`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`Case No. 6:13-cv-507
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`CONSOLIDATED LEAD CASE
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`§§§§§§§§§§§§
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`CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS
`EQUIPMENT LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`HTC CORPORATION, ET AL.,
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`Defendants.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`This Memorandum Opinion construes disputed claim terms in United States Patent Nos.
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`8,055,820 (“the ’820 Patent”), and 7,218,923 (“the ’8923 Patent”) asserted in this suit by
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`Plaintiff Cellular Communications Equipment LLC. On April 9, 2015, the parties presented oral
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`arguments on the disputed claim terms at a Markman hearing. For the reasons stated herein, the
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`court ADOPTS the constructions set forth below.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, a group of mobile device manufacturers and mobile
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`network carriers, infringe five of its patents. The patents-in-suit were acquired from Nokia
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`Siemens Networks and generally relate to mobile communications. Docket No. 361 at 1. This is
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`the second claim construction ruling in this case. The Court previously addressed terms from all
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`of the patents-in-suit, including the ’820 and ’8923 Patents, in a first Memorandum Opinion,
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`which issued on March 9, 2015. Docket No. 363. This second Memorandum Opinion construes
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`three disputed terms that were not construed in the first Memorandum Opinion.
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`APPLICABLE LAW
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` “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381
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`F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define
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`the patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313–1314; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad
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`Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the
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`claims, the rest of the specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13;
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`Bell Atl. Network Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and
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`customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003).
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`Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id.
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`Other claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are
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`normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as
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`additional limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
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`(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[T]he
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`specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
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`dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.
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`Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own
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`terms, give a claim term a different meaning that it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or
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`disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes
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`terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear
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`disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
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`1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own
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`lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2004).
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`The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
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`accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
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`the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For
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`example, “[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the
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`claim ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elam Computer Group Inc., 362
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`F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough
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`the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the
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`claims, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be
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`read into the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
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`1988); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`Although “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
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`meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on
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`the relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and
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`treatises may help the Court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one
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`skilled in the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also provide overly broad
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`definitions or may not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
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`expert testimony may aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the
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`pertinent field, but “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim
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`term are not useful.” Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its
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`prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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`DISPUTED TERM IN THE ’820 PATENT
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`
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`The ’820 Patent, titled “Apparatus, System, and Method for Designating a Buffer Status
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`Reporting Format Based on Detected Pre-Selected Buffer Conditions,” issued on November 8,
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`2011 and bears a priority date of November 5, 2007. The Abstract of the ’820 Patent states:
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`An apparatus, system and method for increasing buffer status reporting efficiency
`and adapting buffer status reporting according to uplink capacity. User equipment
`is configured a [sic, to] monitor a usage of a plurality of buffers, detect one of a
`plurality of pre-selected conditions corresponding to at least one of the plurality of
`buffers, designate one of a plurality of buffer status reporting formats depending
`on the pre-selected condition detected, communicate a buffer status report to a
`network device in accordance with the buffer status reporting format designated.
`The buffer status reporting format is configured to minimize buffer status
`reporting overhead created by the communicating of the buffer status report.
`
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`A. “usage” (Claims 1, 12, and 24)
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning; no construction
`necessary.
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“an act, way, or manner of using”
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`
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`Plaintiff argues that “[t]he specification describes monitoring ‘usage’ in broad terms,
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`commensurate with the plain claim language.” Docket No. 361 at 4. Plaintiff also argues that
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`Defendants’ proposed construction, which “selectively adopt[s] — and omit[s] — phrases from
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`the extrinsic evidence [Defendants] identify,” is “arbitrary and improper.” Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff
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`urges that, for instance, “‘monitoring a usage of a plurality of buffers’ may be accomplished by
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`looking at the buffers to discern whether (or not) the buffers are used or employed.” Docket No.
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`369 at 2.
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`
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`Defendants respond that “Plaintiff conflates the different concepts of ‘monitoring the
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`buffers’ and ‘monitoring the usage of buffers.’” Docket No. 362 at 4. Defendants submit that
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`“the claimed monitoring must be directed to the ‘usage’ of the buffers by other components (e.g.,
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`applications) as opposed to monitoring directly the buffers themselves.” Id. at 5–6. Thus,
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`Defendants conclude, Plaintiff’s interpretation “will confuse the jury because it improperly
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`discards ‘usage’ from the claim limitation.” Id. at 6.
