Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 1 of 29
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC.;
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC; and
`AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-272-ADA
`
`
`AMAZON’S OPPOSED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 2 of 29
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`B.
`
`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED .................... 1
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 1
`LEGAL STANDARDS .................................................................................................. 3
`A.
`Collateral Estoppel .............................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Section 101.......................................................................................................... 3
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 5
`A.
`VoIP-Pal Is Collaterally Estopped from Challenging Patent Ineligibility
`Here. .................................................................................................................... 5
`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid under Section 101.......................................... 7
`1.
`Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. ........................... 7
`a.
`Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms. ......................................... 8
`b.
`Claim 1 is analogous to longstanding call-routing practices. ... 10
`c.
`Claim 1 uses only known technology to perform routine
`functions. ................................................................................... 11
`Alice step two: Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept. ............................. 13
`a.
`The individual claim elements do not provide an inventive
`concept. ..................................................................................... 13
`The ordered combination does not provide an inventive
`concept. ..................................................................................... 14
`Claim 1 is representative and no other asserted claim is patent-eligible. ......... 16
`C.
`Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. ........................................................... 19
`D.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 20
`
`2.
`
`b.
`
`i
`
`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 3 of 29
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-029, 2015 WL 11622489 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015), aff’d, 838
`F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016).....................................................................................................4, 9
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
`838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................18
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank. Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`BroadSoft Inc. v. CallWave Commc’ns, LLC,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 771 (D. Del. 2017) .........................................................................................12
`
`BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)......................................................................................4, 15, 16
`
`Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,
`859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................16
`
`Control v. Digit. Playground, Inc.,
`No. 12-cv-6781 (RJS), 2016 WL 5793745 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) .....................................6
`
`Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs.,
`859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................12
`
`Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc.,
`558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................................14
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 F. App’x 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................15
`
`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................4, 18
`
`Foman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) .................................................................................................................19
`
`Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd.,
`754 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................11
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 4 of 29
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`
`
`Health Discovery Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
`577 F. Supp. 3d 570 (W.D. Tex. 2021)......................................................................................4
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................4, 12, 14
`
`Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,
`50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..............................................................................................3, 5
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................18
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................11
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) ...................................................................................................................14
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................11
`
`NetSoc, LLC v. Oath Inc.,
`No. 18-CV-12267 (RA), 2020 WL 419469 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2020), appeal
`dismissed, 832 F. App’x 703 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ...................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC,
`735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..............................................................................................3, 5
`
`Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd.,
`403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) .....................................................................................3
`
`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..........................................................................................13, 18
`
`RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc.,
`372 F. Supp. 3d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .....................................................................................10
`
`Smart Sys. Innov., LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................19
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................9, 11, 14, 16
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 5 of 29
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`
`
`VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 798 F. App’x 644
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................................ passim
`
`VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 828 F. App’x 717
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................................ passim
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................4
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 ....................................................................................................................4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15 ..................................................................................................................19
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 6 of 29
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`
`The sole asserted patent in this case, U.S. Patent No. 10,218,606 (“the ’606 patent”), is the
`
`seventh member of its family to be litigated. The first six patents were all held invalid under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 101 for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter, and the Federal Circuit has affirmed
`
`each time. The ’606 patent is no different and should meet the same fate. First, VoIP-Pal is
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`collaterally estopped from disputing ineligibility regarding the ʼ606 patent because its claimed
`
`subject matter is substantially identical to the claims already held patent-ineligible in the related
`
`patents, particularly U.S. Patent No. 9,826,002 (“the ’002 patent”). Second, the ’606 patent’s
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`claims fail the two-step Alice test for patent eligibility because they (1) are directed to the abstract
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`idea of routing a communication (such as a phone call) based on the participants’ characteristics,
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`and (2) lack an inventive concept. Like VoIP-Pal’s other invalidated claims, the asserted claims
`
`of the ʼ606 patent simply automate well-known call-routing practices using conventional computer
`
`components. That is not enough for eligibility under § 101.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`VoIP-Pal has a long history of asserting patents from the ʼ606 family. All six previously
`
`asserted patents were invalidated under § 101, and the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed across
`
`the board. VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting mo-
`
`tion to dismiss and invalidating asserted claims of the ’002 patent as well as U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`9,537,762, 9,813,330, 9,948,549), aff’d, 828 F. App’x 717 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“VoIP-Pal 2”); VoIP-
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`Pal.com, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting motion to dismiss
`
`and invalidating asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,542,815 and 9,179,005), aff’d, 798 F. App’x
`
`644 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“VoIP-Pal 1”).
