Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 1 of 29
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`C.A. No. 1:20-cv-00765-LY
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`BANDSPEED, LLC,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`
`
`
`REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORP.,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORP.’S
`RULE 12 MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 2 of 29
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2
`A.
`Procedural History ...................................................................................................2
`B.
`Bandspeed’s Complaint Includes Insufficient Jurisdictional Allegations. ..............2
`C.
`Realtek Lacks Contacts with, and Does Not Purposefully Direct Any Conduct
`Towards, Texas. .......................................................................................................3
`THIS COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER REALTEK .......................4
`A.
`Legal Standard .........................................................................................................4
`B.
`Realtek is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in This District. ..............................6
`C.
`Realtek is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in This District...............................6
`1.
`Bandspeed’s claims do not arise out of any activities of Realtek that
`are purposefully directed at Texas. ..............................................................7
`Specific jurisdiction over Realtek does not exist under the stream-of-
`commerce theory. .......................................................................................10
`Asserting personal jurisdiction over Realtek would be unreasonable
`and unfair. ..................................................................................................12
`Realtek is Not Subject to Federal Long-Arm Jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). .....14
`D.
`THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS BANDSPEED’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE
`IT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF. ..............................................................15
`A.
`Legal Standard .......................................................................................................15
`B.
`Bandspeed’s Complaint Pleads No Plausible Acts of Realtek in the U.S. That
`May Constitute Direct Infringement ......................................................................16
`This Court Should Dismiss Bandspeed’s Claims of Direct Infringement of the
`Three Patents Where Only Method Claims are Asserted. .....................................17
`THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS BANDSPEED’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE
`OF ITS FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND ITS INEXPLICABLE DELAY IN
`EFFECTING SERVICE ....................................................................................................18
`A.
`Bandspeed’s Complaint Should be Dismissed because Bandspeed Failed to
`Exercise Due Diligence in Attempting Service .....................................................18
`Bandspeed’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Under Rule 41(b) Based on
`Bandspeed’s Failure to Prosecute ..........................................................................19
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................20
`
`C.
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 3 of 29
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`10x Genomics, Inc. v. Celsee, Inc.,
`2019 WL 5595666 (D. Del. Oct. 30, 2019), adopting recommendation 2019
`WL 6037558 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2019) .....................................................................................18
`
`AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp.,
`689 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................6, 11
`
`APS Technology, Inc. v. Vertex Downhole, Inc.,
`2020 WL 4346700 (D. Del. July 29, 2020) .............................................................................18
`
`Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct.,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987) .....................................................................................................10, 13, 14
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...........................................................................................................15, 16
`
`Auto Wax Co. v. Kasei Kogyo Co.,
`No. A 00-531 SS, 2001 WL 1891719 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2001) .........................................13
`
`Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd.,
`566 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................5
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...........................................................................................................15, 16
`
`Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.,
`21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994)............................................................................................11, 13
`
`Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
`No. 12-cv-00499, 2014 WL 11829323 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) ...........................................7
`
`Breakall v. Munn,
`No. A-08-CA-485-LY, 2008 WL 11417063 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2008) ....................................7
`
`Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
`368 Fed. Appx. 574 (5th Cir. 2010) .........................................................................................20
`
`Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
`471 U.S. 462 (1985) .............................................................................................................7, 13
`
`Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd.,
`792 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 4 of 29
`
`
`
`City of El Paso v. Soule,
`991 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Tex. 1998).........................................................................................13
`
`Coleman v. Sweetin,
`745 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................19
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`571 U.S. 117 (2014) ...................................................................................................................6
`
`De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. W-19-CV-00612-ADA, 2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) ..........................16
`
`Dillard v. Federal Corp.,
`321 F. Supp. 3d 752 (W.D. Tex. 2018)....................................................................................13
`
`Elecs. for Imaging Inc. v. Coyle,
`340 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................6
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................17
`
`Freescale Semi., Inc. v. Amtran Tech. Co.,
`No. A-12-CV-644-LY, 2013 WL 12121034 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2013) ....................... passim
`
`Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc.,
`379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................................................7
`
`Garnet Digital, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`893 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Tex. 2012) .......................................................................................7
`
`Gomez v. Galman,
`18 F.4th 769 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................5, 14
`
`Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
`564 U.S. 915 (2011) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Hanson v. Denckla,
`357 U.S. 235 (1958) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
