Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 4290
`
`
` IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case No. 6:12-cv-00799-LED
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`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`vs.
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`EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. and
`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
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`Defendants.
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`
`and
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`MICRO MOTION INC., USA,
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`
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`Counterclaim-Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`INVENSYS SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`Counterclaim-Defendant.
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`MICRO MOTION, INC.’S AND EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INDEFINITENESS
`
`
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`4835-1682-0250.
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 4291
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT ................................... 1 
`
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ................................................. 1 
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`IV. 
`
`
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`THE SPECIFIED INVENSYS PATENT CLAIMS ARE INDEFINITE AS A
`MATTER OF LAW ............................................................................................................ 2 
`A. 
`Summary Judgment Legal Standard ....................................................................... 2 
`B. 
`Legal Standards of Indefiniteness ........................................................................... 2 
`1. 
`Means-Plus-Function Indefiniteness ........................................................... 3 
`2. 
`Mixed Claiming of Systems and Methods .................................................. 4 
`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They Are
`Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations Without Disclosure of
`Corresponding Structure ......................................................................................... 4 
`1. 
`“Input Module” and “Output Module” ....................................................... 4 
`2. 
`“Processing Device” ................................................................................... 6 
`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They Are
`Not Amenable to Construction or They Are Insolubly Ambiguous ....................... 7 
`1. 
`“Determine the flow rate” ........................................................................... 7 
`2. 
`“Maintains oscillation” ............................................................................... 8 
`3. 
`“System disturbance” ................................................................................ 10 
`The Broad Functional Language Used in Many of the Invensys Claims
`Render Them Invalid under the Supreme Court’s Halliburton Decision ............. 10 
`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They
`Impermissibly Claim Both a System and a Method ............................................. 11 
`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 12 
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 4292
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases 
`
`Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .............................. 3, 5, 6
`Biosig Instr., Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................ 2
`Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .. 2, 3
`Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946) ............................................. 10
`In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .................................................................... 11
`In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..................................................................................... 6
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................. 11
`IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................ 2, 4, 11
`Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc., No. MJG-04-1787, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46850 (D. Md. Aug.
`29, 2005) ............................................................................................................................. 4
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................... 3, 4
`Mass. Institute Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................... 6
`Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .................................................. 7
`Ranpak Corp. v. Storopak, Inc., No. 98-1009, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16348 (Fed. Cir. July 15,
`1998) ................................................................................................................................... 4
`Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................ 4, 11
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..................................... 3
`Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................ 6
`Widevine Tech., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102768 (E.D.
`Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) .............................................................................................................. 6
`Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, No. CV11-02409 AHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189496 (C.D.
`Cal. Sept. 4, 2012)............................................................................................................... 5
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(b) ...................................................................................................................... 1, 3
`35 U.S.C. § 112(f) ........................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Other Authorities 
`
`76 Fed. Reg. 7162 (Feb. 9, 2011) ............................................................................................... 6, 8
`Brief for Petitioner, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369 (Feb. 24, 2014).......... 3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ....................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Rules 
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 4293
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`Pursuant to the Court’s order dated April 8, 2014 (Dkt. No. 140) Defendants jointly move
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`for partial summary judgment of invalidity based on indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT
`
`Whether the following patent claims (and their respective dependent claims) are invalid
`
`for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b):1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Claims 1 and 9 of the ’761 patent and Claims 1 and 8 of the ’906 patent (for use of “input
`module” and “output module”);
`
`Claim 1 and 10 of the ’646 patent and Claim 15 of the ’854 patent (for use of “processing
`device”);
`
`Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, and 19 of the ’646 patent (for use of “determine the flow
`rate” and variants thereof);
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`Claims 1, 5, 7, 9, and 11 of the ’761 patent and Claims 1, 5, 7, and 8 of the ’906 patent
`(for use of “maintains oscillation of the flowtube” and variants thereof);
`
`Claims 1, 8, and 15 of the ’854 patent (for use of “system disturbance”);
`
`Claims 1, 5, and 9-11 of the ’646 patent, Claims 15, 20, and 21 of the ’854 patent, and
`Claims 13, 23-25, 29, 30, 36, 40, and 43 of the ’062 patent (for use of “configured to”);
`
`Claims 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, and 12 of the ’761 patent, Claims 1 and 7 of the ’854 patent, and
`Claims 1-3, 8, and 9 of the ’906 patent (for use of “operable to”);
`
`Claims 17, 21, 24-26, and 36 of the ’136 patent and Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 9-11, 13, and 14 of
`the ’594 patent (for use of “circuitry”); and
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`Claims 17, 21, 24-26, and 36 of the ’136 patent, Claims 3, 4, 6, 8, 13, and 14 of the ’594
`patent (as impermissibly claiming both a system and a method).
