throbber
Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 25148
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`MAXELL, LTD.,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`MAXELL, LTD.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE
`PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S REBUTTAL EXPERT REPORTS
`BASED ON UNTIMELY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION POSITIONS
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: 25149
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`Dr. Bederson’s Rebuttal Expert Reports – the ’306 and ’991 Patents ............................... 1
`I.
`Dr. Paradiso’s Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’317, ’498, and ’999 Patents ....................... 2
`II.
`Dr. Bims’ Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’193 Patent ......................................................... 3
`III.
`IV. Dr. Bovik’s Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’493 Patent ...................................................... 4
`V.
`Dr. Mensacé’s Rebuttal Expert Reports – the ’438, ’586, and ’794 Patents ..................... 4
`
`-i-
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: 25150
`
`
`
`
`Apple’s Opposition confirms Maxell’s position. Despite fighting for the ability to
`
`construe additional claim terms and having received that ability from the Court, Apple developed
`
`a strategy of not seeking constructions for terms it wanted its experts to interpret narrowly in
`
`their rebuttal non-infringement expert reports under the guise of “plain and ordinary meaning.”
`
`This strategy has allowed Apple to: (1) keep the scope of the claims broad for purposes of
`
`pursuing its invalidity goals in front of the PTAB or the jury; and (2) confuse the jury by
`
`disguising these claim construction positions as “factual disputes.” If Apple’s experts truly
`
`believed that the plain and ordinary meanings of these terms are as stated in their non-
`
`infringement expert reports, surely they would have mentioned these meanings in their invalidity
`
`expert reports or in the IPRs. But Apple’s experts deliberately mentioned these alleged “plain
`
`and ordinary meanings” for the first time in their non-infringement expert reports. This approach
`
`should be stopped in its tracks.
`
`I.
`
`Dr. Bederson’s Rebuttal Expert Reports – the ’306 and ’991 Patents
`
`’306 Patent. Apple is mischaracterizing Dr. Bederson’s clear claim construction
`
`argument as plain and ordinary meaning. In his non-infringement report, Dr. Bederson stated:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Opp. at Ex. 2, Bederson Rpt. at ¶ 51 (emphasis added). Dr. Bederson is unequivocally opining
`
`that the accused products do not meet the ringing sound generator claim element because the
`
`accused products include a single memory. But the claim does not “recite” multiple memories.
`
`This is the same argument Apple unsuccessfully offered at the Markman hearing by requiring
`
`ringing sound generator to include multiple memories, and now Apple is attempting to make that
`
`same argument by requiring at least two sound sources to mean at least two memories. See Opp.
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: 25151
`
`
`
`
`at Ex. 2, Bederson Rpt. at ¶¶ 56-67 (including paragraphs of opinions that read like a claim
`
`construction declaration discussing how the specification discloses multiple memories). Dr.
`
`Bederson goes even further and opines on how the specification discloses specific types of
`
`coding methods in the sound sources, concluding that the claim is not met because the accused
`
`products do not “alert the user of an incoming call via synthesizing any sounds.” Id. at ¶¶ 62-67.
`
`It is clear that Dr. Bederson is limiting the claims to require multiple memories and specific
`
`types of coding requiring synthesizing of sound, despite the fact that Dr. Bederson’s invalidity
`
`reports try to invalidate the same claims without mentioning memory once. Mot. at 4.
`
`’991 Patent. As Apple admits, Dr. Bederson argues that the accused products do not
`
`meet the “videophone function-added TV receiver” limitation because of the “lack of a TV tuner
`
`and inability to receive and decode broadcast program signals transmitted according to television
`
`standards.” Opp. at 4. Thus, Dr. Bederson is construing “videophone function-added TV
`
`receiver” to necessarily require a TV tuner compliant with television standards, even though the
`
`Court’s construction never mentions TV tuner or TV standards and the ’991 Patent discloses
`
`accessing a video on demand server to access content over the Internet. See D.I. 404 at 9-11; see
`
`also D.I. 422 at 11-15.
`
`With respect to the term “display configured to display at least the first and the second
`
`digital information,” Apple admits they are adding a temporal limitation (Opp. at 5) and with
`
`respect to “pauses,” Apple admits that it is construing “pauses” to exclude stops. Opp. at 5.
`
`II.
