Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 1 of 43
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`MEDIATEK INC., ET AL.,
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`NVIDIA CORPORATION,
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`NXP SEMICONDUCTORS NV, ET AL.,
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, ET
`AL.,
`
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`SILICON LABORATORIES INC.,
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`STMICROELECTRONICS INC.,
`Defendant.
`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`WESTERN DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01210-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01211-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01212-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01213-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01214-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01215-ADA
`
`
`
`NO. 6:20-cv-01216-ADA
`
`DEFENDANTS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 2 of 43
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`III.
`
`TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Technology Background and Asserted Patents ....................................................... 3
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ........................................................................... 5
`
`IV.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS ........................................................................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`’097 PATENT ......................................................................................................... 5
`
`1.
`
`The scope of “ultra-thin resist layer” in claims 1–3 and 10–17 of the ’097
`patent is not reasonably certain, rendering the term indefinite ...................... 5
`
`B.
`
`’651 PATENT ....................................................................................................... 11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Overview ........................................................................................................ 11
`
`Ocean’s proposed construction of “pneumatic cylinder” defies the intrinsic
`and extrinsic record (asserted claims 19–24, 75, 81) .................................... 13
`
`The term “said process chamber” lacks antecedent basis and cannot be
`corrected by the Court (asserted claims 31, 32, 34–37) ............................... 16
`
`C.
`
`’305 AND ’248 PATENTS ................................................................................... 19
`
`1.
`
`Intrinsic evidence limits the scope of the “software scheduling agent”
`claimed in the ’305 and ’248 patents ............................................................ 19
`
`D.
`
`’330 PATENT ....................................................................................................... 25
`
`1.
`
`Intrinsic evidence, including Ocean’s own statements to the PTAB, supports
`Defendants’ construction of “concurrently measuring” ............................... 25
`
`E.
`
`’538 PATENT ....................................................................................................... 30
`
`1.
`
`The limitations “[a] significant fault” (claim 5) and “determining in said
`computer whether said parameter is a significant factor” (claim 7) are
`indefinite terms of degree .............................................................................. 30
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 33
`
`-i-
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 3 of 43
`
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................8
`
`Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
`927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)..................................................................................................7
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F. 3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)...............................................................................................29
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................32
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)....................................................................................22, 23, 24
`
`Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC v. AT&T, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-CV-576-RWS-RSP, 2016 WL 7364266 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2016) ........................17
`
`Eagle Pharms. Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC,
`958 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................15
`
`Forest Labs., LLC v. Sigmapharm Labs., LLC,
`918 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................24
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................13
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................7, 8
`
`IBSA Institut Biochimique, S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`966 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................11
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co.,
`285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................15
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .........................................................................................................2, 7, 30
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 4 of 43
`
`
`
`CASES (CONT.)
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................17
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................21
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)....................................................................................2, 7, 8, 13
`
`PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc.,
`355 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................15
`
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................23
`
`Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,
`54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995)..................................................................................................22
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................13, 24
`
`Trusted Knight Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`681 F. App’x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................................................................17
`
`Unwired Planet L.L.C. v. Google, Inc.,
`660 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................32
`
`Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag Int’l Ltd.,
`392 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................15
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................24
`
`-iii-
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 5 of 43
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`While Defendants’ claim construction arguments remain true to the intrinsic and extrinsic
`
`evidence, Ocean turns a blind eye to that evidence. In doing so, Ocean manufactures an overbroad
`
`and infringement-driven construction for one term, eschews specific definitions from the intrinsic
`
`record for others, and denies the indefiniteness of several ambiguous limitations. Defendants’
`
`constructions and indefiniteness arguments should be adopted and Ocean’s faulty arguments
`
`rejected.
`
`First, despite arguing that “no construction is necessary” for the term “pneumatic cylinder,”
`
`Ocean provides an “alternative” definition that broadens the term beyond its plain meaning evident
`
`from the intrinsic record. That is not by accident. Ocean’s construction is designed to salvage its
`
`infringement theory. Because the accused tools do not include a “pneumatic cylinder” as a skilled
`
`person would understand that term, Ocean conjures up an unduly broad definition that would
`
`eviscerate the difference between a “pneumatic cylinder” and other devices that induce movement
`
`without relying on compressed gas. But Ocean’s construction contradicts the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning of “pneumatic cylinder,” and should be rejected.
