throbber
Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 1 of 33
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Civil Case No. 6:21-cv-569-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
` §









`
`GOOGLE’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 2 of 33
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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` Google’s proposed constructions adhere to the fundamental rule that “a word describing
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`patented technology takes its definition from the context in which it was used by the inventor.”
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`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`(citation omitted). Plaintiff Touchstream generally denies that any claim construction is necessary,
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`but repeatedly offers “alternative constructions” or explanations of “plain meaning” that are in
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`reality broad re-definitions of claim terms untethered to the Asserted Patents. Plaintiff’s approach
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`(and its resulting constructions) are wrong as a matter of law. Google’s proposed constructions
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`should be adopted.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
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`The Asserted Patents1, all titled “Play control of content on a display device,” claim a
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`“system for presenting and controlling content on a display device.” See ’528 Patent at Abstract.
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`Claim 1 of the ’528 patent is generally representative:
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`1. A method of controlling presentation of content on a content presentation device
`that loads anyone of a plurality of different media players, the method
`comprising:
`receiving, in a server system, one or more messages from a personal computing
`device that is separate from the server system and separate from the content
`presentation device, wherein the one or more messages, taken together, include
`information associated with a synchronization code assigned to the content
`presentation device, specify a file to be acted upon, identify a particular media
`player for playing content from the file, identify a location of the particular
`media player, and include an action control command for presentation of the
`content on the content presentation device by the particular media player, the
`action control command being independent of the particular media player;
`using the information associated with the synchronization code to store a record
`establishing an association between the personal computing device and the
`content presentation device;
`
`
`1 The Asserted Patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,356,251 (“’251 patent”), 8,782,528 (“’528 patent”),
`and 8,904,289 (“’289 patent”). They all substantively share the same specification because they
`claim priority to the same provisional application. Specification cites in this brief are to the ’251
`Patent (unless otherwise noted) as the first-issued patent.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 3 of 33
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`identifying, by the server system, programming code corresponding to the action
`control command, wherein
`the programming code
`is for controlling
`presentation of the content by the content presentation device using the
`particular media player;
`obtaining, by the content presentation device, the particular media player, wherein
`the particular media player is obtained over a network from a content provider;
`loading the particular media player in the content presentation device; and
`using the particular media player to execute the programming code with respect to
`the file.
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`The claimed method, illustrated below as a system in Figure 1 of the patents, includes three
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`main components: (1) a personal computing device; (2) a
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`server system; and (3) a display device (’251 patent) or
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`“content presentation device” (’528 and ’251 patents). As
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`the patents explain, “[t]he mobile phone 20 [i.e., the personal
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`computing device] . . . transmits a message to the server
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`system 24 (block 110). The message from the mobile phone
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`20 contains a transmission code that includes data regarding
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`. . . the secondary display it wants to connect to (e.g.,
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`television set 22 with display 23), the location and name of
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`the media player for the selected video, the command (e.g., play, pause, rewind, etc.), and the video
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`file to be acted upon.” See id. at 4:27-35. In response, among other things, the “server system …
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`provide[s] to the display device a second message identifying the user-selected content and the
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`media player to play the content.” Id. at Abstract.
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`The disclosed server system is central to facilitating and managing the communication
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`between the personal computing device and display or content presentation device. According to
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`the specification, “the server system stores a look-up table that includes a synchronization code
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`uniquely associated with the display device. A message from the personal computing device can
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`include the synchronization code, and in response to receiving the message from personal
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`2
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 4 of 33
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`computing device, the server system can use the synchronization code and the look-up table to
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`identify the display device on which the content is to be played.” Id. at 2:16-26. The server also
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`includes “a universal adapter 26” “to interpret and convert a standard or universal command (e.g.,
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`play, pause, etc.) into the specific command recognized by the media player.” Id. at 5:53-6:6. In
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`doing so, “[e]ach time a signal is received from the mobile device 20,” the adapter at the server
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`“checks and identifies the specific media player that is being requested” then “converts the
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`incoming commands from the mobile device 20 into the correct JavaScript (or other programming)
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`code used by the target device 22 to control the specific player (block 120).” See id.
