Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 1 of 26
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`Ocean Semiconductor LLC,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Silicon Laboratories Inc.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-1214
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PATENT CASE
`
`PLAINTIFF OCEAN SEMICONDUCTOR LLC’S OPPOSITION
`TO DEFENDANT SILICON LABORATORIES INC.’S MOTION
`TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Alex Chan__________________________
`Timothy Devlin
`tdevlin@devlinlawfirm.com
`Henrik D. Parker
`hparker@devlinlawfirm.com   
`Alex Chan (State Bar No. 24108051)
`achan@devlinlawfirm.com   
`DEVLIN LAW FIRM LLC 
`1526 Gilpin Avenue 
`Wilmington, Delaware 19806 
`Telephone: (302) 449-9010 
`Facsimile: (302) 353-4251 
`
`1
`
`
`DATED: March 25, 2021
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 2 of 26
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`2.
`B.
`
`1.
`
`2.
`C.
`
`D.
`1.
`
`2.
`
`E.
`
`I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
`II. LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................. 2
`A.
`The High Bar for a Motion to Dismiss ........................................................................... 2
`B.
`The Broad Reach of Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) ........................................ 3
`III. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`Ocean’s Complaint Asserts Plausible Acts of Infringement .......................................... 4
`1.
`The Complaint Provides Plausible Details Linking TSMC’s Manufacturing Tools
`Directly to the Accused Products ................................................................................ 5
`Ocean Provides Plausible Details Beyond What Section 271(g) Requires ................ 6
`The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Does Not Require Ocean to Identify All Third-Party
`Foundries and Manufacturing Tools at the Pleading Stage ............................................ 8
`Silicon Labs Has Sufficient Notice as to What It Must Defend Because Ocean Has
`Identified at Least One Foundry and Five Manufacturing Tools Used to Manufacture
`the Accused Products .................................................................................................. 8
`Silicon Labs’ Cases Are Inapposite ............................................................................ 9
`Ocean’s Complaint Sufficiently Asserts Claims for Induced Infringement as Silicon
`Labs Gained Knowledge of the Processes and Tools Used to Manufacture Its Products
`Through Its Contractual Relationships with the Foundries .......................................... 10
`The Complaint Sufficiently Asserts Claims for Willful Infringement ......................... 13
`Ocean’s Complaint Sufficiently Pleads Willful Infringement Because Silicon Labs
`Had Notice of the Asserted Patents........................................................................... 13
`This Court Has Previously Ruled that Egregious Conduct Is Not Required to be Pled
`at the Pleading Stage ................................................................................................. 14
`The 402, 538, 305, and 248 Patents Are All Directed to the Manufacture of Products
`and Are Subject to Section 271(g) ................................................................................ 14
`The ’402 Patent Involves the Making of Physical Products Such as Silicon Wafers,
`and Ocean’s Pleadings Reflect that Fact ................................................................... 14
`The ’538 Patent Involves the Making of Physical Products Such as Silicon Wafers,
`and Ocean’s Pleadings Reflect that Fact ................................................................... 16
`The ’305 and ’248 Patents Involve the Making of Physical Products Such as Silicon
`Wafers, and Ocean’s Pleadings Reflect that Fact ..................................................... 18
`No System Claims of the ’651 Patent Were Asserted Under Section 271(g) ............... 19
`F.
`In All Events, Fact Issues Preclude Dismissal .............................................................. 20
`G.
`At Worst, Rather Than Dismissing the Complaint, Leave to Amend Should Be Granted
`H.
`IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 20
`
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 3 of 26
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 Fed. Appx. 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................... 10
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc.
`340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 3, 4, 16, 17
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................................................................ 2, 3, 7
`
`Bio-Rad Labs Inc. v. Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 499 (D. Del. 2017) ........... 14
`
`Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.
`80 F.3d 1553, 38 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................. 3, 4
`
`Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc.
`394 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 3
`
`DermaFocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 465 (D. Del. 2016) ..................................... 14
`
`Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc.
`888 F.3 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................... 3
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.
`82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996 .................................................................................................. 3, 4
`
`Encoditech, LLC v. Citizen Watch Co. of Am.
