Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 1 of 15
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`OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SILICON LABORATORIES INC.
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-1214
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT SILICON LABORATORIES INC.’ S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
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`102065034.2
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 2 of 15
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`A. Ocean’s Complaint Should be Dismissed as Not Plausibly Pled .............................................2
`1. Ocean stretches inconsistent legal conclusions that, at most, demonstrate
`infringement is possible, not plausible .............................................................................. 2
`2. Ocean’s cited authority is inapplicable and misleading ................................................... 3
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`B. Ocean’s Claims are—at Most—Limited to TSMC and Identified Tools .................................4
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`C. Ocean’s Inducement Allegations Lack Specific Intent to Infringe ..........................................6
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`D. Ocean’s Threadbare Notice Letters Cannot Support Willfulness ............................................7
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`E. Patents Claiming Generation of Information, not Transformation of a Product, Cannot
`Support Infringement Under 271(g) .........................................................................................8
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`F. Ocean Cannot Blame Silicon Labs for Errors in Ocean’s Complaint ....................................10
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 3 of 15
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................7
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`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ...............................................................................................................7
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`Janssen Pharma., N.V. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`No. 15-760-SLR-SRF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192881 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2016) ..................3, 4
`
`Kyowa Hakka Bio, Co. Ltd. v. Ajinomoto Co.,
`No. 17-313, 2018-MSG, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22392 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2018) ..............................3
`
`Luppino v. York,
`No. SA-16-CV-00409-RCL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221246 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
`22, 2017) ....................................................................................................................................6
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`M & C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Prods. Corp.,
`No. 4:17-CV-2372, 2018 WL 4620713 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 2018) ............................................7
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`Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`472 F. Supp. 3d 377 (E.D. Mich. 2020) .....................................................................................7
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`Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc.,
`809 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................4, 8, 9, 10
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`Roebuck v. Dothan Sec., Inc.,
`515 F. App’x 275 (5th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................................6
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`Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A.,
`No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192832 (D. Del. Nov. 13,
`2018) ......................................................................................................................................4, 5
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`Rules and Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(g) ...................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
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`35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(A) .................................................................................................................8
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 4 of 15
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`Ocean Semiconductor LLC’s (“Ocean”) Response (Dkt. 16, “Response”) to Silicon
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`Laboratories Inc.’s (“Silicon Labs”) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14, “Motion”) repeats the errors of
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`its Complaint, advocates a pleading standard that falls short of what Iqbol and Twombly mandate,
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`misleadingly quotes authority, and ignores Federal Circuit precedent on the proper assertion of
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`infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).
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`Drawing on inapplicable case law, Ocean ignores the absence of key details required to
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`properly plead infringement under Section 271(g). Compounding this, Ocean overstates the
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`factual allegations actually in its Complaint. Pleading possible infringement is not sufficient;
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`Ocean must state a case that is plausible. Yet, Ocean still provides no plausible support for its
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`Complaint’s overreach—i.e., Ocean’s contention that every single one of the vast assortment of
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`Silicon Labs’ products is manufactured (by third parties) using the methods of the Asserted Claims.
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`Ocean’s Response repeatedly touts the length of its Complaint and the inclusion of claim
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`charts directed to third party equipment—equipment that is never linked to the Accused Products.
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`But, Ocean’s repetitious pleadings cannot compensate in volume for lack of substance. The
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`Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety, or at least as to fab companies and tools not
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`particularly identified.
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`Further, by alleging Section 271(g) infringement claims that are not cognizable, Ocean
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`invites error and an unnecessary waste of this Court’s and Silicon Labs’ time and resources.
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`Federal Circuit precedent restricts the scope of claims assertable under Section 271(g) to methods
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`that create or give new properties to an accused product, not claims that merely generate
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`information, as Ocean asserts here.
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`For these, and other reasons detailed below and in Silicon Labs’ Motion, respectfully,
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`Ocean’s Complaint should be dismissed.