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`III. ARGUMENT2
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`A.
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`Term 1: “media player” (’251 Patent, claim 1; ’528 Patent, claim 1, 27, 28; and
`’289 Patent, claims 1, 6)
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`a computer application operable to present
`content and control presentation of the content
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`
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`The term “media player” appears in all claims. The role of the “media player” is clear
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`from the claims and there is no special definition or disavowal of claim scope in the intrinsic
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`record. “Media player” should therefore be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`
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`Touchstream here departs from its mantra of “no construction necessary” to offer a
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`definition of “media player” to include any “computer application operable to present content and
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`control presentation of the content.” That proposed construction should be rejected because
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`adopting it would render superfluous other claim language. Specifically, the claims of the ’289
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`patent include the following: “wherein the media player is a computer application operable to
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`2 Terms 1-9 are presented in that order in this brief pursuant to the Court’s current Standing
`Order Governing Proceedings - Patent Cases (Dkt. 24).
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`3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 5 of 33
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`present content and control presentation of the content.” See, e.g., ’289 patent, claim 1 (11:33-
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`35). This is identical to Touchstream’s proposed construction of “media player” and would be
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`rendered redundant if that construction were adopted. “[I]nterpretations that render some portion
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`of the claim language superfluous are disfavored.” Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG,
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`378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Touchstream’s approach is not only disfavored in general,
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`it is unnecessary and unsupported. “Media player” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`B.
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`Term 2: “an association between the personal computing device and the
`[display device / content presentation device]” (’251 Patent, claim 1; ’528
`Patent, claim 1, 27, 28; and ’289 Patent, claims 1, 6)
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction
`One-to-one mapping between the personal
`computing device and the [display device /
`content presentation device]
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`plain and ordinary meaning - no
`construction needed
`
`
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`Google proposes to construe “an association between the personal computing device and
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`the [display device / content presentation device]” to avoid jury confusion and to adhere to the
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`definition of “association” compelled by the claims and the intrinsic evidence. Google’s proposed
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`construction would help the jury understand the very specific “association” claimed and disclosed
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`in the Asserted Patents.
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`
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`The intrinsic evidence establishes that the claimed “association” between the personal
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`computing device and the display device3 is not any relationship but is a direct, one-to-one between
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`specific devices. Each of the asserted independent claims of the Asserted Patents establish that
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`the association between the devices is a one-to-one connection, or in other words, a direct
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`connection between two items. The claims recite that the server stores “a record establishing an
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`association between [a] the personal computing device and [b] [the display device / content
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`3 “Display device” is used interchangeably with “content presentation device” in the Asserted
`Patents.
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`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 6 of 33
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`presentation device].” ’251 patent, claim 1 (11:32-34); see also, e.g., ’528 patent, claim 1 (11:33-
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`36); ’289 patent, claim 1 (11:41-44), claim 6 (12:20-23). The claimed “record” thus associates
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`two specific things: the personal computing device and the display device.
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`
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`Moreover, the term “associate” is used elsewhere in the claims to refer to a one-to-one
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`mapping between the two associated items. In particular, the claims recite “wherein the
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`synchronization code is uniquely associated with the display device,” ’251 patent, claim 8 (12:19-
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`20) (emphasis added), and “wherein the synchronization code is different from an IP address
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`associated with the display device and is different from a MAC address associated with the display
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`device,” see, e.g., id. at claim 9 (12:22-25) (emphasis added). The claims make clear that the
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`synchronization code “associated” with the display device is unique to the display device.
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`
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`Further, the specification of the Asserted Patents confirms that the claimed association
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`between the personal computing device and the display device is limited to a “one-to-one
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`mapping” between the devices. The specification explains how the record associating the personal
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`computing device and display device is stored: “The switchboard 28 also includes a look-up table
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`34 that stores a correspondence between a particular personal computing device (such as mobile
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`phone 20) and target devices (e.g., the television set 22) to which the user command is directed.”
