Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 32171
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`
`
`MAXELL LTD.,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`CASE NO. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
`MAXELL’S MOTION TO SEVER NON-SELECTED PATENTS
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`
`
`
`
`
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 32172
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`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1
`BACKGROUND .....................................................................................................2
`ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................4
`A.
`The Non-Elected Patents Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice, As The
`Parties’ Narrowing Proposals Contemplated. ..............................................4
`1.
`Dismissing non-elected patents without prejudice is the routine
`practice in this District, which balances the rights of the parties. ....4
`Maxell’s new request to sever the non-elected patents would waste
`judicial resources and expand the litigation, not narrow it. .............4
`A second trial on the non-elected patents would be particularly
`wasteful here, because the Patent Office is reviewing all of them. .5
`Granting Maxell’s Motion Would Prejudice Apple. ....................................6
`1.
`Apple would be prejudiced by a one-sided narrowing order. ..........6
`2.
`Maxell’s “prejudice” argument is without merit. ............................7
`Fundamental Fairness Dictates that the Non-Elected Patents Be
`Dismissed. ....................................................................................................9
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................9
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`2.
`
`3.
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`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 32173
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`745 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................4
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`CUPP Cybersecurity, LLC v. Trend Micro Inc.,
`Case No. 3:18-cv-1251, Dkt. No. 87 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2021) (Lynn, C.J.) ...................4, 7, 8
`
`CyWee Grp. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 217-CV-140-WCB, 2019 WL 11023976 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2019)..................................5
`
`IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.,
`No. CV 18-452-WCB, 2019 WL 3943058 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2019) .........................................8
`
`Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,
`6:21-cv-158, Dkt. No. 1 .............................................................................................................9
`
`Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
`No. CIV. A. 2:06-CV-78, 2008 WL 2744909 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008) .................................6
`
`Mobile Telecomms. Techs., LLC v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., LLC,
`No. 2:13-CV-259-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL 7146971 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014)............................6
`
`NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) ................................6
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns v. Google LLC,
`Case No. 2:19-cv-90-JRG, Dkt. No. 476 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021) .........................................4
`
`Ramot at Tel Aviv Univ. Ltd. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2:19-CV-00225-JRG, 2021 WL 121154 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2021) ...............................6, 7
`
`Realtime Data LLC v. Echostar Corp.,
`No. 6:17-CV-00084-JDL, 2018 WL 6267332 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2018) ................................4
`
`VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
`759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................6
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307(b) .................................................................................................................7
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 32174
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`
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R § 1.550(a)..........................................................................................................................6
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 amendment ..............................................................................4
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`Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) ...................................................................................................................12
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`Rule 41(a).........................................................................................................................................4
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`
`
`iii
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 32175
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`The situation Maxell faces is of its own making. It sued Apple on ten patents, asserting
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`90 claims against over 350 accused Apple products and 21 operating systems, for a total of over
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`3,900 accused systems—more than Maxell could ever fairly address in a single trial. As the case
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`progressed and the Court indicated the parties would have only two weeks for trial, Maxell
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`refused Apple’s repeated requests to narrow its case. Only on the day before the November 2020
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`pretrial conference did it reveal it would dismiss a single patent, the ’586 patent. Then later,
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`Maxell revealed it would also drop the ’193 patent as well. But Maxell never told anyone that it
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`would merely try to sever these patents into a different trial. Nor did Maxell speak up when the
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`Court asked the parties to narrow the case or when Maxell submitted its narrowing proposal to
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`the Court. See Dkt. No. 603. Instead, Maxell waited until after the Court issued its narrowing
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`order to first mention that it would only seek to sever the four non-elected patents, rather than
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`dismiss them as it had previously said it would do.
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`Maxell candidly admits it reneged on dismissing patents after the Court adopted Apple’s
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`narrowing proposal. Dissatisfied with the Court’s decision, Maxell drops all pretext and admits
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`it wants to convert the Court’s narrowing order into an order expanding this case into a second
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`trial. But Maxell’s new request would fundamentally frustrate the purpose of the narrowing
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`order to actually narrow Maxell’s bloated case. Because Maxell has already benefitted from
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`Apple’s compliance with Apple’s portion of the narrowing order obligations, the Court should
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`decline Maxell’s invitation. Apple knows of no case, and Maxell cites no case, where a district
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`court severed patents that were previously narrowed pursuant to a court order and set them for a
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`second trial. Rather, the Court should, consistent with its narrowing order, exercise its inherent
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`power to manage its docket and dismiss the non-elected patents without prejudice.
