Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 1 of 50
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`
`
`
`Civil Case No. 6:21-cv-569-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 2 of 50
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`
`Page
`
`TOUCHSTREAM CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE INFRINGEMENT
`BECAUSE THE ACCUSED PRODUCTS DO NOT HAVE A SERVER SYSTEM THAT IS
`SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE DISPLAY/CONTENT PRESENTATION DEVICE.
`
`
`The Law Is Well Established That Where A Claim Lists Elements Separately, Those
`
`The Asserted Patents Claim a “Server System” and a Separate and Distinct “Display
`
`Touchstream Accuses The Same Instrumentalities As Meeting The “Server System”
`
`The Plain Reading Of The Claims And Touchstream’s Infringement Allegations
`
`Alternatively, And Although The Claims Are Clear on Their Face, the Appropriate
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................................... 1
`I.
`II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................................ 5
`III.
`6
`A.
`Elements Are Separate And Distinct. ......................................................................................... 7
`B.
`Device” ....................................................................................................................................... 9
`C.
`And “Display/Content Presentation Device” Limitations ........................................................ 11
`D.
`Warrant Summary Judgment Of Non-Infringement ................................................................. 12
`E.
`Claim Construction of Server System Also Supports Non-Infringement ................................. 16
`1.
`The Claim Language Supports Google’s Construction .............................................. 16
`2.
`Distinctness ........................................................................................................................... 17
`3.
`Claims Indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112 and Nautilus ........................................................... 20
`4.
`Claims ................................................................................................................................... 23
`IV.
`KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, THAT IT WAS INFRINGING. ................................. 25
`A.
`Known That It Was Infringing. ................................................................................................. 27
`B.
`Not Establish That Google Knew Or Should Have Known It Was Infringing ......................... 30
`C.
`Know It Was Infringing. ........................................................................................................... 31
`
`The Specification Further Supports and Does Not Contradict the Presumption of
`
`If Permitted, Touchstream’s New Infringement Read Would Render the Asserted
`
`Touchstream’s Interpretation Renders the Asserted Claims Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. §
`112 Because the Specification Fails to Sufficiently Describe the Full Scope of the Asserted
`
`TOUCHSTREAM CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT ANY
`INFRINGEMENT WAS WILLFUL BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT GOOGLE
`
`The 2011/2012 Communications Do Not Establish That Google Knew Or Should Have
`
`Citations To And Discussions Of Asserted Patents In Google Patent Prosecution Do
`
`Post-Litigation Facts Demonstrate That Google Did Not Know And Had No Reason To
`
`
`
`
`
`-1-
`
`
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 3 of 50
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`TOUCHSTREAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT INJUNCTION BECAUSE
`IT IS A LICENSING ENTITY AND AN AWARD OF MONEY DAMAGES WOULD FULLY
`
`V. TOUCHSTREAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES OR ANY OTHER RELIEF FOR
`ALLEGED EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENT. ............................................................ 33
`VI.
