Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 4378
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
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`C.A. No. 6:12-cv-799-LED
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. and
`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
`
`and
`
`Defendants.
`
`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
`
`v.
`
`Counterclaim-Plaintiff,
`
`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`Counterclaim-Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INDEFINITENESS
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 4379
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii
`
`I.
`
`The Terms “Input Module,” “Output Module,” and “Processing Device” Are Not
`Means-Plus-Function Claims...............................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`The Term “Module” Is Structural............................................................................1
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`This Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the term
`“module” is a means-plus-function limitation. ............................................1
`
`Technical dictionaries provide a structural definition of “module.”............3
`
`The cases on which Defendants rely are distinguishable.............................5
`
`B.
`
`The Term “Processing Device” Refers to a Processor.............................................5
`
`II.
`
`The Terms “Determine the Flowrate,” “Maintains Oscillation,” and “System
`Disturbance” Are Not Ambiguous.......................................................................................6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Terms “Determine the Flowrate” and “Maintains Oscillation” Do Not
`Have to be Distinct from the Prior Art.....................................................................6
`
`The Meaning of “System Disturbance” Is Explained in the ’854 Patent’s
`Specification and Well Understood in the Industry.................................................8
`
`Halliburton Has Been Overruled by Statute......................................................................10
`
`The Patents-in-Suit Do Not Impermissibly Combine System and Method Claims...........10
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................10
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 4380
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Aguayo v. Universal Instruments Corp.,
`Civ. No. H-02-1747, 2003 WL 25787593 (S.D. Tex. June 9, 2003).................................. 6
`
`Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................... 5
`
`Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-263-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 1441779 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) .............. 1, 2, 3
`
`C2 Commc’ns Techs., Inc. v. AT&T, Inc.,
`No. 2:06-CV-241, 2008 WL 2462951 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2008) ................................. 1, 2
`
`Envt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.,
`713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983)............................................................................................. 7
`
`Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`810 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2011).............................................................................. 10
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`No. 3:09cv620, 2010 WL 1779973 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2010)............................................ 2
`
`Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States,
`265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................... 8
`
`FitnessAge Servs., Inc. v. Polar Electro, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-1444-MMD-GWF, 2014 WL 551335 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2014) ..................... 6
`
`Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
`329 U.S. 1 (1946).............................................................................................................. 10
`
`Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc.,
`600 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010)....................................................................................... 8, 9
`
`In re Donaldson Co.,
`16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)........................................................................... 10
`
`In re Fuetterer,
`319 F.2d 259 (C.C.P.A. 1963) .......................................................................................... 10
`
`In re Hyatt,
`708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983)............................................................................................. 6
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)........................................................................................ 11
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 4381
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`Intel Corp. v. ITC,
`946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991)............................................................................................. 6
`
`Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas, Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011)........................................................................................... 2
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P.,
`424 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................... 8
`
`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................... 11
`
`Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc.,
`554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009)........................................................................................... 9
`
`Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc.,
`Civ. No. MJG-04-1787, 2005 WL 6218037 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2005)................................ 5
`
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
`382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 5
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc.,
`520 F.3d 13675 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................... 10
`
`Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`742 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Tex. 2010)................................................................................ 1
`
`Motorola, Inc. v. VTech Commc’ns, Inc.,
`No. 5:07CV171, 2009 WL 2026317 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2009)........................................... 6
`
`PalmTop Prods., Inc. v. Lo-Q plc,
`450 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2006)............................................................................... 2
`
`Ranpak Corp. v. Storopack, Inc.,
`No. 98-1009, 1998 WL 513598 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1998).................................................. 5
`
`Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC,
`641 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011)......................................................................................... 11
`
`ROY-G-BIV Corp. v. FANUC Ltd.,
`No. 2:07-CV-418 (DF), 2009 WL 2971097 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2009) .................... 1, 2, 3
`
`SFA Sys., LLC v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc.,
`940 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. Tex. 2013).............................................................................. 10
`
`Software Tree, LLC v. Red Hat, Inc.,
`No. 6:09-CV-97, 2010 WL 2232809 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2010) ......................................... 1
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`WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`876 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Tex. 2012) .............................................................................. 10
`
`Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc.,
`No. 12-23568-CIV, 2013 WL 4811233 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013).................................. 2, 6
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC,
`No. 2:11-cv-2409-AHM-JEM (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 353 ............................ 5
`
`Rules
`
`FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2)................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Other
`
`IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS TERMS (6th ed. 1997)......... 4, 6
`
`MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS (5th ed. 1994) ................. 4, 6
`
`MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999)............................................................... 3, 4, 6
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 4383
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`Defendants launch a scatter-shot attack claiming that dozens of claims in the patents-in-
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`suit are indefinite. Because Defendants’ arguments are inconsistent with numerous decisions
`
`from this Court and others, however, they can be disposed of easily.
