Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 1 of 57
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00034-ADA
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`v.
`
`LG ELECTRONICS INC. and LG
`ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`.
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00034-ADA
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`ANCORA’S OPPOSITION TO SAMSUNG’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 2 of 57
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`II.
`
`THE ’941 PATENT .............................................................................................................2
`
`III.
`
`OPERATION OF THE ACCUSED OTA UPDATE FUNCTIONALITY .........................3
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................3
`
`V.
`
`SAMSUNG INFRINGES BECAUSE IT CAUSES THE ACCUSED DEVICES TO
`“ESTABLISH OR CERTIFY THE EXISTENCE OF A PSEUDO-UNIQUE KEY” ........4
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Reject Samsung’s New “Pseudo Unique Key” Construction. ...4
`
`B.
`
`Samsung Infringes Under the Ordinary Meaning of “Pseudo Unique Key.” ..........7
`
`C.
`
`Samsung’s New “Pseudo-Unique Key” Construction Is Wrong. ............................9
`
`D.
`
`Adopting a New Construction at This Stage Would Unduly Prejudice Ancora. ...12
`
`VI.
`
`SAMSUNG INFRINGES BECAUSE IT CAUSES THE ACCUSED DEVICES TO
`“CONFIRM WHETHER A PROGRAM IS LICENSED” ................................................12
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Samsung Causes the Accused Devices to “Confirm Whether A Program Is
`Licensed Using At Least The Verification Structure.” ..........................................13
`
`Samsung’s Criticisms of Dr. Martin’s Opinions Fail to Demonstrate the Absence
`a Dispute of Material Fact as to Samsung’s Infringement. ....................................16
`
`VII.
`
`SAMSUNG IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS THEORY
`THAT THE ENTIRE METHOD IS PERFORMED ON THE ACCUSED DEVICES ....19
`
`A.
`
`At a Minimum, Whether the Claim 1 “Using An Agent” Step Is Performed
`Entirely on the Accused Devices Is a Disputed Factual Issue. ..............................20
`
`B.
`
`Samsung Makes No Arguments Regarding Claim 2. ............................................25
`
`C.
`
`At a Minimum, Samsung Directed and Controlled Its Users’ Infringement. ........26
`
`1.
`
`Samsung’s end users do not perform any step of Claim 1. ...........................26
`
`
`
`i
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 3 of 57
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`
`
`2.
`
`If Samsung’s end users perform a method step of Claim 1, Samsung directs
`or controls that performance. ........................................................................27
`
`i)
`
`Samsung conditioned its end users’ participation in an activity or
`receipt of a benefit. ..............................................................................28
`
`ii)
`
`Samsung established the manner and timing of performance. ...........33
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`A Triable Issue Exists as to Whether Samsung Is Liable for the Acts of Its CDNs
`and Carriers. ...........................................................................................................35
`
`Samsung’s Claim That the Accused Devices Do Not Perform “Automatically” Is
`Irrelevant and, in Any Event, Is Factually Disputed. .............................................40
`
`VIII. SAMSUNG’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON A
` IS A RED HERRING ......................................................................42
`
`IX.
`
`SAMSUNG IS NOT LICENSED, AND THERE IS NO EXHAUSTION .......................44
`
`X.
