Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 1 of 15
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Case No. 6:21-cv-569-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`U.S. District Judge Alan Albright
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`PLAINTIFF TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
`ITS RULE 59(E) MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO INCLUDE
`SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES, ONGOING ROYALTIES, AND INTEREST
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`

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`I.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 2 of 15
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`THE JURY’S VERDICT AND THE TRIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORT A
`RUNNING ROYALTY AWARD. ..................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`The evidence presented at trial and the jury verdict support a running
`royalty. .................................................................................................................... 1
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`The implied royalty rate is a straightforward interpretation of the jury’s
`running royalty damages award. ............................................................................. 3
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`II.
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`TOUCSHTREAM’S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL AND ONGOING
`ROYALTIES ARE REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE. ........................................... 4
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`Touchstream’s request for supplemental damages was not “untimely.” ................ 4
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`Touchstream’s 50% enhancement to the implied royalty is appropriate. ............... 5
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`Google’s downward adjustment is meritless. ......................................................... 6
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`III.
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`GOOGLE HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF UNDUE DELAY OR
`PREJUDICE, AND PREJUDMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE GRANTED. ................. 7
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`A.
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`Awarding prejudgment interest at the start of the damages period and at
`the prime rate is appropriate and warranted. ......................................................... 10
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
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`i
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 3 of 15
`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 3 of 15
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`INDEX OF EXHIBITS
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`|Exhibit|Description,
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`|1~_|Christopher Martinez Expert Report. Schedule 4.0
`IPR Decision on ‘528 Patent
`IPR Decision on ‘251 Patent
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`|4~_|IPR Decision on ‘289 Patent
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`Trial Transcript excerpts from July 17-21, 2023
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`i
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 4 of 15
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`Google’s Opposition proposes that Google continue infringing Touchstream’s patents for
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`the next decade with no repercussions whatsoever. Courts consistently reject such arguments from
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`adjudicated infringers. Applying authority from this Court and the Federal Circuit, the evidence
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`presented at trial—as well as the jury’s verdict—supports the remedies Touchstream seeks.
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`Touchstream respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion and award Touchstream on-
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`going royalties, supplemental damages, and interest.
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`I.
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`THE JURY’S VERDICT AND THE TRIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORT A RUNNING
`ROYALTY AWARD.
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`Courts routinely award ongoing royalties where “the record [shows] that [the plaintiff] has
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`not been compensated for [the defendant’s] continuing infringement.” Telecordia Techs., Inc. v.
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages,
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`Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`A.
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`The evidence presented at trial and the jury verdict support a running
`royalty.
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`On its face, the jury’s damages award of $338,760,000 was a clear rejection of Google’s
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`lump sum royalty arguments, and, more generally, Google’s entire damages presentation. The
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`jury’s award is more than 37.7 times greater than Google’s proposed lump sum royalty theory of
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`$8.98 million. Even then, Google spent little effort developing or explaining this theory during
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`trial, and then essentially abandoned its lump sum theory in its closing argument. See generally
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`Tr. 1332:8-1352:7 (arguing that Touchstream deserved zero damages, with no lump sum
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`reference). Google fails to offer any explanation of how a damages number almost 40 times larger
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`than its proposed lump sum is not a clear rejection of its damages theory. Further, Google offers
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`no explanation as to why the jury would reject all of its other arguments (no infringement,
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`invalidity, and no damages) but then accept its unsubstantiated lump sum proposal. Given this
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`history and context, Google’s theory defies logic and common sense.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 5 of 15
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`In reality, the jury rejected Google’s damages approach in favor of Touchstream’s. With
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`respect to Touchstream’s theory, the jury heard abundant evidence in support of a running royalty.
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`Touchstream’s expert, Mr. Chandler, explained why the parties at the hypothetical negotiation
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`would have entered into a running royalty, as well as the benefits that structure provided for both
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`Touchstream and Google. Tr. at 630:22-632:22. Further, all of Touchstream’s license agreements
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`took the form of a running royalty. See PTX-567 (Quadriga); PTX-568 (FetchIt); PTX-690 (Mash).