`
`I.
`
`The Terms “Input Module,” “Output Module,” and “Processing Device” Are Not
`Means-Plus-Function Claims.
`
`Defendants admit that the terms “input module,” “output module,” and “processing
`
`device” do not use the word “means” and thus are presumptively not means-plus-function
`
`limitations. “[T]he presumption flowing from the absence of the term ‘means’ is a strong one
`
`that is not readily overcome.” Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354,
`
`1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Defendants cannot overcome this strong presumption.
`
`A.
`
`The Term “Module” Is Structural.
`
`1.
`
`This Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the term
`“module” is a means-plus-function limitation.
`
`This Court has repeatedly held that the term “module” is a well understood structural
`
`term, not a means-plus-function limitation under § 112(f) (formerly § 112 ¶ 6). See, e.g.,
`
`Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-263-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 1441779, at
`
`*15-16 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2010); ROY-G-BIV Corp. v. FANUC Ltd., No. 2:07-CV-418 (DF),
`
`2009 WL 2971097, at *26-28 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2009); C2 Commc’ns Techs., Inc. v. AT&T,
`
`Inc., No. 2:06-CV-241, 2008 WL 2462951, at *11 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2008). The Court has
`
`also held that similar terms do not invoke § 112(f).1 These decisions are consistent with cases
`
`from many other courts.2
`
`1 See, e.g., Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d 875, 888 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
`(“document organizing facility” was a software module and was not a means-plus-function
`limitation); Software Tree, LLC v. Red Hat, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-97, 2010 WL 2232809, at *7
`(E.D. Tex. June 1, 2010) (“database interface unit” was a module and was not a means-plus-
`function limitation); see also Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas, Corp., 649
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`In their reply letter brief on indefiniteness, ECF No. 135-1, at 1-2, Defendants argued that
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`the decisions from this Court consistently holding that “module” is not a mean-plus-function
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`limitation are distinguishable because the patents in those cases used the word “module” several
`
`times in their specifications. None of those decisions cited the specifications’ use of the word
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`“module” as a basis for their holding, however. Following the Federal Circuit’s instructions in
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`Lighting World, both Beneficial Innovations and ROY-G-BIV held that the term “module” did not
`
`fall within § 112(f) because technical dictionaries provided structural definitions of these terms.
`
`See Beneficial Innovations, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16; ROY-G-BIV, 2009 WL 2971097, at *28;
`
`see also infra Part I.A.2. C2 Communications concluded that the accused infringer had not
`
`overcome the presumption that terms without the word “means” do not fall within § 112(f)
`
`without referencing the specification at all. See 2008 WL 2462951, at *11.
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`Moreover, all of the various “module” terms that Defendants claim provided additional
`
`structure in Beneficial Innovations, ROY-G-BIV, and C2 Communications are in the same
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`“adjective module” form as the terms “input module” and “output module” in the patents-in-suit
`
`in this case. If the terms Defendants cite provided enough structure to avoid construction under
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`§ 112(f), then the “module” terms in Invensys’s patents are not means-plus-function limitations
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`either.
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`Finally, although the term “module” does not appear in the specification, the specification
`
`does describe devices that correspond to the claimed “input” and “output modules.” For
`
`example, the specification provides that “[a]nalog signals from the sensors 48 are converted to
`
`F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“computing unit” was not a means-plus-function
`limitation).
`2 See, e.g., Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 12-23568-CIV, 2013 WL
`4811233, at *42 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09cv620,
`2010 WL 1779973, at *18-19 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 2010); PalmTop Prods., Inc. v. Lo-Q plc, 450
`F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1364-65 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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`digital signals by analog-to-digital (“A/D”) converters 510 and supplied to the controller 505.”