`
`Second, in some instances Ocean asserts “no construction is necessary” when the intrinsic
`
`evidence shows that the patentee defined terms in a very specific way. One of the patents at issue
`
`makes clear that “concurrently measuring” two different semiconductor wafer features refers not
`
`only to taking those measurements simultaneously but also to measuring with the same measuring
`
`tool. In addition, Ocean advises the Court not to address the term “software scheduling agent”
`
`even though the patentee expressly defined the term to include only certain “software” and relied
`
`on that definition to distinguish conventional, prior art “software” during prosecution. The
`
`patentee adopted a particular meaning for the term and disclaimed anything broader.
`
`-1-
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 6 of 43
`
`
`
`Third, Ocean refuses to come to terms with several limitations that are indefinite because
`
`their scope is not reasonably certain to skilled artisans. The defective limitations fall into two
`
`categories. In the first category, the term “said process chamber” implicates an antecedent basis
`
`defect where a claim refers back to a feature that was never initially recited, creating irresolvable
`
`confusion. While Ocean suggests a fix for this limitation, nothing in the intrinsic record suggests
`
`that the patentee intended what Ocean belatedly advances in these litigations. The limitation is
`
`laden with uncertainty and thus indefinite. A second category of limitations, including “significant
`
`fault,” “determining in said computer whether said parameter is a significant factor,” and “ultra-
`
`thin resist layer[s],” involves terms of degree for which the record provides insufficient guidance
`
`to allow a skilled person to decipher the claims’ boundaries with reasonable certainty. The
`
`resulting ambiguity makes the claims indefinite.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Defendants appreciate that the Court is very familiar with the law of claim construction.
`
`Claim terms are given the meaning understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
`
`of the alleged invention (“POSITA” or “skilled person” or the like). Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`
`F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). To determine that meaning, the court should look to “the
`
`words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and
`
`extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and
`
`the state of the art.” Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
`
`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A patent claim is indefinite and invalid if the claim,
`
`read in light of the specification and prosecution history, fails to inform a skilled person “about
`
`the scope of the invention” “with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`
`572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 7 of 43
`
`
`
`III. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Technology Background and Asserted Patents
`
`Plaintiff Ocean Semiconductor LLC (“Ocean”) asserts a total of eight patents (“Asserted
`
`Patents”) against seven different defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) in the above-captioned
`
`cases in the Western District of Texas. The chart below shows which patents Ocean has asserted
`
`against each defendant. Seven patents are asserted against all Defendants, but the ’097 patent is
`
`asserted only against STMicroelectronics, Inc. and NXP USA Inc.
`
`Asserted
`Patents
`
`MediaTek NVIDIA NXP Renesas Silicon
`Labs
`
`ST
`
`Western
`Digital
`
`6,420,097
`(’097 patent)
`
`6,660,651
`(’651 patent)
`
`6,725,402
`(’402 patent)
`
`6,836,691
`(’691 patent)
`
`6,907,305
`(’305 patent)
`
`6,968,248
`(’248 patent)
`
`7,080,330
`(’330 patent)
`
`8,676,538
`(’538 patent)
`
`
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`X
`
`In general, the Asserted Patents relate to different facets of semiconductor manufacturing.
`
`This Brief addresses claim terms from six of the Asserted Patents. The subject matter of those
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 8 of 43
`
`
`
`patents is described briefly below. Additional details appear throughout this Brief as part of
`
`Defendants’ claim construction and indefiniteness arguments.
`
`The ’097 patent relates to methods for manufacturing a semiconductor device to
`
`purportedly achieve smaller features than those allowed by conventional photolithography tools at
`
`the time of the alleged invention. Ex. 11 (’097 patent), 1:4–9. In particular, the ’097 patent
`
`describes and claims methods for “trimming” or narrowing the linewidth of a hardmask layer that
`
`is part of the stack of films processed during manufacturing and then using the trimmed hardmask
`
`to etch an underlying film at reduced dimensions. Id., 1:57–63.
`
`The ’651 and ’330 patents relate to characteristics of tools that are used in semiconductor
`
`manufacturing. The ’651 patent describes and claims methods for using a stage inside a process
`
`chamber of a semiconductor processing tool where the wafer sits on the stage and the stage can be
`
`raised, lowered, or tilted. Ex. 2 (’651 patent), 2:26–57, 3:9–14, 5:3–29, 7:28–34. The ’330 patent
`
`describes and claims methods of using a tool to measure, at the same time, two characteristics of
`
`a semiconductor wafer known as “critical dimension” and “overlay.” Ex. 3 (’330 patent), 1:7–11,
`
`1:29–30, 1:41–51, 1:63–2:5.
`
`The ’538, ’305, and ’248 patents relate to efforts to control semiconductor manufacturing
`
`processes. The ’538 patent describes and claims methods for using a feedback mechanism to
`
`detect undesired “faults” that arise during manufacturing by weighting different parameters based
`
`on their relationships to detected faults. Ex. 4 (’538 patent), 1:9–12, 5:28–59. The ’305 and ’248
`
`patent are related and include claims that are nearly identical.2 They also share the same
`
`
`1 References to exhibits in this Opening Claim Construction Brief refer to exhibits to the
`Declaration of Stephanie Sivinski filed concurrently with this Brief.
`
`2 The ’248 patent is based on an application that was a continuation of the application for the ’305
`patent. Ex. 6 (’248 patent), 1:5–7.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 9 of 43
`
`
`
`specification. The ’305 and ’248 patents describe and claim methods for scheduling activities in
`
`an automated semiconductor manufacturing environment where a “software scheduling agent” is
`
`notified of an event and reactively schedules an action as a result. Ex. 5 (’305 patent), 3:63–4:3;
`
`Ex. 6 (’248 patent), 3:64–4:4.
`
`B.
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`A POSITA would have had at least a B.S. in mechanical engineering, electrical
`
`engineering, materials science engineering, or a related field, and (i) four years of experience
`
`designing and developing semiconductor fabrication processes and tooling (for the ’651 patent) or
`
`(ii) four years of experience working with semiconductor fabrication processes, including
`
`computer programming and data analysis (for the ’538 patent). Declaration of Costas Spanos,
`
`Ph.D. (“Spanos Decl.”) ¶¶ 11–12. For the ’097 patent, a skilled person would have had a B.S. in
`
`chemical engineering, materials science, electrical engineering, physics, chemistry, or a similar
`
`field, and three or four years of work experience in integrated circuit fabrication or related fields.
`
`Id. ¶¶ 13–14. For any of these patents, advanced education may substitute for experience. Id.
`
`¶¶ 12, 14.
`
`IV. DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`’097 PATENT
`
`1.
`
`The scope of “ultra-thin resist layer” in claims 1–3 and 10–17 of the
`’097 patent is not reasonably certain, rendering the term indefinite
`
`ST and NXP’s Construction3
`
`Ocean’s Construction
`
`Indefinite
`
`No construction is necessary
`
`
`3 Ocean asserts the ’097 patent only against STMicroelectronics, Inc. and NXP USA, Inc. The
`term “Defendants” for this section refers to those entities only.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 10 of 43
`
`
`
` The parties dispute whether claims 1–3 and 10–17 of the ’097 patent are indefinite because
`
`of the term “ultra-thin resist layer.” ST and NXP contend that “ultra-thin” is a term of degree and
`
`the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence provide insufficient disclosure of an upper limit for the
`
`thickness of such a layer, leaving a skilled person uncertain about the scope of the claims. E.g.,
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding term of
`
`degree (“unobtrusive manner”) indefinite; terms of degree are definite only when claim language
`
`provides “enough certainty to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the invention”).
`
`Ocean argues the term requires no construction, and it offers none. Based on the unresolvable
`
`ambiguity reflected in the intrinsic and extrinsic records, ST and NXP have the better argument.
