Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 1 of 15
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEMARAY LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`INTEL CORPORATION,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEMARAY LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD (A
`KOREAN COMPANY), SAMSUNG
`ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., and
`SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,
`LLC,
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 6:20-cv-00634-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 6:20-cv-00636-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF DEMARAY LLC’S
`REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`10920342
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 2 of 15
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`“Substrate” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 7, 11; ’276 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 6, 10) ................................ 1
`
`“Pulsed DC power” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 11; ’276 Patent, cls. 1, 6) ................................. 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants Seek To Add Limitations Requiring Constant Pulsing...................... 3
`
`Defendants’ Attempt To Import Preset Parameters Should Be Rejected ............. 5
`
`III.
`
`“Narrow band rejection filter” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 20; ’276 Patent,
`cls. 1, 6) .................................................................................................................................. 7
`
`IV.
`
`“Reconditioning the target” (’657 Patent, cl. 1) ................................................................... 9
`
`V.
`
`“Substantially constant” (’276 Patent, cl. 10) ..................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`10920342
`
`
`- i -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 3 of 15
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp.,
`508 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................8
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................10
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................6
`
`ScriptPro LLC v. Innovation Assocs., Inc.,
`833 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`
`
`---------------------------
`
` *
`
` Unless otherwise noted, internal citations and subsequent history are omitted, and emphasis is
`added.
`
`The “Demaray Patents” are U.S. Patent Nos. 7,381,657 and 7,544,276 (“’657 patent” and “’276
`patent,” respectively) (Exs. 1-2). All exhibits are attached to the previously filed Declaration of C.
`Maclain Wells (“Wells”). Also referenced is the previously filed Declaration of Dr. Alexander
`Glew (“Glew”).
`
`
`10920342
`
`
`- ii -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 4 of 15
`
`
`
`Defendants eschew established claim construction principles and, rather than engage with
`
`the claim language itself, seek to import limitations into the claims based upon extrinsic evidence.
`
`To the limited extent defendants cite the intrinsic record at all, they fail to identify any clear,
`
`unambiguous statements giving rise to lexicography or disclaimers. For these reasons, the Court
`
`should give the claim terms at issue the full scope of their plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`I.
`
`“Substrate” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 7, 11; ’276 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 6, 10)
`
`Defendants admit “there appears to be no disagreement on what constitutes a ‘substrate’ in
`
`practice.” Resp. 5. The term has a plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the patents and no
`
`construction is needed. Defendants do not even attempt to dispute Demaray’s evidence that the
`
`patents embrace all substrates, including those comprising insulating layers (see Br. 6; Ex. 1, 2:61–
`
`62 (“substrate can be any material and, in some embodiments, is a silicon wafer.”)), nor do
`
`defendants present any contrary intrinsic evidence. Defendants’ proposed construction is instead
`
`patched together from cherry-picked, then edited, and then augmented, extrinsic definitions.
`
`Rather than address the term in the full context of the claims, defendants only address an
`
`“insulating substrate” in the preamble to claim 1 of the ’657 patent. Resp. 3 n.2. But defendants fail
`
`to overcome the presumption that preambles are not limiting. Defendants do not disagree with
`
`Demaray’s point that the body of claim 1 recites all the material steps of the invention independent
`
`of the term “insulating substrate.” See, e.g., Ex. 1, cl. 1. Defendants’ argument that the preamble
`
`was relied upon to distinguish the claims during prosecution is incorrect. The amendment to which
`
`defendants point included “narrow band rejection filter” and “RF bias” limitations that the file
`
`history makes clear were the basis for allowance. Ex. 4 at -2514–15. The applicants argued that
`
`“claim 62 is allowable” because the prior art combination “does not teach or suggest the
`
`
`
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 5 of 15
`
`
`
`combination of ‘providing pulsed DC power to the
`
`target through a narrow band rejection filter such
`
`that the target alternates between positive and
`
`negative voltages’ and ‘providing an RF bias at a
`
`frequency that corresponds to the narrow band
`
`rejection filter to the substrate.’” Id. at -2518–20.
