Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 1 of 15
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`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`Civil Case No. 6:21-cv-569-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES INC.’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF
`GOOGLE’S INVALIDITY CONTENTIONS AND EXPERT REPORT
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 2 of 15
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`B.
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... ii
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. iv
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS ................................................................................................................. v
`I.
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 1
`A.
`Relevant Procedural History .................................................................................. 1
`B.
`The Twonky System .............................................................................................. 2
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`Google’s Sotera Stipulation Does Not Estop Google From Asserting The
`Twonky System At Trial ........................................................................................ 4
`The Boxee and Zelfy Peel Systems Are Admissible At Trial As Examples
`Of The Background State Of The Art And Are Admissible For Other
`Invalidity And Damages Purposes ......................................................................... 7
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 8
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`II.
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`III.
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`-i-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 3 of 15
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`CASES
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc)..................................................................................8
`
`Avanos Med. Sales, LLC v. Medtronic Sofamore Danek USA, Inc.,
`2021 WL 8693677 (W.D. Tenn. 2021) ......................................................................................6
`
`Chermours Co. FC, LLC v. Daikin Indus. Ltd.,
`2022 WL 2643517 (D. Del. 2022) .........................................................................................4, 5
`
`Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp.,
`2016 WL 4734389 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ...........................................................................................3
`
`Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp., LLC,
`879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................8
`
`Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon USA L.P.,
`705 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................................7
`
`Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum LLC,
`2020 WL 12572917 (E.D. Tex. 2020) .......................................................................................6
`
`In re Koninklijke Philips Patent Litig.,
`2020 WL 7392868 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .........................................................................................4
`
`Intell. Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp.,
`2016 WL 7634422 (E.D. Tex. 2016) .........................................................................................4
`
`IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.,
`2022 WL 2800861 (D. Del. 2022) .....................................................................................4, 5, 6
`
`Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC,
`948 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................8
`
`Medline Indus., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
`2020 WL 5512132 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ...........................................................................................5
`
`Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`24 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................1
`
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`-ii-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 4 of 15
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page
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`SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K.,
`330 F. Supp. 3d 574 (D. Mass 2018) .........................................................................................5
`
`Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.,
`936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..................................................................................................5
`
`Sonrai Memory Ltd. v. W. Digital Techs., Inc.,
`2022 WL 3108818 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ........................................................................................4
`
`Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
`IPR2020-01054, 2020 WL 7049825 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020) ..................................................1
`
`SPEX Techs. Inc. v. Kingston Tech. Corp.,
`2020 WL 4342254 (C.D. Cal. 2020)..........................................................................................6
`
`Tate v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc.,
`2010 WL 11598051 (W.D. Tex. 2010) ......................................................................................3
`
`STATUTES
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 ....................................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 5
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`Fed. R. Evid. 703 .............................................................................................................................7
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`-iii-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 5 of 15
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Abbreviation
`Touchstream
`Google
`Asserted Patents
`IPR
`FWD
`
`Definition
`Touchstream Technologies, Inc.
