Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 24375
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`MAXELL, LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
`
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.’S OPPOSITION TO MAXELL, LTD.’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102 AND 103 OF CLAIMS 7, 16, AND 17 FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 10,212,586
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 24376
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`I.
`LEGAL STANDARDS ..................................................................................................... 2
`II.
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED. ............................................................... 3
`III.
`IV. MAXELL’S “UNDISPUTED” FACTS ARE DISPUTED. .............................................. 3
`A.
`Response To Plaintiff’s Statement Of Undisputed Facts ....................................... 3
`B.
`Additional Material Undisputed Facts ................................................................... 3
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 7
`A.
`Maxell’s Arguments on Anticipation Demonstrate Genuine Disputes of
`Material Fact, Precluding Summary Judgment. ..................................................... 7
`Maxell Ignores Separate Legal Aspects of Obviousness And the Disputed
`Facts They Present. .............................................................................................. 10
`Maxell Cites No Relevant Supporting Case Law ................................................ 14
`C.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 15
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`
`
`B.
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 24377
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) .............................................................................................................. 2, 14
`
`Balivi Chem. Corp. v. JMC Ventilation Refrigeration LLC,,
`No. 1:07-cv-353, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65695 (D. Idaho, June 29, 2010) ............................ 15
`
`Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`No. 16-CV-1122-RGA, 2018 WL 6727054 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2018) ....................................... 12
`
`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) .................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Cioffi v. Google, Inc.,
`No. 13-CV-103-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 490367 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2017), report and
`recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 478051 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2017) ........................... 2, 8, 10
`
`Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 15
`
`EVM Sys., LLC v. Rex Med., L.P.,
`No. 6:13-CV-184-RWS, 2015 WL 4911090 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2015) ..................... 2, 3, 8, 14
`
`In re Dippin’ Dots Patent Litig.,
`249 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites
`Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004) .................................................................. 13
`
`Ivera Med. Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.,
`801 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................... 2, 11, 15
`
`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 14
`
`Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,
`344 F.3d 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................. 2, 8
`
`Navico Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-CV-190-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3816110 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017) ...................... 2, 10
`
`Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, D.I. 421 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2017) ................................................ 2, 10
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 24378
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc.,
`355 F. App’x. 384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................... 15
`
`ThinkOptics, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`6:11-cv-455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91036 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2014) ..................................... 15
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ....................................................................................................................... 2
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 5 of 22 PageID #: 24379
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Maxell seeks to resolve at summary judgment a classic factual dispute about whether the
`
`asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,212,586 (“the ’586 Patent”) are invalid. Maxell’s motion
`
`seeks to entirely eliminate Apple’s invalidity case—anticipation and two obviousness theories—
`
`for the ’586 Patent, arguing that Apple’s expert Dr. Daniel Menascé “does not show” how a
`
`particular prior art reference (U.S. Patent No. 6,871,063 (“Schiffer”)) discloses a subpart of a
`
`single limitation: a memory which previously stores information “about” another mobile terminal.
`
`While Maxell disagrees with Dr. Menascé’s opinions, that does not justify summary
`
`judgment. Dr. Menascé’s opinion that Schiffer discloses this limitation based on an “access code”
`
`previously stored on a SIM card is well supported by Schiffer alone. E.g., Menascé Appx. D at 8-
`
`10. In addition, Dr. Menascé provides obviousness analyses based on Schiffer and another
`
`reference (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2006/0041746 (“Kirkup”). See Ex. 4, 438/’586 Opening
`
`¶¶ 223-248; see also Ex. 5, Appx. D. Maxell quibbles with Dr. Menascé’s opinions, parroting
`
`opinions of its expert Dr. Tim Williams without citation. At best, this shows a “colorable
`
`disagreement” between experts that must be resolved by a jury as courts in this District hold—not
`
`at summary judgment. If Maxell doubts the bases of Dr. Menascé’s opinions, it may cross-examine
`
`him at trial. But it should not ask the Court to adopt its own expert’s opinions as a matter of law.
