Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 1 of 26
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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`WACO DIVISION
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`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
`
` v.
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`AMAZON.COM, INC.;
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC; and
`AMAZON.COM WEB SERVICES, INC.;
`
`
` Defendants.
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`
`
`
`Case No. 6:20-CV-0272-JD
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`
`PLAINTIFF VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.’S
`OPPOSITION TO AMAZON’S OPPOSED
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 2 of 26
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 1
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`III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 3
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`A.
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`B.
`
`C.
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`Defendants Fail To Establish Claim 1 As Representative. .......................................................... 3
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`VoIP-Pal Is Not Collaterally Estopped From Challenging Ineligibility. ..................................... 6
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`Claim 1 Is Not Directed To An Abstract Idea. ............................................................................. 9
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`1. The allegedly functional terms in Claim 1 do not render it abstract. ....................................... 9
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`2. Claim 1 is not analogous to preexisting call routing practices. .............................................. 11
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`3. Claim 1 does not use known technology to perform routine functions. ................................ 12
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`D.
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`Claim 1 Recites An Inventive Concept. ..................................................................................... 13
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`1. The individual claim elements recite an inventive concept. .................................................. 13
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`2. The ordered combination provides an inventive concept....................................................... 14
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`E.
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`The Court Should Not Decide Patent Eligibility On An Undeveloped Record. ....................... 16
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`F. The Court Should Grant VoIP-Pal Leave To Amend. ................................................................... 17
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`IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 18
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 3 of 26
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............. 2, 3, 15, 17
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .......................................................... 2, 13
`
`AML IP, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00600-ADA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66678
`
`(W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2022) ........................................................................................................ 3, 6, 7, 16
`
`Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................ 13
`
`Avocent Huntsville, LLC v. ZPE Sys., Case No. 3:17-cv-04319-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47655
`
`(N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) ....................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ......................................................................... 2, 7
`
`Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2012)......................................................................... 1
`
`BroadSoft, Inc. v. CallWave Communs., LLC, 282 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Del. 2017) ................................ 13
`
`Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 13 C 6339, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137577 (N.D. Ill.
`
`Sept. 29, 2014) ........................................................................................................................................ 3
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................................................... 2, 3, 14
`
`CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................... 3
`
`Coop. Entm’t, Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............................................... 2
`
`DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..................................................................... 2
`
`e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Tech., Inc., 772 F.3d 723 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................... 8
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................... 12, 13
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)............................................................ 9, 10
`
`Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 18
`
`Grecia Estate Holdings LLC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 3d 905 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ......... 6, 7, 8
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 4 of 26
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`Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 1
`
`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................... 9, 10
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) ......................................... 2
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......................... 12, 13, 14
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) ................................................................ 3
`
`Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................................. 2
`
`Nice Ltd. v. CallMiner, Inc., No. 18-2024-RGA-SRF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20516 (D. Del. Feb. 3,
`
`2020) ....................................................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................. 6
`
`Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .................................................................... 4
`
`PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D. Tex. 2019) ............................... 4, 6
`
`Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomms. Labs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 192 (D. Del. 2015)......... 4
`
`Prompt Med. Sys., L.P. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 6:10-cv-71, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`30694 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2012) ............................................................................................................ 9
`
`Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................ 2
`
`Seven Networks, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-01036-N, 2022 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 24709 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022)................................................................................................ 8
`
`SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................ 8
`
`Slyce Acquisition v. Syte - Visual Conception, No. W-19-CV-00257-ADA, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9451
`
`(W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2020) .............................................................................................................. passim
`
`Smiledirectclub v. Candid Care Co., No. 6:20-CV-01115-ADA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154206 (W.D.
`
`Tex. July 1, 2021) ................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ................... 9
`
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`Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 17
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`Two-Way Media Ltd v. Comcast Cable Communs., LLC, 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..................... 14
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 2
`
`Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. GE Co., 916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ....................................... 3
`
`Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 510 F. Supp. 3d 926 (E.D. Cal. 2020) .......................... 4
`
`Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .................................................. 17
`
`VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ......................................... passim
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`VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ............................................. 11
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. §101 ............................................................................................................................................ 1
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`35 U.S.C. §282 ............................................................................................................................................ 3
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 6 of 26
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
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`ABBREVIATION
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`TERM
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`VoIP-Pal
`
`Amazon
`
`
`Defendants
`
`The ’606 patent or the patent-in-suit
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`The asserted claims
`
`
`The ’002 patent
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`FAC
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`POSITA
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`NDCAL
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`PTO
`
`PSTN
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`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services,
`LLC, and Amazon Web Services, Inc.