`COMPENSATE IT FOR ANY HARM CAUSED BY ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT. ............. 36
`VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 38
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-2-
`
`
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 4 of 50
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`” Bel Power Solutions v. Monolithic Power Systems,
`6-21-CV-00655-ADA, ECF No. 63 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ..........................................................36
`
`Abbvie Deutschland v. Janssen Biotech,
`759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................23
`
`ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co.,
`501 F.3d 1307 ..........................................................................................................................32
`
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commun’s., Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................38
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Auto. Techs. v. BMW,
`501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................24
`
`BASF Plant Sci., LP v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation,
`28 F.4th 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................26
`
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................25
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................7
`
`Brumfield, Tr. for Ascent Tr. v. IB LLC,
`586 F. Supp. 3d 827 (N.D. Ill. 2022) .......................................................................................35
`
`Callwave Commc'ns LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`2014 WL 5363741 (D. Del. Jan. 28, 2014) ..............................................................................31
`
`Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd.,
`807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................35
`
`Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods.,
`44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................6
`
`3
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 5 of 50
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`
`
`eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
`547 U.S. 388 (2006) ...........................................................................................................37, 38
`
`EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`6:20-cv-00075-ADA, ECF No. 236 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ...............................................26, 27, 31
`
`Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .............................................................................................................25
`
`Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`No. 2:20-CV-00030-JRG, 2021 WL 150442 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2021) ...................................8
`
`ICU Med. v. Alaris Med. Sys.,
`558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................24
`
`Impossible Elecs. Techniques v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc.,
`669 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................6
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................21
`
`INVT SPE LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`46 F.4th 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................33
`
`Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`22 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ......................................................................................7, 12, 17
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad,
`481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................24
`
`LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping,
`424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................23, 24
`
`Luminati Networks Ltd. v. Code200, UAB,
`2021 WL 425101 (E.D. Tex. 2021) .................................................................................7, 8, 12
`
`M&C Innovations v. Igloo Prod. Corp.,
`2018 WL 4620713 (S.D. Texas July 31, 2018) .......................................................................37
`
`4
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 6 of 50
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`
`
`Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) ...................................................................................................................6
`
`Meyer Intell. Properties Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc.,
`690 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................33
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,
`550 U.S. 437 (2007) .................................................................................................................35
`
`MiTile, Ltd. v. Hasbro, Inc.,
`2013 WL 5876979 (E.D. Va. 2013) .....................................................................................8, 10
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) .................................................................................................20, 21, 22
`
`O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................16
`
`Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.
`2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) ............................................................25, 31, 33
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed Cir. 2013).....................................................................................33, 34, 35
`
`Secure Web Conference Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`2016 WL 626492 (Fed. Cir. 2016).............................................................................................8
`
`Tolan v. Cotton,
`572 U.S. 650 (2014) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Valinge Innovation AB v. Halstead New England Corp.,
`2018 WL 2411218 (D. Del. May 29, 2018) .............................................................................25
`
`WesternGeco LLC v. Ion,
`138 S.Ct. 2129 (2018). ECF No. 118 .................................................................................35, 36
`
`Wi-LAN Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corporation,
`992 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2021)..................................................................................................8
`
`5
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 7 of 50
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`
`
`Page
`
`
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. 112 ......................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. 271(a) ......................................................................................................................33, 35
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................25, 36
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ........................................................................................................................5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)(B) ...................................................................................................6, 25
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 8 of 50
`
`
`
`Abbreviation
`Touchstream
`Google
`Asserted Patents
`
`Asserted Claims
`
`POSA
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Definition
`Touchstream Technologies, Inc.
`Google LLC
`U.S. Patent Nos. 8,356,251 (the “ʼ251 Patent”), 8,782,528 (the
`“ʼ528 Patent”), and 8,904,289 (the “ʼ289 Patent”)
`Claims 1, 5, and 7-9 of the ʼ251 Patent, claims 1-5, 8, 11, 12, 14,
`and 28 of the ʼ528 Patent, and claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 of the ʼ289
`Patent
`Person Of Ordinary Skill In The Art
`
`
`
`7
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 9 of 50
`
`
`
`Exhibit
`Ex. 1
`Ex. 2
`Ex. 3
`Ex. 4
`Ex. 5
`
`Ex. 6
`
`Ex. 7
`Ex. 8
`Ex. 9
`Ex. 10
`Ex. 11
`Ex. 12
`Ex. 13
`Ex. 14
`Ex. 15
`Ex. 16
`Ex. 17
`Ex. 18
`Ex. 19
`Ex. 20
`Ex. 21
`Ex. 22
`Ex. 23
`Ex. 24
`Ex. 25
`Ex. 26
`Ex. 27
`Ex. 28
`Ex. 29
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`Opening Expert Report of Dr. Almeroth (“Almeroth Open. Rep.”)