`
`Indeed, Maxell frames the issue to be decided as whether “Apple has failed to establish by
`
`clear and convincing evidence that the Schiffer reference relied on by Dr. Menascé discloses
`
`[certain] ‘memory’ limitations,” as if trial has already occurred. Maxell ignores factual disputes
`
`regarding Schiffer’s teachings and it wholly fails to address obviousness as a separate legal
`
`standard. Viewing the evidence in Apple’s favor, the right question is whether there is no genuine
`
`issue of material fact such that “no reasonable jury could return a verdict” finding the asserted
`
`claims invalid. Maxell cannot meet that burden, and therefore, its motion should be denied.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 6 of 22 PageID #: 24380
`
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating there is “no genuine
`
`issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” where the evidence is such that “a
`
`reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`
`477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
`
`party for summary judgment, regardless of the burden of proof. Id. at 255.
`
`Maxell’s motion argues that there is no genuine dispute for trial based on Apple’s alleged
`
`failure to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case on which it has the burden
`
`of proof. Mot. at 1 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
`
`For invalidity, a supported expert opinion is typically sufficient evidence for a reasonable
`
`jury to return a verdict in a party’s favor. See, e.g., Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`
`No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, D.I. 421 at 7-8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2017); Navico Inc. v. Garmin Int’l,
`
`Inc., No. 2:16-CV-190-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3816110 at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017).
`
`Anticipation is “a pure question of fact;” summary judgment is not appropriate where a
`
`reasonable jury could conclude that the prior art anticipates the claims. Cioffi v. Google, Inc., No.
`
`13-CV-103-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 490367, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2017), report and
`
`recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 478051 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2017); EVM Sys., LLC v. Rex Med.,
`
`L.P., No. 6:13-CV-184-RWS, 2015 WL 4911090, at *3-*4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2015); Med.
`
`Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`Obviousness is a legal question based on underlying factual inquiries. Ivera Med. Corp. v.
`
`Hospira, Inc., 801 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Conflicting evidence about the factual
`
`inquiries underlying an obviousness determination precludes summary judgment. EVM Sys., 2015
`
`WL 4911090, at *4.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 7 of 22 PageID #: 24381
`
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`
`Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that Schiffer anticipates the asserted
`
`claims, and/or that the claims as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art based on Schiffer or Schiffer in view of Kirkup.
`
`IV. MAXELL’S “UNDISPUTED” FACTS ARE DISPUTED
`A.
`
`Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts
`
`Maxell presents six allegedly “undisputed” facts in its motion. Mot. at 3-4. However, the
`
`facts of most consequence to its motion are disputed.
`
`Paragraphs 1-2 are undisputed.
`
`Paragraphs 3 and 5 are disputed. Dr. Menascé opines that Schiffer discloses the limitation
`
`(including the subpart that Maxell disputes), and his opinions are amply supported by facts. See
`
`e.g., Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Report ¶¶ 190-210, 211-215, 223-232; Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at
`
`7-11 (Claim 1), 45-46 (Claim 16); Ex. 2, Schiffer at 1:11-22, 1:41-42, 2:38-45, 2:60-65, 2:7-13,
`
`4:23-36, 4:41-52, Figs. 1 & 2; Ex. 1, ’586 Patent at 1:33-42, 3:39-43; see also infra this
`
`Opposition.
`
`Paragraphs 4 and 6 are disputed. Maxell ignores that Dr. Menascé opines on aspects of
`
`Kirkup related to the memory limitations, such as Kirkup’s authentication code used to unlock
`
`another device. See e.g., Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Opening ¶¶ 83, 190-196, 197-210, 211-215,
`
`223-248; Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 11-43 (Claim 1), 44-47 (Claim 16); Ex. 3, Kirkup at [0007],
`
`[0040], [0042], [0053], [0056], [0068], [0080], Figs. 2 & 3; see also infra this Opposition.
`
`B.
`
`Additional Material Undisputed Facts
`
`Facts Regarding ’586 Patent Asserted Claims
`
`1.
