Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 1 of 59
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00034-ADA
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`v.
`
`LG ELECTRONICS INC. and LG
`ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00034-ADA
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`ANCORA’S OPPOSITION TO LG ELECTRONICS’
`MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 2 of 59
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`THE ’941 PATENT .............................................................................................................2
`
`III.
`
`OPERATION OF THE ACCUSED OTA UPDATE FUNCTIONALITY .........................3
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................3
`
`V.
`
`LGE CANNOT ESCAPE LIABILITY BY BLAMING THIRD PARTIES. ......................4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`LGE Is Liable Under Akamai for Providing OTA Updates to Group 1 Devices. ...5
`
`LGE Also Is Liable for Providing OTA Updates to “Group 2” Devices. ................8
`
`
`LGE’s Claim That the Accused Devices Do Not
`Is Irrelevant and, in Any Event, Is Factually Disputed. .........................................11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`
`LGE’s Devices
`. ............................................................................................11
`
` Argument Is Legally Irrelevant
`LGE’s
`Because End-Users Do Not Perform a Method Step. ................................12
`
`If LGE’s End Users Perform any Method Step, LGE Directs or
`Controls That Performance. .......................................................................13
`
`i)
`
`LGE conditioned its end users’ participation in an activity
`or receipt of a benefit. ....................................................................15
`
`ii)
`
`LGE established the manner and timing of performance. .............16
`
`VI.
`
`LGE INFRINGES BECAUSE IT CAUSES THE ACCUSED DEVICES TO
`“CONFIRM WHETHER A PROGRAM IS LICENSED.” ...............................................17
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`LGE Causes the Accused Devices to “Confirm Whether a Program Is
`Licensed Using at Least the Verification Structure.” ............................................18
`
`LGE’s Criticisms of Dr. Martin Fail to Demonstrate the Absence a
`Dispute of Material Fact as to LGE’s Infringement. .............................................21
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Dr. Martin Does Not Equate “Verifying” with “Mere Data Integrity.” .....22
`
`LGE’s Brand-New Construction is Untimely and Wrong. ........................23
`
`LGE Infringes Even Under Its New Erroneous Construction. ..................25
`
`VII. LGE INFRINGES BECAUSE IT CAUSES THE ACCUSED DEVICES TO
`“ESTABLISH OR CERTIFY THE EXISTENCE OF A PSEUDO-UNIQUE
`KEY.”.................................................................................................................................26
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`
`
`The Court Should Reject LGE’s New “Pseudo Unique Key” Construction. ........27
`
`LGE Infringes Under the Ordinary Meaning of “Pseudo Unique Key.” ...............29
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 3 of 59
`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 3 of 59
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`LGE’s New “Pseudo-Unique Key” Construction Is Wrong..................................30
`
`LGE’s Hybrid Claim Construction/Non—Infringement Arguments
`Concerning the “Pseudo-Unique Key” Are Illogical, Irrelevant, and
`Contrary to Fact. .................................................................................................... 34
`
`THE ACCUSED DEVICES’ “LICENSE RECORD LOCATION” IS IN THE
`
`“ERASABLE, NON-VOLATILE MEMORY OF THE BIOS.” ...................................... 36
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Court Already Rejected LGE’s “Stores the BIOS” Construction. .................37
`
`Dr. Martin Never Opined That Any Memory “Accessed By” the BIOS Is
`“Memory of the BIOS.” .........................................................................................38
`
`LGE IS NOT ENTITLED TO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 0N
`
`ANCORA’S— ANALYSIS FOR— MOBILE
`DEVICES ........................................................................................................................... 39
`
`THE ACCUSED DEVICES PERFORM THE STEP OF “ACTING ON THE
`PROGRAM ACCORDlNG TO THE VERIFICATION.” ................................................40
`
`LGE’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT “REPRESENTATIVE CODE” ARE BASELESS. .....44
`
`A.