`598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) .......................................................17
`
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
`326 U.S. 310 (1945) ...............................................................................................................5, 9
`
`J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
`564 U.S. 873 (2011) .................................................................................................................10
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 5 of 29
`
`
`
`Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp.,
`523 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................5, 6
`
`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc.,
`6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993)......................................................................................................17
`
`Kajeet, Inc. v. Gryphon Online Safety, Inc.,
`2021 WL 780737 (D. Del. March 1, 2021)..............................................................................18
`
`Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Medical Corp.,
`656 Fed. Appx. 504 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................18
`
`Lawson v. Aleutian Spray Fisheries Inc.,
`No. C11-0061JLR, 2012 WL 208111 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2012) ........................................20
`
`Lozano v. Bosdet,
`693 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................18
`
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................17
`
`Lyda v. CBS Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................17
`
`M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltda.,
`890 F.3d 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................12
`
`Med. Sols., Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC,
`541 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................5
`
`Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,
`681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................14
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
`550 U.S. 437 (2007) .................................................................................................................16
`
`Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom,
`481 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Motion Games, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
`No. 6:12-cv-878-JDL, 2014 WL 5306961 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014) .....................................14
`
`MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers,
`No. 1:18-cv-444, 2019 WL 7761445 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2019) ..............................................5
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,
`626 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 6 of 29
`
`
`
`O'Malley v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co.,
`No. SA-19-CV-0010-JKP, 2020 WL 1033658 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2020)..............................16
`
`Pancho Villa’s Army, LLC v. Tendot Corp. Travel, Inc.,
`No. 1:13-cv-972-LY, 2014 WL 12663098 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2014) ....................................5
`
`Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
`253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).............................................................................5, 7
`
`Papasan v. Allain,
`478 U.S. 265 (1986) ...................................................................................................................6
`
`Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp.,
`265 F.3d 1329,1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001).........................................................................................6
`
`Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy,
`829 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................5, 10
`
`Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,
`148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................6
`
`Revell v. Lidov,
`317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) .....................................................................................................7
`
`Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc.,
`550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................17
`
`Salter v. Upjohn Co.,
`593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee,
`453 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................19, 20
`
`Silicon Laboratories, Inc. v. Cresta Technology Corp,
`No. A-14-CA-318-SS, 2014 WL 3530817 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2014) .............................11, 12
`
`Sorkin v. Dayton Superior Corp.,
`2006 WL 2141255 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2006) ..........................................................................11
`
`Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,
`953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992) ........................................17
`
`Synergy Drone LLC v. Parrot S.A.,
`No. 1:17-cv-243-LY, 2018 WL 11361758 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018) ....................8, 9, 11, 15
`
`Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico,
`563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................13, 15
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 7 of 29
`
`
`
`Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,
`574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................15
`
`Veazey v. Young’s Yacht Sale & Serv., Inc.,
`644 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................................20
`
`Walden v. Fiore,
`571 U.S. 277 (2014) .......................................................................................................7, 10, 15
`
`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
`444 U.S. 286 (1980) ...................................................................................................5, 6, 11, 15
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) .........................................................................................................................18
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)..........................................................................................................7, 14, 15
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)................................................................................................................1, 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)........................................................................................................1, 15, 16
`
`35 U.S. § 271(a) .................................................................................................................16, 17, 18
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 8 of 29
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`This lawsuit should have never been brought. At the outset, Plaintiff Bandspeed fails to
`identify any activities of Defendant Realtek—a leading fabless semiconductor company in Taiwan—
`that would even arguably give rise to personal jurisdiction in this Court. Realtek has no demonstrated
`connection to Texas. It is headquartered in Taiwan; has no subsidiaries, facilities, or operations in
`Texas; and Bandspeed has offered no facts showing any advertising, marketing, or sale by Realtek in
`this District. Moreover, Bandspeed has provided no evidence that Realtek is connected to or
`purposefully directed any activities to Texas. Instead, it relies on the nationwide activities of third
`parties unrelated to Realtek. As a result, Bandspeed’s allegations fail to establish either a good faith
`or a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction over Realtek. The Court should dismiss the Complaint,
`with prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).