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`1
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 32176
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`
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Following a teleconference with the Court last December, the parties submitted a joint
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`status report with competing proposals to narrow the issues to be heard for trial. See Dkt. No.
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`603 at 1 (“Joint Status Report”). Maxell proposed “a package deal” contingent on adoption of all
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`of its terms: Maxell would “drop” two patents and narrow to 12 claims in exchange for Apple
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`agreeing to a representative product stipulation, limiting itself to a single invalidity ground per
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`patent, and agreeing to Maxell’s pending motion in limine. Maxell proposed limiting itself to
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`eight patents and dropping two patents—the ’586 and ’193 patents—because, according to
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`Maxell, the claims of those two patents “are extremely dense with many claim elements,” and
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`trying them along with eight other patents “would certainly take an inordinate amount of time.”
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`Id. at 2 & n. 2, 3. Notably, Maxell did not then indicate it would want to sever the remaining
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`patents if the Court adopted Apple’s proposal. In fact, before the Joint Status Report was filed,
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`Maxell told Apple that Maxell would dismiss at least the ’586 patent once the parties had agreed
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`on narrowing the case. See Ex. 1.
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`Apple made a competing narrowing proposal that had Maxell “dismiss[ing] four of the
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`ten patents from the case.” Id. at 4. In exchange for Maxell’s dismissal of four patents, Apple
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`would execute a representative product stipulation and would narrow its invalidity challenges to
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`only one ground per patent, with certain exceptions not relevant here. Id. Apple confirmed that
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`“[l]ike Maxell’s proposal, this is a package proposal dependent on Maxell’s dismissal of four
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`patents.” Id.
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`After reviewing the parties’ respective positions, the Court adopted Apple’s proposal.
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`See Dkt. No. 619. The Court ordered Maxell to “narrow its case to no more than six patents and
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`10 asserted claims,” while requiring Apple to execute “a representative product stipulation that is
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`agreeable to Maxell” and “narrow its prior art invalidity challenges.” Id. The Court ordered the
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`
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`2
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 32177
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`parties to file “an agreed notice of their compliance” within fourteen days. Id. On February 10,
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`2021, the parties filed the agreed upon representative product stipulation and a joint notice
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`confirming they complied with the Court’s narrowing order. See Dkt. Nos. 624, 625.
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`The representative product stipulation dramatically simplified the case in Maxell’s favor.
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`For example, after noting that Maxell accused 56 Apple products of infringing the ’317 patent
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`(31 iPhone models, 22 iPad models, and four Watch models), Apple stipulated to a single
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`representative model of iPhone, iPad, and Watch. See Dkt. No. 625 at 2-3. Apple made
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`comparable concessions for each of the remaining asserted patents. See Dkt. No. 325 at 3-7. All
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`told, the stipulation represents Apple’s agreement to simplify a total of 365 accused products to
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`only a handful of accused systems that Maxell may now address at trial for the same result.
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`But on February 12, two days after securing the representative product stipulation from
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`Apple, Maxell reneged on the bargain the Court ordered, and filed this motion. Maxell’s motion
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`proposes to expand the case beyond the limits even Maxell acknowledged were appropriate in
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`the Joint Status Report. Though it previously agreed to one trial on eight patents, Maxell now
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`seeks two trials on all ten patents, including reviving one patent (the ’586 patent) that Maxell
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`told Apple it would dismiss in November 20201 and another (the ’193 patent) that it said a few
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`weeks later it would “drop.”
`
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`1 On November 11, 2020, Maxell informed Apple that it would drop the ’586 patent, which
`Apple noted in the Joint Status Report and Maxell did not dispute. See Dkt. No. 603 at 4 (noting
`that Maxell “previously agreed to drop (the ’586 patent)”).
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`3
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 32178
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`The Non-Elected Patents Should Be Dismissed Without Prejudice, As The
`Parties’ Narrowing Proposals Contemplated.
`1.
`
`Dismissing non-elected patents without prejudice is the routine
`practice in this District, which balances the rights of the parties.