`
`The Federal Circuit Has Held That ExperTs May Rely on Representative Code. ..45
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Dr. Martin Methodically Surveyed the Accused Devices To
`Identify and Document Any Material Variations Between Them. ............46
`
`LGE And Its Expert Identified Not One Mistake in Dr. Martin’s
`Analysis......................................................................................................47
`
`LGE FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE ARBAUGH
`PATENT IS PRIOR ART AS A MATTER OF LAW. .....................................................49
`
`WILLFULNESS / ENHANCED DAMAGES. ................................................................. 50
`
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 50
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 4 of 59
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`AAMP of Fla., Inc v. Auto. Data Sols., Inc.,
`2015 WL 12843845 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2015) .........................................................................37
`
`Acceleron, LLC v. Dell, Inc.,
`2018 WL 7018005 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2018) .........................................................................28
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)........................................................................ passim
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................29
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................28
`
`Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. TCT Mobile (US) Inc.,
`No. SACV 19-2192-GW-ADSx (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) ..................................24, 25, 31, 32
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................................2
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup A/S,
`887 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................50
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`881 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...................................................................................44
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`2014 WL 252045 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) ......................................................................23, 29
`
`BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
`498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Digital Reg of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`2014 WL 2604324 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) ...................................................................11, 14
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 5 of 59
`
`
`
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.,
`800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................49
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc.,
`845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................4, 14
`
`Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC,
`2015 WL 12743875 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2015) .......................................................................41
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................13
`
`ESW Holdings, Inc. v. Roku, Inc.,
`2021 WL 1069047 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2021) .......................................................................16
`
`Fenner Inv., Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Tex. 2009) .....................................................................................37
`
`Flash-Control, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`2020 WL 4561591 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2020) ........................................................................32
`
`Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,
`405 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................28
`
`Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
`607 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................31
`
`Huawei Techs. v. Samsung Elecs. Co, Ltd.,
`340 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ...............................................................................24, 29
`
`Hydro-Thermal Corp. v. Pro-Sonix, LLC,
`2010 WL 1441239 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 2010) ...........................................................................37
`
`IBM Corp. v. Booking Holdings Inc.,
`775 F. App’x 674, 675, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..........................................................................13
`
`Illumina Inc. v. Complete Genomics Inc.,
`2013 WL 1282977 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) .........................................................................50
`
`IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.,
`2019 WL 330515 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2019) ..........................................................................14, 17
`
`KPN v. Zoll Med. Corp.,
`656 F. App’x 504, 512, 516 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................13
`
`Kronisch v. United States,
`150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998).....................................................................................................44
`
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................49
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 6 of 59
`
`
`
`Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
`545 U.S. 913 (2005) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Minemyer v. B-Roc Reps., Inc.,
`2011 WL 1099265 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2011) ...........................................................................41
`
`MIT v. Shire Pharm., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................33
`
`Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
`532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................5
`
`Neopost Industrie B.V. v. PFE Int’l, Inc.,
`403 F. Supp. 2d 669, 676 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ...............................................................................45
`
`NeuroGrafix v. Brainlab, Inc.,
`2020 WL 5642946 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020) ..........................................................................15
`
`Nomadix v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
`2012 WL 682874 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012) .............................................................................45
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc.,
`813 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................29
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................23, 29, 41
`
`Pernix Ireland Pain DAC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd.,
`323 F. Supp. 3d 566, 581 (D. Del. 2018), aff’d, 945 F.3d 1184
`(Fed. Cir. 2019). .................................................................................................................15, 16
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................25, 31, 48
`
`PureCircle USA Inc. v. SweeGen, Inc.,
`2020 WL 4258658 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2020) ......................................................................26, 28
`
`REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj,
`841 F.3d 954 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................49
`
`Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`835 F. Supp. 2d 711 (D. Minn. 2011). .....................................................................................38
`
`Saffran v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
`2008 WL 2716318 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) ...........................................................................18
`
`Schreane v. Beemon,
`575 F. App’x 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................44
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 7 of 59
`
`
`
`Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 2850286 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020) .............................................................................4
`
`SiRF Tech., Inc. v. ITC,
`601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................12, 13
`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2015 WL 660755 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2015) ...............................................................6, 7, 8, 11
`
`Spansion, Inc. v. ITC,
`629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................45, 48
`
`Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................49
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment Am., LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................29
`
`TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp.,
`516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................45, 48
`
`Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp,
`877 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
`442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................36
`
`WiNet Labs LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 409012 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020) ............................................................................13
`
`YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC,
`2017 WL 404519 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017). .........................................................................27
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) ......................................................................................................................44
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ........................................................................................................................3
`
`
`
`vi
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 8 of 59
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`LG Electronics’ motion (MSJ) confirms what Ancora always has alleged: LGE infringed
`
`every step of the asserted ’941 Patent claims when it provided its accused over-the-air (“OTA”)
`
`updates. Faced with this fact, LGE makes six arguments to attempt to avoid liability. All fail.
`
`First, LGE seeks to escape liability for infringement by arguing that certain third parties
`
`perform infringing steps. MSJ § V. LGE is wrong. LGE is directly liable for infringement because,
`
`at minimum, it directed, controlled, and/or formed a joint enterprise with the parties it now blames
`
`for its infringement. That renders LGE liable under the Federal Circuit’s Akamai line of cases.