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`
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`Claim 1 of the ’820 Patent is representative and recites (emphasis added):
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`1. A method, comprising:
`monitoring a usage of a plurality of buffers;
`
`
`detecting one of a plurality of pre-selected conditions corresponding to the
`plurality of buffers;
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`designating one of a plurality of buffer status reporting formats comprising
`a long buffer status reporting format and a short buffer status reporting format
`depending on the pre-selected condition detected; and
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`communicating a buffer status report to a network device in accordance
`with the buffer status reporting format designated, wherein the designating
`designates the long buffer status reporting format when there is sufficient uplink
`bandwidth to communicate using the long buffer status reporting format.
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`
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`The specification does not limit the definition of “usage” to a particular meaning different
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`from or narrower than the term’s plain meaning. Defendants do not dispute that certain
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`meanings of “usage” found in the dictionary excerpts attached to their briefing include or relate
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`to the fact of use. See Docket No. 362-2 at 9 (“the fact of being used”); id. at 24 (“use”). Rather,
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`Defendants argue that the patentee intentionally excluded these meanings because “the patentee
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`made a conscious decision to forgo claiming ‘monitoring buffers,’ ‘monitoring the use of
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`buffers,’ and other possibilities.” Docket No. 362 at 7. Defendants also contend that the
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`patentee drew a distinction between “monitoring buffers” and “monitoring a usage of buffers” in
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`a portion of the specification that states “[i]n certain embodiments, monitoring 310 buffers may
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`include monitoring a usage of one or more communications buffers.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added
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`by Defendants) (quoting ’820 Patent at 7:58–60).
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`Irrespective of whether or how the patentee intended “monitoring a usage of . . . buffers”
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`to be a narrower concept than “monitoring buffers,” the intrinsic evidence suggests that the “fact
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`of being used” meaning of “usage” should not be excluded from the meaning of the term. The
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`specification discloses “monitor[ing] a usage of the plurality of buffers” so as to allow for the
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`detection of conditions, such as whether a buffer contains data:
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`In some embodiments, the monitoring unit 210 is configured to monitor a usage
`of the plurality of buffers 220. In certain embodiments, the monitoring unit 210
`and the detecting unit 230 cooperate to enable the detecting unit 230 to detect one
`of a plurality of pre-selected conditions corresponding to the plurality of buffers.
`The pre-selected conditions . . . may include, for example, any data in one or
`more buffers, data in one or more buffers beyond a pre-selected threshold.
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`’820 Patent at 6:1–9 (emphasis added); see also id. at 7:58–63, 8:6–20, 10:7–28. Thus, the
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`specification links the monitoring of the usage of buffers to at least the determination of whether
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`the buffers contain data or how much data is contained within the buffers. Defendants point to
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`nothing in the specification that supports limiting the method by which the usage of a buffer—
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`i.e., in certain embodiments, the amount of data in the buffer—is monitored.
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`Thus, the specification suggests that the patentee has used the term “usage” in accordance
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`with its broad meaning in ordinary common parlance. Because Defendants’ proposal would only
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`limit the scope of this broad, generic term, Defendants’ proposed construction is rejected. No
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`further construction is necessary. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
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`F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to
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`construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.”).
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`The Court therefore construes “usage” to have its plain meaning.
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`DISPUTED TERMS IN THE ’8923 PATENT
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`The ’8923 Patent, titled “Control of Terminal Applications in a Network Environment,”
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`issued on May 15, 2007, and bears a priority date of December 18, 2003. The Abstract of the
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`’8923 Patent states:
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`A mechanism and method for controlling the rights and/or behavior of
`applications in a terminal, especially in a mobile terminal, are disclosed. At least
`some of the messages generated by an application residing in the terminal and
`destined for a communication network are diverted to an independent controlling
`entity also residing in the terminal. In the controlling entity, the messages are
`controlled before being transmitted to the network. Depending on the application
`and its behavior in the terminal, the control entity may modify the messages or
`even prevent their sending to the network. The modification may include
`inserting control data, such as a digest, which can be used to authenticate the
`application.