`
`Nowhere in that exchange (for claim 62 or 85, which are now independent claims 1 and 2) did the
`
`applicants rely on the term “insulating substrate” to distinguish the prior art.
`
`In addition, recognizing that even in the context of the preamble their proposed
`
`construction is fatally flawed, defendants now propose new, previously undisclosed additional
`
`limitations: “base support structure … for example the entirety of a wafer and all layers on that
`
`wafer.” Defendants argue that this convoluted addition is necessary because an “insulating
`
`substrate” must be wholly insulating, “including all materials in the substrate if it is composed of
`
`multiple materials” (e.g., all previously deposited films). Resp. 5. That is also incorrect. The
`
`patents teach the use of both conductive and insulating elements in the production of “optical
`
`devices and production of semiconductor devices … [that] hold promise for integrated optical and
`
`electronic signal processing on a single semiconductor-like substance.” Ex. 1, 1:15–29. Indeed,
`
`claim 1 of the ’657 patent calls for a “conductive target” of the type used in such products. Id., cl.
`
`1. Defendants’ own dictionaries (Resp. 5) recognize that wafers and previously deposited thin-
`
`films (i.e., the substrates for subsequent depositions) are used to form “the parts of an integrated
`
`circuit,” which, by definition, need to include conductive elements. Defendants do not even
`
`address preferred embodiments that involve substrates that include layers of insulating materials
`
`deposited on top of other materials. Id., 7:62–65 (“[t]ypically, substrate 16 can be a silicon wafer or
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 6 of 15
`
`
`
`a silicon wafer coated with a layer of silicon oxide ….”). The intrinsic record plainly does not
`
`exclude substrates with insulating layers on top of conductive elements.
`
`Indeed, defendants’ own citations defeat their new proposal. They cite portions of the
`
`specification showing examples of an insulating substrate such as glass (Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 1, 2:63
`
`& 7:65–8:1)), but the specification discusses glass substrates being used both with conductive
`
`elements and being doped. Ex. 1, 2:61–65 (glass layer in semiconductor device), 1:37-43 (doping
`
`glass). The example glasses include boro-aluminosilicate glasses (id., 7:65–8:4 (i.e., Corning
`
`1737)) of the type commonly used with, e.g., transistor structures. See Br. 6. Defendants’
`
`contention that claim differentiation applies (Resp. 6) is grammatical sleight of hand. The preamble
`
`of ’657 patent, claim 2 refers to the type of thin-film deposited, not the nature of the substrate.
`
`II.
`
`“Pulsed DC power” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 11; ’276 Patent, cls. 1, 6)1
`
`“Pulsed DC power” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The claim language
`
`itself makes clear that the pulses of DC power “alternate[] between positive and negative
`
`voltages.” This precisely tracks the specification and applicants’ statements during prosecution.
`
`Defendants do not even attempt to dispute Demaray’s evidence that pulses of DC can take many
`
`forms and that various parameters can change (Br. 9–10), nor do they present any contrary intrinsic
`
`evidence. Defendants accuse Demaray of redrafting the claim to remove the “pulsed” limitation.
`
`Resp. 8. Not so—Demaray’s proposal reflects the contextual claim language, which is not in
`
`dispute, that the pulses “alternate[] between positive and negative voltages.” See, e.g., Ex. 1, cl. 1.
`
`A.
`
`Defendants Seek To Add Limitations Requiring Constant Pulsing
`
`The patents disclose using occasional pulses of DC power that alternate between negative
`
`and positive potentials, rather than continuous DC power, because “[d]uring the positive period,
`
`
`1 Defendants do address “pulsed DC power supply” in their brief, confirming that the term
`needs no separate construction. Br. 12.