`C.A. No. 18-1335-XR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105833 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 2019) ................. 3
`
`Estech Sys. v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. 6:20-cv-00322-ADA, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200484
`(W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2020) ........................................................................................................ 10
`
`Frye v. Anadarko Petro. Corp., 953 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 2
`
`Griggs v. Hinds Junior Coll., 563 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977) ......................................................... 20
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) ........................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`James v. J2 Cloud Servs., LLC, 887 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................. 12
`
`Janssen Pharma., N.V. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 15-760-SLR-SRF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`192881 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2016) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 4 of 26
`
`Kyowa Hakka Bio, Co. Ltd. v. Ajinomoto Co., No. 17-313, 2018-MSG, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22392
`(D. Del. Feb. 12, 2018) ............................................................................................................... 6
`
`Lone Star Motor Imp., Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1961) .................. 20
`
`Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .......................................................... 2
`
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .............................................. 8, 10
`
`Motiva Patents, LLC v. Sony Corp., 408 F. Supp. 3d 819 (E.D. Tex. 2019) ............................ 9, 12
`
`Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., No. 6:19-cv-00207-ADA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144094
`(W.D. Tex. Jul. 26, 2019) ......................................................................................................... 13
`
`Plano Encryption Techs. v. Alkami Tech., No. 2:16-cv-1032-JRG, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`221765 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2017) ........................................................................................... 14
`
`Skinner v. Switzer
`562 U.S. 521 (2011) .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v. L’Oréal S.A., No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192832
`(D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018) .............................................................................................................. 8
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) .................................................................................................................... 20
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271 ..................................................................................................................... 2, 3, 15
`
`Other Authorities
`
`5 Chisum on Patents § 16.02........................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 5 of 26
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendant Silicon Laboratories Inc.’s (“Silicon Labs”) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 14) is a
`
`hodgepodge of conclusory assertions about the adequacy of Ocean Semiconductor LLC’s
`
`(“Ocean”) Complaint (Dkt. 1) that both: (a) confuse the pleading standards and Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`law while citing to non-precedential and inapplicable case law; and (b) ignore the extensive
`
`evidentiary presentation (including citation to Silicon Labs’ website, presentations at trade
`
`shows, and Silicon Labs’ online Discussion Forum and Expert’s Corner) in that Complaint.
`
`While purporting to apply a “plausibility” standard, Silicon Labs actually argues for a much
`
`higher, and legally improper, pleading standard that would require Ocean to know, and lay out in
`
`the Complaint, substantially more than is required under the Iqbal/Twombly Supreme Court
`
`standard. This misapplication of legal standards runs throughout Silicon Labs’ Motion.
`
`Indeed, despite having specified in the Complaint at least one foundry, identified five
`
`manufacturing tools, and described more than 165 accused products manufactured by the
`
`foundry using the tools, Silicon Labs wants more—it seeks to require Ocean to identify every
`
`foundry and every tool that might be found to infringe. That is not the law. Ocean need only
`
`plead facts sufficient to place Silicon Labs on notice as to what it must defend—and Ocean did.
`
`Similarly, in support of its inducement claims, Ocean has provided evidence and factual
`
`allegations—allegations that the Court must accept as true—that would allow an inference that
`
`Silicon Labs knew about the manufacturing processes and equipment used to manufacture its
`
`own products by virtue of its contractual relationships with its foundries. Already exceeding
`
`what is typically required under the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard, Ocean’s Complaint also
`
`offered three specific classes of information that Ocean expects discovery will reveal and that
`
`would lend credence to Ocean’s inducement allegations. If this information is insufficient to
`
`meet the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard, it is difficult to imagine what would.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 6 of 26
`
`On willfulness, Silicon Labs argues for an “egregiousness” requirement that is not the
`
`law, while ignoring this Court’s case precedent establishing that notice letters are sufficient to
`
`show knowledge and also to plausibly show that Silicon Labs should have known that its
`
`conduct amounted to infringement.
`
`Finally, Silicon Labs wrongly argues that four of the asserted patents cannot be asserted
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) because they allegedly are not drawn to the manufacture of a product.
`
`Silicon Labs mischaracterizes what the patents cover, however, and ignores that each patent
`
`teaches and claims manufacturing activities and physical products that place them well within
`
`the ambit of § 271(g).
`
`Because this Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true while drawing all
`
`reasonable inferences in Ocean’s favor and should not be resolving at this stage whether Ocean
`
`will ultimately prevail, and because Silicon Labs fails properly to consider the pleaded facts or to
`
`apply the various legal standards, Silicon Labs’ Motion should be denied in its entirety.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A.