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`The ’8923 Patent is the subject of an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding instituted
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`
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`January 15, 2015. See Docket No. 369, Ex. H, IPR2014-01133, 1/15/2015 Decision.
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`A. “a message of the messages” (Claim 24)
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning; no construction
`necessary.
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“one or more, but less than all, of the
`messages”
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`
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`Claim 24 relates in part to a “diverting unit” in a terminal (e.g., mobile device) of a
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`communication system that “divert[s] a message of the messages” originating from an
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`application in the terminal to a “controlling entity” also in the terminal, rather than to the
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`communication network. ’8923 Patent at 10:58–11:5 (claim 24). The parties primarily dispute
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`whether diverting “a message of the messages” may include diverting all of the messages.
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`Plaintiff argues that it may, and that Defendants’ proposed construction is contrary to the
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`intrinsic record, wherein the specification repeatedly states that the invention diverts “at least
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`some of the messages.” Docket No. 361 at 7–8 (citing ’8923 Patent at Abstract, 2:38–45).
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`Defendants respond that “in response to an IPR petition directed to the ’8923 Patent,
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`Plaintiff distinguished certain prior art references on the basis that they diverted all of the
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`messages.” Docket No. 362 at 9. Defendants further argue that claim language “distinguishes
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`between ‘message’ and ‘messages’” such that “the set of messages diverted must be a subset of
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`the set of messages sent.” Id. at 12.
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`
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`Claim 24 of the ’8923 Patent recites (emphasis added):1
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`towards a
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`24. A terminal for a communication system, the terminal comprising:
`to send messages
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`an application program configured
`communication network; and
`a diverting unit configured to divert a message of the messages sent from
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`the application program and destined for the communication network to a
`controlling entity residing in the terminal,
`wherein the controlling entity is configured to control, based on the
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`message and before the message is transmitted to the communication network,
`whether the application program behaves in a predetermined manner in the
`communication terminal, and
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`wherein the terminal is a terminal of a communications system.
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`Neither the claim language nor the specification supports the “but less than all” limitation
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`proposed by Defendants. With respect to the claim language, the parties do not dispute that the
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`1 The Court previously “construe[d] ‘a diverting unit configured to divert a message of the
`messages sent from the application program and destined for the communication network’ to
`have its plain meaning.” Docket No. 363 at 35 (emphasis omitted).
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`word “a” can mean “one or more.” See Docket No. 361 at 7; Docket No. 362 at 11; Baldwin
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`Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n indefinite
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`article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended claims
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`containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’”). The fact that the term distinguishes “a
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`message” from “the messages” indicates only that “a message” may be less than all of the
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`messages; the language does not impose a ceiling on the number of messages.
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`Likewise, nothing in the specification suggests that the diverting unit must divert less
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`than all of the messages. Defendants point to a number of passages in the description that
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`include phrases such as “at least some,” “at least one,” or “selected” messages, see Docket No.
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`362 at 12 (citing ’8923 Patent at Abstract, 1:60–63, 2:21–22, 2:26–27, 2:39), but these phrases
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`are, at most, ambiguous on whether they may include all of the messages sent by an application.
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`The specification is silent on whether all of the messages can be “selected,” and the phrase “at
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`least some” even supports the possibility that all of the messages may be included. Thus, the
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`specification does not support imposing the negative limitation proposed by Defendants.
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`The patentee’s arguments to the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)
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`in the prosecution history, however, do support the negative limitation, “but less than all.” In its
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`preliminary response to a petition to institute an IPR of the ’8923 Patent filed by some of the
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`defendants in this case,2 Plaintiff sought to distinguish the claimed invention from at least three
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`prior art references: Richardson, D’Aviera, and Williamson. Docket No. 362-5 at 24–38.
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`2 Defendants submit that “AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon have not participated in any
`way in the IPR proceedings.” Docket No. 362 at 11 n.4.
