Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 1 of 42
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`
`
`v.
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`IGT and IGT CANADA SOLUTIONS ULC,
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`
`
`
`
`ZYNGA INC.,
`
`
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`
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`
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`C.A. No. 6:21-CV-00331-ADA
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`Judge: Honorable Alan D. Albright
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`IGT’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 2 of 42
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
`
`II.
`
`The ’089 Patent Terms .........................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`“software authorization agent” ................................................................................4
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“gaming software” ...................................................................................................9
`
`“gaming machine” .................................................................................................11
`
`III.
`
`The ’473 Patent Terms .......................................................................................................14
`
`A.
`
`“website server” .....................................................................................................14
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“first gaming server” ..............................................................................................16
`
`“second gaming server” .........................................................................................18
`
`IV.
`
`The ’212 Patent Terms .......................................................................................................18
`
`A.
`
`“publishing” ...........................................................................................................18
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“high-level function” .............................................................................................23
`
`“node” ....................................................................................................................28
`
`V.
`
`The ’791 Patent Terms .......................................................................................................29
`
`A.
`
`“determine instances of probable collusion between players” ..............................29
`
`VI.
`
`The ’189 Patent Terms .......................................................................................................32
`
`A.
`
`“establishing” and “re-established” “communications link” .................................32
`
`IV.
`
`Conclusion .........................................................................................................................35
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`
`
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`
`i
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 3 of 42
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`3M Co. v. Kerr Corp.,
`No. CV 17-1730-LPS, 2019 WL 2411736 (D. Del. June 7, 2019) ..........................................23
`
`Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................27
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................7
`
`Baker Hughes Oilfield Ops., Inc. v. Prod. Tool Sol., Inc.,
`No. 1-17-CV-291-LY, 2020 WL 1916691 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2020) ....................1, 9, 12, 28
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................34
`
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Commscope Techs. LLC v. Rosenberger Site Sols., LLC,
`No. 20-1053-RGA, slip op. (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2021).................................................................23
`
`Cook Biotech Inc. v. Acell, Inc.,
`460 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................29
`
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`10 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................11, 16, 22
`
`eCeipt, LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC,
`No. 6:20-CV-747-ADA, 2021 WL 4037599 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2021) ................................30
`
`Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
`569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................6
`
`Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,
`847 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..............................................................................10, 13, 19
`
`FloodBreak, LLC v. Art Metal Indus., LLC,
`No. 3:18-cv-503 (SRU), 2020 WL 4548084 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2020) ...................................23
`
`Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc.,
`No. 207-CV-279, 2009 WL 3260566 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2009) ..............................................23
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 4 of 42
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`
`
`Innovative Display Techs. LLC v. Acer Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-522-JRG, 2014 WL 4230037 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014)..................................27
`
`Iscar Ltd. v. Sandvik AB,
`243 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)....................................................................................................5
`
`MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007)....................................................................................13, 20, 28
`
`Mission Pharmacal Co. v. Virtus Pharm., LLC,
`No. SA-13-CA-176-OG, 2014 WL 12480013 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) .......................19, 21
`
`Motiva Patents, LLC v. Sony Corp.,
`No. 9:18-CV-180-JRG-KFG, 2019 WL 3933670 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2019) ..........................6
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................24
`
`One-E-Way, Inc. v. ITC,
`859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................24
`
`Oxygenator Water Techs., Inc. v. Tennant Co.,
`No. 20-CV-358, 2021 WL 3661587 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2021) ................................................5
`
`Patriot Universal Holdings, LLC v. Formax, Inc.,
`No. 10-C-355, 2011 WL 2224688 (E.D. Wis. June 7, 2011) ..................................................30
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns v. Apple Inc.,
`952 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................18
`
`Polycom, Inc. v. Codian Ltd.,
`No. CIV.A. 2:05-CV-520DF, 2007 WL 5688763 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2007) .........................34