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
`
`The material facts that are relevant to the issues presented in this motion are the language
`
`of the patent claims themselves, the specifications of the asserted Invensys patents, and their
`
`
`1 The Invensys patents-in-suit are U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,136,761 (“the ’761 patent); 7,124,646
`(“the ’646 patent”); 6,311,136 (“the ’136 patent”); 7,505,854 (“the ’854 patent”); 6,754,594 (“the
`’594 patent”); 7,571,062 (“the ’062 patent”); and 8,000,906 (“the ’906 patent”).
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 4294
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`respective prosecution histories before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and file histories of
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`Inter Partes Review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
`
`III. THE SPECIFIED INVENSYS PATENT CLAIMS ARE INDEFINITE AS A
`MATTER OF LAW
`
`A.
`
`Summary Judgment Legal Standard
`
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the
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`movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
`
`to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
`
`B.
`
`Legal Standards of Indefiniteness
`
`A determination of indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s
`
`performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims. IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com,
`
`Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot
`
`U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The issue of indefiniteness has been made
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`part of the claim construction process in this case pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order (Dkt.
`
`No. 103) because, like claim construction, any questions as to the indefiniteness of a claim must
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`be decided by the Court. General principles of claim construction apply when determining
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`indefiniteness. Biosig Instr., Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013).2
`
`
`2 The indefiniteness standard will soon be addressed by the Supreme Court, which has
`granted certiorari to review Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., Sup. Ct. No. 13-369. Oral
`argument is scheduled for April 28, 2014 with a decision expected by June of this year. There,
`the Petitioner has argued that the definiteness requirement is met only when the claims clearly
`distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what the
`patentee is intending to protect. See Brief for Petitioner at 20-22, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`Instruments,
`Inc.,
`available
`at,
`No.
`13-369
`(Feb.
`24,
`2014),
`http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/13-369.html.
` Defendants here so
`contend, as well, and reserve the right to make further arguments depending on the Supreme
`Court’s decision.
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 4295
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`The definiteness requirement is set forth in § 112(b) of the Patent Act (formerly § 112
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`¶ 2), which provides that a patent’s specification “must conclude with one or more claims
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`particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards
`
`as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Claims are considered indefinite when they are “not
`
`amenable to construction” or are “insolubly ambiguous.” Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
`
`Inc., 723 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013). To prove indefiniteness, an accused infringer must
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`demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that one skilled in the relevant art could not
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`discern the boundaries of the claim. Id.
`
`1.
`
`Means-Plus-Function Indefiniteness
`
`A claim that does not use the term “means” to describe a limitation triggers a rebuttable
`
`presumption that § 112(f)3 does not apply. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382
`
`F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This presumption can be overcome if it is demonstrated that
`
`“the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without
`
`reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Once a court concludes that a claim limitation is a means-plus-function limitation, the
`
`court must then identify the function of the limitation and then look to the specification and
`
`identify the corresponding structure, if any, for that function. Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs.
`
`Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as
`
`“corresponding” structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or
`
`associates that structure to the function recited in the claim. Default Proof, 412 F.3d at 1298. If
`
`
`3 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) provides: “Element in Claim for a Combination – An element in a
`claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function
`without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
`construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
`and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (formerly § 112 ¶ 6).