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`With respect to Richardson, Plaintiff argued to the PTAB that “[i]n Richardson,
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`regardless of whether a firewall is used or not, all communications or packets merely pass
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`through the trusted agent 103 before transmitting to the network 104.” Id. at 24. Thus, Plaintiff
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`concluded, “[b]y pointing to the same thing (trusted entity) for both the controlling and diverting
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`steps, Petitioner is vitiating a claim element, namely, the diverting step.” Id.
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`With respect to D’Aviera, Plaintiff described an “isolator engine” in D’Aviera as “a
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`standalone application, the execution of which can be initiated by double clicking on an icon.”
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`Id. at 30. “[W]hen the isolation engine 225 is executing,” it “intercepts all outbound operations
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`of an application program.” Id. Because, Plaintiff argued, “in D’Aviera, outbound operations or
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`messages from application program 210 merely pass through the isolation engine 225 before
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`being transmitted to the network module 220, no outbound operation or message is actually
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`‘diverted.’” Id. at 31.
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`Finally, with respect to Williamson, Plaintiff argued that the Virus Anti-Propagation
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`Software (“VAPS”) described in that reference “handles all requests to send outbound data.” Id.
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`at 35. Plaintiff emphasized that “Williamson does not disclose ‘diverting’ some of the requests
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`(sent to the network) to the VAPS for processing.” Id. Plaintiff concluded, “[b]ecause, all
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`outbound requests from the application merely pass through the VAPS before being transmitted
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`to the network, no request is actually ‘diverted’ to the VAPS.” Id.
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`Here, Plaintiff frames its prior arguments to the PTAB as that the asserted references did
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`not meet the “diverting” limitation rather than any argument relating to the “message of the
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`messages” limitation. Docket No. 369 at 5. Plaintiff argues that it distinguished the IPR
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`references “not because they ‘diverted all of the messages’ (as Defendants allege), but because
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`they did not divert any of the messages — that is, they fail to disclose any ‘diverting’
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`whatsoever.” Id. at 4.
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`Plaintiff repeatedly argued to the PTAB, as set forth above, that the reason the asserted
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`references did not meet the diverting limitation was because all of the messages were treated the
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`same way or followed the same course. Plaintiff effectively equated the concept of diversion
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`with handling some messages in one manner and other messages in a different manner.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments to the PTAB rise to the level of a clear and unmistakable
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`disclaimer that “a message of the messages” does not include all of the messages. See Typhoon
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`Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The patentee is bound by
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`representations made and actions that were taken in order to obtain the patent.”). Plaintiff may
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`not now obtain a broader construction than the position it advocated to the PTAB. 3
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`The Court therefore construes “a message of the messages” to mean “one or more, but
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`less than all, of the messages.”
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`B. “tamper resistant” (Claim 26)
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning; no construction
`necessary.
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“resistant to being affected by a user or other
`parties that are beyond the control of the
`network operator”
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`Plaintiff argues that this term needs no construction because the word “tamper” is
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`
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`“widely-known and well-understood — it means ‘to interfere in a harmful or unauthorized
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`3 To whatever extent the petitioners in the IPR proceedings proposed constructions broader than
`what Defendants propose in the present litigation, the difference may be accounted for by the
`difference in claim construction standards between the two proceedings. See Facebook, Inc. v.
`Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The broadest reasonable
`interpretation of a claim term [under the PTAB standard] may be the same as or broader than the
`construction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
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`manner.’” Docket No. 361 at 9 (quoting id., Ex. F, Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering
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`Dictionary 771 (2004)). Plaintiff also argues that the intrinsic evidence contains no disclaimer or
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`lexicography that would support Defendants’ proposal. Id. at 9–10. Finally, Plaintiff submits,
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`“one skilled in the art would know that manufacturers often maintain access to devices after their
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`sale in order to distribute software updates for programs and data stored on them (including
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`programs and data in tamper resistant areas).” Docket No. 369 at 8.
