier” or “said access
`
`
`35 See, e.g., Hyperion Solution Corp. v. Outlooksoft Corp., 422 F. Supp. 2d 760, 773 (E.D. Tex.
`2006) (“Importing a negative limitation into a claim, particularly where the claim language does
`not contain such a limitation, is generally not favored.”) (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314, 1329, 1332–33, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
`9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 17 of 29
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`code being different from the callee identifier.” Thus, the use “in place of the callee identifier” in
`
`Defendants’ construction is redundant and unnecessary.36
`
`
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction is even more problematic with respect to the ’721
`
`patent because none of the asserted ’721 claims recite a callee identifier. As such, Defendants’
`
`proposed construction injects further uncertainty into these claims. Although independent claims
`
`1, 20, 38, and 50 of the ’721 patent and their corresponding dependent claims recite “the access
`
`code being distinct from the destination node identifier,” claims 77, 103 and 130 and their
`
`corresponding dependent claims do not. Thus, as to these claims, Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction imports an improper negative limitation that finds no support in the claim language.37
`
`
`
`Finally, Defendants’ reliance on a Federal telecommunications standard in support of the
`
`alleged plain meaning of access code is irrelevant.38 The parties’ dispute does not concern the
`
`plain meaning of “access code,” but rather, Defendants’ attempt to incorporate an unnecessary and
`
`improper usage limitation into the construction of “access code,” which should be rejected.
`
`D.
`
`“access code request message” (’234 claims 1, 10, 11, 19-21, 28, 30, 31, 40, 46,
`47, 62, 72; ’721 claims 1, 16, 20, 34, 38, 39, 49-51, 77, 103, 104, 135)
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“message sent from the [mobile device /
`wireless device / wireless apparatus] and
`received by the access server”
`
`“access code reply message” (’234 claims 1, 10, 11, 19, 20, 25, 28, 30, 43, 45,
`46, 61, 62, 75; ’721 claims 1, 16, 20, 34, 38, 46, 49-51, 77, 103, 124, 135, 138-
`40)
`
`
`36 See Interdigital Commuc’ns., Inc. v. ZTE Corp., 1:13-cv-00009-RG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`113316, at *6 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2014); Asetek Holdings, Inc. v. Coolit Sys., No. C-12-4498 EMC,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170488, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs.,
`Inc., 3:11-cv-00481-RCJ-VPC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17536, at *22 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2013); Atser
`Research Techs., Inc. v. Raba-Kistner Consultants, Inc., No. SA-07-CA-93-H, 2009 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 25294, at *31-32 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2009).
`37 See, e.g., Hyperion Solution, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
`38 Dkt. No. 41 at 7-8.
`
`
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 18 of 29
`
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“message sent from the access server and
`received by the [mobile device / wireless
`device / wireless apparatus]”
`
`Although VoIP-Pal initially identified these terms in Proposed Claim Terms for
`
`
`
`
`Construction, VoIP-Pal advised Defendants during the subsequent meet and confer process that
`
`these terms could be dropped. Nevertheless, some Defendants are unwilling to agree that these
`
`terms should be understood according to their plain and ordinary usage in the claims and have
`
`maintained a proposed construction for these terms. Yet, their proposed construction does not
`
`define what an “access code request message” or an “access code reply message” is. Rather, the
`
`construction seeks to define these terms by the identity of the sender and the recipient of the
`
`message. But these constraints place artificial and redundant limitation on the claims that are
`
`unwarranted. Contrary to what Defendants claim, VoIP-Pal does not contend that the sender and
`
`the recipient can be some unspecified device.39 The plain claim language identifies what sends
`
`the access code request message and what receives the access code reply message. Despite their
`
`quibbling, Defendants fail to specify which claims where that is not the case. Accordingly, the
`
`plain claim language should control.
`
`E.
`
`“pool of access codes” (’234 patent claims 1, 11, 20, 30, 38, 46, 54, 57, 62, 70;
`’721 patent claims 63, 109)
`
`VoIP-Pal’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`table containing access codes for exclusive
`association with a [callee identifier /
`destination node identifier]
`
`39 Dkt. No. 41 at 10.
`
`
`
`
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 41 Filed 04/08/22 Page 19 of 29
`
`The term “pool of access codes” is self-explanatory and does not require any further
`
`construction beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as used in the claims. This term
`
`merely adds two plain English words—“pool of”—to the term “access code.” “Pool of” in this
`
`context is synonymous with “set of.” Yet all the Defendants, except Google, believe that these
`
`two readily understandable words necessitate 12 additional words of definition. These additional
`
`limitations are both improper and unnecessary.
`
`First, Defendants’ contention that “pool of access codes” requires a “table” improperly
`
`imports limitations from the specification into the claims.40 Although the specification discloses
`
`that access codes may be stored in access code association table 170, this table is merely
`
`illustrative.