`
`The High Bar for a Motion to Dismiss
`
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint or cause of
`
`action is appropriate if it fails to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
`
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
`
`When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he court must accept all well-
`
`pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Frye v.
`
`Anadarko Petro. Corp., 953 F.3d 285, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Lormand v. US Unwired,
`
`Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009));1 see also Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461
`
`
`1 Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis in this brief has been added.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 7 of 26
`
`(5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. The
`
`question resolved is “whether [the] complaint was sufficient to cross the federal court’s
`
`threshold”—not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521,
`
`530 (2011). Pleadings should be construed broadly in light of the allegations as a whole, and the
`
`facts pled should be viewed expansively in light of the liberal pleading standards. See, e.g.,
`
`Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288-90 (5th Cir. 2004).
`
`This Court has held, based on Federal Circuit precedent, that identification of specific
`
`products, when coupled with allegations that defendants make, sell, offer to sell, import or use
`
`the accused products in the United States and that each accused product satisfies each and every
`
`limitation of at least one patent claim, is enough to meet “the relatively low threshold for stating
`
`a claim for patent infringement.” Encoditech, LLC v. Citizen Watch Co. of Am., C.A. No. 18-
`
`1335-XR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105833, at *10 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 2019) (citing Disc
`
`Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
`
`B.
`
`The Broad Reach of Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)
`
`Section 271(g) attaches liability to the import or sale of products made by a patented
`
`process. “By enacting the Process Patent Amendments Act, the principal portion of which is
`
`codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), Congress changed the law by making it an act of infringement to
`
`import into the United States, or to sell or use within the United States ‘a product which is made
`
`by a process patented in the United States[.]’” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d
`
`1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`
`Congress created liability under § 271(g) to ensure that holders of process patents and
`
`domestic manufacturers were not disadvantaged relative to holders of device and system claims
`
`or foreign manufacturers, and the courts interpret “made by” in view of these policy goals.
`
`Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bio-Technology
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 8 of 26
`
`General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
`
`911 (1996); Eli Lilly & Co. 82 F.3d at 1578; 5 Chisum on Patents § 16.02[6][d][iv] (2019). The
`
`Federal Circuit has interpreted the term “made” as used in § 271(g) to mean “manufactured” and
`
`the term “product” to mean a “physical article.” Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1377.
`
`Section 271(g) is applied broadly. When enacting the Process Patent Amendments Act
`
`(“PPAA”), Congress specifically declined to require that a product be made “directly” from a
`
`patented process in order to infringe under § 271(g). Eli Lilly & Co., 82 F.3d at 1576. “In
`
`enacting the PPAA, Congress did not include a positive definition of ‘made by.’ The court must
`
`interpret ‘made by’ in light of the PPAA’s policy to afford meaningful protection for owners of
`
`patents claiming processes.” 5 Chisum on Patents § 16.02[6][d][iv] (2019) (citing Bayer, 340
`
`F.3d at 1368; Bio-Technology General Corp., 80 F.3d at 1561). “The connection between a
`
`patented process and a product can vary from immediate . . . to remote[.]” 5 Chisum on Patents
`
`§ 16.02[6][d][iv] (2019). Consequently, whether a product is “made by” a patent should be
`
`interpreted expansively to include products made through the “agency,” “efficacy,” “work,”
`
`“participation,” “means or instrumentality,” “medium,” or “operation” of a process. Bayer at
`
`1378, n.12 (citing Webster’s and Random House dictionaries).
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Ocean’s Complaint Asserts Plausible Acts of Infringement
`
`Silicon Labs argument that the Complaint’s infringement contentions are “conclusory”
`
`and only raise a “possibility of infringement” (Dkt. 14 at 8) fails to address the abundance of
`
`detail contained in the Complaint. What Silicon Labs attacks is a straw man, just the
`
`introductory or summary sentences of the complaint divorced from the other pleadings that
`
`establish pleaded allegation in detail. Each statement that Silicon Labs argues is conclusory—
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 9 of 26
`
`that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (“TSMC”) manufactures products for
`
`Silicon Labs; that TSMC has access to the asserted manufacturing tools; and that the accused
`
`products are manufactured according to the patented processes—is more than sufficiently
`
`supported by citations throughout the Complaint so as to survive a motion to dismiss.
`
`1.