`
`As Chief Judge Gilstrap recognized in one of the cases Maxell cites (Mot. at 5), dismissal
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`without prejudice is the standard practice in this District for non-elected patents. Personalized
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`Media Commc’ns v. Google LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-90-JRG, Dkt. No. 476 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26,
`
`2021). This approach accords with precedent that a “patentee’s voluntary withdraw[al] of
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`previously asserted patent claims is ‘akin to either a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15
`
`amendment to the complaint, … or a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal of claims without
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`prejudice.’” Realtime Data LLC v. Echostar Corp., No. 6:17-CV-00084-JDL, 2018 WL
`
`6267332, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2018); see also Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745
`
`F.3d 1180, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (construing voluntary withdrawal of patents as “essentially
`
`deeming [the patentee’s] complaint as amended to remove them”). This approach also balances
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`the Court’s case-narrowing objectives with Maxell’s ability to file a future lawsuit. See Realtime
`
`Data, 2018 WL 6267332, at *3; Personalized Media Commc’ns, Case No. 2:19-cv-90-JRG at
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`Dkt. No. 476. Maxell offers nothing that would justify the Court deviating from this ordinary
`
`practice.
`
`2.
`
`Maxell’s new request to sever the non-elected patents would waste
`judicial resources and expand the litigation, not narrow it.
`
`As Chief Judge Lynn recently found, “judicial economy is important, which is why it
`
`required [the plaintiff] to narrow its asserted claims in the first place.” CUPP Cybersecurity,
`
`LLC v. Trend Micro Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-1251, Dkt. No. 87 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2021) (Lynn,
`
`C.J.). Granting Maxell’s new severance relief would expand, not narrow, the amount of judicial
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`4
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 32179
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`and party resources required to dispose of this case, frustrating the very purpose of the narrowing
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`order. Indeed, Maxell’s proposal would expand this case beyond even its own initial narrowing
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`proposal (one trial on eight patents) to a second trial on patents that, in Maxell’s words, “would
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`certainly take an inordinate amount of time” to try. Dkt. No. 603 at 2 & n. 2, 3.
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`A second trial would be particularly wasteful here because “the most burdensome part of
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`the case, for both the parties and the court, is the period immediately before, during, and after
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`trial.” CyWee Grp. Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 217-CV-140-WCB, 2019 WL 11023976, at
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`*6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2019) (Bryson, Circuit J.). This burden would be exacerbated if the Court
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`sets Maxell’s non-elected patents for trial soon after the conclusion of the current trial, especially
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`because Apple’s lead counsel is set for other trials in the coming months, including a May trial
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`for Apple against Maxell in the ITC, as well as matters before Chief Judge Gilstrap.
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`3.
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`A second trial on the non-elected patents would be particularly
`wasteful here, because the Patent Office is reviewing all of them.
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`Rushing to a second trial on Maxell’s non-elected patents would be especially wasteful
`
`because all four non-elected patents are currently subject to instituted post-grant review
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`proceedings at the Patent Office. The Patent Office instituted inter partes review of the ’306
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`patent on June 19, 2020, and a final written decision is due no later than June 19, 2021. The
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`Patent Office instituted inter partes review of the ’991 patent on July 15, 2020, and a final
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`written decision is due no later than July 15, 2021. The Patent Office instituted inter partes
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`review of the ’586 patent on July 15, 2020, and a final written decision is due no later than July
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`15, 2021. And the Patent Office instituted ex parte reexamination of the ’193 patent on February
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`1, 2021, after finding a “substantial new question of patentability” on the asserted claims. On
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`average, the Patent Office issues first office actions on ex parte reexaminations within four
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`5
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 32180
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`months after institution, so a decision is expected by June 1, 2021. See 37 C.F.R § 1.550(a); Ex.
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`2. Thus, the Patent Office will determine the validity of all four non-elected patents by mid-July.
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`Recognizing the wastefulness of proceeding where all patents are subject to post-grant
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`review, this District routinely stays cases where review proceedings for all asserted patents have
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`been instituted. NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1058-WCB, 2015 WL 1069111,
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`at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, Circuit J.) (“[S]ince the circuit court’s decision
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`in VirtualAgility, courts have been nearly uniform in granting motions to stay proceedings in the
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`trial court after the PTAB has instituted inter partes review proceedings.”) (citing VirtualAgility
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`Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Given the instituted proceedings
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`on all four non-elected patents, “[i]f the case were to proceed to trial on the current claims, there
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`is a serious risk of wasted resources as to the parties and the Court.” Ramot at Tel Aviv Univ.
`
`Ltd. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00225-JRG, 2021 WL 121154, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
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`2021). In contrast, dismissing the non-elected patents “will spare the parties and the district
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`court the expense of any further litigation, including a trial” if the Patent Office invalidates or
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`amends the patents. Smartflash, 621 F. App’x at 1005 (citing VirtualAgility, 759 F.3d at 1314).