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. ON Semiconductor Corp.,
`396 F. Supp. 3d 851 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .......................................................................................6
`
`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................35
`
`Pulse Elecs., Inc. v. U.D. Elec. Corp.,
`860 F. App’x 735 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................4
`
`In re Sang Su Lee,
`277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................26
`
`iii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 5 of 42
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`
`
`Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,
`54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................7
`
`Tech. Innovations, LLC v. Nstein Techs., Inc.,
`No. 2:10-CV-341-FTM, 2015 WL 1910434 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2015) .................................30
`
`Tinnus Enterps., LLC v. Telebrands Corp.,
`733 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................26
`
`Traxxis, L.P. v. Hobbico, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-CV-00768-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 4347709 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2017) ......................35
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................35
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC,
`No. 2:18-CV-00492-JRG-RSP, 2020 WL 569858 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2020) ..........................35
`
`Vertical Tank, Inc. v. BakerCorp,
`No. 1:18-CV-00145-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 2207668 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2019) .........................6
`
`
`
`
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`iv
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 6 of 42
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The disputed claim terms are straightforward and need no construction. Zynga’s
`
`constructions attempt to re-write claim terms that have plain and ordinary meanings, presumably
`
`in an effort to narrow the claim scope to avoid infringement. Those efforts fail because such
`
`constructions (1) improperly import limitations from the specification, (2) adopt a definition
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`expressly rejected by the USPTO, (3) elevate extrinsic over intrinsic evidence, and/or (4) apply
`
`disclaimer in the absence of clear disavowal. Each term is readily understood by its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning, and the Court should reject Zynga’s proposed constructions. See, e.g., Baker
`
`Hughes Oilfield Ops., Inc. v. Prod. Tool Sol., Inc., No. 1-17-CV-291-LY, 2020 WL 1916691, at
`
`*6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2020). To the extent the Court construes the terms, however, it should
`
`apply their plain and ordinary meanings consistent with the intrinsic evidence.
`
`Zynga also incorrectly contends that one term (“high-level function”) is an indefinite term
`
`of degree. But this term of art is not a term of degree, and the intrinsic evidence readily informs
`
`those skilled in the art as to the term’s scope. The specification describes what the term means,
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`uses the term consistent with its use in the art, describes what the term is not, and even provides
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`multiple examples of the term. The term is not indefinite.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`International Game Technology PLC (“IGT PLC”) is a multinational leader and innovator
`
`in gaming entertainment including social games and is a leading supplier of casinos and lottery
`
`machines. Plaintiffs IGT and IGT Canada Solutions ULC (collectively “IGT”) are subsidiaries of
`
`IGT PLC. Dkt. 7 at 1–2. IGT is the owner of all six asserted patents, each of which discloses
`
`inventions relating to various aspects of remote gaming.
`
`Zynga makes and sells remote games, social casinos, and related services. Zynga infringes
`
`the asserted patents and seeks constructions for eleven claim terms from five of the six asserted
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`
`
`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 7 of 42
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`
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`patents (U.S. Patent No. 7,168,089 (“’089 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,303,473 (“’473 patent”);
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,266,212 (“’212 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,708,791 (“’791 patent”); and U.S.
`
`Patent No. 9,159,189 (“’189 patent”)). Dkt. 25, Zynga’s Op. Br. (“Br.”) at i. These patents are
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`summarized below:
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`The ’089 patent, entitled “Secured Virtual Network in a Gaming Environment,” is directed
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`to secure communication technology for transferring gaming software and gaming data between
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`two gaming devices, such as between a game server and a gaming machine. Br. at Ex. 2. The
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`patent provides various examples of gaming machines, such as a standalone gaming machine in a
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`casino, mobile device, personal digital assistant (PDA), or cell phone. Id. at 27:39–44, 13:18–21.
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`For regulatory and other purposes, a “software authorization agent” authorizes software and data
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`transfers. Id. at 6:15–25, 9:53–63. IGT asserts infringement of claims 28, 29, 31–33, 47–50, 84–
`
`86, 89–92, and 99–100 of the ’089 patent.
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`The ’473 patent, entitled “Network Gaming System,” is directed to a gaming system
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`including hardware, software, and related methods for enabling game play using a remote player
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`device, for example, over the Internet. Br. at Ex. 3. Independent claims 1, 9, 16, 22, 27, and 29
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`recite a controller of a website server (claims 1, 9, 16), a website controller (claim 22), or a website
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`computing apparatus (claims 27 and 29) that “determin[es] whether to select” between a first or a
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`second gaming server (claims 1, 9, 16), gaming computer (claims 22, 27), or gaming apparatus
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`(claim 29) based on a game selection received from a remote player device. Id. at 19:1–24:49.