`Relatedly—and even more egregious—Bandspeed implicitly acknowledges, in every Count
`of its Complaint, that Realtek does not manufacture, sell, offer for sale, use, or import the accused
`components anywhere in the United States. But then, inexplicably, Bandspeed still alleges direct
`infringement by Realtek, contrary to bedrock patent law. Bandspeed’s direct infringement claims are
`baseless and should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
`Bandspeed’s apparent apathy toward its prefiling investigation extends to its prosecution of
`this case. The Court granted Bandspeed’s request for issuance of letters rogatory, for service of the
`Complaint on Realtek, in September of 2020. Counsel for Bandspeed waited nearly two months before
`ostensibly forwarding the letters rogatory to the U.S. Department of State. After doing nothing for the
`next 15 months, Bandspeed then moved for alternative service on January 14, 2022, while representing
`to this Court that “the process of service by letters rogatory is still underway as of the filing of this
`motion.” Dkt. 14 at p. 2. But counsel for Realtek determined—with a simple email, that was answered
`in just a few hours—that the letters rogatory were never received by the American Institute in Taiwan,
`the next recipient in the process after the U.S. Department of State. Bandspeed could have easily
`determined this 15 months ago instead of sitting on its hands and doing nothing. Accordingly, the
`Complaint should also be dismissed for failure to prosecute and undue delay in effecting service.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 9 of 29
`
`
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`Procedural History
`A.
`On July 2, 2020, Bandspeed filed its original Complaint. ECF No. 1. Because Realtek is not
`registered to do business in Texas and has no registered agent in Texas, Bandspeed moved for a
`Request for Judicial Assistance on Sept. 14, 2020, and this Court granted the motion three days later.
`ECF Nos. 9-12. But there the trail goes cold. Though Bandspeed asserts that it “initiated the process
`for service via letters rogatory” through the State Department on November 2, 2020, no request for
`service of process was ever delivered to the American Institute in Taiwan—the first stop on Taiwan’s
`shores for letters rogatory. See Declaration of Jeffrey L. Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”), Ex. B. Over the
`next 15 months, it appears that Bandspeed never followed up on its request. See ECF No. 14 (stating,
`purely on “information and belief,” that the letters rogatory process “is still underway”). With a simple
`call or e-mail to the American Institute, Bandspeed could have readily learned that the American
`Institute had not received the letters rogatory and then addressed the issue.
`Despite this inattention, over fourteen months later, on January 14, 2022, Bandspeed requested
`leave to make alternative service on Realtek through U.S. counsel. ECF No. 14. This Court granted
`the motion on February 7, 2022. Bandspeed delivered its Complaint—more than 20 months after first
`filing—to Realtek’s counsel on February 8, 2022.
`Bandspeed’s Complaint Includes Insufficient Jurisdictional Allegations.
`B.
`In its Complaint, Bandspeed acknowledges that Realtek “is a corporation organized and
`existing under the laws of Taiwan, with a place of business located at No. 2 Innovation Road II,
`Hsinchu Science Park, Hsinchu 300, Taiwan.” Complaint ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. Yet Bandspeed then alleges,
`again based solely on “information and belief,” that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Realtek
`based on boilerplate—and fact-free—recitations of jurisdictional tests. See Complaint ¶¶ 12-18.
`Bandspeed’s Complaint contains no plausible facts supporting jurisdiction. For example,
`Bandspeed alleges in the abstract that Realtek “has solicited business” and “transacted business” in
`Texas. Complaint ¶ 14. But it offers no example of any business solicited or transacted in Texas by
`Realtek. See generally, Complaint. Bandspeed further alleges that Realtek “directly” makes, sells,
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 10 of 29
`
`
`
`uses, and markets accused products “in the United States.” Complaint ¶ 15. But then Bandspeed
`drops any mention of activity “in the United States”—indeed, mentions no location at all—when
`actually describing Realtek’s alleged acts of infringement. See Complaint ¶¶ 28-29, 32, 35, 37-38, 42,
`49, 50, 53-54. Its count for alleged direct infringement also omits any mention of Realtek activities
`“in the United States.” See Complaint ¶¶ 72-76. Bandspeed’s allegations that Realtek engages in
`infringing activities “through subsidiaries,” Complaint ¶ 15, similarly lack factual support; nowhere
`does Bandspeed identify any such subsidiary, or offer a single example of any Realtek subsidiary
`making, using, importing, offering, selling, or marketing even a single accused product in the United
`States, much less in Texas. See generally, Complaint.