`
`The Complaint Provides Plausible Details Linking TSMC’s
`Manufacturing Tools Directly to the Accused Products
`
`Silicon Labs’ suggestion that the Complaint identifies only a “possibility of
`
`infringement” falls flat in view of the voluminous evidence identified. As an initial matter, the
`
`Complaint describes in ample detail how Silicon Labs engaged, and still engages, TSMC to
`
`manufacture accused products for Silicon Labs. For example, the Complaint identifies Silicon
`
`Labs’ microcontrollers (or “MCUs”) as accused products (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 15, 17, 19), and
`
`describes one of Silicon Labs’ “Process Change Notice #1011021” as publicly announcing that a
`
`TSMC fabrication facility (called “Fab10”) has been contracted as a “Fabrication site for Silicon
`
`Labs MCU products,” which, according to that same notice, is “an additional Fabrication site for
`
`Silicon Labs MCU products currently being fabricated in TSMC’s Fab3 site.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8; see
`
`Chan Decl. Ex. 1 at ¶ 1.)2
`
`To tie Silicon Labs’ accused products directly to the offending tools, the Complaint also
`
`describes how TSMC purchased such tools for the manufacture of accused products. For
`
`example, the Complaint identifies ASML’s TWINSCAN semiconductor manufacturing
`
`equipment (one of several extreme ultraviolet (“EUV”) lithography systems offered by ASML)
`
`as one of the infringing tools used to manufacture accused products for Silicon Labs, and
`
`includes a link to a news report affirming that TSMC had placed a “large order” in November
`
`
`2 Citations to Exhibits in this brief refer to the Exhibits attached to the co-filed Declaration of
`Alex Chan in Support of Ocean Semiconductor LLC.’s Opposition to Defendant Silicon
`Laboratories Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 10 of 26
`
`2020 for such EUV systems (an order that boosted ASML’s stock value). (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 17.) The
`
`Complaint also offers evidence indicating that ASML had launched a training facility for TSMC
`
`(for “teach[ing] [TSMC’s] engineers how to use its extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography
`
`systems”) as well as LinkedIn profiles of ASML engineers who support this training endeavor.
`
`Thus, contrary to Silicon Labs’ contention of a “bare conclusion” that all of Silicon Labs’
`
`products are manufactured using the infringing tools, Ocean provided ample evidence linking the
`
`tools directly to accused products. This more than meets the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard.
`
`2.
`
`Ocean Provides Plausible Details Beyond What Section 271(g)
`Requires
`
`Silicon Labs erroneously contends that Ocean has not pled plausible facts supporting that
`
`the accused products are “manufactured according to any asserted method, much less all Silicon
`
`Labs’ products and all asserted methods,” such as detailing “characteristics” or providing a
`
`“teardown” of the accused products. (Dkt. 14 at 8.) As a preliminary matter, Silicon Labs
`
`overlooks that Ocean’s infringement allegations are directed to Section 271(g), which focuses on
`
`unauthorized importation into the United States, or sale or use within the United States, of a
`
`“product which is made by a process patented in the United States.” Thus, this is not a case
`
`where teardown of a product would be required to demonstrate infringement.
`
`Moreover, nothing in Section 271(g) requires Ocean to provide the granular level of
`
`specificity sought by Silicon Labs, which courts in other districts have recognized as
`
`unnecessary. All that is required is that any party utilizes the patented process to manufacture
`
`products and eventually imported such products into the United States. See, e.g., Kyowa Hakka
`
`Bio, Co. Ltd. v. Ajinomoto Co., No. 17-313, 2018-MSG, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22392, at *24 (D. Del.
`
`Feb. 12, 2018) (“Under [the second clause of § 271(g)], the [] Complaint need not allege facts
`
`that the offending process was practiced for a product manufactured outside the United States
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 11 of 26
`
`. . . .”); Janssen Pharma., N.V. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 15-760-SLR-SRF, 2016 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 192881, at *40 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2016) (“The statutory language supports plaintiffs’
`
`assertion that it is defendants' act of importing which is relevant to the § 271(g) analysis, and
`
`the fact that a third party engages in the infringing process is irrelevant under § 271(g). . . .”).
`
`Indeed, the specificity proposed by Silicon Labs is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,
`
`which cautions courts not to transform the plausibility standard into a probability standard.