`
`Second, because LGE cannot avoid infringement under the Court’s constructions or plain
`
`and ordinary meaning (for unconstrued terms), LGE seeks a Markman do-over for four separate
`
`terms: “verifying the program,” “pseudo-unique key,” “memory of the BIOS,” and “acting on the
`
`program.” MSJ §§ VI, VII(A)-(B), VIII.1 LGE’s brand-new claim constructions are as wrong as
`
`they are untimely, and the “memory” term revives a construction already rejected by the Court.
`
`Third, LGE attempts to obtain partial summary judgment on one of Ancora’s two
`
`infringement
`
`theories—the
`
` analysis—by fundamentally misconstruing and
`
`misrepresenting the opinions of Ancora’s technical expert, Dr. David Martin. MSJ §§ VII(C).
`
`Fourth, LGE absurdly seeks to fault Ancora for not presenting evidence that LGE destroyed
`
`after receiving Ancora’s discovery requests. MSJ § VIII.
`
`Fifth, contrary to binding Federal Circuit law, LGE argues that Ancora can prove
`
`infringement only if its expert included source code citations for all
`
` devices accused of
`
`infringement. MSJ § IX. Not only is that not the law, but LGE fails to acknowledge that Dr. Martin
`
`explained and documented his extensive, hundreds-of-hours-long source code analysis to confirm
`
`
`1 This count does not even include LGE’s still-pending motion for reconsideration of the court’s
`construction of the term “agent.” See D.I. 100 (Defs. Mot. for Reconsideration).
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 9 of 59
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`
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`that the source code cited in his expert report fairly represented every accused device.
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`Finally, LGE seeks summary judgment that the Arbaugh patent—which was filed after the
`
`’941 Patent application—is prior art. MSJ § X. But that raises a quintessential factual dispute.
`
`II.
`
`THE ’941 PATENT
`
`As an initial matter, LGE’s “overview” of the ’941 Patent is wrong. To be clear, the ’941
`
`Patent discloses a specific technique for “identifying and restricting . . . an unauthorized software
`
`program’s operation.” Ex. 1 at 1:6-8.2 Specifically, before the ’941 Patent, there were two basic
`
`(sub-optimal) methods of verifying and restricting the operation of a program. One involved
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`“software-based methods” that “require[d] writing a license signature on the computer’s hard
`
`drive.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Hardware-
`
`based methods also existed, but they “require[d] inserting a dongle into a computer port to
`
`authenticate the software authorization.” Id. (citing ’941 Patent at 1:27-32).
`
`The ’941 Patent improved over these prior art techniques by “using the memory space
`
`associated with the computer’s basic input/output system (BIOS), rather than other memory space,
`
`to store appropriately encrypted license information to be used in the verification process.” Ancora
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`Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 733 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Prior to the ’941 Patent, it simply
`
`was not contemplated that operating system level programs could interact with BIOS—much less
`
`“us[e] an agent to setup a verification structure in the erasable non-volatile memory area of the
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`BIOS.” Ex. 2 (Reasons for Allowance) at ANCORA_451; HTC, 908 F.3d at 1348-49. Using BIOS
`
`in this manner “improves computer security, . . . because successfully hacking BIOS memory (i.e.,
`
`altering it without rendering the computer inoperable) is much harder than hacking the memory
`
`used by the prior art to store license-verification information.” HTC, 908 F.3d at 1345.
`
`
`2 All exhibits are attached to the Apr. 16, 2021 declaration of Steven M. Seigel. All emphases are
`added by Ancora unless otherwise stated.
`
`2
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 10 of 59
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`
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`As the above demonstrates, LGE’s description of the ’941 Patent thus is wrong in at least
`
`two key respects. First, citing nothing in the patent itself, LGE incorrectly asserts that “the patent
`
`is directed to preventing software piracy.” MSJ at 5. Quite the contrary: the invention was directed
`
`“[i]mproving security . . . against a computer’s unauthorized use of a program.” HTC, 908 F.3d at
`
`1348. Indeed, in denying HTC’s Petition for CBM review of the ’941 Patent, the PTAB expressly
`
`rejected the framing LGE attempts here—that “the ’941 discloses a method to restrict the operation
`
`of software in order to address piracy.” Ex. 3 (CBM Denial) at 9. Instead, the PTAB found that
`
`“the claims of the ’941 patent recite a technological improvement to problems arising in prior art
`
`software and hardware methods of restricting an unauthorized software program’s operation.” Id.