`
`Amazon
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,218,006
`
`Claims 1, 3-6, 8, 9, 11, 14-15, 18–19, 21-24,
`26-27 and 44 of the ’606 patent
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,826,002
`
`First Amended Complaint
`
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
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`Public Switched Telephone Network
`
` v
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 7 of 26
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`
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`The Court should deny Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings because collateral
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`estoppel does not apply and because Defendants have not shown that the asserted claims of the ’606
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`patent are ineligible in view of VoIP-Pal’s plausible factual allegations. Defendants’ collateral estoppel
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`argument rests entirely on Claim 1, which Defendants fail to show is representative of all asserted
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`claims. Defendants also do not address the differences between all 19 asserted claims and claim 1 of the
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`adjudicated ’002 patent to determine if those differences materially alter the eligibility inquiry.
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`Defendants’ ineligibility argument fails because they have not met their burden to prove by clear
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`and convincing evidence that the asserted claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. Defendants limit
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`their ineligibility position to Claim 1. Claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea of routing
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`communications based on the participant’s characteristics. Consequently, Defendants erroneously
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`analogize Claim 1 to allegedly long-standing call-routing practices that are fundamentally different than
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`the claimed invention. Claim 1 is patent eligible because it recites the inventive concepts of user-
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`specific communication handling and transparent routing. Defendants ignore express intrinsic evidence
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`that shows the claimed inventive concept was not well-known, routine, or conventional and that
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`precludes dismissal at the Rule 12 stage.
`
`Largely, Defendants’ Motion attempts to piggyback off prior decisions in the NDCAL
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`invalidating the asserted claims of six other VoIP-Pal patents under §101. Those decisions, however,
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`are irrelevant because they concern materially different claims in different VoIP-Pal patents asserted
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`against different defendants. Thus, these prior decisions have little bearing on any issue that this Court
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`needs to decide. Based on the merits in this case, Defendants’ Motion should be denied.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`
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`A Rule 12(c) motion requires the Court to take as true the plausible and nonconclusory factual
`
`allegations in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
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`favor.1 Patent eligibility is a question of law that may involve underlying questions of fact.2 Plausible
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`
`1 See Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2012).
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 8 of 26
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`factual allegations may preclude dismissal under §101 where, for example, nothing in the record refutes
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`those allegations as a matter of law or justifies dismissal under Rule 12. 3 “While a fact-finder may
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`ultimately determine that [a claim] limitation was well-understood, routine, and conventional, absent a
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`clear statement to that effect in the specification, complaint, or other material properly before the court,
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`when disputed such a determination may not be made on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”4
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`The Supreme Court has “set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim … abstract
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`ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”5 First, the Court must
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`“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” an abstract idea.6 “If not, the claims pass muster
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`under §101.”7 Courts, however, must “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle less it
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`swallow all of patent law.”8 Thus, “for abstractness to invalidate a claim it must ‘exhibit itself so
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`manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory
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`context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.’”9
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`Second, if the first step is answered “yes,” then the Court must “consider the elements of each claim
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`both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements
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`‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”10 This step essentially asks
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`whether the claims add an “inventive concept” “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts
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`to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.”11 Determining whether claims
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`
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`2 See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`3 See Coop. Entm’t, Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th 127, 130 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Aatrix Software,
`Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Cellspin Soft, Inc. v.
`Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`4 See Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`5 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
`6 Id.
`7 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`8 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
`9 See DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Research Corp. Techs.
`v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
`10 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
`1289, 1297 (2012)).
`11 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297) (modification marks omitted).
`
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`recite an inventive concept, or something more than well-understood, routine, or conventional activities,
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`may turn on underlying questions of fact.12
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`Issued patents are presumed valid, placing a heavy burden on the party challenging eligibility.13
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`The Federal Circuit has held that ineligibility is an invalidity defense under 35 U.S.C. §282.14 Thus,
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`Defendants bear the burden to prove ineligibility by clear and convincing evidence.15
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`In view of these factors, defendants invoking § 101 in a Rule 12 motion face an uphill battle as
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`this Court has aptly explained:
`
`Therefore, during step two of the Alice analysis, after accepting all of
`the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
`inferences in the patentee’s favor, a court must determine whether there
`is clear and convincing evidence that the claim limitations are merely
`“well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously
`known to the industry.” … In other words, to prevail, the movant needs
`to overcome both a factual deck stacked against it and a heightened
`burden of proof. Therefore, because a patent is presumed valid and
`requires clear and convincing evidence to prove its invalidity, a Rule
`12(b) motion to dismiss is a procedurally awkward place for a court
`[sic] resolve a patent’s §101 eligibility.16
`
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`Indeed, the Court has held that resolving § 101 eligibility is rarely appropriate at the Rule 12 stage. 17
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A. Defendants Fail To Establish Claim 1 As Representative.