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 4296
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`there is no structure in the specification corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation in
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`the claims, the claim will be found invalid as indefinite. Id.; Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 950.
`
`2.
`
`Mixed Claiming of Systems and Methods
`
`A claim is also considered indefinite “if it does not reasonably apprise those skilled in the
`
`art of its scope.” IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1383-84. A claim that recites both an apparatus
`
`and a method of using that apparatus is indefinite. Id. at 1384. Such a claim combines two
`
`separate statutory classes of invention, and is not sufficiently precise to provide competitors with
`
`an accurate determination of the “metes and bounds” of the claim. Id; Rembrandt Data Techs.,
`
`LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`C.
`
`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They Are
`Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations Without Disclosure of
`Corresponding Structure
`
`The terms “input module” (’761:1, 9; ’906: 1, 8), “output module” (’761:1, 9; ’906: 1, 8),
`
`and “processing device” (’646:1, 10; ’854:15) should be interpreted as means-plus-function
`
`terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Although the word “means” is not used in these terms, so there
`
`is a rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply, this presumption is rebutted if “the
`
`claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting
`
`sufficient structure for performing that function.” Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358 (internal
`
`quotations omitted).
`
`1.
`
`“Input Module” and “Output Module”
`
`The claim terms “input module” (’761:1, 9; ’906:1, 8) and “output module” (’761:1, 9;
`
`’906:1, 8) are generic terms amounting to nothing more than function without structure for
`
`performing the recited functions. Other courts have held that the term “module” fails to connote
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`sufficient structure to avoid a means-plus-function construction. Kozam v. Phase Forward, Inc.,
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`No. MJG-04-1787, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46850, at *17-18 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2005) (applying
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 4297
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`§ 112 ¶ 6 because no meaningful structure is described by “module”); Ranpak Corp. v. Storopak,
`
`Inc., No. 98-1009, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16348, at*6 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1998) (“settable
`
`control module [in a claim] merely sets forth the same black box as settable context means
`
`without recitation of structure for providing the same specified function”) (unpublished);
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, No. CV11-02409 AHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189496, at
`
`*38-43 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (“module” is simply a generic description for software or
`
`hardware that performs a specified function). In addition, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`
`has published examination guidelines indicating that “module” is a non-structural term that may
`
`invoke means-plus-function construction. (See Ex. A, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, at 7167, 7170 (Feb. 9,
`
`2011).)4
`
`There is no claim language that describes the “input module” or “output module” in terms
`
`of structure. The syntax of the disputed terms—“an input module operable to receive a sensor
`
`signal . . .” (’761:1, 9; ’906:1, 8) and “an output module operable to output the drive signal . . .”
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`(’761:1, 9; ’906:1, 8)—tracks the language commonly used to describe means-plus-function
`
`terms. See Williamson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189496, at *41.
`
`Once a court concludes that a claim limitation is a means-plus-function limitation, the
`
`court must then identify the function of the limitation and then look to the specification and
`
`identify the corresponding structure, if any, for that function. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 950. Here,
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`there is no corresponding structure described in the specification to provide any definiteness to
`
`“input module” or “output module.” Indeed, the terms “input module,” “output module,” and
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`“module” do not appear anywhere in the written descriptions of the ’761 or ’906 patents (except
`
`in their respective Abstracts). The specifications therefore provide no structure that would
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`4 All exhibits referenced herein are attached to the Declaration of Kadie M. Jelenchick,
`concurrently filed herewith.
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`
`
`5
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 4298
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`correspond to either the “input module” or “output module.” Absent a structure that clearly links
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`to the function(s) recited in the claims, the claims containing “input module” and “output
`
`module” (and their dependent claims) are indefinite. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 950.
`
`2.