`Instead, the Complaint relies on products made by third-party manufacturers (located outside
`Texas) such as Asustek and JLab, or still other third parties (also based outside Texas) that retail those
`third-party products, for example Target and Best Buy. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 38-40, 47-48, 50-52,
`60-61. But Bandspeed does not claim that Realtek sells directly to these companies in Texas, in the
`U.S., or anywhere else, only that Realtek “provides” (somewhere, to someone) accused products “to
`be used as components in a variety of end-products” that those third parties or their customers make
`or sell in the United States. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 38 (Asustek makes products using Realtek
`components), 47 (Best Buy sells Asustek products), 50 (JLab makes products using Realtek
`components), 60 (Target sells JLab products). Bandspeed also makes no meaningful attempt to allege
`that any downstream activity in the United States is directed, controlled, or even influenced by Realtek.
`See generally, Complaint. Similarly, Bandspeed offers no concrete example of any activity in Texas
`of which Realtek is actually aware. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 35 (alleging only that Realtek “knew or
`should have known” its products are sold in Texas), 37 (same for alleged download of software).
`Realtek Lacks Contacts with, and Does Not Purposefully Direct Any Conduct
`C.
`Towards, Texas.
`Realtek’s alleged contacts with Texas are simply non-existent. Realtek is not authorized,
`registered, or licensed to do business in Texas. Lin Decl. ¶ 7. Realtek has no place of business or
`operations in Texas. Id. Realtek does not own or lease any real property, personal property, telephone
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 11 of 29
`
`
`
`listing, office space or equipment, bank accounts, or any other assets in Texas. Id. Bandspeed has not
`identified any Realtek subsidiary, affiliate, or employee in Texas. See generally, Complaint.
`The Realtek products Bandspeed accuses are equally devoid of any connection to Texas.
`Bandspeed has not identified any Realtek product sold in Texas by Realtek or imported into Texas by
`Realtek. See generally, Complaint. Bandspeed also has not alleged that Realtek sells or offers its
`products to any person or business located in Texas. Id. Rather, Bandspeed alleges vaguely that
`Realtek “provides” to an unspecified party “Infringing Products to be used as components” in
`downstream products by two other companies, Asustek and JLab, that are in turn sold through still
`other third-party retailers such as Target and Best Buy. See Complaint ¶¶ 38, 47, 50, 60. None of
`these companies is located in Texas,1 and Bandspeed never sets forth facts showing that Realtek
`provides its products “to” any of these companies, much less that it does so in Texas. For good reason:
`Realtek’s general business model is to sell to distributors outside Texas. Lin Decl. ¶ 8. Realtek’s direct
`customers (e.g., distributors) then resell the chip to other third parties that may use them in downstream
`consumer products in places of their own choosing. Id. Furthermore, Realtek does not sell directly to
`any of the companies named by Bandspeed, in Texas or elsewhere in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 9-12.
`III. THIS COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER REALTEK
`Realtek is a foreign entity lacking minimum contacts with Texas, and is thus subject to neither
`general nor specific personal jurisdiction (including under either articulation of the stream-of-
`commerce theory) in this District. As a result, Bandspeed’s claims should be dismissed.
`Legal Standard
`A.
`Federal due process requires that a non-resident defendant have “minimum contacts” with the
`forum state such that asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant “does not offend traditional
`
`
`1 Both
`
`in California.
`located
`are
`arm
`and Asustek’s U.S.
`JLab
`See
`https://www.asus.com/us/About_ASUS/Facilities-
`https://www.jlab.com/pages/about-us-2018;
`Branches.
` Target’s and Best Buy’s headquarters are both
`in Minnesota.