`
`Second, LGE claims that the ’941 Patent requires each device to perform an encryption
`
`function. See MSJ at 6. But “encryption” is recited only in dependent claims and is not included
`
`in any construction. Ex. 1 (’941 Patent) at claims 3, 8, 9, 14, and 15; D.I. 69 (Markman Order).
`
`III. OPERATION OF THE ACCUSED OTA UPDATE FUNCTIONALITY
`
`To the extent relevant to LGE’s MSJ, Ancora identifies in each subsection below any points
`
`of disagreement regarding the operation of the accused devices, along with the specific factual
`
`proofs that defeat summary judgment. However, Ancora cautions that LGE liberally asserts (30
`
`times) throughout its MSJ that certain facts or issues are “undisputed” when the opposite is true.
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant “shows that there is no genuine
`
`dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is likely to
`
`reasonably affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
`
`(1986). The burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists lies with LGE
`
`as the party moving for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
`
`3
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 11 of 59
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`V.
`
`LGE CANNOT ESCAPE LIABILITY BY BLAMING THIRD PARTIES.
`
`LGE first argues that certain third parties perform infringing steps, mistakenly viewing this
`
`as a loophole to liability. MSJ § V. Specifically, LGE argues that it cannot be liable for actions it
`
`took with respect to “Group 1” products because
`
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` participated in the OTA update process.
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`Similarly, for “Group 2” products, LGE argues that it is not liable because
`
`
`
`. Finally, LGE argues that it cannot
`
`be liable because “end users” purportedly had to undertake certain actions.
`
`LGE is wrong. Simply put, to the extent that any third party was involved in performing
`
`any infringing acts, LGE directed, controlled, or formed a joint enterprise with them and thus is
`
`liable for such acts under Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015) (en banc). As LGE admits, this is a “fact-specific inquiry.” MSJ at 12. To create a triable
`
`issue (and defeat LGE’s MSJ), Ancora only needs to point to evidence showing that LGE
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`“exercise[d] direction or control” over these third parties or formed a “joint enterprise” with them.
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`See Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Apple Inc., 2020 WL 2850286, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020).
`
`To show LGE satisfied the “direction or control” test, Ancora needs to show only that LGE
`
`(1) “act[ed] through an agent” to perform a claimed step; (2) “contract[ed] with another to perform
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`one or more steps of a claimed method”; or (3) condition[ed] participation in an activity or receipt
`
`of a benefit upon performance of a step” and “establishe[d] the manner or timing of that
`
`performance.” Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023; see also Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v.
`
`Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (stating that an actor “infringes vicariously by profiting from
`
`direct infringement” if that actor has the right and ability to stop or limit the infringement); Eli
`
`Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 845 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 12 of 59
`
`
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`verdict finding infringement under Akamai); Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370, 1372
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (overruling summary judgment of noninfringement and finding material disputes
`
`of fact over direction and control). Similarly, to create a triable issue on the “joint enterprise” test,
`
`Ancora only needs to identify evidence of (1) “an agreement, express or implied”; (2) “a common
`
`purpose”; (3) “a community of pecuniary interest”; and (4) “an equal right to a voice in the
`
`direction of the enterprise.” Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023.
`
`As detailed below, Ancora has identified more than enough evidence to satisfy either test.
`
`Indeed, tellingly, LGE makes no argument regarding joint-enterprise liability.
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`And remarkably, every case LGE cites about direction or control
`
`
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`applied the restrictive standards from BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d
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`1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`But the Federal Circuit subsequently made clear that such standards no longer apply: “[T]he
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`restrictive view of when the acts of a third party can be attributable to another evidenced in those
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`cases is no longer the governing law.” Travel Sentry, 877 F.3d at 1381. Rather, the Federal Circuit
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`“broaden[ed]” and “relax[ed] the tighter constraints” in these “earlier precedents.” Id.
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`For any or all of these reasons, LGE’s MSJ fails.
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`A.
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`LGE Is Liable Under Akamai for Providing OTA Updates to Group 1 Devices.
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`LGE’s attempt to escape liability by blaming
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`the updates LGE provided to Group 1 devices fails. First and foremost, it is settled law that an
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`infringer cannot escape liability by “contract[ing] with another to perform” a claimed method step.
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`Id. And here, LGE does not dispute that
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`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 13 of 59
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`Yet, more exists.