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`In addition, the jury heard ample testimony regarding the Quadriga Agreement, which was
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`entered into the same exact month as the hypothetical negotiation, and which utilized a running
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`royalty structure. Tr. 623:20-22. Google’s statement that Touchstream entered into a “lump sum”
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`agreement for the patents is misleading. Opp. at 4. The Vizbee Agreement was a settlement
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`agreement to resolve litigation, which provided for a $2.31 million dollar settlement “in lieu of a
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`proposed 10% royalty.” PTX-765 (Vizbee Settlement); Tr. 322:5-9, 656:2-5; id. at 1157:2-9
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`(Martinez). Mr. Mitschelle explained to the jury that Touchstream took this settlement in lieu a
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`running royalty because Vizbee was a “pre-revenue” venture. Tr. 321:16-322:9. Finally, Google
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`did not object to the per-activation running royalty instruction given to the jury, which expressly
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`instructed that “[r]easonable royalty awards may take the form of a running royalty based on the
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`number of activations of the licensed products.” Id. at 1305:9-15 (final jury instruction no. 32).
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`Google’s arguments in support of a lump sum was clearly rejected by the jury. Google’s
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`expert, Mr. Martinez, failed to even develop or detail how he arrived at his lump sum structure.
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`He never testified that the $8.98 million royalty covered the entirety of Touchstream’s patents’
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`life. See Tr. 1094:2-1097:20. Without knowing how far into the future the license went, and
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`specifically that Touchstream’s patents expire at the earliest in 2031, the jury could not have
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`understood it was entering a lump sum royalty nor calculated a lump sum amount (after rejecting
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`2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 6 of 15
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`Google’s unsubstantiated number). See id.. Conversely, Mr. Chandler was explicit about the time
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`period that his running royalty covered: 2015 through 2022. Id. at 698:24-699:6. Google’s failure
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`to detail its own theory of a lump sum royalty (e.g., with any defined dates) fails to provide a basis
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`for interpreting the jury’s verdict as a lump sum award.
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`Google’s other arguments are equally unavailing. For instance, the jury’s verdict being a
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`round number just as easily supports a running royalty structure. In fact, Google’s statement that
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`its expert’s lump sum royalty was a round number is incorrect—Mr. Martinez calculated a
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`reasonable royalty that went down to the specific dollar at
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` (just like Mr. Chandler). Ex.
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`1, Martinez Rpt. at Sch. 4.0. Google’s alleged “preference” for lump-sum licenses was
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`contradicted and undermined at trial. Google did not even present these licenses to the jury.
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`Further, Google states that “no Google license produced in this case provided for a running
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`royalty.” Opp. at 4.
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`3 (Dkt. No. 185, at 4).
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`. PTX-1168; see also Touchstream Mot. in Limine No.
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`. Tr. 1142:23-1146:10.
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`In short, it makes little sense to interpret the jury’s damages award as reflective of Google’s
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`proposed lump sum theory. The evidence presented of an ongoing royalty, and the jury’s damages
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`award itself, are strong evidence that the jury accepted a running royalty structure. As a result, the
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`jury’s damages award does not fully compensate Touchstream for Google’s continuing (and
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`growing) infringement, and, thus, Touchstream is entitled to supplemental damages and an
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`ongoing royalty to account for all sales of the infringing Chromecast-enabled devices.
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`B.
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`The implied royalty rate is a straightforward interpretation of the jury’s
`running royalty damages award.
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`Simple math reveals the royalty rate. Mr. Chandler’s jury implied royalty rates reflect
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 7 of 15
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`calculations that are consistent with how courts typically interpret a jury’s verdict. Mr. Chandler
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`used a straightforward calculation—taking the jury’s verdict and dividing it by his reasonable
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`royalty amount (338,760,000 / 941,419,212) to obtain his 36.98% implied running royalty. Mr.