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`ʼ761 Pat. 11:48-41. Thus, an A/D converter is an example of the claimed “input module” that
`
`“receive[s] a sensor signal from a sensor connected to vibratable flowtube.”
`
`Id. at 56:3-4.
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`Similarly, “[d]igital-to-analog converters 515 convert digital control signals from the controller
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`505 to analog signals for driving the drivers 46.” Id. at 11:53-55. Thus, a D/A converter is an
`
`example of an “output module” that is “operable to output the drive signal to the flowtube.” Id.
`
`at 56:10-11.
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`2.
`
`Technical dictionaries provide a structural definition of “module.”
`
`The Federal Circuit has held that a claim term will not fall within § 112(f) if it “is used in
`
`common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, even if the
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`term covers a broad class of structures and even if the term identifies the structures by their
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`function.” Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1359-60.
`
`In making this determination, the Federal
`
`Circuit has “looked to the dictionary to determine if a disputed term has achieved recognition as
`
`a noun denoting structure, even if the noun is derived from the function performed.” Id. at 1360.
`
`Although the specifications of the patents-in-suit provide additional structural details, see supra
`
`Part I.A.1, some cases have relied solely on dictionary definitions in holding that a claim term
`
`was not a means-plus-function limitation. See Beneficial Innovations, 2010 WL 1441779, at
`
`*16; ROY-G-BIV, 2009 WL 2971097, at *28.
`
`Technical dictionaries provide a structural definition of “module,” which can refer to
`
`either software or hardware. For example, when referring to software the Microsoft Computer
`
`Dictionary, at 295 (Ex. A), defines a “module” as “a collection of routines and data structures
`
`that performs a particular task or implements a particular abstract data type.” This is the
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`definition the Court relied on to find adequate structure in Beneficial Innovations. See 2010 WL
`
`1441779, at *16.
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`In addition, modules typically have a structure “consist[ing] of two parts: an
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 4386
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`interface, which lists the constants, data types, variables, and routines that can be accessed boy
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`other modules or routines, and an implementation, which is private (accessible only by the
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`module) and which contains the source code that actually implements the routines in the
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`module.” MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 295-96 (4th ed. 1999) (Ex. A). Other technical
`
`dictionaries provide similar definitions. See IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL AND
`
`ELECTRONICS TERMS 662 (6th ed. 1997) (Ex. B) (defining “module” as “[a] program unit that is
`
`discrete and identifiable with respect to compiling, combining with other units, and loading”);
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`MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 1285 (5th ed. 1994) (Ex. C)
`
`(defining “module” as “[a] distinct and identifiable unit of a computer program for such purposes
`
`as compiling, editing, and linkage editing”).
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`When referring to hardware, a “module” is “a self-contained component that can provide
`
`a complete function to a system and can be interchanged with other modules that provide similar
`
`functions.” MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 295 (4th ed. 1999) (Ex. A). Again, other
`
`dictionaries provide similar definitions. See IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL AND
`
`ELECTRONICS TERMS 663 (6th ed. 1997) (Ex. B) (defining “module” as “[a] packaged functional
`
`hardware unit designed for use with other components”); MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF
`
`SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 1285 (5th ed. 1994) (Ex. C) (defining “module” as “[a]
`
`packaged assembly of wired components built in a standardized size and having a standardized
`
`plug-in or solderable terminations”). Although these definitions are broad, they do not cover
`
`every electronics package that could perform the claimed function. For example, in addition to
`
`performing a particular function, a module must also be self-contained and interchangeable.
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`MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 295 (4th ed. 1999) (Ex. A).
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 4387
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`The use of the adjectives “input” and “output” provide further structural definition. See
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`Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`In fact, the terms
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`“input module” and “output module” are at least as concrete as the “connector assembly” at issue
`
`in Lighting World. See 382 F.3d at 1361 (using dictionaries to construe “connector assembly” as
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`“a unit that joins, fastens, or links each pair of adjacent support members”).
`
`3.
`
`The cases on which Defendants rely are distinguishable.
`
`The cases Defendants cite represent a minority view and are readily distinguishable.
`
`In
`
`both Ranpak Corp. v. Storopack, Inc., No. 98-1009, 1998 WL 513598, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 15,
`
`1998), and Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc., Civ. No. MJG-04-1787, 2005 WL 6218037, at *7 (D.