`Deposition Transcript of Dr. Almeroth (“Almeroth Dep. Tr.”)
`Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Mayer-Patel (“Mayer-Patel Rebut. Rep.”)
`Rebuttal Expert Report of Dr. Almeroth (“Almeroth Rebut. Rep.”)
`J. Kurose and K. Ross, Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach
`Featuring the Internet", Addison-Wesley (6th Ed. 2013) available at
`https://eclass.teicrete.gr/modules/document/file.php/TP326/Θεωρία%20
`(Lectures)/Computer_Networking_A_Top-Down_Approach.pdf (“Computer
`Network Textbook”)
`CS176B: Network Computing Winter 2012 available at
`https://sites.cs.ucsb.edu/~almeroth/classes/W12.176B/ (“Almeroth UCSB Class
`Web Page”)
`October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`Touchstream’s Supplemental Responses to Google’s Interrogatory No. 11
`Exhibit 2 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`November 30, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Levai
`Exhibit 4 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`Exhibit 5 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`September 30, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Bakar
`October 6, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Kenghe
`Exhibit 1 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`September 9, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Lulla
`Exhibit 15 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`Exhibit 12 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`Exhibit 13 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`Exhibit 16 of October 6, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Weixel
`October 6, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Weixel
`October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Van Der Staay
`Opening Expert Report of Dr. Mayer-Patel (“Mayer-Patel Open. Rep.”)
`PTAB Notice of IPR Institution re ’251 Patent
`PTAB Notice of IPR Institution re ’289 Patent
`PTAB Notice of IPR Institution re ’528 Patent
`Damages Expert Report of Mark J. Chandler
`Exhibit 13 of October 21, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele
`April 1, 2022 Deposition of Mr. Mitschele (“Mistchele Dep. Vol 1”)
`
`
`8
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 10 of 50
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The three Asserted Patents in this case all relate generally to using a personal device to
`
`select content to watch on a different display (or content presentation) device1 and controlling the
`
`watching experience from the personal device. Touchstream asserts that Google directly infringes
`
`the Asserted Claims by selling “cast-enabled” devices, such as Google’s Chromecast, or by
`
`providing “Chromecast Built-In” software for third parties to incorporate into their products, such
`
`as televisions and speakers. Touchstream seeks damages for the alleged infringement, including
`
`damages based on practice of the Asserted Claims (all of which are method claims) outside the
`
`United States, a finding that Google is a willful infringer, and a permanent injunction.
`
`With fact and expert discovery concluded, the record is clear that there are no disputes of
`
`material fact and Google is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Touchstream’s claims
`
`of infringement and several of its subsidiary claims for relief, for the reasons summarized here and
`
`explained in detail below.
`
`A.
`
`Touchstream’s Infringement Theory Fails As A Matter Of Law And Renders
`The Asserted Claims Invalid Under § 112.
`
`Touchstream’s Asserted Patents are hardly foundational and do not cover every method of
`
`selecting content on a personal device and watching it on another screen while controlling the
`
`playback experience from the personal device. Rather, the Asserted Claims identify, among other
`
`elements, a “server system” and a “display device” that perform particular steps and communicate
`
`with each other in particular ways as set forth in the Asserted Claims. The Asserted Claims are
`
`clear on their face that the “server system” and “display/content presentation device” are separate
`
`and distinct instrumentalities. But in its infringement arguments directed to the Accused Products,
`
`
`1 “Display device” and “content presentation device” refer to the same claim element in
`the three Asserted Patents. For convenience, in this motion Google uses “display device.”
`
`1
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 11 of 50
`
`
`Touchstream ignores the requirement of the claims that the “server system” and “display device”
`
`are separate and distinct by accusing a single instrumentality of being both the “server system”
`
`and the “display device.”
