Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 1 of 41 PageID #: 6249
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`MAXELL, LTD.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
` Civil Action No. 5:19-cv-00036-RWS
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
`
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`
`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 2 of 41 PageID #: 6250
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`THE COURT SHOULD REJECT MAXELL’S IMPROPER “PLAIN AND
`ORDINARY MEANING” INVOCATIONS AND CONSTRUE THE DISPUTED
`TERMS .............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`III. MAXELL CANNOT USE “PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING” TO AVOID
`MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CONSTRUCTIONS ........................................................... 3
`
`IV.
`
`THE ’794 PATENT ........................................................................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`“capacity detector for detecting a remaining [battery] capacity of said
`battery” (Claims 1, 9) ............................................................................................. 6
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The “capacity detector” phrase is a means-plus-function limitation. ........ 6
`
`Apple’s construction correctly applies § 112, ¶ 6. ..................................... 8
`
`V.
`
`THE ’306 PATENT ........................................................................................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`“ringing sound generator” (Claims 2, 12, 13) ........................................................ 8
`
`VI.
`
`THE ’438 PATENT ......................................................................................................... 10
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`“an input unit for receiving an input entered by a user” (Claim 1)...................... 10
`
`“means for selecting an object displayed on said display apparatus” (Claim
`3) .......................................................................................................................... 12
`
`“display apparatus” (Claim 1-7) .......................................................................... 12
`
`“adding a comment to contributed data” (Claim 2) ............................................. 14
`
`VII. THE ’991 PATENT ......................................................................................................... 15
`
`A.
`
`“communication apparatus” (Claims 1, 8) ........................................................... 15
`
`VIII. THE ’493 PATENT ......................................................................................................... 18
`
`A.
`
`“effective scanning lines … of a display screen” (Claim 1) ................................ 18
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The specification defines “effective scanning line” in the context
`of an interlaced scanning display. ............................................................ 19
`
`Maxell’s construction excludes the preferred embodiments and is
`otherwise unsupported by the specification. ............................................ 20
`
`B.
`
`The “mixing” and “culling” terms (Claims 1, 5, 10) ........................................... 22
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“Mixing”: Apple’s construction is supported by the intrinsic
`evidence. .................................................................................................. 22
`
`“Culling”: The term carries specialized meaning and requires
`construction. ............................................................................................. 23
`
`IX.
`
`THE ’498, ’317, AND ’999 (WALKING NAVIGATION) PATENTS ......................... 25
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 3 of 41 PageID #: 6251
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`
`
`A.
`
`“a device for getting location information denoting a present place of said
`portable terminal” (all independent claims of the ’498, ’317, ’999 patents) ....... 25
`
`1.
`
`Prosecution history disclaimer requires including an “infrared ray
`sensor” in the term’s construction............................................................ 26
`
`2.
`
`The specification supports Apple’s construction. .................................... 27
`
`B.
`
`“a device for retrieving a route from said present place to said destination”
`/ “a device for getting a location information another terminal … via
`connected network” / “a device for getting the location information of
`another portable terminal” (’317 Claims 10, 15, 18; ’999 Claims 1, 5, 6) .......... 29
`
`X.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 30
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 4 of 41 PageID #: 6252
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
`707 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 3, 7, 9
`
`Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
`811 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc.,
`997 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ......................................................................................... 11
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................................... 26, 27
`
`Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC,
`771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Texas Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp.,
`533 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................ 8, 12
`
`Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:13-cv-00507-KNM, 2015 WL 10741012 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2015) .............................. 11
`
`CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc.,
`No. 3:16-CV-477, 2017 WL 6549933 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017) ........................................... 10
`
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n.,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Eon-net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp.,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................ 16
`
`ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
`700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 5
`
`Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,
`107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................... 10, 11
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 5 of 41 PageID #: 6253
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Continued
`
`Page
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................... 13, 14, 16
`
`IPCom GMBH & Co. v. HTC Corp.,
`861 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................ 28
`
`Kensey Nash Corp. v. Perclose, Inc.,
`2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12754 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2001) ........................................................... 7
`
`Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,
`939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Lochner Techs., LLC v. Lenovo (United States) Inc.,
`No. 2:10-CV-430-JRG, 2015 WL 293625 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2015) ................................ 10, 11
`
`Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`814 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 13
`
`Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc.,
`156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Maxell Ltd. v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`297 F. Supp. 3d 668 (E.D. Tex. 2018) ............................................................................... passim
`
`Mettler-Toledo, Inc. v. B-Tek Scales, LLC,
`671 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................... 25, 28
`
`Mobilemedia Ideas, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`178 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D. Del. 2016) ............................................................................................ 9
`
`Noah Sys. Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................ 5, 10