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`’251 patent, 4:55-59. An example of the look-up table that stores the record of the association is
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`illustrated in Figure 4. See id. at 2:47-48 (“FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a look-up table that
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`forms part of a server system.”). Figure 4 shows that each record directly maps each display device
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`to one smartphone (i.e., the personal computing device).
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`5
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`
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`Nor does Google’s proposed construction import a limitation of one embodiment into the claims.
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`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016) (“The only meaning that matters in claim construction is the meaning in the context of
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`the patent.”). But the specification makes clear that this limitation is not imported but is an integral
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`part of the alleged invention, so integral that it is “assumed”: “In this example [in Figure 4], it is
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`assumed that, at most, a single connection is established at any given time between a particular
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`mobile phone and a display device.”4 Id. at 4:60-62.
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`
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`Finally, in explaining how the server creates the record of the association between the
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`personal computing device and display device, the specification establishes that the association is
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`a direct connection based on a synchronization code that is unique to the display device:
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`The server system 24 performs a target verification (block 118), which includes
`checking whether a connection to a particular display device already is established
`for the mobile phone 20 and, if so, checking the identification of the display device.
`During the target verification, if the look-up table indicates that there is no
`connection established between the mobile phone 20 and a particular display
`device, then the server system 24 sends a message to the mobile phone 20 to prompt
`the user to identify the device on which the video is to be displayed. . . . . [T]he
`user can select the display device by entering a synchronization code uniquely
`associated with the particular display device. . . . Once the synchronization code is
`entered into, or captured by, the mobile phone 20, it is sent from the mobile phone
`20 to the server system 24, which stores the information in the look-up table 36 so
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`4 The specification also states that “other scenarios are also possible to establish group connections
`(e.g., multiple mobile phones connected to the same display device),” ’251 patent, 4:63-65, but
`that embodiment is not found in the claims. The claims, including the recited “record” as discussed
`above, recite a single display device and single personal computing device.
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`6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 8 of 33
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`as to establish a connection between the mobile phone 20 and the display device 22
`through the server system 24.
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`Id. at 4:65-5:41. Through this use of the look-up table, the record that uniquely associates one
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`display device with one personal computing device thus allows the server to identify and find the
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`correct display device on which to play content.
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`
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`The intrinsic evidence thus makes clear that the claimed association between the personal
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`computing device and display device should be a one-to-one mapping (i.e., a joining or connection
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`of two things). Touchstream’s plain and ordinary meaning construction would not help the jury
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`understand the meaning of this term in the context of the Asserted Patents and should therefore be
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`rejected. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1363 (“The only meaning that matters in
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`claim construction is the meaning in the context of the patent.”).
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`C.
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`Term 3: “video file” / “video content” (’251 Patent, claims 1, 6, 7)
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`Google’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
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`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`plain and ordinary meaning - no construction needed
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`Claim 1 of the ’251 Patent (in addition to claims 6 and 7) is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §
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`112, ¶ 2 and Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014) because the claim
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`interchangeably recites “video file” and “video content,” but does not recite how the terms are
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`connected or used together by the claimed method. In particular, while the claimed “machine-
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`implemented method” recites that the signals from the personal computing device to the server
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`system “specify[] a video file to be acted upon” which is then stored in a database for later
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`“transmission to or retrieval by the display device,” the claim does not again expressly recite what
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`the video file is subsequently used for or how it is “acted upon.” In contrast, as originally identified
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`in the preamble, the method “control[s] presentation of video content” as the focus of the remainder
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`of the claim. For example, the signals transmitted from the personal computing device to the server
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`system further “identify[] a particular media player for playing the video content” and include “a
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`7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 9 of 33
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`universal playback control command for controlling playing of the video content.” Like the video
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`file, the particular media player and “programming code” (the result of a conversion by the server)
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`are also stored in the aforementioned database for “transmission to or retrieval by the display
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`device.” The claim language is included below and annotated for illustration purposes:
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`1. A machine-implemented method of controlling presentation of video content on
`a display device that loads any one of a plurality of different media player
`players, the method comprising:
` …
`receiving, … signals specifying a video file to be acted upon and identifying a
`particular media player for playing the video content, the one or more signals
`further including a universal playback control command for controlling playing
`of the video content on the display device by the particular media player
` …
`storing, … wherein the information specifies the video file to be acted upon,
`identifies the particular media player for playing the video content, and includes
`the corresponding programming code to control playing of the video content on
`the display device by the particular media player in accordance with the
`universal playback control command.