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`Independent claim 33 recites transmitting game display data and outcome data for a game, which
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`may be played via a remote player device, from a gaming apparatus to a website computing
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`apparatus, and receiving wager data from the website computer apparatus. Id. at 25:16–26:5. IGT
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`asserts infringement of claims 1–4, 6–12, 14–18, 20–24, and 26–37 of the ’473 patent.
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`2
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 8 of 42
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`The ’212 patent, entitled “Game Talk Service Bus,” is directed to a communication bus
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`that allows gaming machines, servers, and other devices on the bus to communicate with each
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`other. Br. at Ex. 4. The bus allows for publishing (i.e., “providing” or “exposing”) functions that
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`subscribing devices may use. Id. at 23:56–58, 16:52–54. The framework allows participating “end
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`points,” i.e., nodes, to publish functions in a “standardized high level fashion,” enabling them to
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`understand one-another and “talk” together, even if there are “thousands of devices manufactured
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`by dozens of vendors.” Id. at Abstract. The functions may use a “vendor independent protocol,”
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`for example, that does not depend on “low-level” details of the subscriber devices. Id. at 3:21–22,
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`14:32–34. IGT asserts infringement of claims 24, 27–29, 31, and 34–36 of the ’212 patent.
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`The ’791 patent, entitled “Detecting and Preventing Bots and Cheating in Online
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`Gaming,” is directed to technology for detecting probable collusion between players (including
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`“bots”) in an online wagering game, such as online poker. Br. at Ex. 5. The invention of the ’791
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`patent detects collusion by gathering individual game play data at the individual’s “host device”
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`and then analyzing and comparing that data at a game server to determine “times of deviation”
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`from “players’ typical gaming styles.” Id. at 17:2–19. The ’791 patent describes the unique
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`challenges posed by online gaming, including the use of automated “bots” as players, the ability
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`of a single individual to use multiple devices to access a game, and combinations thereof. Id. at
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`1:34–42. The invention is aimed at detecting collusion in all of these environments and scenarios.
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`IGT asserts infringement of claims 1, 4–5, 7–8, and 13 of the ’791 patent.
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`The ’189 patent, entitled “Mobile Gaming Device Carrying out Uninterrupted Game
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`Despite Communications Link Disruption,” describes technology for addressing “communications
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`link failures” that can occur between individual mobile gaming devices, such as an individual’s
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`smartphone, and a stationary gaming terminal during an ongoing game. Br. at Ex. 6 at 23:23–59,
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`3
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 9 of 42
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`24:23–61. The invention of the ’189 patent “extend[s] the game animation” on a user’s device
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`during the communications failure and then, when communication has been reestablished,
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`transmits the final game outcome and ends the animation, such that—from the user’s perception—
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`the game was uninterrupted by the communications failure. Id. As disclosed in the ’189 patent,
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`the mobile gaming devices and the stationary gaming terminal can be connected in many different
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`ways, including via a packet-switched network like the Internet. Id. at Abstract, 14:20–36, 21:34–
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`58. IGT asserts infringement of claims 1, 4–8, 10, and 13–17 of the ’189 patent.
`
`II.
`
`THE ’089 PATENT TERMS
`
`A.
`
`“software authorization agent”
`
`IGT’s Construction
`No construction necessary
`(plain and ordinary
`meaning)
`
`Zynga’s Construction
`“a device that authorizes (that is approves or rejects) specific
`transfers of gaming software based on applicable rules, and
`monitors (that is tracks) these transfers”
`
`
`Zynga’s construction should be rejected because it has multiple problems. First, it imports
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`limitations from the specification, violating basic canons of claim construction. Second, Zynga’s
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`construction contradicts the intrinsic record because it mirrors the construction that the USPTO
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`(and Zynga) expressly rejected in a related interference between the parties. Third, the intrinsic
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`evidence demonstrates that a software authorization agent is simply a processor or device that
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`authorizes software transfers.
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`1.
`
`The Court should reject Zynga’s construction because it improperly
`imports limitations from the specification that are not in the claims.
`
`Zynga’s construction improperly imports multiple limitations into the claims, including the
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`requirement that the software authorization agent “monitors (that is tracks) these transfers.” But
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`it is well established that parties cannot, absent disclaimer or lexicography, “import limitations
`
`from the specification into the claims” through claim construction. Pulse Elecs., Inc. v. U.D. Elec.
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`4
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 10 of 42
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`
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`Corp., 860 F. App’x 735, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Here, nothing in the intrinsic
`
`evidence requires that a software authorization agent must monitor software transfers. The claims
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`refer to an “authorization” agent, not an “authorization and monitoring” agent. Further, the
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`specification confirms that “authorizing” and “monitoring” are separate functions, and that
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`“monitoring” is only optional. For instance, it states that an authorization agent allows software
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`to be transferred “in a manner that may be easily monitored and regulated.” ’089 patent at 25:1–
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`5 (emphasis added); see Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
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`2009) (“[T]he phrase ‘may be required,’ … provides further support for [the] argument that the
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`‘single login’ capacity is an optional feature …, not a limitation ….”).
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`The passages in the specification that Zynga cites are inapposite. Br. at 6. Zynga cites col.
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`24, lns. 32–43, which states that a software authorization agent may, “[i]n general,” be a server
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`that “stores a record of the gaming software transactions.” Id. But merely because something
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`“stores” a record does not mean it also “monitors” the record, let alone monitors software transfers.
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`Storing and monitoring are not synonymous. See also Oxygenator Water Techs., Inc. v. Tennant
`
`Co., No. 20-CV-358, 2021 WL 3661587, at *7 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2021) (“[The phrase] ‘[i]n
`
`general’ tends to negate the clarity of the patentee’s intent to define a claim term.”). The other
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`passages Zynga cites that actually refer to monitoring use permissive language. See Br. at 6 (citing
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`’089 Patent at Abstract, 4:37–40 (“the transfer of gaming software … may be … monitored by a
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`software authorization agent”), 24:50–56 (“gaming software … is typically highly regulated to
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`ensure fair play and prevent cheating,” and for this reason, “it is important … to know what gaming
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`software is installed on a gaming machine”) (emphases added)). But using the words “may” and
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`“typically” implies that monitoring is merely an optional feature of a software authorization agent,
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`not a requirement. See Iscar Ltd. v. Sandvik AB, 243 F.3d 558, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“‘Typically’
`
`5
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 11 of 42
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`
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`is an additional indication that the patent did not necessarily limit the … claims to [the described
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`feature].”); Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1377.
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`Finally, Zynga’s construction also incorrectly requires that the software authorization agent
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`authorize “specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules.” Neither the phrase
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`“specific transfers” nor the word “rules” appears anywhere in the claims or specification. Instead,
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`Zynga’s construction is a blatant and impermissible attempt to narrow claim scope presumably to
`
`attempt to create a non-infringement position.
`
`2.
`
`Zynga ignores that the USPTO already expressly rejected its
`proposed construction during the related interference proceeding.
`
`Zynga’s construction also fails because the USPTO previously rejected the same
`
`construction as “too narrow” during the parties’ interference proceeding. Ex. A at 8. That IGT
`
`had initially proposed the construction is irrelevant where the USPTO ultimately rejected it.1
`
`Indeed, numerous courts have precluded parties from relying on a patentee’s construction that the
`
`USPTO expressly rejected during prosecution, because such prosecution-proffered constructions
`
`no longer serve their “public notice” function. Power Integrations, Inc. v. ON Semiconductor
`
`Corp., 396 F. Supp. 3d 851, 864 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d
`
`1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Motiva Patents, LLC v. Sony Corp., No. 9:18-CV-180-JRG-KFG,
`
`2019 WL 3933670, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2019); Vertical Tank, Inc. v. BakerCorp, No. 1:18-
`
`CV-00145-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 2207668, at *11 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2019) (citing various other
`
`district courts). Thus, the construction that the USPTO specifically rejected during the interference
`
`cannot be reasonably relied upon by Zynga.
`
`
`1 To be clear, the USPTO was addressing the meaning of “authentication agent” in Zynga’s
`application, rather than “software authentication agent” in IGT’s patent. Ex. A at 8. However, in
`interferences, terms are construed based on the patentee’s (IGT’s), not the applicant’s,
`specification. Id. Hence, as the USPTO noted, Zynga’s claim language, including “authentication
`agent,” was interpreted “in light of the patentees’ [i.e.,’089 patent’s] written description.” Id. at 7.