`Google LLC
`U.S. Patent Nos. 8,356,251; 8,782,528; and 8,904,289
`inter partes review
`final written decision
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` All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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` *
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`-iv-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 6 of 15
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
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`Exhibit
`1
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`2
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`3
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`4
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`5
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`6
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`7
`8
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`9
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`10
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`Description
`Excerpts of Google’s Petition for Inter Partes Review (IPR), Paper No. 1, April
`8, 2022, Case No. IPR2022-00795, U.S. Pat. No. 8,356,251
`Excerpts of Google’s Petition for Inter Partes Review (IPR), Paper No. 1, April
`8, 2022, Case No. IPR2022-00793, U.S. Pat. No. 8,782,528
`Excerpts of Google’s Petition for Inter Partes Review (IPR), Paper No. 1, April
`8, 2022, Case No. IPR2022-00794, U.S. Pat. No. 8,904,289
`Excerpts of Decision Granting Institution of IPR, Paper No. 10, September 30,
`2022, Case No. IPR2022-00795, U.S. Pat. No. 8,356,251
`Excerpts of Decision Granting Institution of IPR, Paper No. 10, October 7,
`2022, Case No. IPR2022-00793, U.S. Pat. No. 8,782,528
`Excerpts of Decision Granting Institution of IPR, Paper No. 10, October 7,
`2022, Case No. IPR2022-00794, U.S. Pat. No. 8,904,289
`Excerpts of Defendant’s Final Invalidity Contentions, served April 14, 2022
`Excerpts of Opening Expert Report of Dr. Ketan Mayer-Patel Regarding
`Invalidity of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,356,251, 8,782,528 and 8,904,289, served
`November 11, 2022 (filed under seal)
`Notice of Subpoena, served to J.M. Driver LLC (d/b/a Lynx Technology),
`April 14, 2022
`Email From Counsel for Google to Counsel for Touchstream Re: Narrowing
`Prior-Art Theories (Jan. 11, 2023)
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`-v-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 7 of 15
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`Touchstream seeks to improperly estop Google from advancing its prior-art system
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`invalidity theories that fall well outside the scope of the stipulation Google entered in the parallel
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`IPRs. Google’s stipulation is limited to the boundaries of the IPR estoppel statute, 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(e): grounds that Google “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPRs. Prior-
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`art systems cannot be raised in an IPR. Indeed, “[t]he language of [35 U.S.C.] § 311(b) limits ‘the
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`basis’ of any ‘ground’ in an inter partes review to ‘prior art consistent of patents and printed
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`publications.’” Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc., 24 F.4th 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Court
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`should reject Touchstream’s attempt to expand the stipulated estoppel past its defined limits.
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`I.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`Relevant Procedural History
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`On April 8, 2022, Google petitioned for IPR against each of Touchstream’s Asserted
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`Patents. Exs. 1-3. Prior to institution, Google entered into a stipulation to eliminate any potential
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`overlap between the IPRs and this pending district-court litigation. Dkt. 136-4; see also Dkt.
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`136-3. Per that stipulation, entered in accordance with the Board’s precedential decision in Sotera
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`Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01054, 2020 WL 7049825, at *6-7 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1,
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`2020), Google agreed that, if the Board instituted the IPRs, Google would not pursue any invalidity
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`ground in this litigation that Google “raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPRs.
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`Dkt. 136-4. The stipulation, in effect, prevents Google from raising any grounds that it would be
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`statutorily estopped from pursuing under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) had the Board issued a FWD.
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`After review of Google’s three IPR petitions, and in light of the Sotera stipulation, the
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`Board instituted IPR against each of the Asserted Patents, concluding Google established a
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`reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims of each of the Asserted Patents was
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`unpatentable. Exs. 4-6. The IPRs are ongoing.
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`Google’s invalidity theories here are separate and distinct from the grounds it petitioned
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 8 of 15
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`for in the IPRs. Google’s district-court theories focus on prior-art systems that could not have been
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`raised in the IPRs, even though they also include some patents or printed publications (including
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`two that were offered as the basis for IPR) for obviousness combinations or as additional evidence
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`of operation of one of the prior-art systems. See Ex. 7 at 7-11. Touchstream moves to exclude
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`three such prior-art systems—Twonky, Boxee, and Zelfy Peel—claiming incorrectly that Google
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`could have raised the prior-art systems in the IPRs because they “are just collections of documents
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`that Google could have used . . . in its IPR petitions.” Dkt. 136 at 1.1 After narrowing its invalidity
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`theories, see Dkt. 125, Google will assert only one of these prior-art systems for its invalidity
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`theories—Twonky. See Ex. 10. Google intends to reference the Boxee and Zelfy Peel prior-art
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`systems at trial to illustrate the background state of the art of the Asserted Patents.
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`B.
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`The Twonky System
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`The Twonky System is a software suite comprising several interworking software packages
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`developed by the company PacketVideo. Ex. 8 ¶ 111. PacketVideo designed the Twonky System
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`to allow customers to access and control media across a network on various devices, including
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`laptops, smartphones, and display devices. See id. ¶¶ 111-33. The Twonky System was available
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`at least by March 31, 2009, well before Touchstream sought the Asserted Patents. See id. ¶ 111.
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`To develop its invalidity theories concerning the Twonky System, Google sought out
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`documentation reflecting its functionality and videos demonstrating its use. While some
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`documentation, including patents and printed publications, was public, to fully understand the
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`Twonky System’s functionality, Google sought confidential, internal documentation from
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`PacketVideo. To do so, Google subpoenaed J.M. Driver LLC, the corporate successor to
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`PacketVideo, and requested documents directly from former PacketVideo employees. See Dkt.
