Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 17204
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`MAXELL, LTD.,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`Civil Action No. 5:19-cv-00036
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`MAXELL, LTD.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INVALIDITY
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 AND 103 OF CLAIMS 7, 16, AND 17 OF
`U.S. PATENT NO. 10,212,586
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 17205
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 1
`A.
`Summary Judgment ............................................................................................... 1
`B.
`Invalidity ................................................................................................................ 2
`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ...................................................................... 3
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE ................................ 4
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 8
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
`IV.
`V.
`VI.
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 17206
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Balivi Chem. Corp. v. JMC Ventilation Refrigeration LLC,
`No. 1:07-cv-353, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65695 (D. Idaho, June 29, 2010) .........................2, 3
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`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
`477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...................................................................................................................1
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`Eason v. Thaler,
`73 F.3d 1322 (5th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................1
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`Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001)....................................................................................................2
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`Forsyth v. Barr,
`19 F.3d 1527 (5th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................1
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................................................2
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`Ivera Med. Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.,
`801 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................2
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`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) ...................................................................................................................1
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`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership,
`131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) ...............................................................................................................2
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`Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.,
`136 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 1998) .....................................................................................................1
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`Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc.,
`355 F. App’x. 384 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...........................................................................................2
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`ThinkOptics, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`No. 6:11-cv- 455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91036 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2014) ..........................1, 2
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 102 ...................................................................................................................... passim
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ...................................................................................................................... passim
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 17207
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`35 U.S.C. § 282 ................................................................................................................................2
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) .......................................................................................................................1
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`Other Authorities
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`U.S. Patent No. 10,212,586.................................................................................................... passim
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,871,063 (Schiffer) ..................................................................................... passim
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`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2006/0041746 (Kirkup) ........................................ passim
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 17208
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Maxell moves for summary judgment of no invalidity of the asserted claims of U.S.
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`Patent No. 10,212,586 (Ex. 1,1 “the ’586 Patent”) because Apple’s only prior art reference relied
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`on fails to disclose the “memory” limitations in the asserted claims. Under these circumstances,
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`Apple cannot meet its steep burden of proving invalidity at trial, and summary judgment of no
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`invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 is warranted.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A.
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`Summary Judgment
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`Summary judgment shall be rendered when there is no genuine issue as to any material
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`fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
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`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136
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`F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). If the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no
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`evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must assert
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`competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec.
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`Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); ThinkOptics, Inc. v. Nintendo of
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`Am., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91036, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2014). Mere
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`conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported
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`speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322,
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`1325 (5th Cir. 1996); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment
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`must be granted if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
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`existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.
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`Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
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`1 References to “Ex.” throughout this brief refer to the Declaration of Michael L. Lindinger filed
`concurrently herewith.
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`B.
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`Invalidity
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`An issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. This presumption
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`places the burden on the challenging party to prove the patent’s invalidity by clear and
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`convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
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`“[A] moving party seeking to have a patent held not invalid at summary judgment must show
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`that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear and
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`convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could
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`invalidate the patent.” Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`A patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) only “if the differences between the subject
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`matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
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`have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
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`(POSITA) to which said subject matter pertains.” “Obviousness is a legal question based on the
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`following underlying factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of
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`ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and
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`(4) secondary evidence of nonobviousness.” Ivera Med. Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 801 F.3d 1336,
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`1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
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`Where no reference in a proposed combination of prior art teaches a particular claim
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`limitation, the invention is not obvious in view of that combination. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.
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`Arthrex, Inc., 355 Fed. App’x. 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 2009). District courts have routinely found no
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`question of fact and granted motions for summary judgment of no invalidity where defendants
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`presented insufficient evidence to establish invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See, e.g.,
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`ThinkOptics, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-455, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91036, at
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`*14 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2014) (granting summary judgment of no invalidity because defendants
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`failed to show the prior art system disclosed every element of the claimed invention); Balivi
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 17210
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`Chem. Corp. v. JMC Ventilation Refrigeration LLC, No. 1:07-cv-353, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`65695, at *47-48 (D. Idaho, June 29, 2010) (granting summary judgment of no invalidity
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`because defendant failed to present sufficient evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`had ever thought of combining the claimed elements in the way the patent applicant did).
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`III.
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`STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
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`The following facts are undisputed:
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`1.
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`Claim 1 of the ’586 Patent recites in relevant part: 1[b] “a memory which
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`previously stores information about an another mobile terminal.”
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`2.
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`Claim
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`16
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`of
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`the
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`’586 Patent
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`recites
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`in
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`relevant
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`part:
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`16[b]
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`“wherein the first mobile terminal comprises … a memory which previously stores information
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`about the second mobile terminal.”
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`3.
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`Dr. Menascé’s Opening Expert Report Regarding U.S. Patent Nos. 7,116,438 and
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`10,212,586 (Ex. 22 or “Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt.”) does not show how U.S. Patent No. 6,871,063
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`(Ex. 3, “Schiffer”) discloses “a memory which previously stores information about an another
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`mobile terminal” limitation (1[b]) in claim 1.