`
`The ’097 patent describes a method for forming circuit structures having linewidths smaller
`
`than conventional lithography techniques allowed. Ex. 1 (’097 patent), 1:4–9. Lithography uses
`
`light of specific wavelengths to expose and generate linewidth patterns in a layer of photoresist
`
`material. Id., 1:16–20. The patterned photoresist is used to create circuit structures, such as gates,
`
`from underlying layers. Id., 1:60–63, 4:14–42. In the ’097 patent, the stack of layers includes
`
`substrate 114, device layer 116, hardmask layer 118, and ultra-thin resist (UTR) layer 120, as
`
`shown in Figure 4(b) below left. Id., 3:63–4:2. UTR layer 120 is annotated in blue. UTR layer
`
`120 is patterned to form resist mask 122, as shown in Figure 4(c) below, and used to create
`
`transistor gates with small linewidths. Id., 4:14–42. Resist mask 122 is also annotated in blue.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 11 of 43
`
`
`
`The claims of the ’097 patent indicate that a UTR layer corresponds to a range of resist
`
`thicknesses. Claim 4 recites “[a] method of forming circuit structures as claimed in claim 1,
`
`wherein the ultra-thin resist layer has a thickness of less than 2500 Å” (emphasis added). That
`
`claim makes clear that, for its purposes (and for its dependent claims 5–9), the recited “ultra-thin
`
`resist layer” must have a thickness of less than 2500 Å. Claim 1 similarly recites an “ultra-thin
`
`resist layer,” but unlike claim 4, does not specify any resist thicknesses. As with claim 4, the
`
`“ultra-thin resist layer” of claim 1 and its dependent claims 2–3 and 10–17 (which are unrelated to
`
`claim 4) must correspond to a particular range. The resist layer’s thickness is the characteristic
`
`that qualifies it as “ultra-thin,” which is a term of degree for thickness. But the intrinsic and
`
`extrinsic evidence relating to the UTR layer of claims 1-3 and 10-17 offers only ambiguity about
`
`the upper limit for the thickness of that layer rather than the “reasonable certainty” required to
`
`satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901. Therefore,
`
`claims 1–3 and 10–17 are indefinite. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244,
`
`1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding claim indefinite when the intrinsic record and the knowledge of a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art failed to resolve ambiguity as to the scope of the term “fragile
`
`gel”); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding
`
`claims indefinite because of uncertainty over the scope of the “range of specific activity” covered
`
`by the claim language).
`
`To begin, the intrinsic evidence does not identify or suggest any upper boundary for
`
`thickness of the UTR layer recited in claims 1–3 and 10–17. In determining the meaning of a
`
`claim, courts look to the language of the claim and that of surrounding claims. See, e.g., Phillips,
`
`415 F.3d at 1314–15 (“[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly
`
`instructive. . . . Other claims . . . can also be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 12 of 43
`
`
`
`of a claim term.”). Claim 1 does not provide a thickness range for the recited “ultra-thin resist
`
`layer.” By contrast, claim 4, which depends from claim 1, specifies a thickness range with an
`
`upper limit of “less than 2500 Å.” Under the principle of claim differentiation, the upper limit of
`
`the thickness range encompassed by “ultra-thin resist layer” in claim 1 must be higher than the
`
`upper limit provided in claim 4 of “less than 2500 Å.” Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618
`
`F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, those dependent
`
`claims [reciting a range] give rise to a presumption that the broader independent claims are not
`
`confined to that range.); see also Halliburton, 514 F.3d at 1251 n.3 (“‘the presence of a dependent
`
`claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is
`
`not present in the independent claim’”) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315). But claim 1 and its
`
`dependent claims 2–3 and 10–17 do not provide any indication of an upper limit for the thickness
`
`of “ultra-thin resist layer.” Spanos Decl. ¶¶ 49-50.
`
`The specification likewise fails to define the upper thickness limit for an UTR layer. While
`
`the specification states that “a resist coating having an UTR thickness is considered to be resist
`
`films of less than 0.25 µm (2500 Å) in thickness” (Ex. 1 (’097 patent), 1:43–45) and describes
`
`embodiments having a “[ultra-thin resist] thickness of less than 2500 Å” (id., 3:34–35), that merely
`
`establishes that resist films with thicknesses under 2500 Å qualify as UTR layers. Noticeably
`
`absent from the patent is any specific upper limit for a UTR layer thickness. In fact, the
`
`specification breeds uncertainty on the point. The patent describes a “standard” resist thickness of
`
`5000 Å for 248 nm lithography and of 4000 Å for 193 nm lithography.4 Id., 1:39–43, 2:29–31,
`
`2:51–58, 3:2–3, Fig. 1a. But the specification does not address whether a resist thickness between
`
`2500 Å and 5000 Å for 248 nm lithography or between 2500 Å and 4000 Å for 193 nm lithography
`
`
`4 The distances of 248 nm and 193 nm refer to the wavelengths of light used for patterning
`photoresist.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 13 of 43
`
`
`
`qualifies as “ultra-thin.” One is left to wonder: are resists with thicknesses within those ranges
`
`“ultra-thin” for purposes of claim 1? Or do they fall into some other non-ultra-thin category? The
`
`specification offers no answers. Thus, like the claims, the specification does not provide enough
`
`information for persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention to understand
`
`the upper limit for thickness of the UTR layer recited in claims 1–3 and 10–17. Spanos Decl.