`
`XI.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SAMSUNG FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE ARBAUGH
`PATENT IS PRIOR ART AS A MATTER OF LAW ......................................................46
`
`THE ACCUSED DEVICES WRITE A VERIFICATION STRUCTURE TO THE
`ERASABLE NON-VOLATILE “MEMORY OF THE BIOS”.........................................48
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 4 of 57
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adaptix, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`78 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .......................................................................................42
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)........................................................................ passim
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`805 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................7, 11
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................6
`
`Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. TCT Mobile (US) Inc.,
`No. SACV 19-2192-GW-ADSx (Slip Op.) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) .....................................9
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`744 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..............................................................................................2, 18
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Apator Miitors ApS v. Kamstrup A/S,
`887 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................47, 48
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`2014 WL 252045 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) .................................................................... passim
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Digital Reg of Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`2014 WL 2604324 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) ...................................................................38, 43
`
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.,
`800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................46
`
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc.,
`845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..........................................................................................27, 28
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Flash-Control, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`2020 WL 4561591 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2020) ........................................................................10
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 5 of 57
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`
`
`Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc.,
`405 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............................................................................................4, 6
`
`Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
`607 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................10
`
`Huawei Techs. v. Samsung Elecs. Co, Ltd.,
`340 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .......................................................................................7
`
`IBM Corp. v. Booking Holdings Inc.,
`775 F. App’x 674 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..........................................................................................42
`
`Illumina Inc. v. Complete Genomics Inc.,
`2013 WL 1282977 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) .........................................................................47
`
`IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.,
`2019 WL 330515 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2019) ..........................................................................27, 34
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`2009 WL 8635161 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) ...........................................................................45
`
`Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc.,
`732 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................45
`
`Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp.,
`656 F. App’x 504 (Fed. Cir. 2016). ...................................................................................41, 42
`
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................46
`
`Marlowe Patent Holdings LLC v. Dice Elecs., LLC,
`293 F.R.D. 688 (D.N.J. 2013) ..................................................................................................12
`
`MIT v. Shire Pharm., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................11
`
`Monsanto Co. v. Bowman,
`657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................45
`
`NeuroGrafix v. Brainlab, Inc.,
`2020 WL 5642946 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020) ..........................................................................28
`
`Nichols v. Enterasys Networks, Inc.,
`495 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................25, 42
`
`NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.,
`418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................44
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc.,
`813 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................7
`
`Pernix Ireland Pain DAC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd.,
`323 F. Supp. 3d 566 (D. Del. 2018 ....................................................................................28, 31
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 6 of 57
`
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................9, 18
`
`PureCircle USA Inc. v. SweeGen, Inc.,
`2020 WL 4258658 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2020) ........................................................................6, 12
`
`Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`553 U.S. 617 (2008) .................................................................................................................45
`
`REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil Oyj,
`841 F.3d 954 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................47
`
`Saffran v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
`2008 WL 2716318 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) ...........................................................................13
`
`Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 2850286 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020) .....................................................................26, 27
`
`SiRF Tech., Inc. v. ITC,
`601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2015 WL 660755 .....................................................................................................................37
`
`Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc.,
`175 F.3d 974 (Fed. Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................25
`
`Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,
`545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................46
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment Am., LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................7
`
`Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp,
`877 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc.,
`870 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1989)................................................................................................25
`
`WiNet Labs LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 409012 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2020) ............................................................................42
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ........................................................................................................................3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) ............................................................................................................46
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 7 of 57
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Samsung’s motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) confirms what Ancora has always
`
`alleged: Under the Court’s claim constructions, Samsung’s over-the-air (“OTA”) software updates
`
`perform every step of the asserted claims of the ’941 Patent. Faced with this inescapable fact,
`
`Samsung now relies on six arguments in a desperate attempt to avoid its infringement. All fail.
`
`First, because Samsung cannot avoid infringement under the Court’s constructions (for
`
`construed terms) or plain and ordinary meaning (for unconstrued terms), Samsung seeks a
`
`Markman do-over for the “pseudo-unique key” and “verifying the program” terms. MSJ §§ IV,
`
`V. But Samsung’s brand-new claim construction arguments are as wrong as they are untimely.
`
`Second, Samsung argues that it is not liable for its infringement because it uses third parties
`
`to perform certain steps or because, in Samsung’s view, all steps are performed exclusively on
`
`end-user devices. MSJ § VII. Samsung is wrong on both counts. Ancora has identified mountains
`
`of evidence showing that Samsung directs and controls every part of the OTA update process,
`
`rendering it liable for infringement under Akamai and its progeny. Also wrong is Samsung’s
`
`attempt to avoid liability by arguing that “the entire method is . . . [p]erformed on the accused
`
`devices.” Id. at 29. By definition, certain asserted claims expressly require the participation of one
`
`or more remote servers like Samsung uses here. See Ex. 11 (’941 Patent), Claim 2.