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`Notably, the claim does not recite that the video content is also stored in the database for
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`later “transmission to or retrieval by the display device.” In fact, the claim does not explain nor
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`describe how the video content itself is identified or specified, only that it is intended to be
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`displayed on the display device by the media player (and also controlled). Similarly, while the
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`specification references both files and content, it likewise does not explain how the file and content
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`are related. This is in contrast to claim 1 of the ’289 patent which recites that the particular media
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`player plays content from the “specified video file”: “wherein the one or more messages . . . (ii)
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`specify a file to be acted upon, (iii) identify a particular media player for playing content from the
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`specified file . . . .” See ’289 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added). Indeed, while claim 1 of the ’289
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`patent recites this express connection between the content and file, neither claim 1 of the ’251
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`patent, nor the specification do so.
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`8
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 10 of 33
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`Despite this clear deficiency in the claim, Touchstream has not sought to construe these
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`terms, instead claiming that there is “no construction needed” and the phrases should be given their
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`“plain and ordinary meaning.” However, even if Touchstream sought to construe either “video
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`file” or “video content,” or any surrounding claim language, it should not be allowed to propose a
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`construction merely to retain the validity of the claim. Indeed, any other interpretation to retain
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`validity would require the Court to rewrite the claims, which would be improper. See Allen Eng’g
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`Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is not [the Court’s] function
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`to rewrite claims to preserve their validity.”); K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364
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`(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the terms chosen by the
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`patentee.”). Thus, this claim is invalid as indefinite.
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`D.
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`Term 4: “converting the command from the personal computing device into
`corresponding code to control the media player” (’251 Patent, claim 2)
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`plain and ordinary meaning - no construction needed
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`Like Term 3, Claim 2 of the ’251 Patent (or Term 4) is also indefinite under Nautilus
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`because it depends upon claim 1 but essentially repeats claim language from that claim. See 572
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`U.S. at 901; 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. In particular, claim 1 recites a method comprising, among other
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`things, “converting, by the server system, the universal playback control command into
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`corresponding programming code to control playing of the video content on the display device by
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`the particular media player.” Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites that the “method of claim
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`1” further includes:
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`checking, in the server system, the identity of the media player identified in the one
`or more signals from the personal computing device;
`loading an appropriate set of protocols or application programming interfaces from
`a library based on the identity of the media player; . . .
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`Claim 2 further recites that the method includes:
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`9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 11 of 33
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`converting the command from the personal computing device into corresponding code to
`control the media player
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`The “checking” and “loading” steps recite new steps not present in claim 1. In contrast,
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`the final “converting” step of claim 2 mimics the prior “converting” step of claim 1, but fails to
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`inform a skilled artisan whether this is a second conversion step beyond claim 1’s conversion step,
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`or whether it somehow replaces claim 1’s conversion step. Indeed, the latter interpretation would
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`require the Court to improperly revise the claim, because claim 2 expressly recites that the method
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`includes the “checking,” “loading,” and “converting” steps. The claim does not expressly attempt
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`to refine the original “converting” step or any other step. Claim 2 is therefore inherently flawed
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`and “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
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`invention.” See Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901.
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`Moreover, claim 2 also includes terms that lack antecedent basis. For example, the terms
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`“the command” and “corresponding code” from the “converting” step of claim 2, do not find
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`antecedent basis in either claim 1 or claim 2 (reproduced above). Compare claim 2 with claim 1
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`(reciting “a universal playback control command” and “a programming code”).