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 7 of 15
`
`
`
`the insulating layer on the surface of target 12 is discharged and arcing is prevented.” Ex. 1, 5:39–
`
`41; see Glew, ¶ 20. Defendants assert that this benefit can only be achieved by constant pulsing
`
`(Resp. 12–15), but the patents teach otherwise. The patents explain that “[t]o obtain arc free
`
`deposition, the pulsing frequency exceeds a critical frequency that depend on target material,
`
`cathode current and reverse time.” Ex. 1, 5:41–45. When an arc is impending, the cathode current
`
`increases and the voltage to the target decreases (see, e.g., Ou Ex. 18 at 113 (arc detection at
`
`current threshold))—by monitoring one of these parameters and setting a threshold, pulses can be
`
`provided as necessary (i.e., at a frequency that exceeds a critical frequency) to obtain arc free
`
`deposition. For example, the patents identify the “AE Pinnacle Plus” as an example of a pulsed DC
`
`power supply. Ex. 1, 5:46–48. Defendants offer a 2002 Pinnacle Plus manual as evidence that this
`
`power supply required constant pulsing (Resp. 13–14)—but the manual states the opposite:
`
`
`Ou Ex. 18 at 67 (annotated). Indeed, the manual states “pulsing at the current threshold” is its
`
`
`
`“default setting.” Id. at 73. “If the unit is set to pulse at the current threshold, pulsing is disabled
`
`until the Pinnacle Plus+ unit detects current flow above the current threshold. At this point the
`
`unit will begin to pulse.” Id. Any construction requiring constant pulsing would exclude the
`
`default setting in the exemplar power supply identified in the specification.
`
`Defendants also attempt to classify pulsing of DC power at arc detection as “conventional
`
`DC sputtering” because continuous DC power with power shut off at arc detection was allegedly
`
`“conventional in the 1990s.” Resp. 7. First, the claims are not directed at pulsed DC power
`
`standing alone and such power supplies in the art are not relevant to claim construction. Second,
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 8 of 15
`
`
`
`some conventional DC power sources used pulses (e.g., with pulse width modulation of voltage),
`
`but during the pulses the voltage remained at the same polarity. During prosecution the applicants
`
`recognized that there were different possible definitions of “pulsed DC power” (e.g., when the
`
`voltage maintains the same polarity and when polarity reverses). The applicants “explicitly defined
`
`pulsed DC power to refer to power that oscillates between positive and negative voltages” in
`
`contrast to pulsed DC power in which the “DC power can be shunted to ground so that the voltage
`
`on the target was brought from a high negative voltage to near ground voltage” but with which
`
`“the target remains at a negative voltage throughout the deposition.” Ex. 3 at -1305. This
`
`exchange is consistent with the contextual language of the claims and Demaray’s proposal.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants’ Attempt To Import Preset Parameters Should Be Rejected
`
`Defendants’ attempt to import a “square wave” limitation should be rejected. Defendants
`
`state that “Pulsed DC Power Necessarily Has a Square Waveform” (Resp. 10), but do not actually
`
`argue, let alone offer support, that square waves are the only suitable form of pulsed DC power.
`
`The only evidence establishes that square waveforms are not required. Glew, ¶ 43. Defendants
`
`instead argue that the “‘square wave’ shape was inextricably linked to the narrow band rejection
`
`filter” during prosecution. Resp. 11. But, defendants do not identify any unambiguous disclaimer
`
`of other waveforms or to lexicography through which the applicants defined “pulsed DC power” as
`
`strictly limited to square waves. Id. Instead, defendants point to statements from Dr. Demaray that
`
`the testing he performed involved a square wave. Id. (citing Ex. 4 at ¶ 3 (Pinnacle Plus “produced a
`
`10 kW square wave ....”)). But claims are not limited to characteristics of example
`
`implementations tested by inventors any more than by preferred embodiments in specifications.
`
`Defendants’ proposal would also add needless complexity as they concede that the “square wave”
`
`need not be “perfect.” Id. at 12. As with defendants’ other proposals—seeking to create non-
`
`infringement arguments not supported by the claims as written—defendants’ rewriting of “pulsed
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 9 of 15
`
`
`
`DC power” as “DC power in the form of a square wave” makes the language less clear.