`
`Third, Samsung attempts to inject an extraterritoriality issue by volunteering that some
`
`
`
`—which Ancora has not accused of infringement and which perform none of
`
`the infringing steps—are
`
`. MSJ § VIII. But Samsung itself argues that
`
`“Performance of an unclaimed function is not relevant to infringement of a method claim.” MSJ
`
`at 31. Unclaimed
`
` acts thus are “not relevant.”
`
`Fourth, with no legal analysis whatsoever, Samsung claims that its TV products cannot
`
`infringe because Samsung
`
`, and because
`
`941 Patent to the extent
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 8 of 57
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`
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` involved. MSJ § IX. But as Ancora demonstrated in its affirmative motion, Samsung’s
`
`infringement is expressly carved out of
`
`. D.I. 135-1 at 8-9. Moreover,
`
`Samsung’s expansive reading of the “exhaustion” doctrine is contrary to all precedent.
`
`Fifth, Samsung fails to identify any evidence to support its burden to show that the Arbaugh
`
`patent—which was filed after the ’941 Patent application—is prior art. And, in any event, whether
`
`Arbaugh is prior art is a quintessential factual dispute that the jury will need to resolve. MSJ § X.
`
`Sixth, Samsung argues that it does not infringe the “memory of the BIOS” limitation by
`
`ascribing to Ancora’s expert (Dr. Martin) an opinion he never offered. MSJ § XI.
`
`In sum, Samsung’s MSJ (1) hinges on legal arguments that this Court or the Federal Circuit
`
`already has rejected or (2) simply ignore (or misstate) the overwhelming factual evidence Ancora
`
`has amassed, which easily show that—at a minimum—a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
`
`II.
`
`THE ’941 PATENT
`
`The ’941 Patent relates to a specific technique for “identifying and restricting of an
`
`unauthorized software program’s operation.” ’941 Patent at 1:6-8. Before the ’941 Patent, there
`
`were two basic (sub-optimal) methods of verifying and restricting the operation of a program. One
`
`involved “software-based methods” that “require[d] writing a license signature on the computer’s
`
`hard drive.” Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018). But
`
`writing a signature to the hard drive was unsecure because the signature could easily be changed
`
`by hackers. Id. (citing ’941 Patent at 1:19-26). Hardware-based methods also existed, but they
`
`“require[d] inserting a dongle into a computer port to authenticate the software authorization.” Id.
`
`(citing ’941 Patent at 1:27-32). Those methods also were flawed because they were “costly,
`
`inconvenient, and not suitable for software . . . downloaded over the internet.” Id.
`
`The ’941 Patent improved over these prior art techniques by “using the memory space
`
`associated with the computer’s basic input/output system (BIOS), rather than other memory space,
`
`to store appropriately encrypted license information to be used in the verification process.” Ancora
`
`2
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 9 of 57
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`
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`Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744 F.3d 732, 733 (Fed. Cir. 2014). BIOS memory space “is typically
`
`used for storing programs that assist in the start-up of a computer.” HTC, 908 F.3d at 1345.
`
`Prior to the ’941, however, it was not contemplated that operating system level programs
`
`could interact with BIOS—much less “us[e] an agent to setup a verification structure in the
`
`erasable non-volatile memory area of the BIOS.” Ex. 1 (Reasons for Allowance) at
`
`ANCORA_451;1 HTC, 908 F.3d at 1348-49 (stating that “claimed method here specifically
`
`identifies how that functionality improvement is effectuated in an assertedly unexpected way: a
`
`structure containing a license record is stored in a particular, modifiable, non-volatile portion of
`
`the computer’s BIOS, and the structure in that memory location is used for verification”). Using
`
`BIOS in this manner “improves computer security, . . . because successfully hacking BIOS
`
`memory (i.e., altering it without rendering the computer inoperable) is much harder than hacking
`
`the memory used by the prior art to store license-verification information.” HTC, 908 F.3d at 1345.
`
`III. OPERATION OF THE ACCUSED OTA UPDATE FUNCTIONALITY
`
`To the extent relevant to Samsung’s MSJ, Ancora identifies in each subsection below any
`
`points of disagreement, along with the specific factual proofs that defeat summary judgment.