`
`Apparently believing the third time would be the charm, VoIP-Pal tried again, this time
`
`asserting the closely related ʼ606 patent against multiple defendants in this district. When two of
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`1
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 7 of 29
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`
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`the defendants, Apple and AT&T, filed declaratory judgment actions in the Northern District of
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`California, VoIP-Pal settled those cases to avoid a ruling from that court on the ʼ606 patent’s va-
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`lidity. The cases against two other defendants, Meta and Google, were transferred to the Northern
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`District of California, and VoIP-Pal again settled to avoid a ruling by the Northern District of
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`California on those defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings that the ’606 patent is invalid
`
`under § 101. This case against Amazon is the last remaining suit involving the ’606 patent.
`
`The ’606 patent is directed to routing a call or other communication based on characteris-
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`tics of the call participants—the same patent-ineligible abstract concept recited in VoIP-Pal’s pre-
`
`viously invalidated claims. See VoIP-Pal 2, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 951; VoIP-Pal 1, 375 F. Supp. 3d
`
`at 1130. The substantive similarity between the claims at issue in each wave of lawsuits is no
`
`surprise: the VoIP-Pal patents all come from the same family and share the same specification.
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`The parallels are particularly striking between the ʼ606 claims and those previously invalidated in
`
`the ʼ002 patent. (See Appendix 1 (comparing ʼ606 claim 1 with ʼ002 claim 1).) Both patents
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`describe and claim communication-routing methods that begin with receiving participant identifi-
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`ers for a caller and a callee. (’606 patent at 1:67–2:2; ’002 patent at 1:62–64.) An identifier is
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`used along with “call classification criteria” to classify the call and generate a routing message.
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`(’606 patent at 2:2–11; ’002 patent at 1:64–2:6.) The classification step can involve searching a
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`database for call participant “attributes.” (’606 patent at 2:15–17; ’002 patent at 2:10–12.) Both
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`patents confirm the process runs using standard, generic components known in the art, including
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`“conventional internet services” that are “accessed in the usual way.” (’606 patent at 13:32–35,
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`13:59–63; ’002 patent at 13:32–35, 13:59–63; see also ’606 patent at 1:35–39 (describing preex-
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`isting “IP telephony switches” that connected voice calls using known IP and telephone networks),
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`2
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 8 of 29
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`13:51–53 (stating that the call controller and routing controller “may be implemented as separate
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`modules on a common computer system or by separate computers”).)
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Collateral Estoppel
`
`Regional circuit precedent generally applies to collateral estoppel, also known as issue pre-
`
`clusion, but Federal Circuit precedent applies “to those aspects of such a determination that involve
`
`substantive issues of patent law.” Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2013). In the Fifth Circuit, collateral estoppel applies when: “(1) the identical issue was
`
`previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; and (3) the previous determination was
`
`necessary to the decision.” Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) (en
`
`banc). Importantly, collateral estoppel does not require identical patent claims; “the identity of
`
`the issues” litigated “determines whether collateral estoppel should apply.” Ohio Willow, 735 F.3d
`
`at 1342 (emphasis original). “If the differences between the unadjudicated patent claims and ad-
`
`judicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel ap-
`
`plies.” Id.
`
`B.
`
`Section 101
`
`“Abstract ideas” are not patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
`
`CLS Bank. Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). Patent eligibility is evaluated under the Alice two-part
`
`test. Step one concerns “whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,”
`
`like an abstract idea. Id. at 218. Courts assess “the focus of the claimed advance over the prior
`
`art to determine if the claim’s character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Intel-
`
`lectual Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal
`
`quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, step one requires claims written in functional
`
`terms to “describe how to achieve [the stated] results in a non-abstract way.” Int'l Bus. Mach.
`
`3
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 9 of 29
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`
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`Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and
`
`citation omitted). When assessing whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, courts can con-
`
`sider undisputed facts about well-known, fundamental practices in the field. Yu v. Apple Inc., 1
`
`F.4th 1040, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Courts also routinely compare claims to others already litigated
`
`and found lacking under the Alice test: “a district court’s surest guidance rises from cases analyzing
`
`patents most like those under review.” Health Discovery Corp. v. Intel Corp., 577 F. Supp. 3d
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`570, 584 (W.D. Tex. 2021).
