`United States District Court
`Southern District of Texas
`ENTERED
`November 10, 2020
`David J. Bradley, Clerk
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
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`JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
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` Plaintiff,
`VS.
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`BELLA’S BAR & GRILL LLC, et al.,
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` Defendants.
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-00140
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`§
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`ORDER AND OPINION
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`Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. (JHP) is a commercial licensor of sports and
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`entertainment programming to commercial businesses. JHP brings suit against Defendants
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`Bella’s Bar & Grill LLC, d/b/a Bella’s Bar & Grill, and its owner and manager, Daniel Zuniga,
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`alleging that they aired the boxing match Floyd Mayweather, Jr. vs. Conor McGregor (the
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`Event) without authorization and without paying a sublicense fee to JHP. (Complaint, Doc. 1,
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`6–7 (alleging causes of action under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501 (Copyright Act), and 47 U.S.C. §§
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`605 or 553 (Communications Act))
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`JHP moves for summary judgment on its cause of action under the Copyright Act.1
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`(Motion, Doc. 23)
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`I.
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`Summary Judgment Facts
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`A. Admissions
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`Both parties have submitted summary judgment evidence for the Court’s consideration.
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`During the course of discovery, however, both Zuniga and Bella’s failed to respond or object to
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`properly-served requests for admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. (JHP’s Req.
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`for Admissions, Doc. 23-7) As a result, the factual statements in those requests for admissions
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`are deemed admitted and conclusively established.2 FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); see In re Carney, 258
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`F.3d 415, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment based on facts resulting from a
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`1 JHP titles its Motion as one for “Final Summary Judgment”, but as JHP does not move for summary judgment on all
`its causes of action, the Motion is one for partial summary judgment.
`2 Defendants also have not moved to withdraw or amend the admissions.
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`party’s failure to respond to a request for admissions). The summary judgment facts for
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`purpose of the Motion stem in large measure from these admissions. As to factual matters not
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`established through the admissions, the Court views the competent summary judgment
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`evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec.
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`Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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`B. Facts
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`In 2017, JHP “purchased and retained the exclusive right to distribute and publicly
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`perform the Floyd Mayweather, Jr. vs. Conor McGregor broadcast, including all undercard
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`bouts and commentary” to commercial businesses in the United States. (J. Hand Decl., Doc. 23-
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`2, ¶ 4) JHP’s Licensing Agreement with the Event’s copyright author and owner, Showtime
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`Networks Inc., granted JHP the exclusive commercial rights “to distribute the public exhibition
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`of the audiovisual presentation of the Event to commercial establishments” in the state of Texas.
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`(Copyright Registration, Doc. 23-3; J. Hand Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 6; Lic. Agree., Doc. 23-4, ¶ 1)
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`The contract also granted JHP the “right to take enforcement measures, prosecute and
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`commence legal actions” stemming from any “unauthorized exploitation” of JHP’s rights. (J.
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`Hand Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 6; Lic. Agree., Doc. 23-4, ¶ 7) For a commercial business to receive and
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`broadcast the Event, the location was required to pay JHP a commercial sublicense fee based on
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`the capacity or fire code occupancy of the establishment. (J. Hand Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 11; Event
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`Rate Card, Doc. 23-5) Once a business paid the commercial fee, JHP would then “authorize the
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`receipt of the Event through the establishment’s television programming provider.” (J. Hand
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`Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 13)
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`Bella’s is a commercial business that operates as a restaurant and bar, and Zuniga is its
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`principal, owner, member, manager, and registered agent.3 (Bella’s Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 2;
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`Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 7; Cert. of Formation, Doc. 23-1, 1) Zuniga “arranged cable
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`service at [Bella’s] by telephone”. (Zuniga Aff., Doc. 25-1, 3) On August 26, 2017, the date of the
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`3 Zuniga affies that Bella’s no longer operates as a business. (Zuniga Aff., Doc. 25-1, 3)
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`Event, Bella’s was open and willfully broadcasted the Event to numerous patrons. (Bella’s
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`Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 2–3; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 8) Zuniga was at the restaurant that
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`day, had the right and ability to supervise Bella’s, and witnessed the Event’s broadcast. (Zuniga
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`Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 2) Both Bella’s and Zuniga possessed a financial interest in and derived
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`financial benefit from the restaurant the day the Event was broadcast there. (Bella’s
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`Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 4; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 9)
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`On the day of the Event, JHP’s Event Auditor Wanda Castillo witnessed Defendants air
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`the Event to about 115 restaurant patrons. (Castillo Aff., Doc. 23-6, 1–2; Photos, Doc. 23-6, 3–
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`25) The restaurant has capacity for about 180 people (Castillo Aff., Doc. 23-6, 2) Defendants
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`“did not pay the commercial fees to JHP to legally receive the Event.” (J. Hand Decl., Doc. 23-2,
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`¶ 14; Bella’s Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 3; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 8) Instead, Defendants
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`obtained the Event through a residential cable or satellite account. (Bella’s Admissions, Doc.