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant “shows that there is no genuine
`
`dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is likely to
`
`reasonably affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
`
`(1986). The burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists lies with the
`
`party moving for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Exhibits labeled “Ex.” are attached to the Feb. 17, 2021 declaration of Steven M. Seigel. Exhibits
`labeled “MSJ Ex.” were attached to the Jan. 19, 2021 declaration of Thomas E. Garten filed with
`Samsung’s MSJ.
`
`3
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 10 of 57
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`
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`V.
`
`SAMSUNG INFRINGES BECAUSE IT CAUSES THE ACCUSED DEVICES TO
`“ESTABLISH OR CERTIFY THE EXISTENCE OF A PSEUDO-UNIQUE KEY”
`
`
`
`Because Samsung cannot dispute that its devices “establish[] or certify[] the existence of a
`
`pseudo-unique key” under the Court’s construction, D.I. 69 at 4, it asks the Court to now construe
`
`a term that the parties previously agreed needed no construction: “pseudo-unique key.” MSJ at 15.
`
`The Court should reject this ploy. It is untimely, wrong, and prejudicial.
`
`First, Samsung’s untimely request to construe “pseudo unique key” as a key that is
`
`“unique . . . for a particular computer” reflects a tactical gamble: Samsung improved its IPR
`
`petition by avoiding a construction of the term at Markman. Now that the PTAB has denied
`
`Samsung’s IPR Petition, Samsung argues that the term requires the exact opposite of what it
`
`previously argued. Not only is Samsung’s prior argument clear evidence of what a POSITA would
`
`understand the term to mean, Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005) (holding an accused infringer’s statements regarding a patent or a claim term’s scope is
`
`direct, compelling evidence of how “those skilled in the art would construe the claims”), but courts
`
`routinely reject these late-stage claim construction flip-flops as a matter of course—correctly
`
`concluding that they amount to gamesmanship in its purest form. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
`
`Co., Ltd., 2014 WL 252045, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014).
`
`
`
`Second, even if the Court were to consider Samsung’s untimely Markman arguments, they
`
`would fail. Samsung’s construction conflicts with the claims and the intrinsic record.
`
`
`
`Third, Samsung’s belated claim construction argument should independently be denied
`
`because it would unduly prejudice Ancora and tax judicial resources by forcing Ancora to seek to
`
`re-open both fact and expert discovery to address a brand-new construction that Samsung could
`
`have sought during the Markman stage.
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Reject Samsung’s New “Pseudo Unique Key” Construction.
`
`As an initial matter, the Court should reject Samsung’s new “pseudo-unique key”
`
`construction because it is exactly the opposite of what it (and its expert) argued that the term meant.
`
`4
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 11 of 57
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`
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`Samsung feigns that it was “expert discovery [that] revealed that the parties dispute the
`
`meaning of the term.” MSJ at 14. Wrong. From the beginning of this case, Ancora alleged that the
`
`public key stored in each accused device’s non-volatile memory constituted a “pseudo unique
`
`key.” See Ex. 2 (Ancora Prelim. Infring. Content.) at 91-96, 151-55. In fact, Ancora’s Preliminary
`
`Infringement Contentions—served five months before the Markman hearing—identified the
`
`“public key in the hardware and/or non-volatile cache memory of each . . . Product” as the pseudo-
`
`unique key. Id. at 91. Despite this, Samsung dropped the term as one it sought to construe. Ex. 3
`
`(Email) at 1 (“Defendants no longer seek construction of . . . ‘pseudo-unique key.’”)
`
`Samsung elected not to dispute Ancora’s infringement theory or seek any construction of
`
`the term. Its reason was simple: Samsung’s new construction would have foreclosed the arguments
`
`Samsung was making to the PTAB in its IPR Petition. Indeed, in its IPR Petition, Samsung urged
`
`a broad reading of “pseudo-unique key” that is squarely at odds with the “unique . . . for a
`
`particular computer” construction it seeks now. Specifically, in its Petition, Samsung argued that
`
`any “data” used to encode a file can be a “pseudo-unique key.” See Ex. 4 (IPR Pet’n) at 38.