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`
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`
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`In their attempt to establish collateral estoppel, Defendants focus exclusively on Claim 1.
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`Defendants, however, must first establish that Claim 1 is representative of the asserted claims. It is not;
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`nor is Defendants’ representative claim analysis sound.
`
`
`12 See Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1315 (citing Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1128).
`13 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring,
`joined by Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Wallach, JJ.); id. at 1304-05 (Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-
`in-part, joined by Linn, Moore, O’Malley, JJ.); Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 13 C
`6339, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137577, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014).
`14 See Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. GE Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“§282’s
`defenses include a §101 eligibility challenge … .”).
`15 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that invalidity
`defenses under §282 must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
`16 See AML IP, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00600-ADA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`66678, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2022).
`17 See Slyce Acquisition v. Syte - Visual Conception, No. W-19-CV-00257-ADA, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`9451, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2020).
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`35 U.S.C. §282 provides that “[e]ach claim of a patent … shall be presumed valid independently
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`of the validity of other claims … even though dependent upon an invalid claim.” Thus, patent eligibility
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`must be evaluated for each individual claim.18 Even assuming that it is proper to evaluate the eligibility
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`of individual claims based on allegedly representative claims, Defendants bear the initial burden to
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`establish the representative claims.19 Indeed, “[e]rroneously determining that a claim is representative
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`has constitutional consequences.”20 The Court should not let Defendants oversimplify the claims for
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`their own expediency at the expense of VoIP-Pal’s constitutional rights.21
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`As Defendants admit, claims 3 and 22 relate to determining whether a communication should be
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`allowed to proceed or be blocked, and claims 4, 5, and 22 relate to whether a communication should be
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`forwarded. 22 But Defendants make no effort to show that these features do not meaningfully differ from
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`Claim 1; they merely allege that these features are “routine aspects of routing a communication.”23 This
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`assertion can hardly overcome the allegations in the FAC that communication blocking is a distinctive
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`feature of the ’606 patent.24 Even VoIP-Pal II treated communication blocking as a distinct concept in
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`its representative claims analysis.25 Claim 11 also concerns a concept—locating a new second
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`participant identifier in a database—that VoIP-Pal II treated as distinct.26 Defendants fail to explain
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`otherwise.
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`Defendants also misapply VoIP-Pal II in arguing that routing a communication to a third
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`participant is not distinctive.27 VoIP-Pal II found this concept not distinctive of the representative
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`claims because in the claims at issue it was “accomplished using the same process for routing a
`
`
`18 See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“grounds of invalidity must be
`analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis”) (citations omitted).
`19 See PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 2019);
`Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomms. Labs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 192, 200 (D. Del. 2015).
`20 See Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 510 F. Supp. 3d 926, 944 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2020)
`(citations omitted).
`21 Id.
`22 Dkt. No. 103 at 17.
`23 Id.
`24 Dkt. No. 31 at ¶37.
`25 See VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926, 942 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“VoIP-Pal II”).
`26 Id.
`27 Dkt. No. 103 at 17.
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`communication to the second participant.”28 But in claims 14, 15, and 26, routing to the third participant
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`is accomplished through a gateway, which is different from the routing to the second participant in
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`Claim 1.29 Thus, claims 14, 15, and 26 are meaningfully different than Claim 1.
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`Similarly, Defendants acknowledge that claims 8, 15, and 44 recite a participant device in
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`communication with a PSTN but fail to explain why these claims are not meaningfully different than
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`Claim 1.30 Defendants also fail to appreciate that claim 8 requires that the claimed packet switched
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`communication system form a private network, which is a limitation found in no other claim.31
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`Claim 1 also is not representative of claims 9 and 27. Claims 9 and 27 are not even
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`representative of each other. Claim 9 concerns determining whether the first and second participant are
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`associated with the same location whereas claim 27 concerns determining which node or network
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`element the second participant is associated with based on a geographical location associated with the
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`second participant identifier.32 Defendants argue that “[a]dding the ‘location’ participant characteristic
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`to claim 1’s ‘identifier’ characteristic is an immaterial and conventional variation” but claims 9 and 27
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`have nothing to do with adding a location participant characteristic.