`
`“Processing Device”
`
`The claim term “processing device” (’646:1, 10; ’854:15) is also a generic term that does
`
`not recite structure for performing the recited function(s). See Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc.,
`
`550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (use of generic terms such as “device” typically do not
`
`connote sufficiently definite structure); Mass. Institute Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344,
`
`1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (same); see also Widevine Tech., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321,
`
`2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102768, at *40-41 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) (Ward, J.) (construing the
`
`terms “first device” and “second device” as means-plus-function limitations); Ex. A, 76 Fed.
`
`Reg. 7167 (“device” is a non-structural term that may invoke means-plus-function).
`
`The pertinent claims provide no structural context and only describe the “processing
`
`device” by the function(s) that it performs. In each instance, the term appears in isolation
`
`without any structural language. For instance, in Claims 1 and 10 of the ’646 patent, the only
`
`language modifying “processing devices” are the phrases “coupled to the sensor” and
`
`“configured to [perform the recited functions].” Similarly, in Claim 15 of the ’854 patent, only
`
`the “configured to” language modifies “processing device.” This language is insufficient to
`
`define a particular structure of the “processing devices” claimed, and this term should therefore
`
`be construed as a means-plus-function limitation.
`
`The term “processing device” also does not appear in the written description of the ’646
`
`or ’854 patents. In the absence of a clearly linked structure, these claims (and their respective
`
`dependent claims) are indefinite. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 950.
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 4299
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`Further, claim 15 of the ’854 patent is invalid because it consists of the single means
`
`element “processing device.” Single means claims fail to particularly point out and distinctly
`
`claim the subject matter of an invention. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
`
`(prohibiting single means claim). “The long-recognized problem with a single means claim is
`
`that it covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the specification
`
`discloses at most only those means known to the inventor.” Id. at 714. Here, Claim 15 of the
`
`’854 patent provides:
`
`15. A digital transmitter for use with a flowmeter . . . the digital
`transmitter comprising: a processing device configured to
`transition the flowmeter from a first drive signal generating mode
`into a second drive signal generating mode in response to detecting
`a system disturbance associated with the flowmeter.
`
`(’854: 15.) Because “processing device” fails to connote any structure, Claim 15 covers every
`
`conceivable means for a digital transmitter to achieve the result stated in the claim, i.e., “to
`
`transition the flowmeter.” Thus, this claim also fails because it is an impermissible single means
`
`claim.
`
`D.
`
`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They Are Not
`Amenable to Construction or They Are Insolubly Ambiguous
`
`“The test for definiteness is whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of
`
`the claim when read in light of the specification.” Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d
`
`870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993). As explained below, several of the claim terms here do not meet this
`
`standard. In addition, if the Supreme Court were to adopt the indefiniteness standard advocated
`
`by the Petitioner in Nautilus, several of the claim terms would fail under that standard, as well.
`
`1.
`
`“Determine the flow rate”
`
`The claim term “determine the flow rate” and variants of that term that appear in claims
`
`1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19 of the ’646 patent are indefinite because the metes and bounds of what
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 4300
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`constitutes “determining” the flow rate, such as how long and to what degree of accuracy the
`
`flow rate must be measured, are unclear to one skilled in the art. All Coriolis flowmeters measure
`
`flow rate to some degree, the difference being the accuracy of the measurement. The
`
`specification of the ’646 patent provides no guidance as to the precise meaning of the claim term.
`
`“Determining the flow rate” is not a term that has a particular meaning to a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art. And although Invensys has argued that there is no requirement that a particular
`
`claim element distinguish over the prior art, that principal has no applicability here. First, the
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`’646 patent itself makes it clear that the determination of the flow rate in the prior art is different
`
`from the determination in the patented flowmeter. (’646 patent at 51:36-52:11.) Indeed,
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`Invensys expressly argued, in construing this language in response to Micro Motion’s petition for
`
`inter partes review of this patent, that “it is plainly unreasonable to interpret the claims of the
`
`patent so broadly as to cover the very technology it criticizes and upon which it explicitly
`
`suggests improvement.” (See Ex. B, Invensys Preliminary Response, IPR2014-00179, Paper No.