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`Chandler then applied this 36.98% to his royalty rates he put forth at trial (36.98% multiplied
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`against $15.36, $7.68, and $3.84). Such calculations have been accepted by other courts. See Cioffi
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`v. Google, 2017 WL 4011143, at *5-9 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that although the jury did not
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`expressly provide a royalty rate, the implied royalty rate may be calculated based on the total
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`damages award and the user base). As illustrated by Cioffi, Google is wrong to suggest that simple
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`rounding renders the calculations a “fallacy.” See id. (accepting the implied rate to be 76.12% of
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`the total damages award Plaintiff suggested to the jury, and not 76.115413%).
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`II.
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`TOUCSHTREAM’S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL AND ONGOING
`ROYALTIES ARE REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE.
`A.
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`Touchstream’s request for supplemental damages was not “untimely.”
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`Touchstream’s motion for supplemental damages is not untimely, as Google contends. See
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`Opp. at 10-11. At all stages of this litigation, Touchstream has been explicit about its right to seek
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`supplemental damages: including in the parties’ pre-trial order (Dkt. No. 231 at 7 (“Touchstream
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`is entitled to supplemental damages for all infringement that is not addressed at trial, including,
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`for example, damages for infringement that occurred (i) after the temporal cutoff for data presented
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`at trial”), and by filing its motion to amend the judgment within this Court’s and Fed. R. of Civ.
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`P. 59(e)’s 28-day window. See Jiaxing Super Lighting Elec. Appliance Co., Ltd. v. CH Lighting
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`Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 20-CV-18, 2023 WL 2415281, at *20-21 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2023) (Albright,
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`J) (finding Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion and request for pre-verdict supplemental damages was
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`timely). Google has an obligation under Rule 26(e) to supplement its Chromecast device activation
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`numbers. It has never disputed that obligation but, now three months after Touchstream’s request
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 8 of 15
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`for supplementation, Google has still not produced the requested information that it has allegedly
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`“diligently sought to collect” (Opp. at 11 n.1).
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`B.
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`Touchstream’s 50% enhancement to the implied royalty is appropriate.
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`Touchstream is entitled to an enhanced royalty post-verdict. Google fails to rebut that
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`Touchstream is now in a stronger bargaining position post-verdict in view of the jury’s verdict
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`finding all claims infringed and not invalid. A jury’s verdict finding patent claims not invalid and
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`infringed “amounts to a substantial shift in the bargaining position of the parties.” XY, LLC v.
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`Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Accordingly, district
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`courts often award ongoing royalty rates that are greater than the royalty rate awarded by the jury
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`for past infringement.1In addition, the three PTAB Final Written Decisions—collectively rejecting
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`all of the invalidity arguments in Google’s various IPR petitions—has also improved
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`Touchstream’s bargaining position. See Exs. 2, 3, 4. Courts have relied on rejection of IPR
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`arguments as a basis for awarding a higher ongoing royalty rate. See, e.g., Packet Intelligence LLC
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`v. NetScout Sys., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00230 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2018), Doc. #303 at 7-8 (increasing
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`a royalty, in part, on IPR success), Doc. #396 at 24 (same on remand).
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`Next, Google’s comments that Touchstream is attempting to “double-dip” on trial
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`testimony rings hallow. Opp. at 15. In its Opposition, Google provides only two citations to the
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`trial record for support of its argument that Touchstream already presented its post-verdict
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`evidence to the jury. See Opp. at 11-13. Neither of these two citations includes the information
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`1 See Arctic Cat, 2017 WL 7732873, at *2-4 (doubling rate based on change in bargaining
`position), aff’d 876 F.3d 1350, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017); XY LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, No. 1:13-
`cv-00876 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2019), Doc. #646 at 11 (emphasizing that the verdict itself strengthens
`the patentee’s bargaining position); ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F.