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`Finally, Defendants fail to analyze claims 19 and 24, instead merely asserting that the claims do
`
`not describe how load sharing is accomplished.33 But even if these claims do not describe how load
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`sharing is accomplished, which they do, the how inquiry relates to whether the claims are patent eligible,
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`not whether Claim 1 is representative of these claims. Claim 1 does not address the problem that
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`existing VoIP systems had in providing high availability and resiliency over a geographically dispersed
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`area, which claims 19 and 24 overcome.34 Similarly, Defendants’ assertion that these load-sharing
`
`
`28 See VoIP-Pal II, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 948.
`29 Dkt. No. 31-1 at 39:22-38, 42:9-14.
`30 Dkt. No. 103 at 17.
`31 Dkt. No. 31-1 at 38:54-57.
`32 Compare id. at 38:63-67 with 42:14-21 and 42:64-67.
`33 Dkt. No. 103 at 17.
`34 Dkt. No. 31-1 at 1:53-59.
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 12 of 26
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`claims match the activities of historical switchboard operators also relates to eligibility and not
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`representativeness.35
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`In sum, because Defendants have not shown that Claim 1 is representative of all asserted claims,
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`the Court should limit its eligibility analysis to Claim 1—the only claim Defendants actually analyze—
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`lest the Court deprive VoIP-Pal of its property rights without due process.36 Indeed, it is the Court’s
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`practice to require that alleged patent ineligibility be briefed with respect to all asserted claims, not just
`
`representative claims, which Amazon did not do.37
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`B. VoIP-Pal Is Not Collaterally Estopped From Challenging Ineligibility.
`
`
`
`VoIP-Pal’s suit is not barred by collateral estoppel because the eligibility issues in this case are
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`different than those resolved in VoIP-Pal’s prior cases. Defendants argue that Claim 1 is substantially
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`the same as claim 1 of the ’002 patent. But whether these claims are substantially the same, and they are
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`not, is not the appropriate standard. Instead, Defendants must prove that the differences between these
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`claims do not materially alter the question of eligibility.38 The Court, however, should not make such a
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`determination until it develops a full understanding of the claimed subject matter.39
`
`“Developing the requisite proficiency is a far-fetched (if not unattainable) goal when a court has
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`not construed the patent’s claims or opened discovery.”40 Insufficient discovery can affect a court’s
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`eligibility analysis because “whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a
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`skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”41 Because the Court has stayed this
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`case twice and has yet to enter a new scheduling order after lifting the second stay, discovery has barely
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`begun in this case. Indeed, Amazon has not served any written discovery, the parties have not taken
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`any depositions, and the Court has not set a schedule for completing fact and expert discovery. Rather,
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`
`
`35 Dkt. No. 103 at 19.
`36 See Nice Ltd. v. CallMiner, Inc., No. 18-2024-RGA-SRF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20516, at *13 (D.
`Del. Feb. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5477 (D. Del. Mar.
`30, 2020); PPS Data, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1031-33.
`37 See AML IP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66678, at *16; Slyce Acquisition, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9451, at
`*23.
`38 See Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`39 See Grecia Estate Holdings LLC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 3d 905, 912 (W.D. Tex. 2022).
`40 Id.
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 13 of 26
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`Amazon has strenuously resisted VoIP-Pal’s efforts to obtain discovery by twice opposing VoIP-Pal’s
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`requests for a scheduling order and thrice moving to stay this case.42 The need for further discovery is
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`magnified in this case so that the Court can “appreciate the full context” of the ’606 patent and not
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`“indulge in a series of ‘unsound presumptions’” in applying collateral estoppel to invalidate the asserted
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`claims.43
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`Tellingly, Defendants never attempt to meaningfully characterize the alleged similarity between
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`Claim 1 and claim 1 of the ’002 patent. Instead, Defendants superficially compare the steps of these
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`claims.44 But in reality, substantial portions of Claim 1 do not overlap with the previously asserted
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`claims, including several critical claim elements that contribute to a distinct inventive concept. 45
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`Considering the actual claim language, it is apparent that the ’606 patent claims are distinct from
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`the previously asserted claims. The ’606 patent claims involve, inter alia, determining whether the
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`called party is associated with the same node or network element as the calling party (e.g., same cluster,
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`server, etc.). In contrast, the previously asserted claims apply criteria for classifying destinations as
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`between a private network (or system network) and a public network (or external network beyond
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`control of the system). These determinations are distinct. Even VoIP-Pal II found claim 1 of the ’002
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`patent representative of only a subset of claims for classifying and then routing a communication
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`between participants.46 Thus, the ’606 patent claims features that were absent in the previous cases.