`
`7 at 11-12.) But second, and more important, there can be no dispute that the remaining
`
`elements of the ’646 claims are standard features of every flowmeter, as explained in
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`Defendants’ responsive claim construction brief. (See Dkt. No. 137 at 2-4.)
`
`Thus, the only possible basis to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art is the
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`“determining the flow rate” element, but this term renders the claim hopelessly vague. There is
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`no way to determine when a flowmeter is covered by the claims and when it is not. Accordingly,
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`this claim term is insolubly ambiguous and therefore indefinite as a matter of law.
`
`2.
`
` “Maintains oscillation”
`
`The claim phrase “maintains oscillation of the flowtube . . . during a transition” (and
`
`variants), which appear in the ’761 and ’906 patents are indefinite. (’761:1, 5, 7, 9, 11; ’906:1, 5,
`
`7, 8.) The metes and bounds of “maintaining oscillation . . . during,” such as how long and to
`
`
`
`8
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`

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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 4301
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`what degree oscillation must be maintained, are unclear to one skilled in the art. For example,
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`the ’761 patent claims that it performs better during aeration – and, in particular, when the
`
`flowtube transitions from substantially empty to substantially full – than “traditional”
`
`flowmeters. But the claims do not recite this alleged improvement. Instead, the patent describes
`
`a test that compares the flowmeter of the claimed invention with a prior art “traditional analog
`
`flowmeter” (which is not identified). (’761 patent at 51:48-52:21.) This test showed that both
`
`the prior art “traditional” meter and the disclosed meter produced results during the transition of
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`the flowtube from substantially empty to substantially full. (’761 patent at 52:3-21 (describing
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`results of test); see also Ex. C (Micro Motion tutorial excerpt).) The fact that both meters
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`produced results shows that both must have been oscillating during at least a portion of the
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`transition of the flowmeter from substantially empty to substantially full. (’761:52:3-21.) Thus,
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`“maintains oscillation” is broad enough to cover both the traditional analog and the claimed
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`flowmeter—an insoluble ambiguity.
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`The meaning of “maintained oscillation” cannot simply be to keep the flowtubes
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`oscillating for another reason. Just as with the “determine the flowrate” limitation, Invensys
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`admitted the force of Micro Motion’s argument in the inter partes review proceeding. In
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`Invensys’s preliminary response, Invensys referred to this testing and argued that “it is plainly
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`unreasonable to interpret the claims of the patent so broadly as to cover the very technology it
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`criticizes and upon which it explicitly suggests improvement.” (See Ex. D, Invensys Preliminary
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`Response, IPR2014-00178, Paper No. 7 at 11-12.) For that reason, Invensys argued that the
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`“broadest reasonable interpretation” of this limitation must “require the maintaining an
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`oscillation that produces a mass flow rate useful to measure the actual flow rate of the liquid
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`during the transition.” (Id. at 12 (emphasis added).) The language proposed by Invensys in the
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`9
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 4302
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`IPR is not supported anywhere in the patent. In addition, as noted above, there is no basis in the
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`patent for drawing a line between the accuracy of the flow rate generated by the prior art
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`flowmeter and the patented flowmeter. According to the patent, both produce results with
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`accuracies within 0.15%.
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`3.
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`“System disturbance”
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`The claim term “system disturbance” (’854:1, 8, 15) is indefinite because the metes and
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`bounds of a system disturbance, such as the magnitude, duration or effect on the system, are
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`unclear to one skilled in the art. “System disturbance” does not have an ordinary meaning to one
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`of skill in the art, and could range from simple external electrical or mechanical noise to a high
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`percentage of entrained gas flowing through the flowmeter. Moreover, the specification of the
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`’854 patent does not provide a clear definition for “system disturbance” beyond possibly
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`equating it to a condition in which the flowmeter measurements become “unstable” (’854:29:15-
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`18) – which is no more enlightening as to the scope of that term. Invensys has pointed to two-
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`phase flow as an example of a system disturbance, but it is not clear whether the claim requires
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`transitioning to a new drive mode whenever the controller detects two-phase flow or only in
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`certain two-phase conditions. And, it is not clear what other conditions qualify as system
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`disturbances. Accordingly, it is unclear to a skilled artisan as to when a system is or is not
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`subjected to a system disturbance, and when, if there is a system disturbance, the system
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`transitions to a different drive mode.