`
`6
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 12 of 42
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`
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`Further, Zynga omits that, during the interference, it expressly argued against the
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`construction it now proffers. See, e.g., Ex. B at 4 (Zynga arguing that reciting “monitors (that is
`
`tracks) these transfers” in the definition of authorization agent improperly “reads limitations into
`
`the claims that are not recited”); id. (Zynga arguing that limiting “authorization agent” to “gaming
`
`software” transfers improperly excludes preferred embodiment where it transfers other gaming-
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`related information); id. at 4–5 (Zynga arguing that requiring “authorization agent” to authorize
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`“specific transfers of gaming software based on the applicable rules” is a “transparent and
`
`impermissible attempt to introduce limitations into the claims that simply are not there”). Zynga
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`should not be allowed to advance a construction that it succeeded in asking the USPTO to reject.
`
`Zynga’s cited cases (Br. at 7) are inapposite because, in each case—unlike here—the
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`USPTO never expressly rejected the patentee’s position. See, e.g., Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple,
`
`Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding disclaimer based on patentee’s statement
`
`during IPR that led to Board denying institution); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54
`
`F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Personalized Media Commc’ns v. Apple Inc., 952 F.3d 1336,
`
`1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The courts therefore held that, unlike here, the public could reasonably rely
`
`on the patentees’ characterizations.
`
`In addition, Zynga also proposed its own definition during the interference. Not only did
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`that definition omit any reference to “monitor[ing],” “specific transfers,” or “rules,” it was
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`substantially the same as the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex. C at 5 (Zynga arguing
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`that, in the ’089 patent, “software authorization agent” means “a computer or processor
`
`responsible for authorizing the transfer of gaming software in a game play system”) (emphasis
`
`added). And unlike IGT’s proposed definition in the interference, the USPTO did not reject
`
`Zynga’s definition. Thus, if any definition from the interference is relevant, it is Zynga’s definition
`
`7
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 13 of 42
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`
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`and not the one that the USPTO expressly rejected.
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`3.
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`The intrinsic evidence demonstrates that a software authorization
`agent is a processor or device that authorizes software transfers.
`
`
`
`The Court should therefore decline Zynga’s request to construe the term beyond its plain
`
`and ordinary meaning. The term “software authorization agent” means exactly what its words
`
`reflect: an agent that authorizes something related to software. As the context of the surrounding
`
`claim language makes clear, that “something” is the transfer of software. For example, the claims
`
`recite that the software authorization agent is used to “approve or reject the transfer of gaming
`
`software” from one device to another. ’089 Patent at cl. 1. The specification also describes the
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`agent as being “used to authorize gaming software transfer between two gaming devices.” Id. at
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`28:37–39; see also id. at Figs. 9–15 (depicting software authorization agent for authorizing
`
`software transfer); id. at 29:33–36 (“The software authorization agent … may use the …
`
`transaction information to approve or reject the transfer of the gaming software.”); id. at 28:47–
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`50.
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`Further, consistent with Zynga’s definition during the interference, an “agent” is not
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`necessarily a standalone device, but may be a component of a device, like a processor. The
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`specification states that it may be a conventional server, including a “CPU [that] executes software
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`to provide the functions of the authorization agent.” Id. at 24:32–38. But nothing in the claims or
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`the specification limits “software authorization agents” to standalone devices. Moreover, skilled
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`artisans would have understood that agents can be processors or other device components. See
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`Ex. D (defining term to include, “on computers, … utilities” for performing tasks); Ex. E (defining
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`“agent” to encompass a “program” running on a device). Thus, the term “software authorization
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`agent” encompasses a processor or device that authorizes the transfer of gaming software. The
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`Court should decline to construe the term beyond that plain and ordinary meaning.
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`8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 14 of 42
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`B.
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`“gaming software”
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`IGT’s Construction
`No construction necessary
`(plain and ordinary meaning)
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`The meaning of “gaming software” is “clear from the context in which the term is used”
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`Zynga’s Construction
`“instructions that are executed to run a game or a component
`of a game, as distinct from data”
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`and needs no construction. Baker Hughes, 2020 WL 1916691, at *6. Zynga’s construction seeks
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`to add three different limitations to the term. None of those limitations add clarity, but rather
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`impermissibly narrow the term’s scope and create potential confusion.