`
`The parties’ disagreement here is not one of fact - there is no dispute as to the operation of
`
`Google’s products, nor is there any dispute that what Touchstream accuses of being the “display
`
`device” is the very same instrumentality that it accuses of being the “server system.” Nor should
`
`there be any dispute as to the plain meaning of the Asserted Claims on this point. Their language
`
`is clear, and Touchstream never sought a construction that the “server system” and “display
`
`device” were anything other than separate and distinct, as claimed. In fact, Touchstream’s original
`
`claim construction brief recognized this requirement of the claim language and identified separate
`
`instrumentalities as the “server system” and “display device” of the Asserted Claims. Only now,
`
`after fact discovery, does Touchstream try to change course through its expert and take this new
`
`position accusing the same instrumentality of being both the “server system” and “display device.”
`
`There are two problems with Touchstream’s new approach: it is contrary to the claims,
`
`and it renders them invalid. Starting with the (non) infringement issue, the plain meaning of the
`
`claim language is that the “server system” and “display device” are separate and distinct.
`
`Touchstream’s new infringement read is directly contrary to the claim language and should be
`
`rejected for that reason alone. Should Touchstream persist in this improper position, the Court
`
`will be required to engage in additional claim construction, specifically to construe “server system”
`
`and determine that “the ‘server system’ is separate and distinct from and does not include the
`
`‘display device’,” a conclusion compelled by both the claim language and the specification of the
`
`Asserted Patents, as explained below. But requiring the Court to construe the claims does not
`
`change the ultimate conclusion that the Accused Products do not infringe, because is undisputed
`
`2
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 12 of 50
`
`
`that Google’s Accused Products do not have a separate and distinct “server system” and “display
`
`device” that engage in the communications and perform the steps required by the Asserted Claims.
`
`The other problem is that Touchstream’s latest infringement read renders the asserted
`
`claims invalid. Touchstream’s expert characterizes his infringement analysis as a “box drawing
`
`exercise,” and draws the boxes for the “server system” and the “display device” around the very
`
`same device. But the specification of the Asserted Patents does not describe any scenario except
`
`where the “server system” and “display device” are different instrumentalities. If the claim
`
`language may be stretched such that Touchstream may accuse the same instrumentality of being
`
`both the “server system” and “display device” of the Asserted Claims, then one of skill in the art
`
`would not have any guidance as to where to “draw the boxes” in attempting to practice or
`
`understand whether she was infringing the Asserted Patents. That renders the claims invalid under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, as described in detail below.
`
`As relevant to this motion, there is no dispute as to how the Accused Products work or as
`
`to their various parts, nor should there be any dispute that the claims require the “server system”
`
`and “display device” be separate and distinct. Google is entitled to summary judgment of non-
`
`infringement as a matter of law on this basis, and also because Touchstream’s infringement read
`
`renders all the Asserted Claims invalid.
`
`B.
`
`Google Is Entitled To Summary Judgment Of No Willful Infringement
`
`The Court should grant summary judgment dismissing Touchstream’s claims for willful
`
`infringement because there is no evidence that Google knew or should have known that it was
`
`infringing the Asserted Patents. Touchstream filed this action eight years after the introduction of
`
`the first of the Accused Products and nine years after it engaged in a few communications with
`
`Google that serve as the primary basis of its accusation of willful infringement. But Touchstream
`
`never provided Google with the Asserted Patents (nor could it have, as they did not issue until well
`
`3
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 13 of 50
`
`
`after the parties’ communications). And, critically, Touchstream never provided any express
`
`notice of infringement or even any communication even suggesting that Google infringed the
`
`Asserted Patents or had done anything at all wrong in developing and releasing Chromecast and
`
`the Accused Products.