`
`At step two, the court decides whether there is an “inventive concept” that “transform[s]
`
`the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (internal
`
`quotation marks and citation omitted). That requires “significantly more” than the abstract idea
`
`itself. BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The “mere
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`recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an other-
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`wise abstract idea.” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Limiting an abstract concept to a “particular technological environment” does not suffice to create
`
`a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
`
`1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). A claim is ineligible if it “is recited at a high level of generality and
`
`merely invokes well-understood, routine, conventional components to apply the abstract idea,” and
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`the “generic hardware limitations ... merely serve as a conduit for the abstract idea.” Yu, 1 F.4th
`
`at 1045 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
`
`A § 101 challenge may be resolved at the Rule 12 stage, including before claim construc-
`
`tion. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2017); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. W-15-cv-029, 2015 WL 11622489, at
`
`*1-2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015) (dismissing under Rule 12(c)), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir.
`
`4
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 10 of 29
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`2016). While factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, district courts “need not
`
`accept a patent owner’s conclusory allegations of inventiveness,” and “only plausible and specific
`
`factual allegations that aspects of the claims are inventive are sufficient” to defeat a motion to
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`dismiss under § 101. Int'l Bus. Machines, 50 F.4th at 1379 (internal quotation marks and citation
`
`omitted).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`VoIP-Pal Is Collaterally Estopped from Challenging Patent Ineligibility
`Here.
`
`Collateral estoppel bars VoIP-Pal’s suit because VoIP-Pal already had repeated opportuni-
`
`ties to litigate the § 101 issues at stake here, and it lost each time in decisions where ineligibility
`
`was necessary to the judgment. See VoIP-Pal-2, 411 F. Supp. 3d 926; VoIP-Pal-1, 375 F. Supp.
`
`3d 1110. The eligibility “issues” litigated across these cases are the same such that estoppel should
`
`apply. Ohio Willow, 735 F.3d at 1342.
`
`VoIP-Pal’s asserted ʼ606 claims raise the same ineligibility issues as its previously liti-
`
`gated, related patents. Using claim 1 as representative (as detailed in Section IV.C below), Ap-
`
`pendix 1 shows that the ’606 patent claims recite substantially the same abstract concept as those
`
`in VoIP-Pal’s related ’002 patent that the Federal Circuit already confirmed were ineligible. Patent
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`claims need not be identical for collateral estoppel to apply. Ohio Willow, 735 F.3d at 1342 (col-
`
`lateral estoppel applied where claims were “substantially similar” and used “slightly different lan-
`
`guage to describe substantially the same invention”). It is sufficient that the claims “describe the
`
`same concept,” or are “substantially the same,” as those previously invalidated. NetSoc, LLC v.
`
`Oath Inc., No. 18-CV-12267 (RA), 2020 WL 419469, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2020), appeal
`
`dismissed, 832 F. App’x 703 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collateral estoppel where continuation and parent
`
`patents “describe the same concept” such that differences “[did] not materially alter the question
`
`5
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 11 of 29
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`
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`of invalidity under § 101.”); Control v. Digit. Playground, Inc., No. 12-cv-6781 (RJS), 2016 WL
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`5793745, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (applying collateral estoppel where unadjudicated patent
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`was “substantially the same” as another invalidated under § 101).
`
`Here again, VoIP-Pal asserts claims directed to the same abstract idea for routing a com-
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`munication based on the participants’ characteristics using the same purely functional steps: (1) re-
`
`ceive a “participant identifier”; (2) “identify[ ]” or “locate” a “participant attribute”; (3) process
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`“the second participant identifier” “to produce a new second participant identifier”; (4) “process[ ]”
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`or “classify[ ]” the communication based on “the new second participant identifier”; and
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`(5) “produc[e] a routing message.” (Compare ’606 patent at 37:30–38:3, with ’002 patent at
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`37:30–38:2; Appendix 1.) Both the ʼ606 and ʼ002 patents also recite only generic computer tech-
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`nology, including for example a “processor,” to perform these functional steps. (’606 patent at
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`37:37; ’002 patent at 37:37.) Both patents thus raise the same ineligibility issues, and estoppel
`
`applies. NetSoc, 2020 WL 419469, at *7–8.