`
`Defendants’ attempt to add preset parameter requirements in order to exclude pulses of DC
`
`power upon arc detection (Resp. 14–15) fares no better. First, defendants improperly seek to limit
`
`the claims based on examples from the specification. The patents state that these examples are
`
`“exemplary only and are not intended to be limiting.” Ex. 1, 22:59–67. And it is black letter law
`
`that courts must “avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims.” Phillips v.
`
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further, the specification discusses alternatives
`
`that use other parameters: “[t]o obtain arc free deposition, the pulsing frequency exceeds a critical
`
`frequency that depend on target material, cathode current and reverse time.” Ex. 1, 5:41–45; see
`
`also Ex. 15 at 1 (“If a system is pulsed, the power may either contain a periodic transient followed
`
`by a return to steady state … the transient may be self-generated or may occur in response to a
`
`plasma event, such as an arc.”). As discussed above, the cathode current begins to rise when an
`
`arc is imminent. See Ex. 18 at 73 (threshold current used for arc detection). “[A] specification’s
`
`focus on one particular embodiment or purpose cannot limit the described invention where that
`
`specification expressly contemplates other embodiments or purposes.” ScriptPro LLC v.
`
`Innovation Assocs., Inc., 833 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Defendants’ inability to consistently identify the parameters in their proposed construction
`
`underscores the impropriety of their approach. Regarding amplitude, defendants cite to a
`
`discussion in the patents regarding the amplitude of the pulse during arc suppression that “‘allow[s]
`
`charge neutralization of the surface of [the] target,’ thus ‘decreasing the rate of micro arcing.’”
`
`Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 1, 12:15–21). Defendants then point to the “setpoint” in the manual for the
`
`Pinnacle Plus, the power supply provided as an example in the patents, and claim that it “provided
`
`its power at a set frequency, reverse time, and amplitude.” Id. (citing Ex. 18 at 4-19 and identifying
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 10 of 15
`
`
`
`the “setpoint” as the amplitude). But, the setpoint for the Pinnacle Plus is the amplitude of the DC
`
`power during sputtering, not the amplitude of the arc suppression pulse, and it does not determine
`
`whether the voltage goes positive to provide the arc suppression benefits discussed in the patents.
`
`Defendants also argue that the stated goal of “prevent[ing]” arcing excludes pulsing at arc
`
`detection. Id. at 14. Beyond the fact that no such limitation appears in the claims, this makes no
`
`sense. Extinguishing an arc when it is imminent constitutes “preventing” arcing. This is exactly
`
`what is described in the Pinnacle Plus manual on which defendants rely. Ou Ex. 18 at 73 (“If the
`
`unit is set to pulse at the current threshold … At this point the unit will begin to pulse.”).
`
`Defendants also point to a disclosure in the patents: “the pulsing frequency exceeds a critical
`
`frequency.” Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 1, 5:36-43). A POSITA would understand that this refers to
`
`having arc suppression sufficiently frequent to prevent damage from arcing. Ou Ex. 15 (Glew Tr.)
`
`at 172:22–25 (“It doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s at a fixed value. It’s just saying that you have
`
`to refresh the positive at least this often in order to avoid arcing.”). When the system is configured
`
`to pulse only when an arc is imminent, the “pulsing frequency” is as close as possible to that
`
`critical frequency to maximize deposition time. Id. at 173:9–174:20. This does not require a fixed
`
`time period between pulses. Regarding reverse time, the patents state: “[t]he reverse time on this
`
`embodiment of power supply 14 can be adjusted between 0 and 5 μs.” Ex. 1, 5:53–55. At 0 μs, the
`
`reverse time is not preset at zero (where there would be no arc suppression), it means voltage
`
`should go positive and return to normal as quickly as possible. Ou Ex. 15 at 176:22–178:20.
`
`III.
`
`“Narrow band rejection filter” (’657 Patent, cls. 1, 2, 20; ’276 Patent, cls. 1, 6)
`
`Despite defendants’ ever-changing construction changed on the eve of this brief, the only
`
`dispute defendants raise on this term is whether the construction of narrow band rejection filter
`
`should address frequencies passed in addition to those rejected. Resp. 15. Rejecting and passing
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 11 of 15
`
`
`
`frequencies are different subjects, and adding extraneous “passing” limitations would be improper.