`
`Nor is there any evidence that Google was or should have been conscious of possible
`
`infringement. In fact, the undisputed facts are all to the contrary - Google had been working in
`
`this technical space for years, with products such as GoogleTV and YouTube Remote (which
`
`Touchstream thought was “identical” to its alleged innovations and was released before any
`
`Touchstream product). Google engineers conceived and started development of the Accused
`
`Products before any contacts with Touchstream. And, in contrast to what it thought about
`
`YouTube Remote, when Touchstream heard of Chromecast, it prepared public-facing documents
`
`explaining how Chromecast was “vastly different” from Touchstream’s alleged innovations.
`
`Touchstream bears the burden to prove willful infringement. Touchstream may raise
`
`alleged disputes about “knowledge of the patents,” but that misses the point—the undisputed facts
`
`compel the conclusion that Google did not know, and should not have known, that it was infringing
`
`the Asserted Patents. Touchstream’s claim for willful infringement therefore fails as a matter of
`
`law and summary judgment is appropriate.
`
`C.
`
`Touchstream Is Not Entitled To Damages Arising From Extraterritorial
`Activities Allegedly Practicing The Asserted Method Claims.
`
`The Court should also grant summary judgment that Touchstream is not entitled to any
`
`damages or relief flowing from alleged extra-territorial infringement, as explained in Section V.
`
`Touchstream asserts only method claims. To practice the Asserted Claims requires, among other
`
`things, the selection and control of content to watch by someone using a personal device. This law
`
`4
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 14 of 50
`
`
`is clear – method claims are infringed only where they are practiced, and damages and other relief
`
`are not available for those using Accused Products outside the U.S., as a matter of law.
`
`D.
`
`Touchstream Is Not Entitled To A Permanent Injunction Because It Is
`Undisputed That Any Award Of Damages Will Cure Any Harm And
`Adequately Compensate it For Any Infringement.
`
`It is undisputed that Touchstream is now and has for several years been solely a licensing
`
`entity. Touchstream has no products, does not serve any customers, and does not compete with
`
`Google or anyone else. Touchstream’s only business is to attempt to monetize patents. If
`
`Touchstream receives damages, it will have fulfilled its only business purpose. Touchstream thus
`
`cannot show that it is irreparably harmed by an award of damages in lieu of an injunction, nor can
`
`it meet any other requirement to obtain a permanent injunction. As shown in Section VI, based on
`
`these undisputed facts, Google is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Touchstream is not
`
`entitled to a permanent injunction, even were Touchstream to prevail at trial.
`
`
`
`
`
`*
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`*
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`*
`
`This case should not go to trial at all because based on the undisputed facts and the plain
`
`language of the Asserted Claims, Google is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of
`
`all Asserted Claims as a matter of law. But even should some infringement claims survive for
`
`trial, Touchstream’s claims for willful infringement, non-US damages and a permanent injunction
`
`should be dismissed. Google requests that its motion for summary judgment be granted, for all
`
`the reasons and based on the additional facts explained in detail below.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
`
`to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
`
`56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014). A material fact will have a reasonable
`
`likelihood to affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
`
`5
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 15 of 50
`
`
`(1986). An issue is not genuine if the trier of fact could not, after an examination of the record,
`
`rationally find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
`
`U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
`
`A court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences from such evidence in
`
`a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Impossible Elecs. Techniques v.
`
`Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982). Once the court determines
`
`that the movant has presented sufficient evidence that no genuine dispute of material fact exists,
`
`the burden of production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
`
`586. The non-moving party must demonstrate a genuinely disputed fact by citing admissible
`
`materials in the record or by showing that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the
`
`absence of a genuine dispute. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)(B). “Conclusory allegations
`
`unsupported by concrete and particular facts will not prevent an award of summary judgment.”
`
`Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995).
`
`Google presents in this motion several different and independent bases for at least partial
`
`summary judgment. Additional case law and legal standards specific to those individual
`
`arguments are presented in each section of Google’s motion.
`
`III. TOUCHSTREAM CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE INFRINGEMENT
`BECAUSE THE ACCUSED PRODUCTS DO NOT HAVE A SERVER SYSTEM
`THAT IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE DISPLAY/CONTENT
`PRESENTATION DEVICE.