`Supp. 2d 641, 657-58 (E.D. Va. Nov. 2011) (more than doubling the jury-awarded royalty rate),
`aff’d in relevant part, 694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch
`Networks Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00033, 2018 WL 11357619, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2018).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 9 of 15
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`Touchstream cites in its Motion. Instead, Google relies on citations to Mr. Chandler’s reports,
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`which are not part of the trial record. See id. Although the jury heard some testimony about
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`Google’s cast ecosystem, the evidence presented in Mr. Chandler’s post-verdict analysis is new,
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`unrebutted evidence of Google’s
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`, that was not presented to or
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`considered by the jury. Mot. at 12-13; Chandler Decl., ¶¶ 11-13. Google’s Opposition does not
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`dispute this new evidence, nor its effect on increasing Touchstream’s bargaining position.
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`Google also argues that willfulness is not relevant because there was no finding of
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`willfulness at trial. Opp. at 14. Google misses the point. It is Google’s post-verdict continued sales
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`of Chromecast-enabled devices that are willful. See Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. BMW N. Am.,
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`783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (“Following a jury verdict and entry of judgment of
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`infringement and no invalidity, a defendant’s continued infringement will be willful absent very
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`unusual circumstances.”). Google does not dispute that it is continuing to sell Chromecast-enabled
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`devices, despite the Court entering judgment that Google infringes.
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`Here, Touchstream’s proposed 50% increase to the jury’s royalty rate is reasonable, based
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`on Touchstream’s better bargaining position with a jury verdict, Google’s willful post-verdict
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`infringement, and the change in economic circumstances favoring Touchstream.
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`C.
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`Google’s downward adjustment is meritless.
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`Google’s downward adjustment to any ongoing royalties, which does not include any post-
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`verdict Georgia-Pacific analysis, is riddled with errors. See XY, 890 F.3d at 1298 (reversing district
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`court for lowering the jury-awarded royalty rate without justification). First, Google’s argument
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`for downward adjustment given the potential for reversal on appeal is speculative, and this
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`argument has been consistently rejected by courts. See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo &
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`Co., Case No. 2:06-cv-72-DF-CE, Dkt. No. 2496, at 14 (E.D.Tex. Aug. 2, 2011) (“[T]he Court
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 10 of 15
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`finds no reason to discount the royalty rate based on the possible outcome of an appeal.”). Second,
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`Mr. Martinez’s time value of money argument is flawed, (Martinez Decl., ¶ 26), because in reality,
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`if Google delays in paying the amount that the jury awarded in July 2023, then Touchstream can
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`be compensated with post-judgment interest in order to avoid receiving an award of lower value.
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`III. GOOGLE HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF UNDUE DELAY OR
`PREJUDICE, AND PREJUDMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE GRANTED.
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`Google has failed to meet its burden to show that Touchstream’s delay was “undue” or that
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`it suffered prejudice. “[A]bsent prejudice to the defendants, any delay by [the patentee] does not
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`support the denial of prejudgment interest.” Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d
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`267, 275 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Federal Circuit has advised that withholding of prejudgment interest
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`based on delay is also the exception, “not the rule,” and that “the discretion of the district court is
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`not unlimited” in this respect. Id. at 275.2
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`Google’s representation that this case “closely resemble[s]” Crystal Semiconductor Corp.
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`v. TriTech Nicroelectronics Int’l, Inc., (Opp. at 17) is misplaced, and omits the reasoning for the
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`court’s holding. 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Crystal, the Federal Circuit denied the request
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`for prejudgment interest because Plaintiff’s two-year delay was a “litigation tactic” that was “self-
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`serving”: the plaintiff had two years earlier sent letters to dozens of other companies informing
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`them of its patent rights but excluded the defendants. Id. at 1362. Here, Google has failed to
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`provide any evidence that Touchstream’s alleged delay in bringing suit was a “litigation tactic”,
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`and nor could it. The record is clear that Touchstream’s lawsuit was a last resort, and it did not
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`2 Google’s argument that Touchstream should not be awarded prejudgment interest because of its
`small size and because it has received an “extraordinary high award” are not relevant to the
`question of prejudgment interest, fails to show Google was prejudiced, and would provide Google
`with a windfall. Opp. at 16. In fact, Google’s massive size and wealth supports an award of
`prejudgment interest. See Dkt. No. 278, Google Mot. to Waive Bond Requirement, at 1 ( “Google
`maintains a ‘financial ability to facilely respond to a money judgment.’”).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 11 of 15
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`undertake any litigation until it was put out of business by those who infringed its patents. Tr.