`
`Dr. Paradiso’s Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’317, ’498, and ’999 Patents
`
`“Direction” Limitations. Both Apple’s Opposition and Dr. Paradiso at his deposition
`
`confirm that he is construing the claim to exclude embodiments disclosed in Figure 3. Ex. 15,
`
`Paradiso Dep. Tr., at 85:21-86:9 (“interpreting this with the assistance of figures 3(a) through
`
`3(b)”); see also Opp. at 6 (“Maxell objects that Dr. Paradiso did not consider Figures 3(c)-(f) in
`
`2
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: 25152
`
`
`
`
`determining the scope of the ‘direction’ limitations. Mot. at 7. But those embodiments are not
`
`relevant.”) (emphasis added). Figures 3(c)-(f) are absolutely relevant as the ’317 Patent
`
`addresses Figure 3 collectively without characterizing (a)-(f) as being directed to different
`
`embodiments where one excludes the others. Ex. 14, ’317 Patent, 4:51-53 (“FIG. 3 shows how
`
`data compression is controlled for the “Route Guidance Service” by the portable terminal…with
`
`the function of walking navigation”). Nothing in the claim requires a “straight line or arrow.”
`
`PHS Requirement. The Court’s construction does not require the entire PHS; it requires
`
`a component of a PHS (device for data communication). See D.I. 404 at 6-9. Apple admits that
`
`Dr. Paradiso is relying on extrinsic evidence to limit the meaning of PHS to exclude cellular
`
`communication protocols and limit to using PSTN or ISDN only networks. Opp. at 7-8. And yet
`
`Dr. Paradiso admits that the specification does not limit PHS in such a way. Mot. at 8. Indeed,
`
`the ’317 Patent explicitly discloses relying on cellular networks. Ex. 14, ’317 Patent at 5:64-67
`
`(“cellular”), 9:21-26 (“wireless network”), 1:45-52 and 2:44-49 (Internet communications).1
`
`III.
`
`Dr. Bims’ Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’193 Patent
`
`Apple’s Opposition confirms that Dr. Bims is construing “connected to” in the asserted
`
`claims to necessarily require “separate discrete dedicated analog components for ‘receiver’
`
`‘transmitter’ ‘encoder/decoder’ and ‘controller’” and that a “dedicated encoder/decoder
`
`apparatus that is outside of and connected to the controller” needs to be present. Mot. at 8. But
`
`“discrete or dedicated are not expressly found in the claim” or the patent. Ex. 21, Bims Dep. Tr.
`
`at 89:3-7, 92:7-13. Apple fails to address several of Maxell’s arguments in its Opposition. First,
`
`the ’193 Patent explicitly teaches away from limiting the claims in this way. Ex. 17, ’193 Patent
`
`1 If this was truly a plain and ordinary meaning dispute, Apple or Dr. Bederson would have mentioned
`PHS’s when arguing invalidity of the same claim elements. Instead, in its IPR Apple does not even
`mention PHS for these came claim elements let alone a PHS limited to non-cellular communications,
`instead construing the term to not require a PHS. Ex. 25, IPR2020-00409 Pet. at 29-31; Ex. 26, IPR2020-
`00409 Expert Decl. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 106-108; Ex. 27, IPR2020-00407 Pet. at 16; id. at 40-41.
`
`3
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: 25153
`
`
`
`
`3:30-41, 10:47-60. Second, if this truly was a plain and ordinary meaning dispute, Dr. Bims
`
`would not have interpreted the claim by pointing to the same “logic circuit 23” of prior art
`
`Waldroup as two components and same “baseband processing circuit 15” of prior art Nakayama
`
`as three components. Mot. at 9. Third, Apple’s IPR never mentions “separate” or “dedicated”
`
`components when mapping the prior art. Ex. 22, IPR2020-00203 Pet.2
`
`IV.
`
`Dr. Bovik’s Rebuttal Expert Report – the ’493 Patent
`
`The Opposition confirms that Apple is construing “all signal charges accumulated in all
`
`N number of . . .pixel lines” to exclude “N number.” Opp. at 9. “All N number…of pixel lines”
`
`does not mean “all pixel lines.” See D.I. 422 at 3-11. Regarding claim 6, there is no negative
`
`limitation in the claim excluding “image stability correction” from being during, for example,
`
`post-processing. Opp. at 10.
`
`V.
`
`Dr. Mensacé’s Rebuttal Expert Reports – the ’438, ’586, and ’794 Patents
`
`Authentication Process. Dr. Menascé opines that “an authentication is necessarily a
`
`two-way communication” (Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. at ¶ 90) even though there is no
`
`mention of “two-way” in the Court’s construction. The word “two-way” never appears in
`
`Apple’s IPR for the ’438 Patent. Ex. 23, IPR2020-00201 Pet. Apple admits Dr. Menascé is
`
`construing this term to require two-way communication, but Apple attempts to discount this by
`
`alleging that Dr. Menascé is just agreeing with Dr. Williams. Opp. at 12. And yet Dr. Menascé
`
`states in his report that he disagrees with Dr. Williams. Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. at ¶ 90.