`
`¶¶ 51-53.
`
`Adding to the uncertainty, the disclosed “standard” resist thickness varies according to the
`
`wavelength of light used during a lithography process. According to the patent, the standard resist
`
`thickness is larger for 248 nm lithography (more than 5000 Å) than it is for 193 nm lithography
`
`(more than 4000 Å). Ex. 1 (’097 patent), 1:39–43, 2:29–31, 2:51–58, 3:2–3, Fig. 1a. This suggests
`
`to persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention that the thickness range
`
`for a UTR layer also varies based on the wavelength of light used for lithography. Spanos Decl.
`
`¶ 52. Despite that complication, the claims and the specification of the ’097 patent provide no
`
`guidance to skilled artisans as to what qualifies as a UTR layer for different lithography techniques.
`
`The potential variation deepens the ambiguity reflected in the claims and the specification. Id.
`
`¶ 53.
`
`For its part, the prosecution history provides no evidence at all regarding any upper limit
`
`of thickness for a UTR layer. Spanos Decl. ¶ 54. Neither the patentee nor the examiner ever
`
`confronted the issue during prosecution.
`
`Turning to extrinsic evidence, other patents assigned to the same original assignee as for
`
`the ’097 patent, some of which list the same co-inventors as the ’097 patent, describe that the upper
`
`limit for UTR layer thickness could be anywhere from 2500 Å to about 5000 Å.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 14 of 43
`
`
`
`For example, several patents disclosed an “ultra-thin photoresist layer” with “a thickness
`
`of about 500 Å–5000 Å.” Ex. 7 (U.S. Patent No. 6,127,070), 7:19–20; Ex. 8 (U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,140,023), 6:15–16; Ex. 9 (U.S. Patent No. 6,309,926), 8:34–35; Ex. 10 (U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,162,587), 7:22–23; Ex. 11 (U.S. Patent No. 6,165,695), 7:31–32. Scott A. Bell, one of the co-
`
`inventors listed in the ’097 patent, is also a co-inventor listed in these five patents. Other patents
`
`explain that “[u]ltra-thin resists . . . have a thickness of about 5,000 Å or less.” Ex. 12 (U.S. Patent
`
`No. 6,762,133), 4:4–5; Ex. 13 (U.S. Patent No. 6,645,702), 3:62–64. An additional patent
`
`describes an “ultra thin photoresist layer having a thickness from about 2,000 angstroms to about
`
`5,000 angstroms.” Ex. 14 (U.S. Patent No. 6,746,973), 12:55–59. These eight patents were filed
`
`between December 1998 and August 2002 at around the time of the May 2, 2000 filing of the ’097
`
`patent. Spanos Decl. ¶¶ 55-56.
`
`But other patents assigned to the same original assignee as for the ’097 patent identify an
`
`upper limit for UTR layer thickness that corresponds to different values. One patent filed a day
`
`before the ’097 patent describes that “[u]ltra-thin photoresists . . . have a thickness of about
`
`3,000 Å or less.” Ex. 15 (U.S. Patent No. 6,451,512), 3:49–50. Other patents include 2500 Å in
`
`the range of thicknesses for an “ultra-thin” resist layer, although the ’097 confirmed only that
`
`thicknesses of “less than” 2500 Å qualify. Two patents describe an upper limit for UTR layer
`
`thickness at 2500 Å. Ex. 16 (U.S. Patent No. 6,156,480), 3:44–46 (“about 2,500 Å”); Ex. 17 (U.S.