`
`In particular, Samsung asserted that “Hasebe’s ‘signature key’ is a pseudo-unique key.” Id.
`
`But Hasebe defines its “signature key” as nothing more than “data in license display routine 25”
`
`that is used to encode a file. Ex. 5 (Hasebe) at 7:67-8:5. Nothing about the “signature key” is
`
`“unique . . . for a particular computer.” To the contrary, Hasebe discloses a “user individual key”
`
`which is unique to each computer. Id. at 1:60-2:4. Notably, however, Samsung did not claim that
`
`this unique key (which is not used for verification) was the “pseudo unique key” of the invention.
`
`Samsung’s IPR expert likewise confirmed that a “pseudo unique key” need not be
`
`“unique . . . for a particular computer.” In fact, Samsung’s expert confirmed that a POSITA would
`
`understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “pseudo unique key” to encompass entity-wide keys,
`
`which are broader than the asymmetric cryptography schemes Ancora identifies as infringing:
`
`
`
`5
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 12 of 57
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`
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`In the context of the ’941 patent, uniqueness or pseudo-uniqueness
`need only be guaranteed for a given vendor or entity that licenses
`software. For example, license keys that Microsoft gives out have to
`be unique to Microsoft’s “domain”, regardless what license numbers,
`say, Apple uses to license its own products . . . .
`
`Ex. 6 (Zadok Decl. for Samsung IPR “Zadok IPR Decl.”) ¶ 62.
`
`
`
`The only thing that has changed since then is that the PTAB denied Samsung’s IPR
`
`Petition. But that denial does not provide Samsung free reign to reimagine the scope of the “pseudo
`
`unique key” term. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit has held that an accused infringer’s
`
`statements regarding a claim term’s scope is compelling evidence of how “those skilled in the art
`
`would construe the claims.” Gillette, 405 F.3d at 1374. Gillette is directly on point. There, the
`
`Federal Circuit pointed to the fact that “[t]he defendant itself endorsed” that the patent family at
`
`issue “would not exclude” a particular feature—holding that “[t]his blatant admission by this same
`
`defendant” clearly demonstrated how “those skilled in the art would construe the claims.” Id.
`
`Other courts have gone further—explaining that a litigant’s “desire to change previously
`
`agreed upon constructions . . . after its failure to secure institution of its IPR petition suggests that
`
`there is gamesmanship afoot.” PureCircle USA Inc. v. SweeGen, Inc., 2020 WL 4258658, at *3
`
`(C.D. Cal. July 2, 2020) (rejecting request for new construction). Simply put, “[a] patent may not,
`
`like a ‘nose of wax,’ be twisted one way to [find] anticipation and another to [avoid] infringement.”
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`Amazon.com, Inc. v. barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this same gambit by Samsung before. In Apple,
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`Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., the court rejected as untimely Samsung’s request for new claim
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`constructions raised for the first time at summary judgment. 2014 WL 252045, at *3–*4 (N.D.
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`Cal. Jan. 21, 2014). The court explained that it had fulfilled its claim construction duties under O2
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`Micro by resolving disputes properly presented at the Markman stage, holding that it was not
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`“obligated to rule on claim construction arguments presented for the first time in summary
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`judgment briefs” where the “dispute over claim scope” had not been raised during claim
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 13 of 57
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`construction. Id. at *3. The court ruled the same way in Huawei Techs. v. Samsung Elecs. Co, Ltd.,
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`rejecting requests for new constructions on terms “not selected by the parties for construction
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`during the claim construction process.” 340 F. Supp. 3d 934, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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`In sum, the mere fact that Samsung has become dissatisfied with the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of this term does not require the Court to re-open claim construction. Nuance Commc’ns,
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`Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The fact that
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`shortly before trial [plaintiff] became dissatisfied with its own proposed construction and sought a
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`new one does not give rise to an O2 Micro violation.”). Under O2 Micro, the Court should continue
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`to accord the term its agreed plain and ordinary meaning. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
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`Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding no O2 Micro error where court
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`rejected request for “further construction” at trial after parties had agreed to term’s construction).
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`B.
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`Samsung Infringes Under the Ordinary Meaning of “Pseudo Unique Key.”