`
`Maxell asserts ’586 Patent Claims 7, 16, and 17, which relate to using one mobile
`
`terminal to unlock another mobile terminal when they are within short-range wireless
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 8 of 22 PageID #: 24382
`
`
`communication range and certain other conditions are met. See Ex. 1,’586 Patent Cls. 7, 16, 17.
`
`2.
`
`Claims 1 and 16 are the relevant independent claims, and both contain a similar
`
`“memory” limitation, requiring a memory that previously stores information “about” “another” or
`
`a “second” mobile terminal. Ex. 1, ’586 Patent Cl. 1, Cl. 16. Claims 1 and 16 place no limitations
`
`on what it means for information to be “about” “another” or a “second” mobile terminal. Id.
`
`3.
`
`The ’586 Patent explains that the information stored on the first mobile terminal
`
`may be matched with information stored on the second mobile terminal as a condition of unlocking
`
`the second mobile terminal. See Ex. 1, ’586 Patent at 3:37-43 (explaining that matching unlocking
`
`information is stored in mobile terminal 1’s storage unit 14 and mobile terminal 2’s storage unit
`
`24); see also 1:33-42 (inhibiting use if information of the key device does not agree with the stored
`
`information); 1:66-2:1 (describing terminals being “previously registered mutually”); 4:8-20
`
`(same) 7:21-23 (same). Upon receiving the information from mobile terminal 1, “terminal 2
`
`further confirms whether to be unlocked.” See id. at 4:36-42.
`
`Facts Regarding Dr. Menascé’s Disclosed Opinions
`
`4.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines that all elements of the asserted claims, including the memory
`
`limitations presented in Maxell’s motion, are anticipated by Schiffer and rendered obvious by both
`
`Schiffer alone and Schiffer combined with Kirkup. Ex. 4, ’438/’586 Opening ¶ 27.
`
`5.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines that Schiffer discloses an “access code” that is previously
`
`stored on the memory of a mobile phone (e.g., the claimed first mobile terminal) and is information
`
`“about” a computer system (e.g., the claimed second / another mobile terminal), including because
`
`it unlocks the second mobile terminal. Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 7-8, Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586
`
`Opening ¶¶ 212, 223-232.
`
`6.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines that the “access code” can be the mobile phone’s subscriber
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 9 of 22 PageID #: 24383
`
`
`identity number or may be generated using data, including the subscriber identity number, stored
`
`in the SIM. Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 8-9. He also opines that the “access code” can be an
`
`“alternate value” such as an “other security code.” Id. at 10 (citing Schiffer at 4:41-52). In each
`
`case, Dr. Menascé opines that the access code is stored on the mobile phone’s SIM. Id. at 8-10.
`
`7.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines that the access code (in all of Schiffer’s embodiments) is
`
`information “about” the second mobile terminal (e.g., the computer system) because it is stored on
`
`the second mobile terminal, in addition to being stored in the SIM of the first mobile terminal (e.g.,
`
`the mobile phone), and because it is used to authenticate the devices and unlock the second mobile
`
`terminal (e.g., the computer system). Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 8-10 (citing Schiffer at 2:7-13;
`
`2:60-65); Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Opening ¶¶ 225-227 (citing Schiffer at Abstract, 1:61-64;
`
`2:44-49; 2:60-3:5; 4:24-37, 4:43-52; Fig. 2); see also Ex. 2, Schiffer at 2:14-18 (the SIM is used
`
`for authentication). For example, Dr. Menascé explains that the access code is compared to a
`
`“previously stored value” on the computer system that “may include, for example, the subscriber
`
`identity number, or some portion thereof, or other security code.” Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 10
`
`(quoting Schiffer at 4:41-52). And Dr. Menascé quotes Schiffer as explaining that “access to the
`
`computer system is granted in response to receiving the access code.” Id. at 8 (quoting Schiffer at
`
`2:7-13); see also Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Opening ¶ 227 (citing Schiffer at 2:60-67; 4:54-59).
`
`8.