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`Thus, the correct result here is for the Court to dismiss without prejudice the non-elected patents.
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`B.
`
`Granting Maxell’s Motion Would Prejudice Apple.
`1.
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`Apple would be prejudiced by a one-sided narrowing order.
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`Maxell’s new request to sever the non-elected patents into a second trial would make the
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`narrowing order one-sided in Maxell’s favor. Ordinarily, Maxell would be required to prove
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`infringement for each accused system. Mobile Telecomms. Techs., LLC v. Samsung Telecomm.
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`Am., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-259-JRG-RSP, 2014 WL 7146971, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014).
`
`But here, Apple’s agreement to a representative product stipulation dramatically eases Maxell’s
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`burden of proving infringement at trial. See, e.g., Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
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`6
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 32181
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`
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`No. CIV. A. 2:06-CV-78, 2008 WL 2744909, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2008). The benefit of
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`Apple’s representative product stipulation is substantial, reducing 365 accused products running
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`multiple accused operating system versions to only a handful that Maxell must address at trial to
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`make its case.
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`Apple agreed to a representative product stipulation only because it reasonably believed
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`that Maxell was in fact going to dismiss patents as the Court ordered, and would not try to
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`actually expand the case into a second trial on certain patents. See CUPP Cybersecurity, Case
`
`No. 3:18-cv-1251, Dkt. No. 87 at *6. Having secured the considerable benefit of Apple’s
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`representative product stipulation, Maxell cannot be permitted to undo its obligations under the
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`narrowing order to actually narrow this case. Both parties submitted proposals as a “package,”
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`and the Court adopted Apple’s proposal in full. The Court should not countenance Maxell’s
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`about-face, nor should it relieve Maxell of its obligations under the narrowing order.
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`2.
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`Maxell’s “prejudice” argument is without merit.
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`Maxell argues it will be “prejudiced” by dismissal of the non-elected patents because it
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`purportedly will have to duplicate its efforts in this case. Mot. at 6, 7. For at least three reasons,
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`Maxell’s “prejudice” argument lacks merit.
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`First, all of the non-elected patents are subject to post-grant review at the Patent Office,
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`and the probable outcome is that Maxell’s patents will be invalidated, mooting Maxell’s concern
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`about redoing litigation work. Ex. 3 (80 percent of instituted claims are invalidated in IPR); Ex.
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`4 (79 percent of instituted claims in ex parte reexaminations are “materially changed”). Even if
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`Maxell’s patents survive post-grant review, some or all of its remaining case may be barred by
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`intervening rights if Maxell amends its claims. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307(b). At the very least,
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`reworking discovery is likely inevitable because Maxell’s patents “will not likely stay as they
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`were when this suit was filed.” Ramot, 2021 WL 121154, at *2. This is because of claim
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`
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`7
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 32182
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`amendments or because post-grant review will create “additional prosecution history relating to
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`all of the claims in this case.” IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., No. CV 18-452-WCB,
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`2019 WL 3943058, at *10 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2019) (Bryson, Circuit J.); Aylus Networks, Inc. v.
`
`Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (statements made during IPR are prosecution
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`history that affect claim construction). Indeed, if post-grant review narrows the claims explicitly
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`or by argument to avoid the cited prior art, the parties will need to redo at least infringement
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`contentions and expert discovery (to account for the narrowed claims) and damages reports (to
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`account for the narrowed infringement theories). CUPP Cybersecurity, Case No. 3:18-cv-1251,
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`Dkt. No. 87 at *6-7 (ordering supplemental claim construction post-IPR to account for new
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`prosecution history). Thus, if Maxell’s patents survive, some measure of reworking will be
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`necessary regardless.
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`Second, Maxell identifies no reason why the parties would need to start from scratch if
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`the non-elected patents were dismissed without prejudice. Certainly, many discovery materials
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`would carry over to a follow-on case (assuming the parties agreed), so any new case on the non-
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`elected patents would enjoy a significant head start.
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`Third, any delay in Maxell’s ability to proceed with the non-elected patents is a problem
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`of Maxell’s own making. Maxell pursued ten patents despite knowing as far back as the ZTE
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`trial that these patents could not all be tried in a single trial. See Dkt. No. 603 at 2 & n. 2, 3.