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`304:12-322:9 (Mitschelle on losing business to Vizbee, and subsequently going out of business).3
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`As a startup, bringing an action against a company such as Google is no small task.
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`Touchstream was focused on its own business and growing as a company, not litigation. After
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`presenting its technology to Google on multiple occasions, Touchstream as a start-up went out and
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`attempted to build up its business. This included, going out and raising funds (Tr. 185:19-186:3),
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`pitching its business (id. at 186:4-25), presenting its patented technology at trade shows around
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`the United States and world (id. at 256:12-21, 262:5-20), negotiating and working with various
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`companies to license its patents (Quadriga, Mash, Fetch-It), working in conjunction with
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`companies like HP (id. at 262:21-263:10), and trying to compete with other businesses (id. at
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`304:24-306:1). Touchstream was focused on growing its business, not litigation.
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`Further, Crystal Semiconductor does not stand for the rule that a two-year delay is an undue
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`delay. The Federal Circuit rejected such an interpretation. Kaufman v. Microsoft Corp., 34 F.4th
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`1360, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (holding that “the fact that Mr. Kaufman did not sue for five years
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`after he became aware of Microsoft’s potential infringement does not alone justify a finding of
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`undue delay.”); see also Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 2022 WL 103894,
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`*2–3 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (“Mere delay, absent prejudice, however, is insufficient to deny a prevailing
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`patentee prejudgment interest.”). The Federal Circuit, instead, has advised that “absent
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`prejudice…any delay…does not support the denial of prejudgment interest.” Lumus Indus., 862
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`F.2d at 275. Google has not provided any evidence showing that Touchstream’s delay in bringing
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`3 Further, Google’s argument that Touchstream did not sue it until four years after it had sued
`Vizbee seeks to punish Touchstream for not having the resources, after it went out of business, to
`pursue multiple litigations at the same time. See e.g., Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Systems Corp.,
`972 F.2d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing laches, and noting that “[d]elay may be excused
`by a host of factors, including involvement in other litigation.”).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 12 of 15
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`suit was undue or that Touchstream was “lying in wait.” See Opp. at 17.
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`Even if the Court finds there was delay in Touchstream bringing suit, Google has failed to
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`show that it was prejudiced from such delay. Google does not offer any evidence to support its
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`claim that damages are higher due to delay (see Opp. at 17), and further does not contend that it
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`would have mitigated its damages but for the delay. In fact, the opposite is true. Google has greatly
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`benefited from its decade-long infringement of Touchstream’s patents. See Tr. 603:2-15 (
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`); id. at 597:16–598:3 (
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`); id. at 652:24–653:6 (
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`). Google has also had the use of the money it should have paid as a royalty, since July
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`2015. Allowing Google to retain that benefit without paying for it gives Google a windfall,
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`regardless of any delay in filing suit. Given a fair rate of interest, it should make no difference
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`when the claim is legally liquidated—adjusting for that is the very purpose of interest.
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`. Opp. at 18 (“Google could have pursued non-infringing alternatives
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`in the interim.”); Halliwell Decl., ¶¶ 5-7 (same). This argument has been rejected by the Federal
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`Circuit in Kaufman v. Microsoft, when the court reversed the district court’s denial of prejudgment
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`interest on the basis that Microsoft “could have” implemented a non-infringing alternative, but not
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`that it “would have” if Plaintiff did not wait five years to bring suit. 34 F.4th at 1375.
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` and for the same reasons as Kaufman it should be
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`rejected.
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`g. Google has failed to meet its burden of showing it suffered any prejudice.