`
`Defendants’ proposal that “[substantially] all frequencies outside of the narrow band” must be
`
`passed is not required by the term’s plain meaning. Contextual claim language provides, for
`
`example, that the filter “rejects at a frequency of the RF bias power supply” (Ex. 2 (’276 Patent),
`
`cl. 1), “operat[es] at a frequency of the RF bias power supply” (id., cl. 2), and an “RF bias [at a
`
`frequency] that corresponds to the narrow band rejection filter” (Ex. 1 (’657 Patent), cls. 1, 2). The
`
`specifications similarly focus on the frequency rejected: “[f]ilter 15 prevents the bias power from
`
`power supply 18 from coupling into pulsed DC power supply 14.” Id., 5:56–65.
`
`Defendants point to examples from the prosecution history about the filter passing
`
`frequencies, but fail to identify any statements giving rise to lexicography or prosecution
`
`disclaimer. See Resp. 15–16. Although defendants cite basic prosecution disclaimer caselaw, they
`
`never point to any passages having the “clarity and deliberateness” required for disclaimer under
`
`that law. Notably, here, the applicants discussed the claimed filter without any reference
`
`whatsoever to “passing” See, e.g., Ex. 4 (’657 FH) at -2521 (“A filter that blocks too many of the
`
`constituent frequencies of the pulsed DC waveform results in the target voltage not attaining a
`
`positive voltage. A filter that does not block the RF bias voltage can result in failure of the DC
`
`power supply.”); Ou Ex. 3 (’356 FH) at 1457 (similar); 1302 (“The band rejection filter is arranged
`
`to reject RF power at the frequency of the RF bias to the substrate.”). Neither the prosecution
`
`history nor specification supports adding the new limitation urged by defendants. See Elbex Video,
`
`Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (no “clear and
`
`unmistakable” disclaimer when unsupported by specification and prosecution history as a whole).
`
`Defendants also contend their proposal is appropriate to prevent Demaray from arguing
`
`that a filter which “rejects … additional frequencies outside that band could still be a NBRF.”
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 12 of 15
`
`
`
`Resp. 15. The term (and Demaray’s construction) defines rejection in a “narrowband,” not mere
`
`broadband rejection typically seen with, e.g., low-pass or high-pass filters alone. See, e.g., Ex. 3
`
`(’356 FH) at -1302 (distinguishing a narrow band rejection filter from “a conventional high or low
`
`pass filter”). That said, this is a “comprising” claim and a filter that is directed at rejecting
`
`frequencies in narrowband, but that is also engineered to do other things as well (e.g., a dual-notch
`
`filter rejecting at a second frequency), certainly be encompassed by the claim term.
`
`Defendants deny that they are attempting to capture prior art in redefining contextual
`
`language (i.e., “operating at,” “corresponds to,” “rejects at”), but in response offer only
`
`mischaracterizations of the prior art disclosures and misreading of the claim language. See Resp.
`
`18. As Demaray explained, Hirose (cited in the IPRs) affirmatively seeks to offset its filter from
`
`the frequency of the RF power supply. Contrary to defendants’ misrepresentation, Dr. Glew did not
`
`agree that Hirose discloses a narrow band rejection filter that “corresponds to,” “rejects at”, or is
`
`“operating at” a frequency of the RF bias power supply. Ou Ex. 19, ¶ 78 (“a narrow band rejection
`
`filter, which filter circuit 20 [in Hirose] is not” and filter circuit 20 is “more than 10% shift[ed]
`
`from the frequency of the RF power supply”). Defendants also argue that this contextual language
`
`should be redefined because the narrowband rejection filter attenuates more than a single
`
`frequency. Resp. 17. The specification is clear that the filter is set to correspond to the RF bias
`
`frequency and attenuates signals at that frequency and within the narrowband and thus “prevents
`
`the bias power from power supply 18 from coupling into pulsed DC power supply 14.” Id., 5:56–
`
`65. This is reflected in the claim language as written but not in defendants’ rewrites.