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 2
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................... 27, 30
`
`Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Device Co.,
`No. 2:17-CV-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) .............................. 10
`
`Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.,
`704 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 17
`
`Personalized Media Commc’n, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 6 of 41 PageID #: 6254
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Continued
`
`Page
`
`R&J Mfg. Co. v. First Card Co., Inc.,
`No. 15-200M, 2017 WL 8234397 (D.R.I. July 18, 2017) .......................................................... 2
`
`Red Rock Analytics, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 2:17-CV-101-RWS-RSP, 2018 WL 1806859 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16 2018) .......................... 26
`
`Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. Ltd.,
`743 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 29
`
`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc.,
`769 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC,
`824 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 17
`
`Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
`593 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Semcon IP Inc. v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-00437-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108040 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2017) ..... 24
`
`St. Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, 2016 WL 6275390 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) .................................... 10
`
`TM Patents, L.P. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
`72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ........................................................................................ 29
`
`Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus.,
`199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................ 7, 22
`
`UltimatePointer, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`816 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 22
`
`Vantage Point Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:13-cv-909-JRG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16316 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015) ................. 4, 5
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 13
`
`White v. Dunbar,
`119 U.S. 47 (1886) ...................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`v
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 7 of 41 PageID #: 6255
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Continued
`
`Page
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`vi
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 8 of 41 PageID #: 6256
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`
`
`Patents-in-Suit Requiring Construction (in order presented in this brief)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 8
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,329,794 (the “’794 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 7
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,928,306 (the “’306 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 4
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,116,438 (the “’438 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 6
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,084,991 (the “’991 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 3
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,339,493 (the “’493 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 10
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,430,498 (the “’498 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 1
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,748,317 (the “’317 patent”)
`
`D.I. 1, Ex. 2
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,580,999 (the “’999 patent”)
`
`Apple’s Expert Declarations
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. A
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Daniel Menasce (“Menasce Decl.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. B
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Benjamin Bederson (“Bederson Decl.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. C
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Alan Bovik (“Bovik Decl.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. D
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Joseph Paradiso (“Paradiso Decl.”)
`
`Maxell’s Expert Declarations
`
`D.I. 136, Ex. 1
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Michael Brogioli (“Brogioli Decl.”)
`
`D.I. 136, Ex. 4
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Robert Maher (“Maher Decl.”)
`
`D.I. 136, Ex. 6
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Tim Williams (“Williams Decl.”)
`
`D.I. 136, Ex. 8
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Vijay Madisetti (“Madisetti Decl.”)
`
`D.I. 136, Ex. 11
`
`Expert Declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg (“Rosenberg Decl.”)
`
`Deposition Excerpts Cited by Apple
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. E
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Michael Brogioli (“Brogioli
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. F
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Robert Maher (“Maher Dep.
`Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. G
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Tim Williams (“Williams
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`vii
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 9 of 41 PageID #: 6257
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`Continued
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. H
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Vijay Madisetti (“Madisetti
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. I
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Craig Rosenberg (“Rosenberg
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. J
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Daniel Menasce (“Menasce
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. K
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Alan Bovik (“Bovik Dep.
`Tr.”)
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. L
`
`Excerpts of Deposition Transcript of Dr. Joseph Paradiso (“Paradiso
`Dep. Tr.”)
`
`Other Exhibits
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. M Excerpt from the file history of the ’991 Patent, Original Application
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. N
`
`Excerpt from the file history of the ’991 Patent, Amendment dated
`7/24/2018
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. O
`
`Excerpt from the file history of the ’493 Patent, Office Action dated
`3/14/2012
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. P
`
`Excerpt from the file history of the ’493 Patent, Amendment dated
`7/16/2012
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. Q
`
`IPR Case No. IPR2019-00071, Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`dated January 22, 2019
`
`Simmons Decl., Ex. R
`
`IPR Case No. IPR2019-00071, Paper 7, Institution Decision dated
`March 14, 2019
`
`
`
`
`
`viii
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 10 of 41 PageID #: 6258
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Trying to stretch its claims to cover Apple’s products, Maxell proposes constructions
`
`untethered to the intrinsic evidence on one hand, and on the other, uses “plain and ordinary
`
`meaning” to obfuscate claim scope. Maxell’s complaint that Apple is “look[ing] for ways to
`
`narrow the scope of the claims” (D.I. 136 at 1) is a rich accusation from a party that has no support
`
`for its positions. Apple merely seeks to define disputed terms as a skilled artisan would understand
`
`them in view of the intrinsic evidence, as required by the Federal Circuit. In contrast, Maxell’s
`
`positions are unsupported by evidence and contradict established claim construction precedent.