`
`Md. Aug. 29, 2005), the module terms corresponded to means terms found in other claims and
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`were given the same construction.
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`In addition, Ranpak is an unpublished, non-precedential
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`decision that predates Lighting World by approximately six years and contains little analysis.
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`Williamson largely followed Ranpak. See Civil Minutes—General at 24, Williamson v. Citrix
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`Online LLC, No. 2:11-cv-2409-AHM-JEM (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 353.
`
`B.
`
`The Term “Processing Device” Refers to a Processor.
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`As an initial matter, although Defendants fixate on the word “device,” the phrase in
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`dispute is “processing device.” It would be error to consider the term “device” in isolation from
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`the rest of the claim. See Apex, 325 F.3d at 1372 (holding that the district court incorrectly
`
`interpreted the term “circuit” as a means-plus-function claim because it failed to consider the
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`limitation as a whole (i.e., “a first interface circuit for receiving keyboard and cursor control
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`device signals from the workstation”)). There is no reason to believe that a skilled artisan would
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`fail
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`to understand that
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`the term “processing device” refers to a processor.
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`In fact,
`
`the
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`specification is replete with references to a processor that corresponds to the “processing device”
`
`in the claims. E.g. compare ʼ646 Pat. 67:16-28 (claim 1 reciting a “processing device” coupled
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 4388
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`to the sensor that sends drive signals to the flowtube, receives a sensor signal, and determines the
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`flow rate), with id. at 4:47-65 (attributing these capabilities to a processor). (Because it is plain
`
`from the specification that “processing device” refers to a processor, Invensys did not offer a
`
`construction of this term.)
`
`A “processor” is a well-understood structure, that is, a microprocessor or CPU.3 This
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`Court has also held that the term “processor” is not a means-plus-function claim. See Motorola,
`
`Inc. v. VTech Commc’ns, Inc., No. 5:07CV171, 2009 WL 2026317, at *16 (E.D. Tex. July 6,
`
`2009). Many other courts have reached the same conclusion.4 Finally, since “processing
`
`device” is not a means-plus-function limitation, In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983), is
`
`inapplicable.
`
`II.
`
`The Terms “Determine the Flowrate,” “Maintains Oscillation,” and “System
`Disturbance” Are Not Ambiguous.
`
`A.
`
`The Terms “Determine the Flowrate” and “Maintains Oscillation” Do Not
`Have to be Distinct from the Prior Art.
`
`Defendants appear to argue that the terms “determine the flowrate during a transition”
`
`and “maintains oscillation during a transition” are indefinite if they are not construed in a way
`
`that distinguishes them from the prior art. Not every element of a patented invention must be
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`new, however. See Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Claim limitations
`
`3 See, e.g., MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 359 (4th ed. 1999) (Ex. A); IEEE STANDARD
`DICTIONARY OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS TERMS 823 (6th ed. 1997) (Ex. B); MCGRAW-
`HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 1582 (5th ed. 1994) (Ex. C).
`4 See, e.g., FitnessAge Servs., Inc. v. Polar Electro, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1444-MMD-GWF, 2014
`WL 551335, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2014); Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc.,
`No. 12-23568-CIV, 2013 WL 4811233, at *40-42 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013); Aguayo v.
`Universal Instruments Corp., Civ. No. H-02-1747, 2003 WL 25787593, at *12 (S.D. Tex. June
`9, 2003).
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 4389
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`may, and often do, read on the prior art, particularly in combination patents.”).5 Thus, even if the
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`terms “determine the flowrate” and “maintains oscillation” do partially read on the prior art, that
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`does not make them indefinite.
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`Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ argument, the ability to “determine the flowrate” and
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`“maintain oscillation” are not the sole points of novelty in the patents-in-suit. For example, the
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`patents also require digital controllers, processing devices, and processing systems that
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`distinguish the patented digital drive Coriolis flowmeters from prior art analog drive Coriolis
`
`flowmeters.
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`Even assuming that these elements did have to be construed in a way that distinguishes
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`them from the prior art, however, the specification explains that analog drive flowmeters failed
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`during two-phase flow and during transitions from empty-to-full. See ’646 Pat. Figs. 40A-40H
`
`& 48:45-46 (showing the “stall point of Foxboro’s analogue transmitter” (the vertical bar 4000)
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`and demonstrating that “traditional analog meters tend to stall in the presence of low levels of
`
`aeration”); 56:32-33 (stating that when transitioning from empty-to-full “the analog control
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`system stalls, and is unable to provide measurement data”); see also id. Fig 48A & 57:13-45.