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`E.
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`The Broad Functional Language Used in Many of the Invensys Claims
`Render Them Invalid under the Supreme Court’s Halliburton Decision
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`Many of the Invensys claims use broad functional language that is calculated to cover
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`every structure for performing the recited function. For example, certain of the claims recite
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`devices that are “configured to” or “operable to” perform in a particular way without reciting any
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`10
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 4303
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`structure that performs those functions. (“Configured to”: ’646:1, 5, 9-11; ’854:15, 20, 21;
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`’062:13, 23-25, 29, 30, 36, 40, 43. “Operable to”: ’761:1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 12; ’854:1, 7; ’906:1-3, 8,
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`9.) Other claims recite “circuitry to” perform various functions. (’136:17, 21, 24-26, 36; ’594:1,
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`3, 4, 6, 9-11, 13, 14.) The Supreme Court in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329
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`U.S. 1 (1946), found that such language at the point of novelty rendered the claim invalid as
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`indefinite. Congress responded to Halliburton by permitting the use of purely functional claim
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`language only if drafted in means-plus-function fashion. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189,
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`1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). But where functional claim language is not commensurate in
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`scope with an enabling disclosure, as Invensys has done, the concerns expressed by Halliburton
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`should still apply to prohibit the use of functional claim language.5
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`F.
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`Certain Claims of the Invensys Patents Are Indefinite Because They
`Impermissibly Claim Both a System and a Method
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`A claim that recites both apparatus and method limitations is invalid as indefinite. IPXL,
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`430 F.3d at 1383-84. Instead, the claim must tell an accused infringer whether a particular claim
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`is infringed (a) when the system is built; or (b) when the system is used.
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`Claim 36 of the ’136 patent is representative of Invensys’s indefinite “mixed”
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`system/method claims. Claim 36 is directed to a digital flowmeter that first recites structures,
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`such as “a control and measurement system,” and then adds a method step that states: “wherein
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`the control and measurement system uses digital processing to adjust a phase of the drive
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`signal….” Under IPXL, the phrase “uses digital processing” renders the claim indefinite because
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`it is unclear whether infringement occurs when one creates the digital flowmeter or whether
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`5 The defendants are aware that the Federal Circuit has not adopted this argument, but
`make it here to preserve the issue on appeal.
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`11
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`Case 6:12-cv-00799-JRG Document 144 Filed 04/11/14 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 4304
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`infringement occurs only when the user uses digital processing with the flowmeter. Id. at 1384;
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`see also Rembrandt, 641 F.3d at 1340.
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`Whereas the focus of the “operable to” and “to generate” is the capability and
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`functionality of the digital flowmeter apparatus, the focus of the method step “uses digital
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`processing” requires actual performance by way of digital processing. This is the same defect
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`the Federal Circuit found to invalidate the claims in IPXL and in Rembrandt. See also In re Katz
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`Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting
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`argument that the term “wherein” defines a functional capability rather than a method step).
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`Besides claim 36 of the ’136 patent, the following claims are indefinite “mixed” claims
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`that similarly combine structural elements and “wherein” clauses that use method steps; ’136: 17
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`(digitally implements a PI control algorithm); ’594: 13, 14 (digitally generates a gain); ’136: 21
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`(selectively applies a negative gain…); ’136: 24-26 (accounts for effects of aeration); ’594: 3, 6
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`(combines the sensor signals); ’594: 4 (generates the drive signal); and ’594:8 (initiates motion).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the defendants respectfully request this Court grant their
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`Motion for Summary Judgment and issue an Order providing that the identified Invensys patent
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`claims are invali