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`A.
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`Ocean’s Complaint Should be Dismissed as Not Plausibly Pled
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`1.
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`Ocean stretches inconsistent legal conclusions that, at most, demonstrate
`infringement is possible, not plausible
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`Ocean’s Response doubles down on the very same logical leaps of its Complaint—leaps
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`that fail for the reasons detailed in Silicon Labs’ Motion. Motion at 4-5, 7-9. Ocean’s Response
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`highlights websites cited in its Complaint, the contents of which indicate that (a) certain TSMC
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`facilities may have the enumerated tools at its disposal, and (b) TSMC manufactures certain
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`products for Silicon Labs. Id. at 7. But, none of Ocean’s evidence supplies the missing link of
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`any tool used to manufacture a Silicon Labs product—much less all such products.
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`For example, Ocean’s Response attaches “Process Change Notice #1011021,” a webpage
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`identified in the Complaint. Dkt. 16-2. That website indicates TSMC’s “Fab 10” site—in addition
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`to its “Fab 3” site—is approved to manufacture Silicon Labs’ MCU products. Id. at 1, 2. But, the
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`document never indicates the tools at either location used to manufacture such products.
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`Indeed, Process Change Notice #1011021 underscores Ocean’s pleading deficiency. This
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`Notice indicates Silicon Labs’ MCU products are manufactured in TSMC Fabs 3 and 10, but
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`Ocean’s purported support regarding TSMC’s use of the PDF Solutions tool states the tool “will
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`be deployed in TSMC’s 300-mm Fab 12.” Ex. 1.1 There is nothing plausible about a pleading
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`that contends Silicon Labs’ products manufactured at TSMC Fabs 3 and 10 use a tool expressly
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`deployed at Fab 12.2
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`At root, as to TSMC, Ocean’s Complaint indicates at most a possibility of infringement—
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`namely that TSMC allegedly has access to certain tools, and TSMC manufactures products for
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`1 Citations to Exhibits in this brief refer to Exhibits to the co-filed Declaration of Eric Green.
`2 Websites cited in the Complaint indicate TSMC has numerous facilities with differing
`capabilities and tools, underscoring the implausibility of Ocean’s allegation that all Silicon Labs
`products are manufactured using the tools identified in the Complaint. See Ex. 1 (Fab 12); Ex. 2
`(Fab 6); Ex. 3 (Fabs 12, 14, 15); and Dkt. 16-2 (Fabs 3 and 10).
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 6 of 15
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`Silicon Labs. But, the Complaint is devoid of plausible facts suggesting that TSMC actually uses
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`the identified tools to manufacture the Accused Products. Given the sheer scope of Ocean’s
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`infringement allegation—virtually all Silicon Labs products—plausibility requires Ocean to
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`provide more than incomplete, open-ended speculation.
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`2.
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`Ocean’s cited authority is inapplicable and misleading
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`Ocean defends its wholly inadequate allegations under section 271(g) by citations to two
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`unpublished, outside jurisdiction district court cases. Response at 6-7. Neither supports Ocean.
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`First, Ocean cites Kyowa Hakka Bio, Co. Ltd. v. Ajinomoto Co., No. 17-313, 2018-MSG,
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`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22392, at *24 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2018) for the proposition that “[u]nder [the
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`second clause of § 271(g)], the [] Complaint need not allege facts that the offending process was
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`practiced for a product manufactured outside the United States . . . .” Response at 6 (emphasis
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`added by Ocean). Yet, Ocean neglects to tell the Court the issue addressed by Kyowa was whether
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`Section 271(g) liability (a) only attached to products manufactured outside the United States or
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`(b) whether it also attached to products manufactured inside the United States. Id. at *22-24. This
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`case does not address whether a Complaint for Section 271(g) infringement must “allege facts that
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`the offending process was practiced;” it must. There was no dispute that plaintiffs in Kyowa pled
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`the manufacturing facilities, process steps, and resulting products, just as Silicon Labs requests
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`here. Id. at * 9-10 (quoting Complaint paras. 65-66).