`
`Dr. Menascé explains that this “access code” is used throughout the unlocking
`
`process. See generally Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 11-43. He opines that “Schiffer teaches that,
`
`when the conditions are met . . . the controller controls mobile phone 100 to transmit the access
`
`code to computer system 110,” and that this “access code causes computer system 110 to grant the
`
`user access.” Id. at 18-19. Dr. Menascé also explains that “Schiffer teaches that the user may be
`
`required to authenticate before the access code is transmitted from mobile device 100 to computer
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 10 of 22 PageID #: 24384
`
`
`system 110.” Id. at 39.
`
`9.
`
`Like the access code from Schiffer, Dr. Menascé opines that an “authentication
`
`code” in Kirkup is transmitted from the handheld electronic device to the computer (Id. at 20-21),
`
`and is used to unlock the computer. Id. at 21-22; see generally id. at 11-43. He explains the
`
`“authentication code” and charts Kirkup for the claimed unlocking conditions. See, e.g., Ex. 4,
`
`Menascé ’438/586 Opening ¶¶ 235-241, Ex. 5, Menascé Appx. D at 20-22, 27-31, 34-39, 39-43.
`
`10.
`
`Dr. Menascé explains that Kirkup’s memory stores information. See, e.g., Ex. 4,
`
`Menascé ’438/’586 Opening ¶¶ 83, 236-237, 240-241; Ex. 3, Kirkup at Fig. 3.
`
`11.
`
`Dr. Menascé explains the fundamental similarities between Schiffer and Kirkup
`
`and why a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them to render obvious the claims as
`
`a whole, (Ex. 4, Menascé 438/’586 Opening ¶¶ 223-248), including opining on the level of skill in
`
`the art (id. ¶¶ 190-196), the state of the art around the ’586 Patent’s claimed priority date (id. ¶¶
`
`197-210), and the subject-matter claimed by the ’586 Patent (id. ¶¶ 211-215). Dr. Menascé’s
`
`opinions are further supported by his discussion of the state of the art related to mobile devices,
`
`Bluetooth communications, secure communications, authentication, and physical device
`
`protection in the “Technological Background” sections of his Opening Report. See id. at ¶¶ 81-
`
`90, 96-101, 113-121, 197-210 (¶ 198 incorporates portions of the ’438 Patent technical background
`
`as “fully applicable” to the ’586 Patent).
`
`Facts Regarding Maxell’s Motion and Maxell’s Expert’s Opinions
`
`12. Maxell does not dispute that Schiffer discloses a memory that previously stores
`
`information. See, e.g., Mot. at 7. Maxell disputes that the previously stored information is “about”
`
`the computer system, arguing that the memory on the mobile phone only stores information about
`
`the mobile phone itself, and not about the computer system. See Mot. at 4-6.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 11 of 22 PageID #: 24385
`
`
`13. Maxell’s expert Dr. Williams presents the same arguments in his rebuttal report,
`
`including disagreeing that the memory limitation is taught by either Schiffer or Schiffer combined
`
`with Kirkup. See, e.g., Ex. 6, Williams Rebuttal ¶¶ 122, 287-300, 338-340, 361-375, 460-462.
`
`14. Maxell misreads Dr. Menascé’s opinions to mean that because an access code “is
`
`stored on the computer 110,” the code cannot also be stored on the mobile terminal. See Mot. at
`
`6 (citing Menascé Appx. D at 10).
`
`15. Maxell wrongly contends that because Dr. Menascé does not cite to Kirkup in
`
`element [1.b] of his claim chart, “any combination of Schiffer and Kirkup fail for the same reasons
`
`as discussed for Schiffer alone.” Mot. at 7-8.
`
`V.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Maxell asks the Court to ignore genuine disputes of material fact precluding summary
`
`judgment. For anticipation—a purely factual question—Maxell asks the Court to resolve genuine
`
`disputes of material fact regarding Schiffer’s teachings in its favor, ignoring legal holdings from
`
`this District that such “colorable disagreements between the experts” should go to the jury. For
`
`obviousness, Maxell’s arguments fail for the same reasons as anticipation, and for the additional
`
`reasons that Maxell largely ignores separate legal standards for obviousness, and the clear factual
`
`disputes regarding the “scope and content of the prior art” and the “differences between the
`
`claimed invention and the prior art.” Maxell further seeks to avoid obviousness for the Schiffer
`
`and Kirkup combination by mischaracterizing Dr. Menascé’s opinions.