`
`Furthermore, Dr. Williams never mentions “two-way” communication in any portion of his
`
`report let alone in paragraphs 152, 322, or 411. Dr. Williams’ report describes how “AirDrop
`
`2 Apple also does not address that Dr. Bims mentions “separate” over twenty times in his non-
`infringement report. See Ex. 2. In contrast, “separate” was not even mentioned once in Dr. Bims’
`invalidity report to discuss the arrangement of components. See Ex. 18.
`
`4
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: 25154
`
`
`
`
`Discovery Flow” meets the claimed authentication under the Court’s construction, not that
`
`authentication is met because of two-way communication.3
`
`Display Apparatus. There is no construction in this case that the preamble of a claim is
`
`limiting. Apple’s opposition confirms that Dr. Menascé is construing the preamble to be limiting
`
`without any construction in this case of the same and is essentially relying on attorney oral
`
`argument given at the Markman hearing. Opp. at 12-13.
`
`if and only iff. The claim recites “if” not “if and only if.” The words of the claims
`
`matter. Dr. Menascé literally said that the claims “can be rewritten using the logical if and only if
`
`(shortened as iff) connector.” Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. at ¶ 55. Rewriting is not
`
`“explaining” the plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`’794 Patent. Apple admits that it wants the jury to decide whether “when” as recited by
`
`the claim excludes the scenario where the second event occurs any time after the first occurs.
`
`Opp. at 14. This is not a factual dispute, and the jury should not be charged with resolving claim
`
`construction disputes.
`
`’586 Patent. Apple’s argument is cyclical and admits that Dr. Menascé is construing
`
`“memory which previously stores” to mean previously stores in the factory. Opp. at 15 (stating
`
`
`
`). There is no requirement in the claim that the accused devices must come pre-
`
`paired from the factory. There is also no mention of being pre-paired or stored in the factory in
`
`Apple’s corresponding IPR. Ex. 24, IPR2020-00202 Pet. at 25-28.
`
`Accordingly, the opinions identified in Apple’s Motion should be stricken.
`
`3 In trying to cast Dr. Menascé’s claim construction opinion as the mere application of plain and ordinary
`meaning, Apple’s counsel has now admitted that Dr. Mensacé’s non-infringement opinion was incorrect
`in arguing that
`
`
`
`Opp. at 12.
`
`5
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: 25155
`
`
`
`
`Dated: July 23, 2020
`
`By:
`
`/s/ Jamie B. Beaber
`Geoff Culbertson
`Kelly Tidwell
`Patton, Tidwell & Culbertson, LLP
`2800 Texas Boulevard (75503)
`Post Office Box 5398
`Texarkana, TX 75505-5398
`Telephone: (903) 792-7080
`Facsimile: (903) 792-8233
`gpc@texarkanalaw.com
`kbt@texarkanalaw.com
`
`Jamie B. Beaber
`Alan M. Grimaldi
`Kfir B. Levy
`James A. Fussell, III
`William J. Barrow
`Baldine B. Paul
`Tiffany A. Miller
`Michael L. Lindinger
`Saqib J. Siddiqui
`Bryan C. Nese
`Alison T. Gelsleichter
`Clark S. Bakewell
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`1999 K Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 263-3000
`Facsimile: (202) 263-3300
`jbeaber@mayerbrown.com
`agrimaldi@mayerbrown.com
`klevy@mayerbrown.com
`jfussell@mayerbrown.com
`wbarrow@mayerbrown.com
`bpaul@mayerbrown.com
`tmiller@mayerbrown.com
`mlindinger@mayerbrown.com
`ssiddiqui@mayerbrown.com
`bnese@mayerbrown.com
`agelsleichter@mayerbrown.com
`cbakewell@mayerbrown.com
`
`Robert G. Pluta
`Amanda Streff Bonner
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive
`
`6
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: 25156
`
`
`
`
`Chicago, IL 60606
`(312) 782-0600
`rpluta@mayerbrown.com
`asbonner@mayerbrown.com
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Maxell, Ltd.
`
`7
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 451 Filed 07/27/20 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: 25157
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
`electronic service are being served this 23rd day of July, 2020, with a copy of this document via
`electronic mail pursuant to Local Rule CV-5(d).
`
`/s/ Jamie B. Beaber
`Jamie B. Beaber
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`PUBLIC
`VERSION
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket