Case 1:21-cv-00027-LY Document 20 Filed 03/01/21 Page 1 of 5
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`Austin Division
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`Case No. 1:21-cv-00027-LY
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`Plaintiff,
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`MEDIA CHAIN, LLC,
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`v.
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`ROKU, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS
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`Counter-Defendant Media Chain, LLC (“Media Chain”), pursuant to Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), respectfully files this motion seeking the dismissal of Counter-Plaintiff
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`Roku, Inc.’s (“Roku”) counterclaims, and rely on the following memorandum of law.
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Memorandum of Law
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`Roku pleaded 12 counterclaims against Media Chain. (DE 10, at 9-18). Counterclaims 1-
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`6 seek declaratory judgments of non-infringement of the 6 Patents-at-Issue (Id. at 9-13), and
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`Counterclaims 7-12 seek declaratory judgments of invalidity of the 6 Patents-at-Issue (Id. at 14-
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`18). As explained in more detail below, all of Roku’s counterclaims should be dismissed for
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`being an unacceptable “shotgun pleading” and otherwise failing to satisfy the applicable pleading
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`requirements.
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`II.
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`Argument
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`A. Legal Standard
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move for dismissal of
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`an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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`1
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`“In a patent infringement suit, the laws of the regional courts of appeals govern whether to grant
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`a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
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`714 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
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`In deciding a motion to dismiss, “[t]he Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts
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`contained in the plaintiff’s complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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`Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[f]actual allegations must be
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`enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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`U.S. 544, 127 (2007); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion
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`to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
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`to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
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`(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
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`pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
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`liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows, that “where thee well-pleaded facts do not
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`permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
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`– but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
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`While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain
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`detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a
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`court must accept all of a plaintiff's allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal
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`conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
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`mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. Instead, “to survive a motion to dismiss”
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`under Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims
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`asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that
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`the plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10,
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`135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).
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`B. Roku’s Counterclaims Deficiently Pleaded
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`Roku has pleaded 12 separate counterclaims. The first paragraph under each counterclaim
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`realleges and incorporates by reference all the preceding paragraphs of the pleading. (DE 10 ¶¶
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`7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, 57, 62). “Claims presented in this ‘shotgun’ manner lack
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`substantive plausibility.” Roe v. Johnson County, Texas, 3:18-CV-2497-B-BN, 2019 WL
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`5031357, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 3:18-CV-2497-
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`B-BN, 2019 WL 3980737 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019).
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`As opposed to the “short and plan statement” requirement contemplated by Rule
`8, shotgun pleadings contain several counts within a complaint with each count
`“incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a
`situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual
`allegations and legal conclusions.”
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`Copeland v. Axion Mortg. Group LLC, No. 1:16-cv-159-HSO-JCG, 2016 WL 4250431, at *4
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`(S.D. Miss. Aug. 11, 2016) (quoting Griffin v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 4:14-cv-132-DMB-
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`JMV, 2015 WL 4041657, at *5 (N.D. Miss. July 1, 2015) (quoting, in turn, Strategic Income
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`Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellog Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002))).
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` “What makes a pleading an objectionable ‘shotgun’ pleading is the inclusion of
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`irrelevant and unrelated facts not tied to specific causes of action such that the claims made are
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`indeterminate and
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`the defendant's
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`task
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`in defending against
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`them
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`is significantly
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`impaired.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., No. 2:13–cv–178, 2013 WL 6190519, at * 4
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`(S.D.Tex. Nov. 26, 2013). Such a pleading forces a “trial court [to] sift out the irrelevancies, a
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`task that can be quite onerous.” Strategic Income Fund, 305 F.3d at 1295. “Shotgun pleadings
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`are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Roe, 2019 WL 5031357, at *5; see Strategic
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`Income Fund, 305 F.3d at 1295.
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` “Asserting claims in this manner – that is, ‘by merely attaching a label and/or legal
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`conclusion to no facts unique to that claim or, at best, threadbare unique facts – is not sufficient
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`to state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Roe, 2019 WL 5031357, at *5 (quoting Lowe v.
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`Dallas Police Dep't, No. 3:17-cv-704-G-BN, 2017 WL 4863076, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17,
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`2017), rec. adopted, 2017 WL 4838980 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017)).
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`Beyond this deficiency, the counterclaims are devoid of additional factual details that
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`could help them achieve plausibility. For example, look at Counterclaims 7-12, which allege
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`invalidity of the Patents-at-Issue. While hedging that not all of the claims in the Patents-at-Issue
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`may be invalid, Roku fails to identify any specific claims that are invalid. These counts allege
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`that “[s]ome or all of the claims of the [given Patent-at-Issue], however, are invalid….” (DE 10
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`¶¶ 39, 44, 49, 54, 59, 64). Accordingly, Media Chain is left without certainty as to even one of
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`the claims in the Patents-at-Issue that Roku alleges is invalid.
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`Moreover, these counterclaims do not give Media Chain any notice of the specific
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`allegations of invalidity. Roku merely makes the blanket allegation that the patents “are invalid
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`under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq., including but not limited to 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102,
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`103, and/or 112.” (Id.). The one example given is mere boilerplate language – the “patent claims
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`recite patent-ineligible subject matter in violation of § 101 because they are directed to an
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`abstract idea and because they lack an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claim into
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`patent-eligible invention.” (Id.)
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`Roku’s counterclaims, as currently pleaded, “lack sufficient facts to support an inference
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`that [the] defendant[ (s) ] is responsible for [that] particular harm to [Plaintiff] – therefore there is
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`no ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct,’ which, of course, is not enough to state a
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`plausible claim.” Lowe, 2017 WL 4863076, at *9 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing Robbins
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`v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a
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`‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to
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`relief.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556))).
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`Accordingly, all of Roku’s counterclaims should be dismissed.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Media Chain respectfully requests this Court grant the subject
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`motion to dismiss and enter an order dismissing all of Roku’s counterclaims, and all other relief
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`deemed just and equitable.
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`Dated: March 1, 2021.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
`Business Trial Group
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`/s/ David Tamaroff
`David F. Tamaroff (Fla. Bar # 92084)
`DTamaroff@forthepeople.com
`703 Waterford Way, Suite 1000
`Miami, Florida 33126
`Tel: (305) 929-1900
`Fax: (305) 929-1941
`Counsel for Counter-Defendant,
`Media Chain, LLC
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on March 1, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with
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`the Clerk of the Court and served it on all counsel of record using the CM/ECF system.
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`/s/ David Tamaroff
`David F. Tamaroff
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