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`To the extent the ’606 patent’s claim language differs slightly from the ’002 claims, those
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`minor differences have “no material effect on the [court’s] invalidity analysis and thus the issue of
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`the [unadjudicated] Patent claims’ eligibility under § 101 has already been addressed and re-
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`solved.” NetSoc, 2020 WL419469, at *5. For example, the two patents merely use different words
`
`to recite the same process—routing based on whether participants are associated with the same
`
`versus different network elements. In the ’606 patent, when the first and second network elements
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`are “the same,” that corresponds to “system communication” in the ’002 patent; when they are
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`found “not to be the same,” that corresponds to “external network communication” in the ʼ002
`
`claims. (Compare ’606 patent at 37:52–65 with ’002 patent at 37:51–65.) Indeed, during prose-
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`cution of the ʼ606 patent, the examiner rejected the pending claims for non-statutory double
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`6
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 12 of 29
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`
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`patenting over the ʼ002 patent’s claims because they were “not patentably distinct from each
`
`other.” (Ex. A at 5.) Rather than disputing that double-patenting rejection, VoIP-Pal filed a ter-
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`minal disclaimer as to the ʼ002 patent. (Ex. B.)
`
`The overlap in intrinsic evidence further confirms that collateral estoppel applies. The ’606
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`patent, as a continuation of the previously invalidated patents, shares the identical subject matter,
`
`specification, title, parent application, inventors, and owner. Tellingly, even VoIP-Pal’s complaint
`
`here recycles its allegations from VoIP-Pal-2, largely copying its prior assertions regarding the
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`technology and asserted patents. (Compare, e.g., ECF No. 31 at ¶¶ 12–40 (Background of the
`
`Technology and the Patent-in-Suit), with First Amended Complaint, VoIP-Pal 2, No. 5:18-cv-
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`06216 at ¶¶ 13-41, ECF No. 81 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2019).) That VoIP-Pal alleged essentially the
`
`same technical description for both patents confirms “the two patents describe the same concept”
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`and are substantively the same. See NetSoc, 2020 WL 419469 at *7–8.
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`The ’606 patent has substantially similar claims, the same intrinsic evidence, and raises the
`
`same ineligibility issues as VoIP-Pal’s six previously invalidated patents. Collateral estoppel ap-
`
`plies. The analysis below further demonstrates the substantial overlap between the issues currently
`
`before the Court and those issues previously litigated and decided. It also confirms that, even
`
`absent estoppel, the ’606 patent claims recite patent-ineligible subject matter and should be found
`
`invalid.
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid under Section 101.
`Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
`1.
`Representative Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a communication based
`
`on the participants’ characteristics. The Federal Circuit has already affirmed that claims from
`
`related VoIP-Pal patents were directed to this abstract concept where a representative claim was:
`
`(1) “worded in such broad, functional terms, so as to describe a desired result—routing the
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`7
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 13 of 29
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`
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`communication—without explaining how that result is achieved”; (2) was “analogous to preexist-
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`ing practices of manual call routing”; and (3) “[did] not focus on a specific means or method that
`
`improves the relevant technology and is instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the ab-
`
`stract idea and merely invokes generic processes and machinery.” VoIP-Pal-2, 411 F. Supp. 3d at
`
`952, 956, 963 (emphasis original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same anal-
`
`ysis applies here and yields the same conclusion.
`
`a. Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms.
`
`Claim 1 recites basic steps for call routing: (1) “receiving … a second participant identifier
`
`associated with the second participant device”; (2) “identifying at least one first participant attrib-
`
`ute” from “a first participant profile”; (3) “processing the second participant identifier and the at
`
`least one first participant attribute … to produce a new second participant identifier”; (4) “pro-
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`cessing the new second participant identifier” to determine which network element “the new sec-
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`ond participant identifier” is associated with; and (5) “producing a routing message” identifying a
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`network address associated with that network element. (’606 patent at 37:30–38:3.) But as in
`
`VoIP-Pal’s prior cases, claim 1 does not disclose how these functions are achieved, e.g., how the
`
`processing “produce[s] a new second participant identifier” or how processing “the new second
`
`participant identifier” “determine[s] whether the second network element is the same as the first
`
`network element.” See VoIP-Pal-1, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (“[C]laim 1 discloses ‘locating a
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`caller dialing profile’ without describing how the caller dialing profile is located; ‘determining a
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`match’ without specifying any kind of structure or non-functional language to describe how a
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`match is determined and compared to the callee identifier; and ‘classifying a call’ without identi-
`
`fying how the call is classified.”). Claim 1 of the ʼ606 patent is likewise directed to the abstract
`
`idea of routing a communication based on the participants’ characteristics.