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`Also noticeably absent from Dr. Direen’s experiment or declaration is any statement that the
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`flowmeter returned measurements during the transition, and the behavior of the sensor signal at
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`those points suggests that it did not. See Defs.’ Resp. Claim Constr. Br. Ex F. at 0:30-0:37, 0:53-
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`1:04, 1:18-1:26, ECF No. 137. Thus, even though the analog drive flowmeter he tested may
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`5 In fact, every element of the invention could have existed in the prior art. See id. (“ ‘That all
`elements of an invention may have been old (the normal situation), or some old and some new,
`or all new, is however, simply irrelevant. Virtually all inventions are combinations and
`virtually all are combinations of old elements.’ ” (quoting Envt’l Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil
`Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 4390
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`have technically “maintained oscillation,” it appears that that oscillation was insufficient to
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`provide useful measurements, which is the entire reason the flowtubes oscillate.
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`Finally, the bulk of the specifications of the patents-in-suit is devoted to describing how
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`to “determine the flowrate” and “maintain oscillation.” See ʼ646 Pat. 14:55-66:66; ʼ761 Pat.
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`14:63-55:40.6 This includes numerous examples as well as test results demonstrating the
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`improved accuracy and performance of the patented digital drive Coriolis flowmeters over prior
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`art analog flowmeters. See ʼ646 Pat. Fig. 44 & 51:38-52:11; ʼ761 Pat. Fig. 44 & 51:48-52:21.
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`These detailed disclosures belie any claim that skilled artisans could not ascertain the parameters
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`of these terms. In addition, it is well settled that a term is not indefinite merely because it cannot
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`be defined with mathematical precision.7 Thus, to the extent Defendants argue that the terms
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`“determine the flowrate” and “maintains oscillation” are indefinite because they allow some
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`margin for interpretation, Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by precedent.
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`B.
`
`The Meaning of “System Disturbance” Is Explained in the ’854 Patent’s
`Specification and Well Understood in the Industry.
`
`Defendants’ statement that the ʼ854 patent does nothing to explain what constitutes a
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`“system disturbance,” beyond equating it with instability in the flowmeter’s measurements, is
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`inaccurate. To the contrary, the ʼ854 patent provides several examples of a system disturbance:
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`“For example, there may be some external disturbance to the system, or there may be some
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`unanticipated object/material that flows through the flowtube. As another example, conditions
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`such as two-phase flow and/or three-phase flow, particularly if initiated quickly or unexpectedly,
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`might degrade or interrupt an operation of the flowmeter.” ʼ854 Pat. 29:19-24.
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`6 Because the ʼ906 patent is within a continuation line back to the ʼ761 patent, all citations are to
`the ʼ761 patent.
`7 See, e.g., Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Exxon Research
`& Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 4391
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`Moreover, users of prior art analog Coriolis flowmeters were well aware of their
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`deficiencies and the problems the patented invention solved. See Jim Reizner, Procter & Gamble
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`Co., Coriolis—the Almost Perfect Flow Meter at 14 (Ex. A to Pl.’s Opening Claim Constr. Br.)
`
`(“90% or 95% of non-hardware Coriolis problems are due to entrained gas.”); see also Rebekkah
`
`Marshall, Cash in on Flowmeter Innovation, CHEM ENG’G 25, 27 (Mar. 2003) (Ex. B to Pl.’s
`
`Opening Claim Constr. Br.) (“Two-phase flow is ‘one of the Holy Grails’ of Coriolis
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`measurement, says Micro Motion’s O’Banion.”).8 Entrained gas is the same thing as two-phase
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`flow, which is listed as an example of a condition that can constitute a system disturbance in the
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`ʼ854 patent. See ʼ854 Pat. 2:8-9, 29:19-24. This is sufficient to defeat Defendants’ indefiniteness
`
`argument. See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010) (examples in the specification rendered the claims sufficiently definite); Kinetic Concepts,
`
`Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (no indefiniteness when
`
`the specification provided examples and there was evidence that skilled artisans would
`
`understand the claims).