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`When a claim construction “dispute” is first “presented at the summary judgment stage”
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`for “terms that were not selected for construction,” the proper approach is to proceed with an
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`infringement analysis using “the full range of [the term’s] plain and ordinary meaning.” Huawei,
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`340 F. Supp. 3d at 948, 957. The Court should “view the . . . dispute[] through the lens of whether
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`a reasonable jury, armed with . . . an instruction that the plain and ordinary meaning controls . . . ,
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`could or would necessarily conclude that the asserted claim reads on an accused device.” Apple,
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`2014 WL 252045, at *5; Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1369
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012) (same). Under this analysis—which is the only appropriate one at this stage—
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`there is a triable issue of fact because Samsung does challenge Dr. Martin’s opinion that Samsung
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`infringes under the plain and ordinary meaning of “pseudo-unique key.”
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`Nor could Samsung challenge infringement on this point given Dr. Martin’s extensive
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`explanation as to the ways the accused devices establish pseudo-unique keys. These include:
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 14 of 57
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`Furthermore, Samsung’s IPR expert agrees with Dr. Martin that—read in light of the
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`specification—the plain and ordinary meaning of “pseudo unique key” is one that “increase[s] the
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`bit-length of the random number[] generated, making it large enough that a probability of
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`duplicates is ‘acceptably low.’” Ex. 6 (Zadok IPR Decl.) ¶ 71. The “acceptably low” probability
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`of duplicates Dr. Zadok is referring to is a quotation from the ’941 patent that, consistent with both
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`experts’ opinions concerning the plain and ordinary meaning of this term, describes the “pseudo
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`unique key” in one embodiment as one that is “of sufficient length such that there is an acceptably
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`low probability of a successful unauthorized transfer.” Ex. 11 (’941 Patent) at 4:15-18.2
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`2 Dr. Zadok’s description of the “pseudo unique” scheme with his description of a “unique” key
`scheme as a “stateful” scheme that requires the entity that creates the key to track and store its
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`Case 1:20-cv-00034-ADA Document 159 Filed 02/25/21 Page 15 of 57
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`In sum, there is substantial record evidence that Samsung performs the step of “establishing
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`or certifying the existence of a pseudo-unique key.”
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`C.
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`Samsung’s New “Pseudo-Unique Key” Construction Is Wrong.
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`Even if the Court were to now construe “pseudo unique key,” Samsung’s construction—
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`“a string of bits that constitutes, effectively, a unique identification code for a particular
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`computer,” MSJ at 1—is wrong. In addition to conflicting with how Samsung’s own expert
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`explained a POSITA would understand the term, it conflicts with the claim language, is
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`inconsistent with the specification, and relies on a distorted and mistaken reading of the
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`prosecution history. Indeed, the court in Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. TCT Mobile (US) Inc.
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`recently rejected nearly the identical construction. See Ex. 12 (TCT Markman Order) at 6-9.
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`Beginning with the claim language, Samsung ignores the core teachings of Phillips v. AWH
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`Corp. that claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” as understood
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`by a person of ordinary skill. 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Indeed, Samsung remarkably
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`makes no argument that its “effectively unique . . . for a particular computer” limitation is
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`supported by the claim language. There is a reason: nothing in the claims supports it.
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`To the contrary, the word “pseudo unique” inherently has a broader meaning than
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`“unique.”3 Consistent with that a reality, when the claims actually require a “unique key,” they say
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`so explicitly. For example, Claim 13 further modifies the claims to require a “unique key.”
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`Compare id. Claims 7, 9, and 12 (“pseudo unique key”), with id. Claim 13 (“unique key”); see
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`also id. at 1:48-50 (describing “unique key” as a “unique identification code for the host
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`information to “guarantee uniqueness.” Id. ¶¶ 63-69.
`3 See Ex. 13 [Garfinkle, Forensic Feature Extraction (2006)] at 73 (“A pseudo-unique identifier
`is an identifier that has sufficient entropy such that within a given corpus it is highly unlikely that
`the identifier will be repeated by chance. Repetitions of pseudo-unique identifiers happen, but
`when they happen it is the result of