`
`Patent No. 6,566,214), 3:49–52 (“2500 Angstroms or less”). Scott A. Bell is listed as a co-inventor
`
`for one of these patents. Ex. 17 (U.S. Patent No. 6,566,214). Another patent similarly discloses
`
`“UTR coatings having thicknesses of 2,500 Å or less.” Ex. 18 (U.S. Patent No. 6,326,319), 1:47–
`
`50. Christopher L. Pike, a second co-inventor listed in the ’097 patent, is a listed co-inventor on
`
`this patent. Spanos Decl. ¶¶ 55, 57.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 15 of 43
`
`
`
`This extrinsic evidence confirms that the upper limit on the thickness of an “ultra-thin resist
`
`layer” could correspond to one of several different values. Based on the evidence cited above, the
`
`upper limit could be 5000 Å, 3000 Å, or 2500 Å. Spanos Decl. ¶ 58. Nothing in the ’097 patent
`
`or claims 1–3 and 10–17 settles whether any of these potential upper limits, or some other upper
`
`limit, applies to the “ultra-thin resist layer” recited in those claims. The resulting uncertainty
`
`confirms the term is indefinite. IBSA Institut Biochimique, S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 966
`
`F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2470 (2021) (finding “half-liquid”
`
`indefinite where the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence did not supply a definite meaning for the
`
`term).
`
`For the reasons described above, based on the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence a skilled
`
`person simply cannot determine the upper limit for the thickness of the claimed “ultra-thin resist
`
`layer” recited in claim 1–3 and 10–17. Spanos Decl. ¶ 58. As a result, those claims are indefinite.
`
`B.
`
`’651 PATENT
`
`1.
`
`Overview
`
`
`
`In an attempt to minimize problematic “across-wafer variations” that occur during
`
`semiconductor wafer fabrication processes (such as deposition and etching) in some process tools,
`
`the ’651 patent discloses a wafer stage that is “adjustable” (i.e., the wafer stage can be raised,
`
`lowered, or tilted). Ex. 2 (’651 patent), 2:25–57, 5:3–29; see also id., 7:28–34. The ’651 patent
`
`discloses that such processing tools can include a process chamber—where process operations are
`
`performed—with a wafer stage located in the process chamber. Id., 3:9–14. To adjust the wafer-
`
`stage, the ’651 patent discloses using “a variety of devices, such as pneumatic, hydraulic,
`
`electromagnetic or mechanical systems.” Id., 5:65–6:1; see also id., 6:66–7:16.
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 16 of 43
`
`
`
`In the ’651 patent, some claims leave open which type of device is used to make the wafer-
`
`stage adjustments, and other claims require a specific type of device. In particular, the claims in
`
`dispute here expressly require “a plurality of pneumatic cylinders.” Although the claimed
`
`“pneumatic cylinders” “may be any type of pneumatic cylinders useful for performing the function
`
`of adjusting the surface . . . of the wafer stage,” may have various “stroke, size and supply pressure
`
`. . . depending upon the particular application,” and may rely on “air or inert gas . . . supplied to
`
`the cylinders [] at the required pressure,” they actually have to be “pneumatic cylinders.” Id.,
`
`6:13–21; see also id., 5:46–6:27, Figs. 2–3. They cannot be a different type of device. Figure 2,
`
`reproduced below, illustrates an adjustable wafer stage 40 with a pneumatic cylinder 46.
`
`
`
`For context, pneumatic devices are powered by compressed air or other gas. Spanos Decl.
`
`¶¶ 40–43. Pneumatic cylinders are a subset of pneumatic devices in which the compressed air or
`
`other gas acts on a piston inside a cylinder, causing the piston to move along a linear path within
`
`the cylinder. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Hydraulic devices are powered by liquid. Id. ¶ 44. Electromagnetic
`
`devices are powered by an electric current and a magnetic field. Id. Mechanical devices are
`
`generic, in that they employ interacting mechanical structures to generate forces. Id.
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01216-ADA Document 41 Filed 10/06/21 Page 17 of 43
`
`
`
`2.
`
`Ocean’s proposed construction of “pneumatic cylinder” defies the
`intrinsic and extrinsic record (asserted claims 19–24, 75, 81)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`Ocean’s Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`No construction is necessary, or in the
`alternative, “a pneumatic, hydraulic,
`electromagnetic or mechanical device”
`
`T