`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`
`
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`Case No. 12-CV-00799-LED
`
`
`EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. and
`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
`
`
`
`
`and
`
`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
`
`
`
`
`Defendants,
`
`Counterclaim-Plaintiff,
`
`
`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`
`vs.
`
`Counterclaim-Defendant
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MICRO MOTION, INC.’S SUR-REPLY TO INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE MICRO MOTION’S COUNTERCLAIM AND
`AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
`
`
`
`
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 2410
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The three asserted independent claims of the ’646 patent require that Invensys’s
`
`Coriolis flowmeters “determine[], based on the sensor signal, the flow rate of the flowing liquid
`
`during a transition of the flowtube from a first state in which the flowtube is substantially empty
`
`of the flowing liquid to a second state in which the flowtube is substantially full of the flowing
`
`liquid.” (Dkt. No. 81-3 at cls. 1, 10, 11.) Invensys provides no limitations on the particular
`
`situation or set of circumstances under which its Coriolis flowmeters can determine flow rate
`
`during such “batching from empty.” Instead, Invensys purports to claim and goes as far as to
`
`“guarantee” that these measurements can be done and repeated in all industrial settings,
`
`seemingly relying on the ’644 application’s specification for support. (Dkt. No. 81-4 at 103
`
`(“Thus, it can be guaranteed that similar repeatability could be achieved in an arbitrary
`
`industrial batch process.”) (emphasis added)); see also (Dkt. No. 81-3 at Col. 57, Ln. 39-40
`
`(“[s]imilar repeatability could be achieved in an arbitrary industrial batch process”).)
`
`This so-called “guarantee” is surprising and is the crux of Micro Motion’s
`
`inequitable conduct allegations, given that less than a year earlier, the ’742 provisional stated the
`
`exact opposite with respect to the Coriolis flowmeter’s ability to measure flow rate in a range of
`
`industrial processes. Specifically, the ’742 provisional, to which the ’646 patent also purports to
`
`claim priority, provides that “it cannot be guaranteed that similar repeatability could be
`
`achieved in an arbitrary industrial process.” (Dkt. No. 81-5 at 3 (emphasis added).)
`
`There was no basis for this flip-flop during prosecution of the ’646 patent, and in
`
`briefing this Motion, Invensys still fails to provide any credible justification. This complete
`
`reversal in language constitutes a material misrepresentation to the PTO, and under the
`
`circumstances, it is appropriate to infer an intent to deceive. As explained in detail in its
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 2411
`
`
`Opposition, (Dkt. No. 81), Micro Motion has pled its inequitable conduct allegations with the
`
`necessary particularity, and these allegations should not be dismissed. Nothing Invensys offers
`
`in its Reply demands a different result.
`
`II. MICRO MOTION’S INEQUITABLE CONDUCT COUNTERCLAIM AND
`AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ARE ADEQUATELY PLED
`
`In its Reply, Invensys contends there are three bases for rejecting Micro Motion’s
`
`inequitable conduct allegations. Each of Invensys’s arguments is without merit.
`
`First, Invensys focuses on the Exergen requirement of “who” committed the
`
`alleged inequitable conduct. Initially, in its Motion, Invensys mistakenly argued that Micro
`
`Motion omitted identifying any “who,” ostensibly ignoring Micro Motion’s unequivocal
`
`identification of the “author of the ’644 [application’s] specification” as the relevant actor. (Dkt.
`
`No. 71 at 18, ¶ 90 and 23, ¶ 32.) Now, apparently recognizing its error, Invensys has given up
`
`that argument and instead demands that in order to meet the “who” requirement, Micro Motion
`
`must provide the actual name(s) of the individual(s).
`
`Contrary to Invensys’s assertion, Exergen and its progeny do not require this
`
`specificity. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`
`(rejecting a pleading for merely identifying “Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys”); Breville Pty
`
`Ltd. v. Storebound LLC, 12-CV-01783-JST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58893, at *11-13 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Apr. 24, 2013) (rejecting allegations to the extent they were directed at a general category of
`
`employees of the patent holder). To satisfy the “who” requirement, specific names are not
`
`necessary, provided that sufficient identification is provided to put Invensys on notice of Micro
`
`Motion’s claim. See, e.g., Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Canon U.S.A., No. 2:08-cv-08637-MRP-VBK,
`
`2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126174, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009). Unlike Exergen and Breville,
`
`whose deficient pleadings alleged a blanket charge of inequitable conduct against an unlimited
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 2412
`
`
`pool of vague and amorphous potential actors, Micro Motion has specifically identified the
`
`author of the ’644 application as the only individual who made material misrepresentations to the
`
`PTO. In this case, there can be no question that Invensys has adequate notice of Micro Motion’s
`
`claim regarding “who” committed the inequitable conduct.
`
`Second, Invensys turns to the “how” and “why” requirements of Exergen in a
`
`further attempt to challenge the sufficiency of Micro Motion’s pleading. In its Reply, just as it
`
`did in its Motion, Invensys improperly contends that Micro Motion must not only allege why the
`
`information is material, which Exergen requires, but prove its materiality. This is not the law or
`
`required at the pleading stage. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
`
`1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (changing the definition of materiality from the “reasonable
`
`examiner” standard to “but-for” materiality, but not changing the pleading requirements under
`
`Exergen). Invensys’s numerous attempts to “disprove” materiality are premature, at best.