`
`A. Maxell’s Arguments on Anticipation Demonstrate Genuine Disputes of
`Material Fact, Precluding Summary Judgment
`
`Maxell is only entitled to summary judgment of no anticipation if it can demonstrate that
`
`no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Apple; summary judgment is not proper where the
`
`teachings of the prior art are genuinely disputed. See, e.g., Cioffi, 2017 WL 490367, at *2; Med.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 12 of 22 PageID #: 24386
`
`
`Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1221. In Medical Instrumentation, for example, the Federal Circuit
`
`reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment of no anticipation where the court
`
`“improperly usurped the role of the jury in finding that the reference failed to raise a genuine issue
`
`of material fact.” Id. In EVM Sys., this Court denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
`
`of no anticipation where the parties presented “conflicting evidence,” similarly disputing whether
`
`a prior art reference disclosed a certain claim element. 2015 WL 4911090, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
`
`17, 2015). The Court concluded that the question of what the prior art taught was “best left for the
`
`trier of fact.” Id. Similarly, in Cioffi, another court in this District denied plaintiff’s motion for
`
`summary judgment of no anticipation, refusing to resolve disagreements between experts at the
`
`summary judgment stage. 2017 WL 490367, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2017).
`
`So too, the Court should deny Maxell’s motion. The parties dispute Schiffer’s teachings.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines that Schiffer anticipates all asserted claims, and specifically the disputed
`
`memory limitations regarding storing information “about” another device. See Section IV.B
`
`above, ¶¶ 4-8. Dr. Menascé’s opinions support Apple’s anticipation case. Maxell concedes that
`
`Schiffer teaches a device with a memory (e.g., a SIM card) that previously stores information, but
`
`argues that information in Schiffer’s SIM is not “about” another device (i.e., the computer system).
`
`See Mot. at 5-7. Maxell also contends that Schiffer’s SIM “only stores or comprises memory about
`
`the mobile terminal in which the memory is included, i.e., [the] mobile phone,” (Mot. at 5),
`
`apparently assuming that information “about” the mobile phone cannot also be about the computer
`
`system. Maxell is wrong about each of these points, and Dr. Menascé’s opinions in this area are
`
`well supported.
`
`Dr. Menascé explains that Schiffer discloses a mobile phone with memory that stores an
`
`access code used to authenticate a user to a computer system, and to unlock the computer system.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 24387
`
`
`See Section IV.B above, ¶¶ 5-7. Schiffer’s “access code” can be the mobile phone’s subscriber
`
`identity number, a different number generated using the subscriber identity number, or an alternate
`
`value. Id. ¶ 6. Dr. Menascé explains that Schiffer’s access code, which is stored on the mobile
`
`phone, is information “about” the computer system because it is a code that unlocks the computer
`
`system, and because it is stored not only on the mobile phone, but also on the computer system
`
`itself. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. In order to verify the access code (which the mobile phone stores on its SIM
`
`and sends to the computer system), the computer system compares it to a previously stored value
`
`stored on its own memory. Id. ¶ 7. Dr. Menascé opines that this access code is information “about”
`
`a second mobile terminal as contemplated by the ’586 Patent. See id ¶ 5, 7. To the extent there is
`
`any difference between Schiffer’s disclosure and asserted claims, Dr. Menascé opines that the
`
`claims would be obvious to a POSITA, as discussed further below. See Section V.B.
`
`Dr. Menascé’s opinion is supported by the claims and the specification. The claims do not
`
`require a particular type of information “about” another device, such as a unique identifier. See
`
`Ex. 1, ’586 Patent, Cls. 1 & 16. The specification describes the “information” consistent with Dr.
`
`Menascé’s opinion, explaining that the information stored on the first mobile terminal may be
`
`matched with information stored on the second mobile terminal as a condition of unlocking the
`
`second mobile terminal. See id. at 3:37-43 (explaining that matching unlocking information is
`
`stored in mobile terminal 1’s storage unit 14 and mobile terminal 2’s storage unit 24); see also
`
`1:33-42 (inhibiting use if information of the key device does not agree with the stored information).