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`1 Touchstream does not move to exclude the GTS prior-art system. See Dkt. 136.
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`-2-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 9 of 15
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`136-11 ¶ 2; Ex. 9. Ultimately, Google received documents, including non-public, confidential
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`PacketVideo documents that explained critical functionality of the Twonky System, from former
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`PacketVideo employee Rick Schwartz, who was a Senior Product Manager of the Twonky System.
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`Dkt. 136-11 ¶ 2. Google produced these documents to Touchstream on October 13, 2022, prior to
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`the close of fact discovery. These non-public documents play a central role in establishing that
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`the Twonky System, in combination with other prior art, invalidates the Asserted Patents. Google
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`also collected videos demonstrating its functionality. See Ex. 8 ¶ 111 (T-9); Dkt. 136-6.
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`Google’s expert, Dr. Mayer-Patel, reviewed this material to opine as to why the Twonky
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`System in combination with other prior-art references invalidates Touchstream’s Asserted Patents.
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`Ex. 8 ¶¶ 2, 111. In his opening report, Dr. Mayer-Patel analyzed the non-public PacketVideo
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`internal documents, including several marked confidential, and videos demonstrating the Twonky
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`System’s functionality to reach his invalidity opinion. Id. ¶¶ 111 (listing Twonky System materials
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`reviewed, including videos of product demonstrations and non-public and confidential
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`documents). After review, Dr. Mayer-Patel opined on the invalidity of the Asserted Patents based
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`on information available only in these non-public Twonky System documents. See, e.g., id.
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`¶¶ 473, 482-83, 485-91, 507, 512, 530, 555, 576, 795.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Touchstream bears the burden to prove that estoppel should be applied. E.g., Clearlamp,
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`LLC v. LKQ Corp., 2016 WL 4734389, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Tate v. Veolia Transp.
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`Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 11598051, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 2010). Touchstream fails to meet that burden
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`here. Given the Sotera stipulation, case law interpreting the scope of § 315(e) as it relates to prior-
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`art systems guides the Court’s analysis, as Touchstream acknowledges, see Dkt. 136 at 4.
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`-3-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 10 of 15
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`A.
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`Google’s Sotera Stipulation Does Not Estop Google From Asserting The
`Twonky System At Trial
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`Touchstream improperly attempts to expand Google’s Sotera stipulation beyond its scope.
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`Touchstream argues that “any invalidity contentions that purport to use the Twonky system in
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`combination with other prior art in the form of patents and printed publications should . . . be
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`excluded.” Dkt. 136 at 6. But as this Court has acknowledged in other circumstances, “[e]stoppel
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`under § 315(e) is broad but would not foreclose [the defendant] from challenging the asserted claim
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`using system prior art . . . —maybe even combined with prior art publications used in the IPRs.”
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`Sonrai Memory Ltd. v. W. Digital Techs., Inc., 2022 WL 3108818, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2022). As
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`other courts have explained, “any invalidity theory relying upon [a] product as a prior art reference
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`is not a ‘ground’ that reasonably could have been raised during [an] IPR.” Chermours Co. FC,
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`LLC v. Daikin Indus. Ltd., 2022 WL 2643517, at *1-2 (D. Del. 2022) (quoting Medline Indus., Inc.
`
`v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2020 WL 5512132, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2020)). Numerous other courts have reached
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`this same conclusion. See, e.g., IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., 2022 WL 2800861, at
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`*31 (D. Del. 2022) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (“In general, IPR estoppel does not apply
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`to device art, because ‘a petitioner cannot use an IPR to challenge the validity of a patent claim . . .
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`based on prior art products or systems.’”); In re Koninklijke Philips Patent Litig., 2020 WL
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`7392868, at *27 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“IPR estoppel does not apply to [a defendant’s] product prior
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`art grounds.”); Intell. Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp., 2016 WL 7634422, at *3 (E.D. Tex. 2016)
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`(“[R]egardless of any estoppel, defendants have considerable latitude in using prior art systems . . .