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`4.
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`The Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. does not offer an opinion that U.S. Patent
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`Application Publication No. 2006/0041746 (Ex. 4, “Kirkup”) dislcoses “a memory which
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`previously stores information about an another mobile terminal” limitation (1[b]) in claim 1.
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`5.
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`The Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. does not show how Schiffer discloses the “wherein
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`the first mobile terminal comprises … a memory which previously stores information about the
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`second mobile terminal” limitation (16[b]) in claim 16.
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`2 Ex. 2 includes both Dr. Menascé’s Report and the accompanying appendix, Appendix D,
`related to the ’586 Patent.
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`6.
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`The Menascé ’438/’586 Rpt. does not offer an opinion that Kirkup discloses the
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`“wherein the first mobile terminal comprises … a memory which previously stores information
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`about the second mobile terminal” limitation (16[b]) in claim 16.
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`IV.
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`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE
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`1.
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`Whether Apple has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
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`Schiffer reference relied on by Dr. Menascé discloses the “memory” limitations (1[b] and
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`16[b])?
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`V.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Apple’s expert, Dr. Menascé, offers two invalidity opinions concerning the ’586 Patent:
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`(1) the asserted claims (claims 7, 16, and 17) are anticipated pursuant to § 102 in view of
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`Schiffer and (2) the asserted claims are obvious pursuant to § 103 in view of Schiffer alone or in
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`combination with Kirkup. To substantiate these opinions, Dr. Menascé must show that the
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`“memory” limitations in independent claims 1 (“element 1[b]”) and 16 (“element 16[b]”)3 are
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`disclosed in the prior art. Dr. Menascé does not rely on Kirkup as disclosing these limitations.
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`Thus, the only question is whether Schiffer discloses the “memory” limitations in 1[b] and
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`16[b]—it does not.
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`The claims require that the memory is located on an unlocking device (i.e. “a mobile
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`terminal” in claim 1 and “a first mobile terminal” in claim 16) and the information that is stored
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`in the memory is information related to a device to be unlocked (“an another mobile terminal” in
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`claim 1 and “a second mobile terminal” in claim 16). Dr. Menascé agrees with this
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`straightforward understanding of the claims, as shown in his own summary chart reproduced
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`below:
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`3 Asserted claim 7 depends from claim 1. Asserted claim 17 depends on asserted claim 16.
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`Ex. 2, App. D at 2. Dr. Menascé unambiguously states that “claim 1 is written to cover aspects
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`of Mobile Terminal 1 in the table above” and defines mobile terminal 1 in Schiffer as “mobile
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`phone 100.” Id. With respect to Mobile Terminal 2, the unlocked device, Dr. Menascé relies on
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`the “computer system 110.” See generally id. at 7-11.
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`Dr. Menascé begins by stating that Schiffer discloses that “mobile phone 100 includes
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`‘SIM 101’ (see FIG. 1, supra), which includes a ‘protected memory region having data stored
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`therein’”. See Ex. 2, App. D at 7-8 (citing to Ex. 3, 2:38-45 and 2:60-65); see also Ex. 2 at
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`¶¶227-228. But Schiffer does not disclose that this memory “previously stores information about
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`an another mobile terminal,” i.e., computer system 110. Rather, SIM 101 only stores or
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`comprises memory about the mobile terminal in which the memory is included, i.e., mobile
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`phone 100. See id. As Dr. Menascé recognizes in his report, Schiffer discloses that “[t]he data
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`stored in the protected memory region of SIM 101 includes the subscriber identity number
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`associated with the user of mobile phone 100.” Ex. 2, App. D at 8 (citing Ex. 3, 2:38-45)
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`(emphasis added). Thus, as Dr. Menascé concedes, the subscriber identity number is associated
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`with the mobile phone 100 (i.e., “a mobile terminal”), not computer system 110 (i.e., “another
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`mobile terminal” in Schiffer) as required by the claims.
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`In an apparent attempt to rectify this deficiency, Dr. Menascé relies on the “access code”
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`and, specifically, the “alternate value” of the access code to demonstrate that the SIM 101 on the
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`mobile phone 100 allegedly stores information about the computer system 110. See Ex. 2, App.
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`D at 8-11; see also Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 227-228. However, this disclosure does not demonstrate that the
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`“memory” limitations are met.
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`In fact, Dr. Menascé admits that that “access code” in Schiffer, which he refers to as a
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`“security code”, “is stored on the computer 110” (i.e. the unlocked device) not on the mobile
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`terminal (i.e. the unlocking device) as required by the claims.
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`See Ex. 2, App. D at 10 (citing to Ex. 3, 4:41-52).