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`Specifically, as compared to Claim 1, claim 1 of the ’002 patent does not recite: (1) “the first and
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`second participant devices being associated with first and second network elements of the
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`communication system;” (2) “processing the new second participant identifier, using the at least one
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`processor, to determine whether the second network element is the same as the first network element;”
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`41 See AML IP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66678, at *9 (quoting Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369).
`42 See Dkt. No. 92; Dkt. No. 99; Dkt. No. 100.
`43 See Grecia Estate Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 913; see also AML IP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66678,
`at *10 (“[R]esolving § 101 eligibility of all asserted claims almost certainly requires fact discovery.”);
`Slyce Acquisition, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9451, at *20 (recognizing that “fact discovery can completely
`change the Court’s § 101 analysis”).
`44 Dkt. No. 103 at 5-6; but see Cabric Decl. at ¶¶11-20.
`45 Id.; see also Ex. 1. All exhibits are attached to the supporting declaration of Lewis E. Hudnell, III.
`46 See VoIP-Pal II, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 941-42.
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 14 of 26
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`(3) “when the second network element is determined to be the same as the first network element,
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`producing a routing message identifying a first network address associated with the first network
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`element;” and (4) “when the second network element is determined not to be the same as the first
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`network element, producing a routing message identifying a second network address associated with the
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`second network element.” Even if these differences do not prove Claim 1’s validity, they raise
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`substantially different validity issues.47 Because Defendants cannot show that claim 1 of the ’002 patent
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`is representative of Claim 1, Claim 1 requires an independent eligibility evaluation.
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`Defendants argue that the filing of a terminal disclaimer in the ’606 patent prosecution over the
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`’002 patent shows that the claims of the two patents are not patentably distinct.48 But the Federal Circuit
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`has foreclosed any argument that a terminal disclaimer is conclusive or gives rise to a presumption that a
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`patent subject to a terminal disclaimer is patentably indistinct from its parent patents.49
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`Contrary to what Defendants claim, an alleged overlap in the intrinsic evidence also proves
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`nothing. A patent is not materially the same merely because it is closely related.50 A court must still
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`independently determine that the eligibility issues are identical in each claim related to an invalidated
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`claim before applying collateral estoppel.51 Additionally, VoIP-Pal’s factual allegations regarding the
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`technology in its FAC are not the same as in the complaints in its prior cases. In this case, VoIP-Pal’s
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`allegations are supported by the Declarations of Drs. William Henry Mangione-Smith and Danijela
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`Cabric, which demonstrate how the asserted claims are patent eligible.52
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`Finally, Defendants do not discuss how differences between any other asserted claim besides
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`Claim 1 and claim 1 of the ’002 patent do not materially alter the eligibility inquiry. As noted above, the
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`asserted claims recite at least seven distinct concepts. Because Defendants fail to show that Claim 1 is
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`47 See Grecia Estate Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 912.
`48 Dkt. No. 103 at 6-7.
`49 See Seven Networks, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-01036-N, 2022 U.S.
`Dist. LEXIS 24709, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2022) (citing SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d
`1160, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
`50 See Smiledirectclub v. Candid Care Co., No. 6:20-CV-01115-ADA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154206,
`at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2021) (citing e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Tech., Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 727 (Fed.
`Cir. 2014)).
`51 Id.
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 106 Filed 12/13/23 Page 15 of 26
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`representative of all seven distinct concepts, they fail to establish that collateral estoppel based on claim
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`1 of the ’002 patent applies to any of the other asserted claims. Thus, Defendants’ collateral estoppel
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`arguments must fail.
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`C. Claim 1 Is Not Directed To An Abstract Idea.
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`
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`1. The allegedly functional terms in Claim 1 do not render it abstract.
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`The allegedly broad and functional nature of Claim 1 does not show that it is directed to an
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`abstract idea. Defendants assert, unremarkably, that Claim 1 recites allegedly basic call-routing
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`functions, such as “receiving,” “identifying,” “processing,” and “producing.”53 But Claim 1 relates to
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`voice over IP calling; thus reciting calling functions proves nothing.54 Defendants’ argument that Claim
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`1 does not disclose how to achieve any of these functions also is not the prop