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`Second, Ocean quotes Janssen Pharma., N.V. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 15-760-SLR-
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`SRF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192881, at *40 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2016) as stating “[t]he statutory
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`language supports plaintiffs’ assertion that it is defendants’ act of importing which is relevant to
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`the § 271(g) analysis, and the fact that a third party engages in the infringing process is
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`irrelevant under § 271(g). . . .”). Response at 6-7. Ocean selectively culled that sentence from a
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`broader paragraph that demonstrates the issue in Janssen was whether a party avoids Section
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`271(g) liability for importation where it uses a third party manufacturer:
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`Defendants cite no authority rejecting the application of § 271(g) in circumstances
`in which a third party implements the patented process in a foreign country, and the
`resulting product is subsequently imported into the U.S. by the accused infringer.
`The statutory language supports plaintiffs’ assertion that it is defendants’ act of
`importing which is relevant to the § 271(g) analysis, and the fact that a third party
`engages in the infringing process is irrelevant under § 271(g)[.]
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`Janssen Pharma., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192881, at *40 (quotation omitted by Ocean underlined).
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`This says nothing of what is required to properly plead Section 271(g) infringement. More
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`substantively, Plaintiffs’ own citation to Janssen proves Silicon Labs’ point. As eloquently
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`summarized by the Janssen court:
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`The Federal Circuit urged courts to construe § 271(g) narrowly to focus on the
`actual “making” of a product instead of extending it to “methods of testing a final
`product or intermediate substance.” Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA
`Inc., 809 F.3d 610, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`Id. at 40, n.12. Ocean’s own authority contradicts its assertion that “Section 271(g) is applied
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`broadly.” Response at 4.
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`Because Ocean has not plausibly alleged all Silicon Labs’ products are manufactured using
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`the asserted methods (embodied in the enumerated tools), Ocean’s Complaint should be dismissed.
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`B.
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`Ocean’s Claims are—at Most—Limited to TSMC and Identified Tools
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`In the alternative, Silicon Labs’ Motion seeks partial dismissal of Ocean’s allegations
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`against unnamed fabs and tools, as Silicon Labs cannot reasonably defend itself against such vague
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`allegations implicating third party conduct. Motion at 9-12. In Response, Ocean contends: “under
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`the Iqbal/Twombly standard, a plaintiff need only ‘plead facts sufficient to place [an alleged
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`infringer] on notice as to what [the alleged infringer] must defend.’” Response at 8 (quoting Univ.
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`of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A., No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192832, at *13
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`(D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018)). Silicon Labs agrees, which is why Silicon Labs seeks dismissal as to
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 8 of 15
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`the tools and fabs for which Ocean has not provided the requisite notice.
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`Ocean does not dispute that the unnamed fabs are simply identified as “third-party
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`semiconductor fabricators or foundries (‘SILABS Foundry Partners’) that own, operate, or control
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`semiconductor fabrication plants (‘fabs’).” Motion at 3, 9. Nor does Ocean dispute the unnamed
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`tools are identified as “similar systems (e.g., with similar technical and functional features).”
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`Motion at 10-11 (listing insufficient tool descriptions). Instead, Ocean contends the tools and fabs
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`it has identified open the door to future tools and fabs for which Ocean has provided no notice.
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`Again, the case relied upon by Ocean is instructive. In University Of Massachusetts, the
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`plaintiff’s complaint was found to constitute sufficient notice where the accused products were
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`defined as eighteen explicitly listed “brands with products containing adenosine.” Univ. of Mass.
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`Med. Sch., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192832, at *12. There, the court found the defendant was “on
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`notice that products containing adenosine made by the eighteen brands specified in the FAC are
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`accused of infringement,” and the motion to dismiss was denied. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
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`Nowhere did the court find the defendant was on notice as to any unidentified brands.