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`
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`Defendants respond that “[t]he meaning of tamper resistant is clearly and consistently set
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`forth in the specification.” Docket No. 362 at 14. Defendants also submit that “[t]here is no
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`suggestion in the patent that manufacturers have access to the tamper resistant area of a terminal
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`after the terminal is manufactured, i.e., during the period in which Defendants are alleged to
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`infringe the patent.” Id. at 16. Further, Defendants argue, the dictionary definition of “tamper”
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`that Plaintiff cites as an indication of the term’s alleged plain meaning “injects ambiguity into the
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`claim and will prove unworkable.” Id. at 17; see id. at 18–19.
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`Claim 26 of the ’8923 Patent recites (emphasis added):4
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`26. The terminal according to claim 24, wherein the controlling entity is
`configured to reside in a tamper resistant area of the terminal.
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`Defendants base their proposed construction on a sentence in the specification which
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`states: “[t]he controlling entity resides in a tamper resistant area of the terminal, so that its
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`operation cannot be affected by the user or other parties that are beyond the control of the
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`4 Claim 24, from which Claim 26 depends, is reproduced in the discussion of the term “a
`message of the messages,” above.
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`network operator.” ’8923 Patent at 2:3–11 (emphasis added). Some embodiments in the
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`specification suggest that a purpose of the controlling entity is to ensure that controlled
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`applications behave in accordance with the network operator’s rules. For instance, the
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`specification refers to “applications that behave contrary to the agreements made with the
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`operator of the network” and “applications that are not approved by the operator.” Id. at 1:43–47
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`& 7:1–3; see id. at 5:10–12 (“In another embodiment, the mechanism is utilized for ensuring that
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`authorized applications obey the SIP policies of the operator.”); id. at 6:27–31 (“[I]n one
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`embodiment of the invention the applications are controlled to ensure that they obey the policies
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`set by the operator. In this embodiment of the invention, the tamper resistant area includes the
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`policy rules set for the terminals.”). Thus, the specification indicates that one purpose of the
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`tamper resistant area, which contains at least the controlling entity, is to prevent applications
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`from exploiting network capabilities in violation of the agreements and policies that are designed
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`to thwart such exploitation.
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`However, the portions of the specification cited by Defendants do not amount to clear
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`lexicography or disclaimer that would require a departure from the plain meaning of the term.
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`See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he claim
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`term will not receive its ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and
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`clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution
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`history.”) (emphasis added). To the contrary, the specification contains little guidance on the
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`meaning of “tamper resistant.” For instance, the parties dispute the meaning of statements in the
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`description that explain that policy rules, certificates, and keys may be “stored in the tamper
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`resistant area in the manufacturing phase of the terminal.” ’8923 Patent at 6:45–48 & 7:65–8:5;
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`Page 13 of 15
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`Case 6:13-cv-00507-KNM Document 413 Filed 06/01/15 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 6444Case 6:14-cv-00251-KNM Document 165 Filed 08/09/16 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 6550
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`see also Docket No. 361 at 11; Docket No. 362 at 15–16. The relevance of this disclosure to the
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`identities of those entities that may tamper with the tamper resistant area before or after the
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`manufacturing phase, let alone the manner of such tampering, is unclear. Absent sufficient
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`guidance from the specification, Defendants’ proposed construction too narrowly restricts the
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`scope of the claim. Furthermore, it would improperly restrict the claim scope to a specific
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`feature of some preferred embodiments. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d
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`1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the
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`meaning of disputed claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the
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`specification will not generally be read into the claims.”) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-
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`Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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`Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ proposed construction. In its place, the Court
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`also does not adopt any specific dictionary definition of “tamper” or “tamper resistant” proposed
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`by either party. Instead, the Court construes “tamper resistant” to have its plain meaning.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ADOPTS the claim constructions as set forth
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`above. For ease of reference, the Court’s claim interpretations are set forth in a table in
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`Appendix A.
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`Page 14 of 15
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`Case 6:13-cv-00507-KNM Document 413 Filed 06/01/15 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 6445Case 6:14-cv-00251-KNM Document 165 Filed 08/09/16 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 6551
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`APPENDIX A
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`Terms, Phrases, or Clauses
`’820 “usage”
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`Court’s Construction
`plain meaning
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`’8923 “a message of the messages”
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`“one or more, but less than all, of the
`messages”
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`’8923 “tamper resistant”
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`plain meaning
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`Page 15 of 15