`
`8
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 14 of 29
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`Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. is instructive. 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016). There, the ineligible claim described the “function of streaming content to a wireless de-
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`vice, but not a specific means for performing that function,” when it recited responding to a user’s
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`content request by retrieving and delivering the content. Id. at 1269. As the Federal Circuit ex-
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`plained, at “that level of generality, the claims do no more than describe a desired function or
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`outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to
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`an identified problem.” Id. Similarly, claim 1 of the ʼ606 patent recites general functions without
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`explaining how to perform them—e.g., routing a communication based on the participants’ char-
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`acteristics by searching for participant attributes, producing a new second participant identifier,
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`and producing a routing message. As in Affinity Labs, the “purely functional nature of the claim
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`confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea.” Id.
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`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly found similar functional claims in the call-routing con-
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`text ineligible, including VoIP-Pal’s similar ’002 patent claims. In VoIP-Pal 2, the court found
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`claims to be ineligible where they “simply require[d] the functional results of ‘receiving,’ ‘pro-
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`cessing,’ and ‘classifying’ a call based on the participant identifiers, and then ultimately ‘identify-
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`ing’ an appropriate Internet address.” 411 F. Supp. 3d at 955, aff’d, 828 F. App’x 717. Similarly,
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`in Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
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`the Federal Circuit held ineligible a claim that recited “a method for routing information using
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`result-based functional language. The claim requires the functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘rout-
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`ing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating records,’ but does not sufficiently describe
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`how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.” Claim 1 of the ʼ606 patent is not meaningfully
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`different. It requires only the functional results of “receiving” and “processing” the participant
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`identifiers associated with the requested communication participants and then “identifying” an
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 15 of 29
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`appropriate internet address to route the requested communication. ’606 patent at 37:30–38:3.
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`Just as in VoIP-Pal 2, claim 1 “is worded in such broad, functional terms, so as to describe a
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`desired result—routing the communication—without explaining how that result is achieved.” 411
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`F. Supp. 3d at 952 (emphasis in original).
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`b. Claim 1 is analogous to longstanding call-routing practices.
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`Claim 1’s purported invention of routing a call based on participant characteristics (specif-
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`ically, identity) is analogous to well-known, longstanding practices in telephone communications.
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`As explained in VoIP-Pal 2, and as VoIP-Pal alleged in its complaint, these call-routing concepts
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`have existed for decades. 411 F. Supp. 3d at 956–57 (claim was “analogous to preexisting prac-
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`tices of manual call routing” and “provide[d] simple automation of a task previously performed
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`manually”); ECF No. 31, ¶¶ 14–16, 18, 20, 21; see also RingCentral, Inc. v. Dialpad, Inc., 372 F.
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`Supp. 3d 988, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]he claim is directed to the abstract ideas of routing tele-
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`phone calls based on routing parameters … and allowing a user to modify those routing parameters
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`.… [T]hese are functions that humans have routinely performed ....”).
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`As VoIP-Pal’s complaint concedes, even in the “earliest telephone systems,” the caller
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`would identify the callee by “say[ing] the name of the person they wished to call to the operator,”
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`who would direct the call based on the caller’s location; for example, based on whether the call
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`participants were on the same switchboard. (ECF No. 31 ¶ 14.) Later, callers identified callees
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`by dialing their telephone numbers with rotary phones rather than human operators, but calls were
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`routed via “trunk lines” if the participants were customers of different telephone companies. (Id.
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`¶¶ 15–17.) Increasingly, calls were made over “Voice Over Internet Protocol” (VoIP) networks
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`rather than traditional “Public Switched Telephone Network” (PSTN) networks, and gateways
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`were developed to bridge the two. (Id. ¶ 20.)
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`Case 6:20-cv-00272-ADA Document 103 Filed 11/15/23 Page 16 of 29
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`Claim 1 merely reiterates these longstanding, well-known call-routing practices, using ge-
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`neric computer elements (e.g., the claimed “processor”) rather than a human dialer or operator to
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`route a call based on the participants’ characteristics. As in VoIP-Pal’s previously invalidated
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`patent claims, claim 1’s “‘physical computer’ simply acts as a tool to carry out the abstract pro-
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`cess.” VoIP-Pal 2, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 958–59 (rejecting VoIP-Pal’s “attempt to distinguish Rep-
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`resentative Claim 1 from switchboard operators”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Syman-
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`tec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“with the exception of generic computer-imple-
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`mented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
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`by a human”).
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`c. Claim 1 uses only known technology to perform routine functions.
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`Claim 1 does not focus on a specific method “that improves the relevant technology,” it
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`“merely invokes generic processes and machinery.” See VoIP-Pal 2, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (in-
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`ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though claim 1 recites using computers, the claim
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`is directed to communication routing, and the computer is me