`
`IV.
`
`“Reconditioning the target” (’657 Patent, cl. 1)
`
`There is no requirement in the claims, specification, or elsewhere that reconditioning
`
`happen “between depositions.” “Reconditioning the target” is instead described as “includ[ing]
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 13 of 15
`
`
`
`reactive sputtering in the metallic mode and then reactive sputtering in the poison mode.” Ex. 1, cl.
`
`1; see also id., 17:10–11; 18:11–15, 20:54–55. Defendants argue there is a distinction between
`
`“reconditioning” and “conditioning” based on claim 1 of the parent ’356 patent. Resp. 19. First, the
`
`term “conditioning” appears nowhere in the ’657 patent claims, and the specification makes no
`
`such distinction. Id., 20:52–55 (“recondition process … to condition target 12.”); see GPNE Corp.
`
`v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1365, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (declining to apply claim differentiation
`
`based on parent patent). Second, even if there was a difference, reconditioning does not require a
`
`prior deposition; for example, the target can require cleaning even after its initial setup.
`
`Regarding the “metallic” and “poison” modes that make up the reconditioning process,
`
`Demaray’s proposals closely track the specification. Ex. 1, 11:27–37; 11:66–12:9. Defendants’
`
`suggestion that these terms do not require construction, but that other far more readily
`
`understandable claim terms do, makes no sense. Defendants do not argue that Demaray’s proposal
`
`is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. They merely point out other
`
`purported characterizations in the specification. Resp. 19. But claim construction is not about
`
`importing every callout from the specification into the claims. Demaray’s constructions would help
`
`jurors understand technical terms they never would have encountered, and they should be adopted.
`
`V.
`
`“Substantially constant” (’276 Patent, cl. 10)
`
`Defendants attempt to require that the substrate achieve a homogenous temperature at a
`
`predefined set point. These new requirements are extraneous, as there is no basis in the claims
`
`for them. In addition, they are technologically unfounded. Substrates do not typically have
`
`uniform temperatures. See Glew, ¶ 71; Ou Ex. 15 (Glew Tr.) at 278:4–5 (“the edges are almost
`
`always colder than the center.”). Defendants’ extrinsic evidence does not hold otherwise. See Ou
`
`Ex. 21, 2:2–3 (“it is not easy to control the wall surface temperature”), 2:48–53 (contemplating
`
`controlling temperature of “top plate installed opposite to the sample”).
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 14 of 15
`
`
`
`Dated: March 19, 2021
`
`/s/ C. Maclain Wells
` By: C. Maclain Wells
`
`Richard D. Milvenan
`State Bar No. 14171800
`Travis C. Barton
`State Bar No. 00790276
`MCGINNIS LOCHRIDGE LLP
`600 Congress Ave., Suite 2100
`Austin, Texas 78701
`Telephone: (512) 495-6005
`Facsimile: (512) 505-6305
`rmilvenan@mcginnislaw.com
`tcbarton@mcginnislaw.com
`
`Morgan Chu (pro hac vice)
`Benjamin W. Hattenbach (pro hac vice)
`Annita Zhong (pro hac vice)
`C. Maclain Wells (pro hac vice)
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
`Los Angeles, California 90067
`Telephone: (310) 277-1010
`Facsimile: (310) 203-7199
`mchu@irell.com
`bhattenbach@irell.com
`azhong@irell.com
`mwells@irell.com
`
`Darish Huynh (pro hac vice)
`IRELL & MANELLA LLP
`840 Newport Center Drive, Suite 400
`Newport Beach, CA 92660
`Telephone: (949) 760-0991
`Facsimile: (949) 760-5200
`dhuynh@irell.com
`Attorneys for Demaray LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00636-ADA Document 83 Filed 03/19/21 Page 15 of 15
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that on March 19, 2021 all counsel of record who are deemed
`
`to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the
`
`Court’s CM/ECF system.
`
`By: /s/ Darish Huynh
`Darish Huynh
`
`
`
`
`
`10920342
`
`
`- 12 -
`
`