`
`Maxell incorrectly claims that Dr. Menascé “admits that that ‘access code’ in Schiffer . . .
`
`‘is stored on the computer 110’ (i.e. the unlocked device) not on the mobile terminal (i.e. the
`
`unlocking device).” Mot. at 6 (emphasis in original). Dr. Menascé instead opined that the “access
`
`code” in Schiffer is stored on both devices. See Section IV.B above, ¶¶ 5-7.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 24388
`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 24388
`
`Maxell’s motion asks the court to adopt Maxell’s expert’s disputed rebuttal opinions as
`
`“undisputed facts.” Compare, e.g., Mot. at 3 with Ex. 6, Williams Rebuttal 1H] 287-300. As the
`
`examples below show, Maxell presents arguments from Dr. Williams’s report as allegedly
`
`“undisputed” facts in its favor—without citing Dr. Williams’s report:
`
`Maxell’s Motion
`
`Williams Rebuttal
`
`...the subscriber identity number is associated The subscriber identity number is associated
`with the mobile phone 100 (i.e., “a mobile
`with the mobile phone 100 (i. e., the “a mobile
`terminal”), not computer system 110 (i.e.,
`terminal”), not computer system 110 (i. e., the
`“another mobile terminal” in Schiffer). ..
`“another mobile terminal”).
`x. 6, Williams Rebuttal
`
`
`
`Rather, Schiffer’s disclosure points to the
`opposite conclusion—that the information
`stored on the mobile phone 100 that is
`transmitted to the computer system 110
`comprises information about the mobile
`phone 100 and not the computer system 110.
`
`Rather, Schiffer’s disclosure points to the
`opposite conclusion—that the information
`stored on the mobile phone 100 that is
`transmitted to the computer system 110
`comprises information about the mobile
`phone 100 and not the computer system 110.
`Ex. 6, Williams Rebuttal
`
`But as discussed above, Maxell’s expert’s opinions are disputed. See supra, and e.g., Ex. 5,
`
`Menascé Appx. D at 7-11. Maxell thus merely presents a “colorable disagreement between the
`
`experts” regarding Schiffer’s teachings—a disagreement for the “jury to resolve.” Ciofii, 2017
`
`WL 490367, at *2. See also Saint Lawrence Commc’ns, No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, D.I. 421 at 7-8
`
`(E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2017) (denying plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment of validity because
`
`the defendant’s expert’s opinion was “some evidence” of invalidity that “cleared the evidentiary
`
`burden imposed by Rule 56”); Navico, 2017 WL 3816110 at *3 (ED. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017)
`
`(denying patentee’s motion for summary judgment of no anticipation where defendant’s expert
`
`could testify that each limitation of the claims could be found in prior art).
`
`B.
`
`Maxell Ignores Separate Legal Aspects of Obviousness and the Disputed
`Facts They Present
`
`While Maxell acknowledges that Obviousness involves factual inquiries, it simply ignores
`
`them. Factual inquiries for Obviousness include: “(1) the scope and content ofthe prior art; (2) the
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 24389
`
`
`level of ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
`
`art; and (4) secondary evidence of nonobviousness.” Mot. at 2 (quoting Ivera, 801 F.3d at 1344
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2015)). Maxell collapses its anticipation and obviousness arguments, arguing that Dr.
`
`Menascé does not provide separate obviousness opinions—suggesting that if the Court finds that
`
`Schiffer does not anticipate, that is the end of the inquiry. See Mot. at 7-8. Maxell misstates the
`
`law and mischaracterizes Dr. Menascé’s opinions. As discussed below, Dr. Menascé provides
`
`opinions supported by evidence that the asserted claims are obvious, and obviousness involves
`
`additional legal and factual questions beyond anticipation.
`
`(1) the scope and content of the prior art. The parties dispute the “scope and content”
`
`of Schiffer’s teachings, as evidenced by the discussion above. See Section V.A. Dr. Menascé also
`
`opines that to the extent Schiffer does not anticipate the claims, it renders them obvious based on
`
`Schiffer alone or in combination with Kirkup. See Ex. 4, Menascé ’438/’586 Opening ¶¶ 223-232.