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`Prejudgment interest is necessary to fully compensate Touchstream for the infringement.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 13 of 15
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`A.
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`Awarding prejudgment interest at the start of the damages period and at the
`prime rate is appropriate and warranted.
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`Google’s arguments that prejudgment interest should be constrained to post-complaint and
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`at the lower T-Bill rate do not comport with the purpose of prejudgment interest. “The purpose of
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`prejudgment interest is to place the patentee in as good a position as he would have been had the
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`infringer paid a reasonable royalty rather than infringe.” SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769
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`F.3d 1073, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Prejudgment interest compensates “the forgone use of [the value
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`of the royalty payments] between the time of infringement and the date of the judgment.” Gen.
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`Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656 (1983). Google provides no support as to why
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`prejudgment interest should be limited to the period after the filing of the complaint. Opp. at 18.
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`Touchstream’s prejudgment interest period is already limited to the start of the damages period,
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`and not the date of first infringement (July 2013), and further limiting it would provide Google a
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`windfall. Mot. at 16. Moreover, “it is not necessary that a patentee demonstrate that it borrowed at
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`the prime rate in order to be entitled to prejudgment interest in that rate.” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-
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`Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “The prime rate . . . is a conservative, middle-
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`of-the road approach that takes into account normal market fluctuations.” NTP Inc. v. Research in
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`Mot., Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (E.D. Va. 2003), amended, No. 01 Civ. 767, 2003 WL
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`22746080 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003). On the other hand, the “Treasury bill rate is too low to
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`accomplish this,” as “Treasury bills are purchased for a price less than their face value.” Id. An
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`award of prejudgment interest, from the beginning of the damages period and at the prime rate,
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`conforms with the purpose of prejudgment interest—it restores Touchstream to the position it
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`would have been in had it received a royalty from Google.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`Touchstream requests that this Court grant its Motion and award all relief sought.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 14 of 15
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
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` /s/ Ryan D. Dykal
`One of Its Attorneys
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`Ryan D. Dykal (Pro Hac Vice)
`B. Trent Webb (Pro Hac Vice)
`Jordan T. Bergsten (Pro Hac Vice)
`Lauren E. Douville (Pro Hac Vice)
`Philip A. Eckert (Pro Hac Vice)
`Robert McClendon (Pro Hac Vice)
`SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
`2555 Grand Boulevard
`Kansas City, MO 64108
`(816) 474-6550
`Fax: (816) 421-5547
`rdykal@shb.com | bwebb@shb.com |
`jbergsten@shb.com
`
`
`Date: November 15, 2023
`
`
`By: Michael W. Gray (TX Bar No. 24094385)
`Andrew M. Long (TX Bar No. 24123079)
`Sharon A. Israel (TX Bar. No. 00789394)
`Robert H. Reckers (TX Bar No. 24039520)
`Kyle E. Friesen (TX Bar No. 24061954)
`SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
`600 Travis Street, Suite 3400
`Houston, TX 77002
`(713) 227-2008
`Fax: (713) 227-9508
`mgray@shb.com
`amlong@shb.com
`sisrael@shb.com
`rreckers@shb.com
`kfriesen@shb.com
`
`Gary M. Miller (Pro Hac Vice)
`Justin R. Donoho (Pro Hac Vice)
`Samuel G. Bernstein (Pro Hac Vice)
`SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
`111 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 4700
`Chicago, IL 60606
`(312) 704-7700
`Fax: (312) 558-1195
`gmiller@shb.com | jdonoho@shb.com |
`sbernstein@shb.com
`Counsel for Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies, Inc.
`
`
`
`11
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 291 Filed 11/21/23 Page 15 of 15
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic service are
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`being served with a copy of this document via electronic mail on November 15, 2023. I also certify
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`that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic service are being served with a notice
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`of filing of this document, under seal, pursuant to L.R. CV-5(a)(7) on November 15, 2023.
`
` /s/ Ryan D. Dykal
`Attorney for Plaintiff
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`