`
`First, without evidence supporting its arguments, Maxell resorts to mischaracterizing the
`
`record, often blatantly misquoting statements from Apple’s experts to argue they said the polar
`
`opposite of what they actually said. In one exemplary instance, Apple’s expert states in his
`
`declaration that a particular claim term “does not sufficiently describe a structure,” yet Maxell
`
`cites that paragraph of the declaration to argue that the expert admitted that “the term connotes
`
`sufficient structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” D.I. 136 at 3-4 (citing to Ex. A, Menasce
`
`Decl., ¶ 63); see also Appendix 1 (chart of Maxell’s misleading citations).
`
`Second, Maxell consistently misapplies the law. Ignoring established precedent governing
`
`means-plus-function limitations, Maxell relies on an argument that has been soundly rejected by
`
`the Federal Circuit—that the mere identification of possible structures capable of performing a
`
`function is sufficient to make a term structural. For other terms, Maxell asks the Court to adopt a
`
`construction broader than the PTO’s “broadest reasonable interpretation” construction, and makes
`
`up a new rule that claim constructions must use only words from the patent specification.
`
`Third, for half of the disputed claim terms, Maxell refuses even to disclose its interpretation
`
`of the claim language, instead hiding behind “plain and ordinary meaning.” For one term, Maxell
`
`refuses to disclose what it contends to be the term’s “plain meaning” even when its own expert
`
`1
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 11 of 41 PageID #: 6259
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`
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`testified that the term has a meaning in the relevant technical context different from its ordinary
`
`dictionary definition. By withholding interpretations, Maxell hopes to leave the claims vague so
`
`that their scope can be shaped to whatever suits Maxell at whatever time suits Maxell.
`
`II.
`
`THE COURT SHOULD REJECT MAXELL’S IMPROPER “PLAIN AND
`ORDINARY MEANING” INVOCATIONS AND CONSTRUE THE DISPUTED
`TERMS
`
`As part of the claim construction process, the parties must disclose their proposed
`
`construction of each claim term the parties collectively identified for claim construction. See P.R.
`
`4-2. Ignoring this requirement, Maxell has consistently refused to disclose its views as to the
`
`meaning of six disputed terms, instead asserting only that “plain and ordinary meaning” governs—
`
`without ever explaining what that “plain and ordinary meaning” is.1 If there is a “plain and
`
`ordinary meaning,” then Maxell should have no difficulty describing what it is. See, e.g., Azure
`
`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336 , 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (construing a term’s
`
`“ordinary meaning” based on its “well-established meaning in the relevant industry”) (vacated on
`
`other grounds). Simply stating a term carries its “plain and ordinary meaning,” without offering a
`
`construction, does not resolve the parties’ dispute about what that meaning is. See O2 Micro Int’l
`
`Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).2 Maxell’s refusal
`
`to disclose its interpretation of the disputed terms is improper and should not be condoned.
`
`Maxell’s repeated invocation of “plain and ordinary meaning” fails to resolve the parties’
`
`disputes over terms that have multiple meanings. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361 (“‘plain and
`
`
`
`1 These six terms are: “capacity detector for detecting a remaining capacity of said battery,”
`“ringing sound generator,” “input unit for receiving an input entered by a user,” “adding a
`comment to contributed data,” “communication apparatus,” and “culling.”
`2 See also Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1319
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“legal error” not to construe a term when parties dispute its “plain and ordinary
`meaning”); R&J Mfg. Co. v. First Card Co., Inc., No. 15-200M, 2017 WL 8234397, *7 (D.R.I.
`July 18, 2017) (“plain and ordinary meaning” construction simply “kicks the can down the road,
`creating the need for additional jury instructions to clarify”).
`
`2
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 12 of 41 PageID #: 6260
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`ordinary meaning’ … inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning”). For
`
`example, Maxell’s expert admitted that the dictionary definition of “culling,” a disputed ’493
`
`patent term, is “not applicable … to the field of endeavor that covers the type of art that [the ’493
`
`patent] is involved with”—thus confirming that the term carries specialized meaning in the
`
`relevant technical context. Ex. H (Madisetti Dep. Tr.) at 72:16-73:20. But even in light of this
`
`testimony, Maxell still refuses to disclose its interpretation of the claim term, and instead argues
`
`that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have understood the term’s meaning,
`
`whatever it may be. See D.I. 136 at 23-24. Maxell’s position is improper because the jurors—
`
`who likely will not have the technical training of a POSA—will be left to their own devices to
`
`guess what these disputed terms mean in the relevant technical context without a construction.