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`While there are other legal problems with the contentions, Silicon Labs does not challenge
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`notice at this stage as to potential relevance of TSMC and tools supplied by Applied Materials,
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`PDF Solutions, camLine, and ASML—the equivalent of the “brands” at issue in University Of
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`Massachusetts Medical School. Rather, the Motion only seeks dismissal as to unidentified fabs
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`and tools where notice has not yet been given—i.e., the unspecified “brands.” Stated another way,
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`an allegation that one named fab using certain tools may practice the asserted claims is not
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`sufficient to give fair notice as to unnamed fabs, using unnamed tools, to make unnamed products.
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`In an attempt to downplay case law cited in the Motion, Ocean contends Silicon Labs’
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`cases “are irrelevant because Ocean has not accused the manufacturing tools of infringement;
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`instead, Ocean’s Complaint accuses Silicon Labs’ own products that are and were imported, sold,
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`and/or used in the U.S. as infringing Section 271(g).” Response at 9. This non-sequitur ignores
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`that to properly plead Section 271(g) infringement by any such products, Ocean must plausibly
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`allege they are manufactured pursuant to its patented methods, and the only way the Complaint
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`seeks to demonstrate practice of the patented methods is through the tools alleged to implement
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`the methods. See, e.g., Dkt. 1-8 to 1-17 (claim charts aligning method claims with specified tools).
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`Silicon Labs simply has no notice as to which third party fabs and what other tools form
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`the basis for Ocean’s infringement allegations. Thus, those allegations should be limited to
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`TSMC’s use of the tools identified in the Complaint. See Motion at 4 (listing enumerated tools).
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`C.
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`Ocean’s Inducement Allegations Lack Specific Intent to Infringe
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`As noted in the Motion, Ocean’s Complaint never alleges that Silicon Labs has knowledge
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`of the tools and processes its fabs use to manufacture the Accused Products, and thus Silicon Labs
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`could not have the specific intent to knowingly induce infringement. Motion at 12-13. In response,
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`Ocean lists various factual contentions in the Complaint, draws strained inferences, and concludes:
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`“[a]s the customer, and as the designer and developer of its accused products, Silicon Labs surely
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`has knowledge of the processes and equipment used to manufacture them.” Response at 11. First,
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`this contention only discusses “knowledge” as opposed to the required “specific intent.” Second,
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`Ocean’s attorney argument regarding knowledge is found nowhere in the Complaint. Luppino v.
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`York, No. SA-16-CV-00409-RCL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221246, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22,
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`2017) (“It is not enough for [plaintiff] to clarify the nature of his allegations in his briefs; ‘it is
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`axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
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`dismiss.’” (quoting Roebuck v. Dothan Sec., Inc., 515 F. App’x 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2013)).
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`There is simply nothing plausible in Ocean’s apparent contention that alleged generation
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`of a “fault code” during the foreign fabrication of a product at a fab Silicon Labs does not run,
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 10 of 15
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`using tools Silicon Labs does not own, which are operated by non-Silicon Labs employees is
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`somehow “known” to Silicon Labs (much less the required “specific intent” to infringe). To
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`properly allege a claim for induced infringement, Ocean needed to allege (and have the usual good
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`faith basis) that Silicon Labs “specifically intended [another] to infringe the [patent] and knew that
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`the [induced] acts constituted infringement.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys.
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`Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`Further, Ocean’s Response recites a litany of “facts” purportedly demonstrating how
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`Silicon Labs induces others to infringe through product marketing and support documentation
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`(Response at 11-12), but as described in Silicon Labs Motion, this documentation has no bearing
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`on the specific intent needed to properly plead inducement. Motion at 13-14.
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`D.
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`Ocean’s Threadbare Notice Letters Cannot Support Willfulness
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`Ocean’s willfulness allegation should be dismissed. “[N]umerous district courts have
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`concluded that an allegation of willful infringement without evidence of egregiousness is futile.”