`
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Twombly simply requires enough facts at the pleading stage to rise
`
`above the level of sheer speculation, such that there is “a reasonable expectation that discovery
`
`will reveal evidence” supporting a claim for relief. (Id.) Ocean has clearly done this and more.
`
`Silicon Labs also ignores the voluminous claim charts accompanying the Complaint that
`
`demonstrate use of the patented processes by its contracted supplier TSMC. As one example, the
`
`’402 patent is directed to “a fault detection system in a semiconductor manufacturing process to
`
`detect the presence of a manufacturing fault and perform corrective measures in expedient
`
`manner.” (See Dkt. 1 at ¶ 45.) In two separate claim charts provided for that patent, Ocean
`
`demonstrates, in great detail, how the manufacturing tools (e.g., Applied Materials’ E3 system
`
`and PDF Solutions’ Exensio system) determine if a fault condition exists during manufacturing
`
`(e.g., based on failed patterns on a semiconductor wafer), and if such a condition exists, perform
`
`corrective actions such as updating recipe tables or scraping the die or package that contains the
`
`fault condition. (See Dkt. 1-9 at 10-11; Dkt. 1-10 at 19-21.) The result is a defect-free product.
`
`This defect-free “characteristic” is undoubtedly in all of Silicon Labs’ accused products. Thus,
`
`Ocean’s allegation that Silicon Labs’ accused products are manufactured by an infringing
`
`process is not only plausible; it is already established.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 12 of 26
`
`B.
`
`The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Does Not Require Ocean to Identify All Third-
`Party Foundries and Manufacturing Tools at the Pleading Stage
`
`Silicon Labs does not claim that it cannot understand Ocean’s infringement theories
`
`based on Ocean’s explicit identification of third-party foundries and manufacturing tools.
`
`Instead, it complains that Ocean has not identified all such foundries and tools. (Dkt. 14 at 9.)
`
`Silicon Labs, however, fails to cite a single case requiring a plaintiff to identify this level of
`
`specificity for pleading purposes under Section 271(g). It cannot for good reason—under the
`
`Iqbal/Twombly standard, a plaintiff need only “plead facts sufficient to place [an alleged
`
`infringer] on notice as to what [the alleged infringer] must defend.” Univ. of Mass. Med. Sch. v.
`
`L’Oréal S.A., No. 17-868-CFC-SRF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192832, at *13 (D. Del. Nov. 13,
`
`2018) (citing McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
`
`1.
`
`Silicon Labs Has Sufficient Notice as to What It Must Defend Because
`Ocean Has Identified at Least One Foundry and Five Manufacturing
`Tools Used to Manufacture the Accused Products
`
`Silicon Labs does not, and indeed cannot, dispute that it is on notice as to: (a) which
`
`accused products infringe (e.g., with more than 165+ products and models listed by Ocean); (b)
`
`which foundries are implicated (e.g., TSMC); and (c) what manufacturing tools are used to
`
`manufacture the accused products (e.g., Applied Materials’ E3 system, PDF Solutions’ Exensio
`
`system, camLine’s LineWorks system, and ASML’s TWINSCAN and YIELDSTAR systems)—
`
`all of which are specified for each asserted patent in the Complaint. Instead, Silicon Labs seeks
`
`Ocean to identify, at the pleading stage, all unknown foundries and unnamed tools, the absence
`
`of which allegedly would somehow open the door for a “fishing expedition.” (Dkt. 14 at 10.)
`
`But Silicon Labs misses the mark. The Iqbal/Twombly standard does not require Ocean
`
`to “prove its case at the pleading stage” by identifying all foundries that Silicon Labs contracted
`
`to manufacture its accused products and naming all such tools at the outset. In re Bill of Lading
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 13 of 26
`
`Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To the
`
`extent other such foundries exist but are not publicly known, Silicon Labs itself obviously knows
`
`about them. To require all such information would “effectively require[] [Ocean] to prove, pre-
`
`discovery, the facts necessary to win at trial” and “[t]hat is not the law.” Motiva Patents, LLC v.
`
`Sony Corp., 408 F. Supp. 3d 819, 831 (E.D. Tex. 2019). Instead, Ocean “need only identify the
`
`class of information which it reasonably expects will be revealed through discovery in support of
`
`its claims.” (Id.)