`
`All Asserted Claims require performance of method steps that specify particular operations
`
`by a “server system.” That server system is clearly claimed as separate from the “display device.”
`
`But there is no material dispute that Google’s Accused Products operate very differently than
`
`Touchstream’s claimed inventions.
`
`
`
`. Touchstream’s infringement
`
`6
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 16 of 50
`
`
`allegations are fundamentally flawed because, in an effort to stretch the claims to cover Google’s
`
`Accused Products, Touchstream accused the same device (i.e., each Accused Product) as being
`
`both the claimed “server system” and the claimed “display device” of the Asserted Claims. This
`
`is directly contrary to the claim language. For this reason, Touchstream’s infringement allegations,
`
`among other reasons, fail as a matter of law as to all Asserted Claims, and Google is entitled to
`
`summary judgment of non-infringement.
`
`A.
`
`The Law Is Well Established That Where A Claim Lists Elements
`Separately, Those Elements Are Separate And Distinct.
`
`The Federal Circuit has long held that two elements recited separately in a claim are
`
`presumed to be separate and distinct. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616
`
`F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, as stated by the Federal Circuit, this separate
`
`recitation creates “a presumption that those components are distinct.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools
`
`Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Becton, 616 F.3d at 1254
`
`(“Where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication of the claim language’ is that
`
`those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of the patented invention.”)). Further, the presumption
`
`holds where (1) “[t]here is nothing in the asserted claims to suggest that the” two recited elements
`
`“can be the same structure.” (see id.), nor “any language in the written description that overcomes
`
`that presumption.” Kyocera, 22 F.4th at 1382-83 (“The ‘safety contact element’ and ‘exit end of
`
`the mechanism’ are distinct components. The asserted claims list those elements separately. . . .
`
`No party has identified claim language overcoming the presumption that the exit end of the
`
`mechanism and the safety contact element are distinct components. Nor is there any language in
`
`the written description that overcomes that presumption.”)
`
`Courts have consistently applied this guidance and determined that separately claimed
`
`elements are separate and distinct from each other. Luminati Networks Ltd. v. Code200, UAB, is
`
`7
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00569-ADA Document 140 Filed 01/05/23 Page 17 of 50
`
`
`instructive; the Court held that the claim language was “plainly [] directed to a ‘first server’ acting
`
`as an intermediary between the ‘client device’ and ‘second server.’” 2021 WL 425101, *7–8 (E.D.
`
`Tex. 2021). Accordingly, the claims were “plainly directed to a method treating the first web
`
`server, second server, and client device as three distinct components.” See id.; see also Wi-LAN
`
`Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corporation, 992 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (affirming
`
`construction of “a multimedia processor, coupled to the data rate analyzer” to mean “a multimedia
`
`processor connected to the data rate analyzer, where the multimedia processor is separate from,
`
`and not a sub-component of, the data rate analyzer”); Secure Web Conference Corp. v. Microsoft
`
`Corp., 2016 WL 626492, *2-6 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“security devices” properly construed to be
`
`physically separate from “microprocessor based devices” in view of the intrinsic evidence only
`
`describing the devices as being separate, while also finding that a “network communication
`
`device” to be physically separate from the “security device” in view of the plain language of the
`
`claim); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00030-JRG, 2021 WL
`
`150442, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2021) (“The two buffers are separately recited in the claims.
`
`Thus, the plain meaning based on the claim language reflects that the buffers are necessarily
`
`distinct structures.”); MiTile, Ltd. v. Hasbro, Inc., 2013 WL 5876979, *5-6 (E.D. Va. 2013)
`
`(granting summary judgment of no literal infringement where accused product used the same
`
`circuitry for a “communications unit” and a “proximity sensor,” and the court construed the
`
`asserted claim to require that these two components be separate and distinct because there was a
`
`presumption