` See
`https://corporate.target.com/about/locations;
`https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/764478/000076447821000068/bby-
`20211030x10q.htm.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 12 of 29
`
`
`
`notions of fair play and substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
`286, 291-92 (1980); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Minimum contacts exist when a defendant
`“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
`the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). A federal
`court may dismiss an action when personal jurisdiction is absent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
`In patent cases, Federal Circuit law determines whether a district court may exercise personal
`jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d
`1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1230
`(Fed. Cir. 2010). Personal jurisdiction is proper “in a patent infringement case if two things are true.
`First, jurisdiction must exist under the forum state’s long-arm statute. Second, the assertion of personal
`jurisdiction must be consistent with the limitations of the due process clause.” Med. Sols., Inc. v. C
`Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Int’l
`Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the
`limits of federal due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis.”
`Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008).
`In response to a motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the “plaintiff bears the burden of
`establishing minimum contacts, and upon that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that
`the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343,
`1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Prior to conducting jurisdictional discovery or an evidentiary hearing on
`personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff usually bears only a prima facie burden of demonstrating
`jurisdiction. Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd., 792 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`However, in assessing personal jurisdiction, this Court need not credit conclusory allegations, even if
`uncontroverted. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.
`2001) (per curiam); MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers, No. 1:18-cv-444, 2019 WL 7761445 at *3 (W.D.
`Tex. July 29, 2019); Pancho Villa’s Army, LLC v. Tendot Corp. Travel, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-972-LY,
`2014 WL 12663098, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2014). Nor must Court “accept as true a legal
`conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021)
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 13 of 29
`
`
`
`(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Following jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff
`has the burden to prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Celgard, 792 F.3d
`at 1378 (citing Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 265 F.3d 1329,1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
`Realtek is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in This District.
`B.
`General jurisdiction exists only when a “corporation’s affiliations with the State are so
`continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimler AG v.
`Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39 (2014) (emphasis added). Random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts
`are insufficient. Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
`1998). The “paradigm all-purpose forums” for general jurisdiction over a corporation are its place of
`incorporation and principal place of business. Id.
`Realtek is “at home” in Taiwan, not in Texas or anywhere else in the United States. Bandspeed
`does not even allege that Realtek has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with Texas. See
`generally, Complaint. Rather, the Complaint admits that Realtek is a Taiwanese company with its
`principal place of business in Taiwan. Complaint ¶ 3; see also Lin Decl. ¶ 5. Realtek cannot be subject
`to general jurisdiction in Texas. See, e.g., Johnston, 523 F.3d at 611-612 (no general jurisdiction over
`corporation that had three percent of total sales to Texas customers and periodically sent employees to
`Texas); Freescale Semi., Inc. v. Amtran Tech. Co., No. A-12-CV-644-LY, 2013 WL 12121034, at *4-
`5 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2013) (finding no general jurisdiction over a Taiwanese corporation absent an
`alter-ego relationship with a U.S. subsidiary).
`Realtek is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in This District.
`C.
`Specific jurisdiction exists only if sufficient minimum contacts connect the defendant and the
`forum. Courts examine “(1) whether the defendant purposefully directs activities at the forum’s
`residents; (2) whether the claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3) whether assertion of
`personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358,
`1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (Fed.
`Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must establish minimum contacts under the first two prongs; if successful,
`the defendant must show the exercise of jurisdiction to be unreasonable under the third. Elecs. for
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00765-DAE Document 17 Filed 02/28/22 Page 14 of 29
`
`
`
`Imaging Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). None of these prongs have been met.
`1. Bandspeed’s claims do not arise out of any activities of Realtek that are
`purposefully directed at Texas.
`When a litigation arises from allegations that infringing products were used within the forum
`or sold to residents of the forum, the plaintiff must prove that the accused contacts were the result of
`defendant’s own activities, not the activities of third parties. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 291 (2014)
`(“[I]t is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum State.”);
`Garnet Digital, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 814, 816 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (“The test … focuses
`on defendant’s actions with the forum state and not a third party’s independent actions”); Blue Spike,
`LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., No. 12-cv-00499, 2014 WL 11829323, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014)
`(same). “Suffering harm in Texas is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.” Blue Spike, 2014
`WL 11829323, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 n.41 (5th
`Cir. 2002)). The specific jurisdiction inquiry rests on “the relationship between the defendant, the
`forum, and the litigation.” Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Ser