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`embodying the same patents or printed publications placed before the PTO in IPR proceedings.”).
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`These courts have reached this conclusion after interpreting § 315(e), explaining that,
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`“[a]lthough the Patent Act does not expressly define the term ‘ground,’ . . . courts have interpreted
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`this term in the IPR estoppel context to mean the ‘specific pieces of prior art’ that are ‘the basis or
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`-4-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 11 of 15
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`bases on which a petitioner challenges a claim.’” Chemours, 2022 WL 2643517, at *1 (quoting
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`Medline, 2020 WL 5512132, at *3). And this line of decisions emphasize that “Congress could
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`have dictated that estoppel applies to products covered by the paper art underlying the IPR where
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`the paper art discloses the same claim limitations as the product. But Congress did not do so.” Id.
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`at *2; Medline, 2020 WL 5512132, at *4 (same). Because prior art systems are outside of the
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`scope of § 315(e) estoppel—even if based on functionality outlined in other printed prior art—
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`estoppel does not prevent Google’s use of the Twonky System for invalidity purposes here.
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`There is also no basis to prevent Google from relying on documents describing a prior-art
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`system’s functionality rather than the product itself. Contra Dkt. 136 at 6. Courts “have allowed
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`the functions of prior art devices to be established through the use of documents and testimony.”
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`IOENGINE, 2022 WL 2800861, at *31. That is because “documentation is evidence of how the
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`product is configured, how it is made, and how it works,” and it is thus permissible for an expert
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`to have “relied on documentation describing the product” to understand it. SiOnyx, LLC v.
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`Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 330 F. Supp. 3d 574, 604 (D. Mass 2018). Indeed, the Federal Circuit
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`has explained that materials other than the physical prior-art system itself are suitable for
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`describing a prior-art system’s functionality. E.g., Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261,
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`1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (under § 102(b) “the offered product is in fact the claimed invention may be
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`established by any relevant evidence, such as memoranda, drawings, correspondence, and
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`testimony of witnesses”).
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`Even if the Court were to adopt Touchstream’s view of estoppel (it should not), courts
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`applying that view have explained that “reliance on some printed publications in an overall
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`collection of documents being used to describe a system invalidity theory should not lead to
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`estoppel of the overall system invalidity theory itself, nor piecemeal exclusion of the printed
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 12 of 15
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`publications underlying that system invalidity theory, absent a showing that the system invalidity
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`theory is a patent or printed publication theory in disguise.” SPEX Techs. Inc. v. Kingston Tech.
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`Corp., 2020 WL 4342254, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Touchstream fails to meet its burden to show
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`why estoppel should apply to Google’s invalidity theories and Dr. Mayer-Patel’s expert report
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`based on Twonky—which, as explained above, depend on non-public, confidential documents
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`from PacketVideo and thus could not have been reasonably relied upon in the IPRs. Under similar
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`circumstances, courts have refused to apply estoppel that would have prevented the use of asserted
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`prior-art systems for invalidity purposes. See, e.g., IOENGINE, 2022 WL 2800861, at *31
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`(declining to apply estoppel because “IOENGINE’s briefing address the general categories of
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`documents on which Ingenico seeks to rely, but it does not address Ingenico’s assertion that some
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`of those documents would not have been publicly available and could not reasonably have been
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`relied upon in an IPR proceeding”); SPEX, 2020 WL 4342254, at *15 (same). Indeed, even
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`Touchstream’s cited cases required a showing that the asserted prior-art systems relied exclusively
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`on public documentation for estoppel to apply. Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum LLC,
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`2020 WL 12572917, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (explaining that defendant’s prior-art system should
`
`be excluded if defendant “is using its system prior art as a Trojan horse for printed subject matter”);
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`Avanos Med. Sales, LLC v. Medtronic Sofamore Danek USA, Inc., 2021 WL 8693677, at *2 (W.D.
`
`Tenn. 2021) (granting estoppel because patentee showed information from confidential materials
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`were duplicative of publicly available documentation). Touchstream has made no such showing
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`here, nor could it.