`
`Maxell invokes “plain and ordinary meaning” to try to treat the claims like “a nose of wax
`
`which may be turned and twisted in any direction” to suit its needs. See White v. Dunbar, 119
`
`U.S. 47, 51 (1886). The Court should reject Maxell’s improper use of “plain and ordinary
`
`meaning” and adopt Apple’s proposed constructions.
`
`III. MAXELL CANNOT USE “PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING” TO AVOID
`MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`For three claim phrases that recite purely functional language—“capacity detector,”
`
`“ringing sound generator,” and “input unit” (addressed in Sections IV.A, V.A, and VI.A)—Maxell
`
`uses “plain and ordinary meaning” to avoid construction under § 112, ¶ 6. Because each of these
`
`phrases is “simply a description of the function performed” without the recital of structure, § 112,
`
`¶ 6 governs. Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1346-49 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016); Vantage Point Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-909-JRG, 2015 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 16316, *55 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015) (construing “a snooper for snooping …” as means-
`
`plus-function because “‘snooper’ appears to be merely a noun form of the claimed ‘snooping’
`
`3
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`

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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 13 of 41 PageID #: 6261
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`
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`function”). Thus, Maxell’s invocations of “plain and ordinary meaning” are improper, and the
`
`Court should adopt Apple’s means-plus-function constructions for at least three reasons.
`
`First, Maxell has failed to rebut Apple’s evidence that these claim phrases are purely
`
`functional. To determine whether § 112, ¶ 6 applies, “[t]he standard is whether the words of the
`
`claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning
`
`as the name for structure.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2015) (emphasis added). But Maxell presents “no evidence—in the form of dictionary definitions
`
`or otherwise—that [any term] was reasonably well understood by persons of ordinary skill in the
`
`art to refer to a structure or class of structures.” Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 899
`
`F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Because none of these functional phrases is known as the name
`
`for structure within the relevant field, the Court should adopt Apple’s § 112, ¶ 6 constructions.
`
`Second, Maxell misapplies the law. That “both parties’ experts were able to identify a
`
`number of software and hardware solutions for implementing” the functions in question does not
`
`mean the claim phrases recite sufficient structure. See D.I. 136 at 5, 8, 10. The Federal Circuit
`
`has flatly rejected Maxell’s argument, explaining that “merely listing examples of possible
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`structures is insufficient to avoid invocation of § 112, ¶ 6.” Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc.,
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`769 F.3d 1094, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “Indeed, means-plus-function language that defines a
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`category in functional terms will typically cover examples of structures that fall within it.” Id.
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`The standard is not whether a POSA could surmise ways to implement a recited function, but
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`whether a term has “a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson, 792
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`F.3d at 1349-51 (rejecting argument that a POSA would know how to implement the claimed
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`function “in software or … in hardware”). Tellingly, Maxell’s reliance on the specifications’
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`disclosure of structure for the recited functions, coupled with its inability to identify any structure
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`4
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 14 of 41 PageID #: 6262
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`
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`actually recited by the claims, confirms that the claim phrases are means-plus-function.
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`Third, Maxell’s “plain and ordinary meaning” proposal for these functionally-claimed
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`limitations violates the prohibition against pure functional claiming. A claim “cannot be construed
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`so broadly to cover every conceivable way or means to perform the [recited] function.” Mas-
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`Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Noah Sys. Inc. v.
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`Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (prohibiting “pure functional claiming”). Yet,
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`this is exactly what Maxell attempts to achieve by refusing to disclose its constructions. Maxell’s
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`experts consistently testified that, without a construction, the “plain and ordinary meaning” of
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`these functionally-claimed phrases means they can encompass any and all possible structures for
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`performing the claimed functions.3 But the scope of a functionally-claimed limitation cannot be
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`“open-ended.” Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus,
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`Maxell’s constructions would expand claim scope to “in effect claim[] everything that [performs
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`the recited function] under the sun,” which would render the claims indefinite. ePlus, Inc. v.
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`Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`As in Vantage Point, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16316, at *55, these claim phrases are merely
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`functions rewritten as nouns, and the Court should adopt Apple’s § 112, ¶ 6 constructions.