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`Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d 377, 383 (E.D. Mich.
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`2020) (collecting cases); see also Motion at 16. Ocean has simply not alleged the conduct that
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`makes this anything other than a “‘garden-variety’ patent case that Halo affirms is ill-suited for a
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`finding of willful infringement.” M & C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Prods. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-
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`2372, 2018 WL 4620713, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 2018) (dismissing claim for willful
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`infringement) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016)).
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`In Response, Ocean points to its purported notice letters sent to Silicon Labs prior to
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`initiating litigation, but Ocean still does not attach them. The deafening silence is not accidental.
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`The reason is that Ocean’s letters do not put Silicon Labs on notice of the alleged Section 271(g)
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`infringement at issue here. Ocean’s letters—relied upon in the Complaint—are Exhibits 4 and 5.
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`For example, Ocean’s October 16, 2020 letter broadly asserts—without support—that the
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 11 of 15
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`patents “cover any SILABS products, devices, systems, components of systems, and/or integrated
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`circuits developed, fabricated, or manufactured using advanced/automatic process control systems
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`and lithography/etching tools,” and then goes on to list a number of products that allegedly utilize
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`these unidentified “tools.” Ex. 4; see Ex. 5 (similar). This begs the question: what are these
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`unnamed “systems” or “tools” allegedly covered by the patents? The letters do not say. Such
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`omission is critical here, as Ocean’s entire infringement theory is predicated on the use of tools
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`that allegedly result in infringement under Section 271(g).
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`Further, adequate notice for a Section 271(g) claim is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(A):
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`[N]otice of infringement means actual knowledge, or receipt by a person of a
`written notification, or a combination thereof, of information sufficient to
`persuade a reasonable person that it is likely that a product was made by a process
`patented in the United States.
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`35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Ocean’s letter giving a list of patents, overly general
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`technical categories, and Silicon Labs’ products does not provide information “sufficient to
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`persuade a reasonable person that it is likely that a product was made by a process patented in the
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`United States.” Id. Thus, Ocean’s letters cannot support enhanced damages, and Ocean’s
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`willfulness allegations should be dismissed for reasons detailed in the Motion. Motion at 14-16.
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`E.
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`Patents Claiming Generation of Information, not Transformation of a Product,
`Cannot Support Infringement Under 271(g)
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`Ocean’s Response seeks broad application of Section 271(g) in a manner that contradicts
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`controlling authority. Ocean seemingly contends Section 271(g) liability attaches to any ancillary
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`execution of a method in connection with the manufacture of a product, no matter how tenuous
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`the connection between the claimed method and the accused product. But, that is not the law.
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`In Momenta—a case identified in the Motion and not addressed by Ocean—the Federal
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`Circuit found Section 271(g) inapplicable to methods used during quality control testing to confirm
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`a manufactured product had certain traits. Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., 809
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`F.3d 610, 616 (Fed. Cir. 2015). While the testing step was alleged to be “a crucial interim step
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`used directly to manufacture” the accused product, Section 271(g) liability did not attach because
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`the testing did not “create or give new properties to the [accused product] in batches that are
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`selected for further processing.” Id. at 615, 617 (emphasis added). Under Momenta, Section
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`271(g) is inapplicable to a method that “provides information regarding a substance . . . but does
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`not transform it.” Id. at n.5. Ocean ignores this controlling authority, and instead cites a non-
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`controlling secondary source to argue for a more lenient standard. Response at 3 (quoting
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`5 Chisum on Patents § 16.02[6][d][iv] (2019)). The Federal Circuit standard applies, and Ocean’s
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`standard should be rejected.
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`None of the claims asserted from the ’402, ’538, ’305, and ’248 patents can fairly be
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`described as creating or giving new properties to the Accused Products. See Motion at 16-19.