`
`In its pleading, Micro Motion has provided particularized facts and a detailed
`
`recitation as to why the ’644 application’s and the ’646 patent’s statements guaranteeing
`
`similarly repeatability across real-world industrial batch processes are material. These
`
`statements are the exact opposite of what was originally claimed in the ’742 provisional, and
`
`there is no substantiation for the change. Using an unmistakably false statement as the sole
`
`support for Invensys’s broad claims that its Coriolis flowmeter can do exactly what the ’742
`
`provisional says it cannot, gives Invensys an “unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim.”
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. Purple Leaf, Inc., No. C 11-4601 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83531, at *15
`
`(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (internal quotation marks and quoting citation omitted).
`
`Invensys does not contest the proposition that such unmistakably false statements
`
`are in and of themselves material. See Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 2012-1658,
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 2413
`
`
`2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20529, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2013). Instead, in a failed attempt to
`
`distinguish Intellect Wireless, Invensys complains that Micro Motion only stated that the
`
`unmistakably false statements were merely “inconsistent,” and therefore not considered material.
`
`Invensys is wrong. A plain reading comparing the ’644 application and the ’646 patent with the
`
`’742 provisional demonstrates, unequivocally, that the statements at issue are directly opposite,
`
`not simply “inconsistent.” The reversal in language between the ’742 provisional and the ’644
`
`application, without further substantiation, cannot be reconciled with the particular ’646 patent
`
`claim limitation that purports to claim a process in all industrial settings. A reasonable examiner
`
`at the PTO would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the ’646 claims.
`
`See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1333.
`
`Third, Invensys argues that Micro Motion’s pleading is insufficient to infer intent
`
`because again, in one instance, Micro Motion referred to the statements as being “inconsistent.”
`
`Unlike in Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-6519-MRP (JEMx),
`
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153834 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) on which Invensys attempts to rely, the
`
`contradiction at issue here goes to the heart of the proper scope of the claims of the ’646 patent.
`
`Thus, under the facts and circumstances as pled, an intent to deceive should be inferred. See
`
`Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2005).
`
`Invensys fails to offer any legitimate basis for the complete rejection of the
`
`language from the ’742 provisional and the adoption of the language to the contrary in the ’644
`
`application and the ’646 patent. Indeed, in its Reply, Invensys abandons its original position that
`
`Invensys may have conducted additional testing and research, the outcome of which could have
`
`substantiated the change. Invensys no longer appears to contend that such testing was done.
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 2414
`
`
`Invensys similarly has not rebutted Micro Motion’s arguments that the language change is
`
`unsupported by another related patent chain or that Invensys’s failure to comply with 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 112 may also be a proper ground for an inequitable conduct claim.
`
`As pled, Micro Motion’s inequitable conduct allegations provide sufficient detail
`
`under Exergen to support a reasonable inference of an intent to deceive.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`Micro Motion has sufficiently pled its inequitable conduct allegations and more
`
`than satisfied the requirements of Rule 9(b) and Exergen. Micro Motion does not seek leave to
`
`conduct discovery to repair its allegations as Invensys contends. As discovery progresses and
`
`this case unfolds, additional information solely in Invensys’s possession will come to light and
`
`further substantiate Micro Motion’s inequitable conduct claim.1
`
`For the foregoing reasons as well as those stated in its Opposition, Micro Motion
`
`respectfully requests that the Court deny Invensys’s Motion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 At the appropriate time, Micro Motion intends to seek redress for the inequities of
`Invensys’s continued efforts to stall and prevent Micro Motion from having access to the
`relevant evidence in this case. The ’646 patent issued more than seven years ago on October 24,
`2006, which is the same year Micro Motion’s accused Coriolis flowmeters were introduced to
`the market. Given Invensys’s self-proclaimed “thorough” pre-suit investigation, and its delay in
`bringing this lawsuit, there is no excuse for Invensys’s failure to provide complete responses to
`Micro Motion’s discovery directed to among other things, issues surrounding the alleged
`conception, reduction to practice, and prosecution of the claimed inventions.
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 2415
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: November 15, 2013
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Guy N. Harrison, State Bar No. 00000077
`Guy Harrison Law Offices
`
`
`217 N. Center Street
`
`
`Longview, Texas 75601
`
`
`Phone: (903) 758-7361
`
`
`Fax: (903) 753-9557
`
`
`Email: guy@gnhlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/s/ Kadie M. Jelenchick
`Linda E.B. Hansen, WI Bar No. 1000660
`Richard S. Florsheim, WI Bar No. 1015905
`Jeffrey N. Costakos, WI Bar No. 1008225
`Kadie M. Jelenchick, WI Bar No. 1056506
`Matthew J. Shin, WI Bar No. 1090096
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`777 East Wisconsin Avenue
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
`Phone: (414) 271-2400
`Fax: (414) 297-4900
`Email: lhansen@foley.com
`rflorsheim@foley.com
`jcostakos@foley.com
`kjelenchick@foley.com
`mshin@foley.com
`
`
`Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim-
`Plaintiff Micro Motion, Inc.
`
`
`
`4840-9941-9414.2
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 86 Filed 11/15/13 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 2416
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on November 15, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing
`
`document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such
`
`filing via electronic mail to all counsel of record.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Kadie M. Jelenchick
`Kadie M. Jelenchick
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4840-9941-9414.2