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`Maxell acknowledged from nearly the beginning of the case that trial would be only two weeks
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`(Dkt. No. 46 at 9), yet Maxell neither narrowed the case nor asked the Court to sever any of the
`
`ten patents. Maxell attempts to obfuscate its strategy by suggesting that the case was narrowed
`
`as a result of the pandemic. Although the pandemic certainly warrants a continuance of the trial
`
`date (see Dkt. No. 629), the need for case narrowing arose independently of any COVID-19
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`
`
`8
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 32183
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`
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`procedures for trial. Even without a global pandemic, ten patents on hundreds of accused
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`systems cannot be tried in two weeks. Having started out this case by asserting more patents
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`against more accused systems than it could ever try in one trial, Maxell cannot credibly claim
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`that dismissing the non-elected patents would prejudice it.
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`C.
`
`Fundamental Fairness Dictates that the Non-Elected Patents Be Dismissed.
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`Finally, Maxell argues that “fundamental fairness” requires Maxell to continue to enjoy
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`its venue of choice. Mot at 7, 8. Maxell’s argument rings hollow in light of its recent conduct.
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`Maxell’s recent “venue of choice” is the Western District of Texas, where Maxell has filed
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`multiple cases against Apple, including a complaint filed on February 19, 2021. That lawsuit
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`asserts three patents that are continuations of two of the non-elected patents in this case. See
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`Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 6:21-cv-158 (WDTX), Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 26, 39 (asserting two patents
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`that are continuations of the ’991 patent); id. ¶ 129 (asserting one patent that is a continuation of
`
`the ’586 patent). And Maxell’s infringement allegations there for each continuation patent
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`overlap so completely with the allegations in this case that it alleges that Apple has pre-suit
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`notice of the continuation patents by virtue of the non-elected patents in “Maxell’s prior, pending
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`case against Apple” in this Court. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 39, 129. Clearly, Maxell concluded it was not
`
`“fundamentally unfair” to assert related patents in a different district court, so it should not be
`
`heard to complain if this Court dismisses the non-elected patents without prejudice—just as the
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`parties contemplated when the Court issued its narrowing order.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`The Court’s narrowing order was designed to narrow the case, not expand it. Maxell’s
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`current motion to sever would eviscerate the Court’s narrowing order and would deprive Apple
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`of the benefit of its bargain in agreeing to narrow its defenses. The proper result here is also the
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`9
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 32184
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`typical result—to dismiss without prejudice the non-elected patents. The Court should therefore
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`deny Maxell’s motion to sever.
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`Dated: February 26, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
` Respectfully Submitted
`
`By: /s/ Harry L. Gillam, Jr.
`Harry L. Gillam, Jr.
`Texas Bar No. 07921800
`Melissa Richards Smith
`Texas Bar No. 24001351
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`gil@gillamsmithlaw.com
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`Mark D. Fowler (Pro Hac Vice)
`Brent K. Yamashita
`Christian Chessman
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`2000 University Ave.
`East Palo Alto, CA 94303-2214
`Tel: 650.833.2000
`Fax: 650.833.2001
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`Sean C. Cunningham (Pro Hac Vice)
`Erin P. Gibson (Pro Hac Vice)
`Kevin Hamilton (Pro Hac Vice)
`David R. Knudson (Pro Hac Vice)
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`401 B Street, Suite 1700
`San Diego, CA 92101
`Tel: 619.699.2700
`Fax: 619.699.2701
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`Michael Jay (Pro Hac Vice)
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`2000 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 400
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Tel: 310.595.3000
`Fax: 310.595.3300
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 635 Filed 02/26/21 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 32185
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`Aaron G. Fountain
`Zachary Loney
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2500
`Austin, Texas 78701-3799
`Tel: 512.457.7000
`Fax: 512.457.7001
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`Dawn M. Jenkins
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`1000 Louisiana, Suite 2800
`Houston, TX 77002-5005
`Tel: 713.425.8490
`Fax: 713.300.6012
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`Paul Steadman
`Stephanie Lim (Pro Hac Vice)
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`444 West Lake Street, Ste. 900
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Tel: 312.368.4000
`Fax: 312.236.7516
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`COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT APPLE INC.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that on this 26th day of February 2021, all counsel of record
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`who are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this
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`document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3). Any other counsel
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`of record will be served by a facsimile transmission and/or first-class mail.
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`/s/ Harry L. Gillam, Jr.
`Harry L. Gillam, Jr.
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`11
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