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`By Dr. Menascé’s own admission, Schiffer discloses a “previously stored value” in
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`memory 113 of computer system 110. This “previously stored value” in the memory of computer
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`system 110 does not meet the claim limitation of “a memory which previously stores information
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`about an another mobile terminal,” because this value would need to be stored in the memory of
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`mobile phone 100. Dr. Menascé’s opinions themselves make clear that the “security code” is
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`stored on the computer 110, but then he concludes that somehow this storing of information on
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`computer system 110 shows that “mobile phone 100 stores ‘information about’ computer system
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`110 in its memory.” See Ex. 2, App. D at 10. The fact that “security code” is stored on the
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`computer 110 has no bearing on information stored in the memory of mobile phone 100 of
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`Schiffer.
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`Dr. Menascé does not point to any disclosure in Schiffer that demonstrates by clear and
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`convincing evidence that the “security code” is “information about” the computer system 110
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`(i.e., “another mobile terminal”) that is stored on the memory of the mobile phone 100 (i.e., “a
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`mobile terminal”). Rather, Schiffer’s disclosure points to the opposite conclusion—that the
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`information stored on the mobile phone 100 that is transmitted to the computer system 110
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`comprises information about the mobile phone 100 and not the computer system 110. See Ex. 2,
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`App. D at 7-9. And Dr. Menascé has just provided conclusory opinions while pointing to data
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`stored in the memory of computer system 110 or to an access code being sent from mobile phone
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`100 that is information about the mobile phone 100 itself not about computer system 110.
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`Moreover, Dr. Menascé does not provide any separate obviousness arguments as to the
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`“memory” limitation for claim 1. See Ex. 2, App. D at 7-11. The only reference to what a
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`“POSITA would have understood” is in relation to claiming that “computer system 110” is a
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`mobile terminal—nothing related to the lack of disclosure of the memory limitation. See id. at
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`11. Nor does Dr. Menascé provide any opinions regarding whether or how a POSITA would
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`modify Schiffer to disclose the absent “memory” limitation in claim 1. See id.
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`As previously noted, Dr. Menascé does not rely on Kirkup to teach the missing
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`“memory” limitation in Schiffer for claim element 1[b]. Thus, any combination of Schiffer and
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`Kirkup fail for the same reasons as discussed for Schiffer alone. See Ex. 2, App. D at 7-11.
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`Similarly, Dr. Menascé does not provide any additional opinions as to Schiffer
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`anticipating or rendering obvious the “memory” limitation of claim element 16[b] other than
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`referring back to his opinions for claim 1. See Ex. 2, App. D at 45 (“Schiffer discloses the
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`claimed memory that stores information about the second terminal. See element [1(b)], supra.”).
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`Thus, just as Schiffer fails to teach the “memory” limitation for claim element 1[b], Dr.
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`Menascé’s sole reliance on Schiffer for element 16[b] equally fails.
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`In sum, Schiffer does not expressly or inherently disclose the “memory” limitations, and
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`Dr. Menascé does not provide any motivation to combine Schiffer with another reference in an
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`attempt to remedy this fatal deficiency.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`For at least the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be granted dismissing
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`Apple’s defenses and counterclaims of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 of Claims 7,
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`16, and 17 of the ’586 Patent.
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 17216
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`Dated: June 30, 2020
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`By:
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`/s/ Jamie B. Beaber
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`
`
`Geoff Culbertson
`Kelly Tidwell
`Patton, Tidwell & Culbertson, LLP
`2800 Texas Boulevard (75503)
`Post Office Box 5398
`Texarkana, TX 75505-5398
`Telephone: (903) 792-7080
`Facsimile: (903) 792-8233
`gpc@texarkanalaw.com
`kbt@texarkanalaw.com
`
`Jamie B. Beaber
`Alan M. Grimaldi
`Kfir B. Levy
`James A. Fussell, III
`William J. Barrow
`Baldine B. Paul
`Tiffany A. Miller
`Michael L. Lindinger
`Saqib Siddiqui
`Bryan C. Nese
`Alison T. Gelsleichter
`Clark S. Bakewell
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`1999 K Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 263-3000
`Facsimile: (202) 263-3300
`jbeaber@mayerbrown.com
`agrimaldi@mayerbrown.com
`klevy@mayerbrown.com
`jfussell@mayerbrown.com
`wbarrow@mayerbrown.com
`bpaul@mayerbrown.com
`tmiller@mayerbrown.com
`mlindinger@mayerbrown.com
`ssiddiqui@mayerbrown.com
`bnese@mayerbrown.com
`agelsleichter@mayerbrown.com
`cbakewell@mayerbrown.com
`
`Robert G. Pluta
`Amanda Streff Bonner
`Luiz Miranda
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 375 Filed 07/02/20 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 17217
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`MAYER BROWN LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60606
`(312) 782-0600
`rpluta@mayerbrown.com
`asbonner@mayerbrown.com
`lmiranda@mayerbrown.com
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`Graham (Gray) M. Buccigross
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`3000 El Camino Real, Suite 2-300
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`(650) 331-2000
`gbuccigross@mayerbrown.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff Maxell, Ltd.
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to
`electronic service are being served this 30th day of June 2020, with a copy of this document via
`electronic mail pursuant to Local Rule CV-5(d).
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`/s/ Jamie B. Beaber
`Jamie B. Beaber
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