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`The ’089 patent broadly refers to “gaming software” as software for playing a game. For
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`example, the claims recite “gaming software” for “a game of chance,” “a device driver for a device
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`installed on a gaming machine,” “a player tracking service on a gaming machine,” and “an
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`operating system.” See, e.g., ’089 patent at cl. 1. The term “software,” as understood by persons of
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`ordinary skill in the art, broadly encompasses programs, instructions, data, and code, which may
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`be executed on a computer. E.g., Ex. F (“software” is “[a] generic term for those components of
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`a computer system that are intangible …”); Ex. G (“[c]omputer programs … and possibly
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`associated … data pertaining to the operation of a computer system”); Ex. H (“computer programs
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`and associated data”); Ex. I (“Programs … codes, … for use with digital computers”); Dr. Wills
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`Decl.2 ¶¶ 31–40.
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`Moreover, the ’089 patent does not limit what types of software qualify as gaming
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`software. It repeatedly uses permissive language to describe the term. ’089 patent at 8:38–44,
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`25:38–39 (stating that gaming software “may comprise one or more gaming software
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`components,” “may be used to upgrade a gaming software component,” “may be used to correct
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`2 These citations refer to the Declaration of Dr. Craig E. Wills in Support of Plaintiff’s Responsive
`Claim Construction Brief, filed contemporaneously herewith.
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`9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 15 of 42
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`an error in a gaming software component,” and “may be executed on a gaming machine to play a
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`gam[e]”). Thus, the patent uses “gaming software” consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning
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`to encompass programs, instructions, data, and code, which may be executed on a computer, for
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`playing a game.
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`Zynga’s construction, on the other hand, is incorrect for at least three reasons. First, it is
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`unclear what Zynga means by the word “instructions.” Although some extrinsic definitions of
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`software refer to instructions, others also refer to data or programs. E.g., Ex. J (“Software is a set
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`of instructions, data or programs used to operate computers and execute specific tasks.”)
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`(emphasis added); Ex. K (software includes, e.g., “instructions or programs”) (emphasis added).
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`Nor is there any support in the intrinsic evidence for limiting the claim term to “instructions.” The
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`patent nowhere disclaims the full scope of “gaming software” to narrowly mean “instructions,”
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`nor does the patent evidence any inventor-inspired lexicography to redefine this well-understood
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`term to mean something different than its ordinary meaning.
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`Second, excluding any type of “data,” as Zynga’s construction does by specifically stating
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`that the “instructions” are “distinct from data,” is improper. Again, there is no evidence of an
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`unmistakable disclaimer or lexicography that would support that broad negative limitation. See
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`Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We have
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`identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including ‘a negative limitation’
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`and held that such exclusions must find support either in the words of the claim’ or through an
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`‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description[.]”) (quotations
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`omitted); see also, e.g., Exs. G, H, J (all specifically defining “software” to include “data” for
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`operating computer).
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`Zynga incorrectly contends that the patentee distinguished “gaming software” from
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`10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00331-ADA Document 33 Filed 11/10/21 Page 16 of 42
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`“gaming data” or “gaming information” in the specification and interference. Br. at 8–9. Zynga
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`is wrong. The patentee merely distinguished certain types of data that potentially related to gaming,
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`such as gaming performance, metering, and credit card information, as unrelated to a computer’s
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`operation. ’089 patent, 18:1–10; 27:4–10; 27:31–36; 27:55–59; Dkt. 27-10 at 1; Dr. Wills Decl.
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`¶ 40. Merely because the patentee distinguished those non-gaming-software types of data,
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`however, does not mean it disavowed all types of data, let alone entirely changed the meaning of
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`“gaming software.” See Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 10 F.4th 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
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`2021) (disavowal must be “clear and unmistakable”).
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`Zynga’s contention that its construction is consistent with the parties’ proposed definitions
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`during the interference is also incorrect. Br. at 9. Neither of the parties’ definitions expressly
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`excluded “data.” Instead, both broadly defined “gaming software” to refer to software
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`“components” that may be executed, without limiting what those components might be. Ex. C at
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`4 (Zynga’s definition); Dkt. 27-10 at 4, 8 (IGT’s definition); Dr. Wills Decl. ¶ 40.
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`Finally, Zynga’s construction narrowly requires that the gaming software is “executed to
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`run” a game, which is also inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence. As Zynga acknowledged
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`during the interference, the term “g