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`IV.
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`THE ’794 PATENT
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`The ’794 patent discloses “methods for controlling power consumption in a battery
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`operable information processing device.” Maxell Ltd. v. Huawei Device USA Inc., 297 F. Supp.
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`
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`3 See, e.g., Ex. E (Brogioli Dep. Tr.) at 97:15-100:9, 103:9-104:10 (unable to identify any
`structure capable of detecting battery capacity that would be excluded by Maxell’s “plain and
`ordinary meaning” construction of “capacity detector …”); Ex. F (Maher Dep. Tr.) at 90:14-24
`(Maxell’s interpretation of “ringing sound generator” captures all possible structures capable of
`performing the function of generating a ringing sound); Ex. G (Williams Dep. Tr.) at 38:11-40:2;
`60:25-61:4 (the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “input unit …” encompasses any structure that
`can perform the function of receiving an input).
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`5
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 15 of 41 PageID #: 6263
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`3d 668, 736 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (citing ’794 patent). To perform these methods, the ’794 patent
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`recites using “a capacity detector capable of detecting the remaining capacity in a battery.” Id.
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`A.
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`“capacity detector for detecting a remaining [battery] capacity of said battery”
`(Claims 1, 9)
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`Maxell’s Proposal
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`Apple’s Proposal
`Function: detecting a remaining capacity of a battery
`Structure: Capacity Detector 107 (as configured in Figs. 1, 6, 10, or
`11) performing the steps shown in Fig. 4.; or equivalents thereof
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`
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`The parties dispute whether this phrase is a means-plus-function limitation (Apple’s
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`position) or can encompass any structure capable of detecting battery capacity (Maxell’s position).
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`1. The “capacity detector” phrase is a means-plus-function limitation.
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`The “capacity detector” phrase recites a function—“detecting a remaining capacity of said
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`battery.” ’794 patent at Claim 1. And the ’794 patent specification describes the “capacity
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`detector” only by its function of detecting battery capacity. Id. at 4:22-24, 4:46-52, Fig. 4.
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`“Capacity detector” is not the name of a known structure in the field of power management and
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`does not connote a definite structure to a POSA, and the phrase is simply the “detecting …
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`capacity” function rewritten as a noun. See Ex. A (Menasce Decl.) at ¶¶ 60-61. Thus, the phrase
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`should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation. See supra Section III.
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`Unable to present evidence that a POSA in the relevant field knows “capacity detector” to
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`identify structure, Maxell relies on the use of “detector” in unrelated contexts. See D.I. 136 at 3-
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`5. Maxell cites Personalized Media Commc’n, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998), to argue that “detector” denotes structure. D.I. 136 at 4.4 There, however, dictionary
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`evidence not present here confirmed that “digital detector” had an established meaning in the
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`relevant art of a television broadcasting patent. See Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 698, 704-05.
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`4 Maxell cites two other cases involving Apple, both of which merely discuss Personalized
`Media and do not address any terms relevant to this case. See D.I. 136 at 4.
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`6
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`Case 5:19-cv-00036-RWS Document 161 Filed 12/09/19 Page 16 of 41 PageID #: 6264
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`In contrast, Maxell has no evidence that “detector” has a specific meaning in the field relevant to
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`the ’794 patent—a field unrelated to that in Personalized Media.5 Moreover, even if “detector”
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`has a specific meaning (it does not), that still would not mean that “capacity detector” describes a
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`definite structure in the relevant context. See Advanced Ground Info. Sys., 830 F.3d at 1348
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`(rejecting argument that individual words of the claim phase “are terms of art in computer science”
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`because “the combination of the terms” is not the name of a structure). Personalized Media does
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`not support the proposition that any “detector” always describes a structure, regardless of the
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`context. Indeed, another court has since construed a “detector” term as means-plus-function
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`despite Personalized Media. See Kensey Nash Corp. v. Perclose, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`12754, *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2001) (“location detector” is means-plus-function because it
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`“recites no specific structure or material for performance of location detection”).
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`Maxell’s other arguments are similarly unavailing. Maxell points to Apple’s agreement to
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`the Court’s prior construction of the ’493 patent’s “image-instability detector” term as alleged
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`support that “detector” is structural. See D.I. 136 at 4. But the ’493 patent relates to the irrelevant
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`field (for this claim phrase) of image processing, not the relevant field of power management. See
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`Huawei, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 723; Trs. of Columbia Univ. in Cit