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`23-7, 3; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 8) Based on the 180-person capacity of the restaurant,
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`Defendants would have had to pay a fee of $6,700.00 to legally broadcast the Event. (J. Hand
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`Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 11; Event Rate Card, Doc. 23-5, 1)
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`C. Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence
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`1. Defendants’ Objections
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` Defendants “object[] to Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence”, but do not contend
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`that any specific evidence that JHP has offered is not competent summary judgment evidence.
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`(Response, Doc. 25, 2–3) As a result, the Court does not consider the Response as asserting
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`objections to the summary judgment evidence that JHP has submitted.
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`2. JHP’s Objections
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`JHP objects to various statements in Defendant’s Response, arguing that Defendants
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`offer no competent summary judgment evidence to support those factual statements or that
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`Defendants cannot present such evidence because the facts have been conclusively established
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`through admissions. (Reply, Doc. 27, ¶¶ 7–12 (contesting, for example, the Defendants’ ability
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`to deny knowing that Bella’s broadcast of the Event was wrongful)) The Court agrees that
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`statements in a party’s brief do not constitute competent summary judgment evidence. See FED.
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`R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (listing categories of proper evidence for purposes of summary judgment).
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`The only evidence that Defendants offer that falls within Rule 56(c) is the Affidavit of Daniel
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`Zuniga. (Doc. 25-1) Aside from statements in that affidavit, Defendants offer no competent
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`summary judgment evidence. In addition, to the extent that Zuniga’s affidavit seeks to
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`controvert admitted facts, the Court disregards such statements.
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`JHP also relies on the best evidence rule to object to statements in Zuniga’s affidavit that
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`“no provision in any agreement with any cable service provider” restricts the Defendants’ use of
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`the service, and that Bella’s “charter is forfeited”. (Reply, Doc. 27, ¶¶ 10–11) When attempting
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`to prove the contents of a writing, an original of that writing is required. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
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`Zuniga’s statements at issue seek to prove the contents of a writing—i.e., the provisions of an
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`agreement and the status of a corporate charter. As a result, JHP’s objections to these
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`statements are sustained.
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`
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`II. Analysis
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`JHP sues Bella’s and Zuniga under the Copyright Act of the United States, 17 U.S.C. §§
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`101 and 501 (2019), and the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 553 (1992),
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`or alternatively § 605 (1996). (Complaint, Doc. 1) In its Motion, however, JHP moves for
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`summary judgment solely under the Copyright Act. (Motion, Doc. 23, 7 n.1)
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`A. Standard of Review
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`Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
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`nonmoving party, shows that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and that the movant is
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`entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475
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`U.S. at 587. A genuine dispute over material facts exists if the evidence presents an issue “that
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`properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor
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`of either party,” and the fact at issue might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty
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`Lobby, Inc. 47 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986). The moving party “bears the burden of identifying
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`those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
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`fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp.
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`v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–25 (1986)). All facts and inferences drawn from those facts must
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`be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
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`(2007).
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`If this evidence is provided, the burden then shifts to the responding party to present
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`affirmative evidence to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. “[T]he nonmoving party
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`must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential
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`component of its case.” Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.
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`1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255–57). “Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable
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`inferences, and unsupported speculation, however, are not sufficient to defeat a motion for
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`summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted).