`
`Nevertheless, Ocean has pled with “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation”—
`
`through its 71-page Complaint and eight accompanying claim charts, that the accused products
`
`are and were imported, sold, or used by Silicon Labs and made by an infringing patented
`
`process. Thus, neither Silicon Labs nor this Court need speculate about what evidence discovery
`
`may reveal or be concerned that discovery would be so broad that it would become a “fishing
`
`expedition,” because Ocean has identified precisely what it expects discovery will reveal: Silicon
`
`Labs’ importation of the accused products that infringe each of the asserted patents.
`
`2.
`
`Silicon Labs’ Cases Are Inapposite
`
`Silicon Labs misleadingly cites to Artrip, Estech, and McZeal for the proposition that the
`
`pleading standard requires Ocean to identify all unnamed “machines.” (Dkt. 14 at 11.) These
`
`cases provide no such support. First, all three are inapposite because they are not directed to
`
`Section 271(g). Second, they are irrelevant because Ocean has not accused the manufacturing
`
`tools of infringement; instead, Ocean’s Complaint accuses Silicon Labs’ own products that are
`
`and were imported, sold, and/or used in the U.S. as infringing Section 271(g).
`
`Each is distinguishable on further grounds as well. In Artrip, the Federal Circuit affirmed
`
`the district court’s motion to dismiss because the “complaint does not identify, for example, by
`
`photograph or name, any of the particular machines that allegedly infringe other than by broad
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 14 of 26
`
`functional language.” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 Fed. Appx. 708, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here,
`
`however, Ocean has identified by name at least five such “machines” used to manufacture the
`
`accused products. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 13, 17, 19.) Ocean has also provided
`
`“photograph[s]” of such tools. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1-8 (claim chart for the ’651 patent), which
`
`identifies the name and provides a photo of the manufacturing tool called “TWINSCAN.”)
`
`Similarly, Estech is inapplicable because the plaintiff there failed to identify even a single
`
`product, which is not the case here. Estech Sys. v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. 6:20-cv-00322-ADA,
`
`2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200484, at *5-6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2020) (“The statement claiming
`
`infringement fails to reasonably inform Defendant as to what devices or practices, if any, are
`
`accused of infringement”).
`
`Finally, McZeal actually supports Ocean’s position. There, the Federal Circuit found that
`
`the plaintiff’s “complaint contain[ed] enough detail to allow the defendants to answer and thus
`
`meets the notice pleading required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion” because the plaintiff
`
`“described the means by which [Defendant] allegedly infringes (‘[t]he defendant’s [] machine
`
`physically have [sic] or perform all of the basic elements contained in the patent claims . . . and
`
`pointed to the specific parts of the patent law invoked.” McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1357. The
`
`Complaint here goes far beyond the standard of McZeal.
`
`C.
`
`Ocean’s Complaint Sufficiently Asserts Claims for Induced Infringement as
`Silicon Labs Gained Knowledge of the Processes and Tools Used to
`Manufacture Its Products Through Its Contractual Relationships with the
`Foundries
`
`While Silicon Labs does not dispute that it has knowledge of the Asserted Patents, it
`
`misleadingly avers that it “could not have possibly known the alleged induced acts would
`
`constitute infringement” because it “does not know the processes and tools used to manufacture
`
`its products.” (Dkt. 14 at 13.) This argument fails for two reasons.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-01214-ADA Document 16 Filed 03/25/21 Page 15 of 26
`
`First, as specified in the Complaint, Silicon Labs has contractual relationships with its
`
`foundries, which use third-party manufacturing tools to manufacture the accused products. (Dkt.
`
`1 at ¶¶ 8, 9, 17, 19.) As the customer, and as the designer and developer of its accused products,
`
`Silicon Labs surely has knowledge of the processes and equipment used to manufacture them.
`
`Indeed, this knowledge can be gleaned from Silicon Labs’ own “Process Change Notice”
`
`identified in the Complaint, which specifies that the second TSMC facility being used as an
`
`additional manufacturing site fabricates products that “comply with Silicon Labs relevant
`
`datasheets and quality levels,” and which have “no impact on form, fit, function, quality or
`
`reliability.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8; see Chan Decl. Ex. 1 at ¶ 1.) This notice thus suggests that Silicon
`
`Labs communicated with TSMC, tested the accused products, and along the way, gained
`
`knowledge about the fabrication processes adopted and tools used by TSMC to make the
`
`products in announcing the “successful qualification” of TSMC. Hence, Ocean has, at a
`
`minimum, provided factual allegations—allegations that the C