`
`Defendants also seem to vaguely suggest that term “system disturbance” is indefinite
`
`because it is unclear when the flowmeter is required to transition to a new mode. But the ’854
`
`patent does not mandate a specific threshold at which the system has become so unstable that
`
`switching to a new mode is required. Instead, it describes a simple cause-and-effect relationship
`
`(i.e., detecting a system disturbance prompts a change to a new mode).
`
`8 In their reply letter brief on indefiniteness, ECF No. 135-1, at 3, Defendants complained that
`these documents are hearsay. The Reizner presentation and the Marshall article are not offered
`for the truth of the matter asserted, however, but only to show the types of conditions those in
`the industry would have considered to be a “system disturbance.” See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 4392
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`III. HalliburtonHas Been Overruled by Statute.
`
`The Federal Circuit has expressly held that Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
`
`Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946), has been overruled by statute. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d
`
`1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 n.11
`
`(C.C.P.A. 1963). Since Defendants candidly admit that they are raising this argument only to
`
`preserve it for appeal, Invensys will not address it further at this time, but reserves the right to do
`
`so in the future, if necessary.
`
`IV.
`
`The Patents-in-Suit Do Not Impermissibly Combine System and Method Claims.
`
`It is well-settled that claim elements that merely describe the capabilities of the claimed
`
`system do not
`
`improperly mix system and method limitations.
`
`See Microprocessor
`
`Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).9 Generally,
`
`a claim only improperly combines system and method limitations when it contains elements that
`
`require the user of the system to take some action. See id.; see also cases cited supra note 9. All
`
`the terms about which Defendants complain simply set forth the capabilities of the claimed
`
`system and do not require the user of the patented digital drive Coriolis flowmeter to do
`
`anything. For example, the phrase “wherein the control and measurement system uses digital
`
`processing to adjust a phase of the drive signal” in claim 36 of the ʼ136 patent logically and
`
`grammatically refers to the capabilities of the “control and measurement system,” not a user-
`
`required action.10
`
`In contrast, in IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377,
`
`9 See also, e.g., SFA Sys., LLC v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 433, 454-55 (E.D.
`Tex. 2013); WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 857, 873-74, 885-
`86 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 795, 812-14 (E.D.
`Tex. 2011).
`10 In fact, since human beings are not capable of “digital processing,” this limitation can only
`refer to the “control and measurement system.” In their reply letter brief on indefiniteness,
`ECF No. 135-1, at 3, Defendants argue that human beings can use the patented device for
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 4393
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`1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the system claims stated that “the user uses the input means,” thus
`
`expressly requiring action by the system’s operator. Similarly, the patented system in In re Katz
`
`Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011), required
`
`that “callers digitally enter data.” Finally, in Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC,
`
`641 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the last element of the apparatus claim (“transmitting the
`
`trellis encoded frames”) did not recite any machine or apparatus at all, but implicitly instructed
`
`the user to transmit the data.
`
`In contrast, all the limitations Defendants claim are indefinite
`
`specify a particular device or component that has the claimed capability or performs the required
`
`action.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Invensys requests that the Court deny Defendants’ Motion for
`
`Summary Judgment of Indefiniteness.
`
`Dated: April 18, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Claudia Wilson Frost
`Claudia Wilson Frost
`State Bar No. 21671300
`Jeffrey L. Johnson
`State Bar No. 24029638
`Dawn M. Jenkins
`State Bar No. 24074484
`DLA PIPER LLP
`1000 Louisiana, Suite 2800
`Houston, TX 77002
`Telephone: 713.425.8400
`Facsimile: 713.425.8401
`Claudia.Frost@dlapiper.com
`Jeffrey.Johnson@dlapiper.com
`Dawn.Jenkins@dlapiper.com
`
`Nicholas G. Papastavros
`Daniel Rosenfeld
`
`digitally processing. But the purpose of a patented system is that people will be able to use it.
`An indefiniteness problem arises only when a system requires the user to perform some act.
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`EAST\75106795.3
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 148 Filed 04/18/14 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 4394
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`DLA PIPER LLP
`33 Arch Street, 26th Floor
`Boston, MA 02110
`Telephone: 617.406.6000
`Facsimile: 617.406.6100
`Nick.Papastavros@dlapiper.com
`Daniel.Rosenfeld@dlapiper.