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`B. Copyright Act Claim
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`“The Copyright Act prohibits infringement by ‘[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
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`rights of the copyright owner.’” Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
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`17 U.S.C. § 501(a)). To succeed on a claim that these rights have been infringed, a plaintiff must
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`generally demonstrate two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) that a defendant
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`violated one or more of the plaintiff's exclusive rights under the copyright. Avtec Sys., Inc. v.
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`Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1994); Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 129
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`F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001–02 (S.D. Tex. 2000). “Ownership of a valid copyright is established by
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`proving the originality and copyrightability of the material and compliance with the statutory
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`formalities.” Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995). A
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`copyright registration certificate is prima facie evidence of copyright validity. Id.; 17 U.S.C. §
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`410(c).
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`Upon a showing of validity, a copyright owner establishes
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`infringement by
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`demonstrating that one of its rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 has been violated. Id. at § 501(a);
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`Avtec Sys., 21 F.3d 571. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, requiring no intent to
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`infringe. Buck v. Jewell–LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931); Chavez v. Arte Publico
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`Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Fed’n of State Massage Therapy Boards v.
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`Mendez Master Training Ctr., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 557, 573 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (“Copyright
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`infringement is a strict liability tort and plaintiffs do not need to prove a defendant’s mental
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`state to prosecute a claim.”); Microsoft Corp., 129 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (“Neither lack of
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`knowledge nor intent is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement.”).
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`The Copyright Act grants the copyright owner various exclusive rights, including, in
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`relevant part: “(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
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`sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”; and, “(4) in the case of
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`literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
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`other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly”. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (4).
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`Violation of these rights to distribute and to perform protected intellectual property constitutes
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`copyright infringement. Id. at § 501(a).
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`In the present matter, JHP argues that by broadcasting the Event at Bella’s, Defendants
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`violated these rights. (Motion, Doc. 23, 19) As the Court concludes that Defendants’ broadcast
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`violated JHP’s exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) to perform the Event, the Court does not
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`reach whether the broadcast also violated Section 106(3).4
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`1. Right to Performance
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`4 The Court notes that it has found no authority definitively establishing that the broadcast of a sporting event falls
`within the protections of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). On the contrary, cases considering Section 106(3) typically concern an
`actual reproduction of the copyrighted work and distribution of the copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. See, e.g.,
`SA Music, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00105-BAT, 2020 WL 3128534, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020),
`reconsideration denied, No. 2:20-CV-00105-BAT, 2020 WL 3798935 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2020), motion to certify
`appeal denied, No. 2:20-CV-00105-BAT, 2020 WL 4501518 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 2020) (writing that Section 106(3)
`“requires actual dissemination of the infringed copies by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
`lending”); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir.
`2018) (concluding that the sale of digital music files via the internet constituted distribution under Section 106(3));
`Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. CIVA H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008)
`(involving an infringer who made copyrighted music available for download over a peer-to-peer network). JHP does
`not contend that Defendants copied and then distributed the copies of the Event.
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`JHP alleges that Defendants infringed its right to publicly perform the copyrighted
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`audiovisual work under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). (Complaint, Doc. 1, 7)
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`Courts have repeatedly found a violation of the right to publicly perform copyrighted
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`works where a commercial restaurant or bar publicly broadcasts copyrighted works. See Broad.
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`Music, Inc. v. Tex. Border Mgmt., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 3d 689, 693 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (concluding
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`that a bar infringed copyright holders rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) by performing copyrighted
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`music without authorization); Stygian Songs v. Johnson, 776 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238 (N.D. Tex.
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`2011) (granting summary judgment where a bar performed copyrighted musical works without
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`authorization); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Deek, No. 4:14-CV-2894, 2017 WL 6334180, at *2 (S.D.
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`Tex. Mar. 16, 2017) (granting summary judgment where a restaurant hosted live or recorded
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`performances of copyrighted music without authorization); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Midtown
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`Beverage, LLC, No. 4:12-CV-1617, 2013 WL 3554406, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 11, 2013) (granting
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`summary judgment where a hotel bar and restaurant played copyrighted songs without
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`authorization). In fact, JHP has repeatedly relied on the Copyright Act to secure default
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`judgment or summary judgment against various restaurants and bars that have broadcasted
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`sporting events for which JHP held the exclusive rights. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v.