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`All the above defeats LGE’s MSJ under Akamai’s “agency” theory of liability. LGE’s
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`“continuous[] engagement” with carriers and CDNs shows direction and control. See Akamai, 797
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`F.3d at 1025. Courts routinely find triable issues with far less evidence. In Smartflash LLC v. Apple
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 14 of 59
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`Inc., for example, a triable issue existed where the evidence showed that “Apple contracts with
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`Akamai [a CDN] specifically to deliver content on behalf of Apple” despite a contractual clause
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`“stating that neither Apple or Akamai give each other the power to control the ‘day-to-day’
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`activities of the other.” 2015 WL 660755, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2015). The court explained
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`that “it is well settled that a party may not escape liability by directing another party to carry out
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`one or more claimed steps on its behalf” and that, at a minimum, it was for the jury to determine
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`if “content originating with Apple and transmitted by Akamai satisfies the claim.” Id. at *2–3.
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`This same evidence also defeats summary judgment under Akamai’s “benefits” test.
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`Simply put, it shows that
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` could “obtain access to certain benefits” only if
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`they “perform[ed] certain steps identified by [LGE]” under “terms prescribed by” LGE. Travel
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`Sentry, 877 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, to obtain the benefit
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`See, e.g., Akamai, 797 F.3d
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`at 1024 (affirming infringement where third party “must” engage in the method step to obtain
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`benefit); Travel Sentry, 877 F.3d at 1382-83 (triable issue where defendant “supplied” devices and
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`content “enabl[ing]” infringement and benefit “can only be realized” by practicing method step).
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`There also is a triable issue as to whether LGE formed a joint enterprise with
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`to which it now points. See Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023. First, LGE admits that it agreed
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`parties share a common purpose and pecuniary interest in
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 15 of 59
`Case 1:20-cv-OOO34-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 15 of 59
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`—. Finally, the same evidence showing LGE’s direction and control
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`over the OTA update process, see supra pp. 5—7, also at least is evidence of equal voice.
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`In sum, LGE cannot avoid tlial by blaming— as to “Group 1” devices.
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`B.
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`LGE Also Is Liable for Providing OTA Updates to “Group 2” Devices.
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`Next, LGE contends that it is entitled to MS] because LGE did not “control”—
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`— LGE is wrong.
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`First, a jtuy could find that LGE directed and controlled—. As explained,
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`LGE cannot eseaep liability— for
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`the simple reason that LGE “contract[ed] wit”—.
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`See Almmai, 797 F.3d at 1023: Smarfllash, 2015 WL 660755, at *2 (“[I]t is well settled that a party
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`may not escape liability by directing another party to carry out one or more claimed steps on its
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`behalf».—
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`---
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 16 of 59
`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 16 of 59
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 17 of 59
`Case 1:20-cv-OOO34-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 17 of 59
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 18 of 59
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`engagement” with third party’s performance of method steps shows direction or control);
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`Smartflash, 2015 WL 660755, at *2–3 (finding triable issue on direction and control despite
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`contract clause disclaiming day-to-day control); Digital Reg of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 2014
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`WL 2604324, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (denying summary judgment where, as here, CDNs
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`were alleged to have performed method steps); see also Travel Sentry, 877 F.3d at 1380, 1382-83
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`(triable issue where defendant “supplied” devices and content “enabl[ing]” infringement and
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`benefit “can only be realized” by practicing method step).
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`Moreover, at a minimum, these same facts also show a joint enterprise
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` Akamai, 797 F.3d at 1023.
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`C.
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`LGE’s Claim That the Accused Devices Do Not
`Irrelevant and, in Any Event, Is Factually Disputed.
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`Finally, LGE also argues
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`regardless, LGE is liable under Akamai.
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`1.
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`LGE’s Devices
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`LGE contends “it is undisputed” that
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` For
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`11
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 19 of 59
`Case 1:20-cv-OOO34-ADA Document 231 Filed 04/23/21 Page 19 of 59
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`example, LGE’s End User License Agreement
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`(“EULA”) states that—
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`Thus, LGE’s MSJ should be denied because LGE failed to identify an undisputed fact.
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`2.
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`Argument Is Legally Irrelevant Because
`LGE’S
`End-Users Do Not Perform a Method Step.
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`LGE’s MSJ also fails because it depends on a requirement that does not exist. As the
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`Federal Circuit made clear in SiRF Tech, Inc. v. ITC, a plaintiff need not show that an end user
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`has no involvement in the practical steps that effectuate a claimed method. 601 F.3d 1319, 1331
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010). At most, all that is required is that the defendant “automatically perform th_e
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`_p_p—diswed ste s of the claims at
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`Id-—
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`SiRF makes clear that LGE’s “user consent” argument does not “preclude a fmding of
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`direct infringement” because the ’941 Patent does not separately claim that sub-step. 601 F.3d at
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`1330. Specifically, SiRF recognized that, for the accused method in that case