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`Regarding the ’402 Patent, Ocean points to references in Claim 1 to a “process tool” and a
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`“processing piece” to allege practice of the method claim does indeed result in the physical
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`manufacture of a product. But, as explained in the Motion, this “process tool” is merely a source
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`of information used for fault detection in the remaining claim elements. Motion at 17-18. Such
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`fault detection is a type of “quality control” equivalent to the method of Momenta—i.e., not
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`actionable under Section 271(g). To the extent any action is taken by the “process tool,” the action
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`is the termination of manufacturing, an act contrary to making a good capable of infringing under
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`Section 271(g). Id. Indeed, the open-ended nature of “process tool” in the patent’s specification
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`leaves no doubt that Claim 1 does not result in the manufacture of any particular physical article:
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`“the processing tool 105 need not necessarily be limited to . . . a tool for processing silicon wafers,
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`but could include other types of manufacturing equipment for producing a variety of different
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`types of commercial products.” ’402 Patent at 2:51-57 (emphasis added).
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 13 of 15
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`Regarding the ’538 patent, which also concerns fault detection, Ocean’s arguments fail for
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`the same reasons as the ’402 patent noted above. See also Motion at 18-19. Relying on non-
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`asserted claims and the patent specification, rather than the claim at issue, Ocean again alleges that
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`some ill-defined, ancillary relationship to the manufacture of a semiconductor wafer is sufficient.
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`But again Ocean fails to identify any physical creation or transformation of the Accused Product
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`imparted by its fault detection method. See Momenta, 809 F.3d at 617, n.5.
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`Regarding the ’305, and ’248 patents, which merely relate to setting a schedule, Ocean
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`contends the methods “govern[] not only when to take certain manufacturing actions but also what
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`manufacturing actions to take in making the physical products.” Response at 19. But, even if that
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`is accurate, the asserted claims still only result in the generation of information—when to take
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`action, and what action to take. The asserted claims do not cover any actual process step that
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`creates or transforms the Accused Product, as Momenta requires. Momenta, 809 F.3d at 617, n.5.
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`No amount of discovery or Complaint amendment can remedy the deficiencies of the ’402,
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`’538, ’305, and ’248 patents, and Ocean’s requests for discovery and amendment should be denied.
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`F.
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`Ocean Cannot Blame Silicon Labs for Errors in Ocean’s Complaint
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`Ocean’s Complaint alleges infringement of two claims from the ’651 patent, system claim
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`1 and method claim 19. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 73. Ocean’s Response does not dispute—nor
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`could it—that the Complaint states that claim 1 of the ’651 patent is infringed. Instead, Ocean
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`contends that “Silicon Labs had misread the Complaint,” and seemingly indicates that only claim
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`19 is asserted because that is the claim that Ocean charted. Response at 20. If that is the case,
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`then Ocean should have no objection to this Court dismissing Paragraph 73 of the Complaint,
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`which plainly states: “SILABS has directly infringed and continues to infringe at least claim 1 of
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`the ’651 patent.” Complaint at ¶ 73 (emphasis added). Respectfully, this Court should dismiss
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`Paragraph 73 and any other allegation of infringement of a system claim.
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`102065034.2
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 14 of 15
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`April 1, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Marc B. Collier
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`Marc B. Collier (SBN 00792418)
`marc.collier@nortonrosefulbright.com
`Eric C. Green (SBN 24069824)
`eric.green@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1100
`Austin, Texas 78701
`Tel: (512) 474-5201
`Fax: (512) 536-4598
`
`Richard S. Zembek (SBN 00797726)
`richard.zembek@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77010-3095
`Tel: (713) 651-5151
`Fax: (713) 651-5246
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`COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT SILICON
`LABORATORIES INC.
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`102065034.2
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`11
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`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 17 Filed 04/01/21 Page 15 of 15
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on April 1, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the
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`CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
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`By: /s/ Eric C. Green
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`Eric C. Green
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`102065034.2
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`12
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