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`Alburl, No. 5:18-CV-1935-LCB, 2020 WL 836844, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2020) (summary
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`judgment entered based on the unauthorized broadcast of Mayweather vs. McGregor fight);
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`Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Allen, No. CV 118-127, 2020 WL 1491288, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 19,
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`2020) (same); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Jones, No. 1:18-CV-3702-TCB, 2019 WL 5280971,
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`at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2019) (default judgment based on the unauthorized broadcast of
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`Mayweather vs. McGregor); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Infante, No. 20 CIV. 1650 (NRB),
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`2020 WL 6063796, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020) (default judgment for unauthorized display of
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`a boxing match).5
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`5 The court acknowledges that in most of those cases, the defendant defaulted or did not contest summary judgment.
`In addition, in many of these decisions, the court’s written decision cited generally to 17 U.S.C. § 106, and not
`specifically to Section 106(4).
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`In the present matter, Defendants have admitted that Bella’s was a commercial business
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`open on the day of the Event, and that Bella’s broadcasted the Event without having obtained a
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`license from JHP to do so. (Bella’s Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 2; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 8)
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`These admissions, coupled with the uncontroverted fact that JHP held the exclusive right to
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`license the broadcast of the Event, entitle JHP to summary judgment.
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`In their Response, Defendants deny the admitted facts and contend that they did not
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`know the illegality of broadcasting the Event. But as previously explained, the Defendants’
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`failure to object or respond to requests for admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36
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`results in those facts being conclusively established. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); In re Carney, 258
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`F.3d at 421–22. As a result, Defendants cannot now submit summary judgment evidence
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`controverting those admissions.
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`2. Laches
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`Defendants also assert the defense of laches, arguing that Bella’s is closed and that JHP
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`waited almost two years to file its lawsuit. (Response, Doc. 25, 23) The Copyright Act contains a
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`three-year statute of limitations. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). Laches “cannot be invoked to preclude
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`adjudication of a claim for damages brought within the three-year window.” Petrella v. Metro-
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`Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014); see also SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First
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`Quality Baby Prod., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2017) (“In Petrella, we held that laches cannot
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`preclude a claim for damages incurred within the Copyright Act's 3–year limitations period.”).
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`As Defendants concede that JHP initiated this action within two years of the Event, the laches
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`defense fails.
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`3. Forfeited Corporate Charter
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`Finally, even if the Court considered Zuniga’s statement that Bella’s has forfeited its
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`business charter, this fact would not immunize the company from lawsuit. Under the Texas
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`Business Organizations Code, a company that forfeits its charter under Chapter 11 of the Code
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`continues in existence until the third anniversary of its effective termination for purposes of
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`maintaining an action against the entity or permitting the survival of an existing claim by or
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`against the entity. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 11.356(a)(1)–(2). Bella’s has not demonstrated that its
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`charter was forfeited more than three years ago.
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`C. Zuniga’s Liability
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`Under the Copyright Act, “[d]irect liability is imposed on those who ‘trespass[ ] into [the
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`copyright owner’s] exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted
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`work . . . .’” BWP Media USA, Inc. v. T & S Software Assocs., Inc., 852 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir.
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`2017) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)).
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`In addition to direct liability of the infringer, joint and several liability can be imposed on any
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`person who: (1) had the right and ability to control the infringing activity, and (2) had a direct
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`financial interest in the activity. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc., 20 F.3d 1171, 1994 WL 144812,
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`at *2 (5th Cir. 1994); see also EMI Apr. Music Inc. v. Jet Rumeurs, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 619,
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`623 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. EP-13-CV-32-KC, 2014 WL
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`2440556, at *8 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2014). This applies to corporate officers. Hobi, 20 F.3d
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`1171, 1994 WL 144812, at *2; see also Fed'n of State Massage Therapy Boards, 393 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 574.
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`Turning to the present matter, Zuniga was Bella’s principal, owner, member, and
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`manager. (Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 7) On the date of the Event, he was at the restaurant,
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`supervised activities there, and witnessed the broadcast of the Event. (Id.) Zuniga possessed a
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`financial interest in and received a financial benefit from the activities at Bella’s that day. (Id.)