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`Accordingly, given that claim 2 is fundamentally flawed for several reasons as discussed
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`above, this claim should be rendered invalid as indefinite. Touchstream has not even sought to
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`construe this claim despite being indefinite on its face, instead claiming that there is “no
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`construction needed” and should be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” However, even if
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`Touchstream sought to construe the “converting” term in claim 2, it could not be construed to
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`retain validity. Any interpretation to retain validity would require the Court to rewrite the claims
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`for Touchstream, an improper result. See Allen Eng’g, 299 F.3d at 1349; K-2 Corp., 191 F.3d at
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`1364 (“Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the terms chosen by the patentee.”).
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`10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 12 of 33
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`E.
`
`Term 5: “universal command” (’251 Patent, claim 5)
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
`plain and ordinary meaning - no construction needed
`Alternatively, plain and ordinary meaning, which is “a
`standard command used for controlling playback of
`media content such as play or pause”
`
`In the ’251 patent, claim 5, “universal command” is also indefinite because it “fail[s] to
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`inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”
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`Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901; 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. In particular, claim 1, from which claim 5 depends,
`
`never uses the term “universal command”; instead, it uses different terms: “universal playback
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`control command,” and “a plurality of specific commands, each of which represents a
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`corresponding playback control command.” We know these are different terms with different
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`meanings because Touchstream proffered a construction for “universal command,” but not so for
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`either “universal playback control command” (’251 patent, claim 1) or “action control command”
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`(’528 patent, claims 1, 27, and 28; ’289 patent, claims 1 and 6). Therefore, “universal command”
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`recited in claim 5 lacks antecedent basis to claim 1, and it is not expressly defined anywhere in the
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`Asserted Patents. For these reasons, the patentee failed to inform with reasonable certainty
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`whether the “universal command” is related to the “plurality of specific commands,” much less
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`what that relationship is. Therefore, the term “universal command” is undefined and unexplained
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`and should be found to be indefinite.
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`Touchstream’s proffered construction for “universal command” is improper for several
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`reasons. First, a plain and ordinary meaning is improper given that “the universal command” of
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`claim 5 lacks antecedent basis to independent claim 1, from which it depends, as discussed above.
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`Second, Touchstream’s proposed alternative construction “a standard command used for
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`controlling playback of media content such as play or pause” is similarly inappropriate because
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`substituting the claim term with this construction would inappropriately render other claim
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`11
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 13 of 33
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`language—specifically “stop playing the video content or to pause playing the video content”—
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`in claim 5 redundant. Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1399
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting construction that would render a limitation “superfluous”); Aristocrat
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`Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (same).
`
`For these reasons, this claim term is also invalid as indefinite.
`
`F.
`
`Term 6: “unique identification code assigned to the content presentation
`device” (’289 Patent, claims 1 and 6) and “synchronization code assigned to
`the content presentation device” (’528 Patent, claims 1, 27)
`
`Google’s Proposed Construction
`[unique identification / synchronization] code
`assigned by the server system to the content
`presentation device
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`plain and ordinary meaning - no construction
`needed. Alternatively, plain and ordinary
`meaning, which is “[unique identification
`code] / [synchronization code] associated
`with a content presentation device.”
`
`These two terms play the same role in the claims of the ’289 and ’528 patents and should
`
`be similarly construed. The purpose of the claimed invention as embodied in the claim language
`
`and the consistent characterization of the term (and the purported invention) in the specification
`
`support Google’s construction that a “unique identification code” or “synchronization code” is
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`assigned by the server system to the content presentation device. The key point, and one avoided
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`in Touchstream’s proposal, is that the codes are assigned by the claimed server system.
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`First, as explained in the Asserted Patents, the assignment of the “synchronization code”
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`(’528 patent) or the “unique identification code” (’289 patent) to the content presentation device
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`is performed by the server. In particular, each of claims of the Asserted Patents, including for the
`
`’289 and ’528 patents, recite a “method of controlling presentation of content on a content
`
`presentation device.” The claims further define that the server system is utilized to facilitate the
`
`communication and management between the user’s personal computing device and the
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`aforementioned content presentation device. For example, claim 1 recites that the server system
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`12
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 14 of 33
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`“receiv[es], … from a personal computing device, … information associated with a
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`synchronization code assigned to the content presentation device.” The “information … [is used]
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`to store a record establishing an association between the personal computing device and the content
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`presentation device,” as further recited in the claim. Moreover, the server system is further utilized
`
`for “identifying . . . programming code corresponding to the action control command” sent from
`
`the personal computing device. Because the server system uses the “information associated with
`
`the synchronization code” as received from the personal computing device to “establish[] an
`
`association between the personal computing device and the content presentation device” and to
`
`facilitate communication for control of the content presentation device, it is axiomatic that the
`
`server system was aware that the synchronization or identification code was specific to the content
`
`presentation device. Given this recited functionality and the importance of the server to the
`
`claimed method, it is clear that the server system is the entity that assigned the code to the content
`
`presentation device at the outset.
`
`Second, this notion is confirmed in the specification of the Asserted Patents. In particular,
`
`consistent with the claim language as discussed above, the server system that facilitates
`
`communication to the content presentation device includes a look-up table integral to connecting
`
`to and relaying pertinent information to the device. For example, the specification discloses that
`
`“the server system stores a look-up table that includes a synchronization code uniquely associated
`
`with the display device” (’251 patent, 2:16-18), and “the server system can use the synchronization
`
`code and the look-up table to identify the display device on which the content is to be played” (id.
`
`at 2:18-23). Furthermore, “FIG. 7B [reproduced below] illustrates an example of a
`
`synchronization code look-up table” that shows the synchronization code “435-05-342” assigned
`
`to the device illustrated in FIG. 7A. Id. at 2:49-50. The specification further confirms that “in
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 15 of 33
`
`some implementations, the synchronization code is … assigned to the display device 22 each time
`
`it connects to the server system 24.” Id. at 5:22-25; see also 5:25-35 (“Thus, a particular display
`
`device 22 may have an IP address, a MAC address, a web or browser cookie, and a synchronization
`
`code (‘sync code’) assigned to it at any given time.”).
`
`
`
`While the specification describes this functionality regarding the synchronization code as
`
`exemplary, this description is consistent with the repeated and consistent characteristic of the
`
`manner in which the server system is portrayed in the purported invention in the patents. The
`
`Federal Circuit “recognize[s] that when a patent ‘repeatedly and consistently’ characterizes a claim
`
`term in a particular way, it is proper to construe the claim term in accordance with that
`
`characterization.” GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, from
`
`start to finish, the Asserted Patents uniformly teach that it is the server system that manages
`
`communication between the devices, including by assigning the synchronization code (or unique
`
`identification code) to the content presentation device. Consistently, the server is tasked with such
`
`similar responsibilities including: receiving messages from the personal computing device (’251
`
`patent, 4:40-42), authenticating users and storing messages from the user (id. at 4:42-50),
`
`establishing the connection between the devices (id. at 5:36-41), and interpreting and converting
`
`standard commands to specific commands recognized by the media player (id. at 5:58-62), among
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 25 Filed 12/16/21 Page 16 of 33
`
`others. Accordingly, Google’s construction gets to the heart of the invention and is supported by
`
`the consistent characterization of the functionality throughout the specification.
`
`Touchstream’s alternative proposal of “[unique identification / synchronization] code
`
`assigned to the content presentation device” being construed as “[unique identification code] /
`
`[synchronization code] associated with a content presentation device” is improper for two reasons.
`
`First, it inappropriately attempts to broaden the meaning of the claimed “assigned to” by simply
`
`exchanging the term with “associated with,” and second, it ignores that the server system performs
`
`the assignment. That latter point is amply explained above. The attempted substitution of
`
`“associated with” for “assigned by” should also be rejected. The term “associated with” is broader
`
`than “assigned to” because, for example, “assigned to” requires a form of affirmation (e.g., a
`
`component needs to affirma

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