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`Touchstream argues that the Declaration of Rick Schwartz should be excluded because
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`Google did not produce it until after the close of fact discovery and that, as a result, the non-public
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`Twonky documents are inadmissible. See Dkt. 136, at 5-6. Both arguments are meritless. Google
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`-6-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 13 of 15
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`produced the Twonky documents on October 13, 2022, prior to the close of fact discovery. See
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`Dkt. 92 at 1. There are thus no grounds to exclude the documents under Touchstream’s late-
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`disclosure theory. As to the Schwartz Declaration, Touchstream’s argument misunderstands the
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`purpose of the Declaration. Google does not intend to seek testimony from Schwartz at trial or to
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`admit his Declaration into evidence. The Schwartz Declaration simply provided Dr. Mayer-Patel
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`with context of the timely produced public and non-public Twonky documents received from
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`Schwartz, a former employee of PacketVideo. The referenced documents were produced during
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`discovery in this case and available to both parties. Dr. Mayer-Patel is entitled to rely on such
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`information to reach his expert opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 703. See Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon
`
`USA L.P., 705 F.3d 518, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2013) (“If the facts and data relied upon are the sort that
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`experts in that field would reasonably rely on, then those facts ‘need not be admissible for the
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`opinion to be admitted.’”). The parties are thus equally situated, and there is no prejudice to
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`Touchstream in Dr. Mayer-Patel’s review of the Schwartz Declaration.
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`B.
`
`The Boxee and Zelfy Peel Systems Are Admissible At Trial As Examples Of
`The Background State Of The Art And Are Admissible For Other Invalidity
`And Damages Purposes
`
`Touchstream argues that the Boxee and Zelfy Peel Systems should be excluded under
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`Google’s Sotera stipulation because they “are based entirely on patents and printed publications
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`that were publically [sic] available.” Dkt. 136 at 4. But Google is no longer relying on the Boxee
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`or Zelfy Peel Systems as prior art for an invalidity theory. See Ex. 10. Accordingly,
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`Touchstream’s motion as to Boxee and Zelfy Peel is moot. To the extent Touchstream’s challenge
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`expands to Google’s use of Boxee and Zelfy Peel for any prior-art purpose, Touchstream’s motion
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`should be denied because it is appropriate for Google to rely on prior art such as the Boxee and
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`Zelfy Peel Systems as evidence of the background state of the art. As the Federal Circuit has
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`explained, “[r]egardless of the tribunal, the inquiry into whether any ‘differences’ between the
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 14 of 15
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`invention and the prior would have rendered the invention obvious to a skilled artisan necessarily
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`depends on such artisan’s knowledge.” Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330,
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`1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Likewise, the Boxee and Zelfy Peel Systems are appropriate prior-art
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`evidence countering Touchstream’s purported evidence of secondary considerations of
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`nonobviousness, see, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`(en banc) (prior-art evidence relevant to the fact finder’s evaluation of secondary considerations
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`of nonobviousness), and as evidence of available non-infringing alternatives for damages
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`purposes, see, e.g., Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp., LLC, 879 F.3d 1332,
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`1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (error to limit use of prior art for damages purposes).
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Touchstream’s Motion to Exclude
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`Portions of Defendant’s Invalidity Contentions and Expert Report, Dkt. 136.
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`-8-
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`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 149 Filed 01/12/23 Page 15 of 15
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Tharan Gregory Lanier, with
`
`permission by Michael E. Jones
` Tharan Gregory Lanier
`
`JONES DAY
`Tharan Gregory Lanier (Admitted pro hac vice)
`CA State Bar No. 138784
`E-mail: tglanier@jonesday.com
`Michael C. Hendershot (Admitted pro hac vice)
`CA State Bar No. 211830
`E-mail: mhendershot@jonesday.com
`Evan M. McLean (Admitted pro hac vice)
`CA State Bar No. 280660
`E-mail: emclean@jonesday.com
`1755 Embarcadero Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94303
`Telephone: (650) 739-3939
`Facsimile:
`(650) 739-3900
`
`POTTER MINTON PC
`Michael E. Jones
`TX State Bar No. 10929400
`E-mail: mikejones@potterminton.com
`Shaun W. Hassett
`TX State Bar No. 24074372
`E-mail: shaunhassett@potterminton.com
`102 N. College Ave., Suite 900
`Tyler, TX 75702
`Telephone:
` (903) 597-8311
`Facsimile:
` (903) 593-0846
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`Dated: January 12, 2023
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