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`He also arranged the cable service at Bella’s. (Id.)
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`The summary judgment record conclusively establishes that Zuniga personally engaged
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`in the infringing conduct, had the right and ability to control that activity, and had a direct
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`financial interest in that activity. As a result, the Court concludes that Zuniga is both directly
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`liable and jointly and severally liable with Bella’s for copyright infringement.
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`D. Damages
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`A “copyright owner may elect at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover,
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`instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements
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`involved in the action . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court
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`considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). If the infringement is willful, a court may increase the
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`statutory damages up to $150,000. Id. at § 504(c)(2).
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`
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`Here, the Defendants admitted that their broadcast of the Event was willful. (Bella’s
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`Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 3; Zuniga Admissions, Doc. 23-7, 9) JHP requests statutory damages of
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`$33,500, equal to five times the licensing fee of $6,700. (Motion, Doc. 23, 21; Reply, Doc. 27,
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`¶ 37; J. Hand Decl., Doc. 23-2, ¶ 11; Event Rate Card, Doc. 23-5; Castillo Aff., Doc. 23-6, 2)
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`Defendants do not contest the amount of the licensing fee or argue against a five-fold
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`multiplier.
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`In various instances, courts granting a copyright owner’s motion for summary
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`judgment have awarded statutory damages of three to five times the licensing fee. See, e.g.,
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`Controversy Music v. Down Under Pub Tyler, Ind., 488 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578–79 (E.D. Tex.
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`2007) (awarding damages of $25,000 based on a licensing fees of $6,850); WB Music Corp. v.
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`Big Daddy’s Ent., Inc., No. EP-05-CA-267-PRM, 2005 WL 2662553, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18,
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`2005) (awarding “between four to five times the amount of licensing fees owed by Defendants,
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`a ratio within the bounds followed by courts addressing similar cases”); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
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`Barflies, Inc., No. CIV.A. 03-304, 2003 WL 21674470, at *2 (E.D. La. July 16, 2003) (awarding
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`damages four times the licensing fees); Broad. Music, Inc. v. R Bar of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F.
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`Supp. 656, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding damages “approximately five times what BMI
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`license fees would have been”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. DeGallo, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 167, 170
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`(D.N.J. 1995) (awarding damages “approximately five times the license fee”); Golden Torch
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`Music Corp. v. Pier III Cafe, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Conn. 1988) (awarding more than
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`five times the license fee). Based on the summary judgment record, the Court finds that JHP is
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`entitled to statutory damages, and that $33,500 constitutes a just amount.
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`E. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
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`A district court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a civil
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`copyright action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. “Although attorney's fees are awarded in the trial court's
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`discretion [in copyright cases], they are the rule rather than the exception and should be
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`awarded routinely.” McGaughey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 12 F.3d 62, 65 (5th Cir.
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`1994) (quoting Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1985)). The district
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`court considers factors that include frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness, and
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`the need for compensation and deterrence. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 535 n.19
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`(1994); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 412 (5th Cir. 2004). The
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`party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of showing the hours expended through adequate
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`records. Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
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`Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995).
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`JHP requests reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs from Defendants. (Motion, Doc. 23,
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`19) Based on the summary judgment record, JHP has prevailed on its claims under 17 U.S.C. §
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`106(4) and is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs as to this claim. But as JHP has
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`other causes of action not raised in the Motion, the amount of those attorneys’ fees and costs
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`must await disposition of those claims.
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`III. Conclusion
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`For these reasons, it is:
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`ORDERED that Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment is
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`GRANTED;
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`ORDERED that Defendants Bella’s Bar & Grill LLC, d/b/a Bella’s Bar & Grill and
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`Daniel Zuniga are directly liable and jointly and severally liable for violation of 17 U.S.C. §§
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`106(4) and 501;
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`ORDERED that Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. is entitled to just statutory damages in the
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`11 / 12
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`Case 1:19-cv-00140 Document 35 Filed on 11/09/20 in TXSD Page 12 of 12
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`amount of $33,500.00; and
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`ORDERED that Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. is entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees and
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`costs in an amount to be later determined.
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`SIGNED this 9th day of November, 2020.
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`________________________________
`Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.
`United States District Judge
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`12 / 12
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