`
`Dr. Menascé opines, for example, that the “access code” relied upon for anticipation could be an
`
`alternate value, such as an “other security code.” See Section IV.B above, ¶¶ 6. Thus, to the extent
`
`that Maxell contends that Schiffer does not disclose the claimed memory limitations, Dr. Menascé
`
`opines that it would be obvious that either the “access code”—including the “alternate value” or
`
`the “other security code”—could be information “about” the second mobile terminal. See Ex. 5,
`
`Menascé Appx. D. at 7 (“Schiffer . . . renders obvious this claim limitation), 9-10 (citing Schiffer
`
`at 4:23-36, 4:41-52, describing that the “alternate value” may be an “other security code” and
`
`explaining why it is “information about” the computer system stored in the memory of the mobile
`
`phone). Moreover, Dr. Menascé’s opinions regarding the state of the art with respect to Bluetooth,
`
`authentication, and the general functionality of mobile devices at the time of the ’586 Patent also
`
`are relevant to the question of obviousness for this factor and others. These opinions are relevant
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 24390
`
`
`to the knowledge of a POSITA and differences between the prior art and the claimed invention,
`
`including because it informs how a POSITA understands Schiffer’s disclosures that a Bluetooth
`
`communication link is established between the two devices (see Schiffer at 3:43-50) and that the
`
`access code is used to authenticate the two devices to each other (see id. at 2:60-3:5). See Section
`
`IV.B above, ¶ 11.
`
`Dr. Menascé also opines that the claims are obvious based on Schiffer in combination with
`
`Kirkup. Maxell wrongly claims that “any combination of Schiffer and Kirkup fail for the same
`
`reasons as discussed for Schiffer.” Mot. at 7. But Dr. Menascé’s obviousness opinions include
`
`evidence based on Kirkup, including Kirkup’s “authentication code” and functionality related to
`
`the claims unlocking functionality. See Section IV.B above, ¶¶ 9, 10. Dr. Menascé also describes
`
`Schiffer and Kirkup and opines on motivations to combine them. See Section IV.B above, ¶ 11.
`
`Dr. Williams disagrees, but that does not mean summary judgment is appropriate. Because Dr.
`
`Menascé’s opinions with respect to each of the four factual inquiries is supported by evidence, that
`
`the scope and content of the prior art is disputed means summary judgment should be denied. See,
`
`e.g., Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., No. 16-CV-1122-RGA, 2018 WL 6727054, at *9 (D.
`
`Del. Dec. 21, 2018) (denying summary judgment of non-obviousness over plaintiff’s argument
`
`that defendant’s expert’s opinions regarding prior art did not account for every claim limitation).
`
`(2) the level of ordinary skill in the art. Maxell’s motion does not address the level of
`
`skill in the art, and therefore does not dispute that Apple has provided sufficient evidence on this
`
`factual determination. Dr. Menascé describes the state of the art, including applicant admissions
`
`and the level of skill in the art, which are relevant to obviousness in light of Schiffer alone or
`
`Schiffer in combination with Kirkup. See Section IV.B above, ¶ 11. Dr. Williams acknowledges
`
`that any difference between the two proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are minor and would
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 442 Filed 07/24/20 Page 17 of 22 PageID #: 24391
`
`
`not change his opinions. See Ex. 6, Williams Rebuttal ¶ 53. Accordingly, Dr. Menascé’s
`
`testimony is capable of supporting a jury finding of obviousness—a fact implicitly acknowledged
`
`by Dr. Williams’s agreement.
`
`(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. In Dr. Menascé’s
`
`opinion, there is no difference between the inventions claimed in the ’586 Patent and the prior art
`
`of Schiffer, as he opines that Schiffer anticipates the asserted claims. See Section IV.B above ¶ 4.
`
`To the extent that there is any difference between Schiffer and the asserted claims, Dr. Menascé
`
`opines that the difference i