Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 1 of 92 PageID #: 18771
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TEXARKANA DIVISION
`
`Case No. 5:16-cv-00179-RWS
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`§§§§§§§§§§§
`
`MAXELL LTD.,
`
`ZTE (USA) INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF MAXELL, LTD.’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ZTE (USA), INC.’S
`RULE 50 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION FOR A
`NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE 59
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 2 of 92 PageID #: 18772
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`.”.................................................................................36
`Substantial evidence supports finding the ZMAX 2 includes
`
`2.
`
`........................................................................................40
`
`i
`
`THE COURT SHOULD DENY ZTE’S REQUEST FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
`OF LAW. ............................................................................................................................ 1
`A.
`Legal Standard ........................................................................................................ 1
`B.
`’794 Patent .............................................................................................................. 2
`1.
`The record includes substantial evidence that the ZMAX 2 includes
`a controller for controlling operation based on remaining
`capacity........................................................................................................2
`The record includes substantial evidence that the controller sends
`a power consumption reduction instruction to each function device
`in a set GA....................................................................................................5
`Sets GA and GB do not overlap. ..................................................................9
`3.
`Dr. Phinney complied with the Court’s claim construction order.............10
`4.
`’317 Patent ............................................................................................................ 11
`’493 and ’729 Patents............................................................................................ 15
`1.
`Substantial evidence supports the verdict that ZTE infringes claim
`5 of the ’493 Patent....................................................................................15
`Substantial evidence shows infringement of claim 1 of the ’729
`Patent. ........................................................................................................24
`’491 and ’695 Patents............................................................................................ 31
`1.
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that ZTE infringed
`claim 8 of the ’491 Patent..........................................................................31
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that ZTE infringed
`claim 1 of the ’491 Patent..........................................................................33
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that ZTE infringed
`the ’695 Patent...........................................................................................36
`’193 Patent ............................................................................................................ 36
`1.
`Substantial evidence supports a finding that the accused devices
`include a
`
`2.
`
`2.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`C.
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 3 of 92 PageID #: 18773
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`VI.
`
`D.
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
`MARKING IS NO BASIS TO REDUCE DAMAGES.................................................... 44
`A.
`Legal standards ..................................................................................................... 44
`B.
`The marking issue is limited to the Casio G’zOne and a subset of patents.......... 45
`C.
`ZTE failed to meet its burden of producing evidence that Casio did not
`mark the G’zOne................................................................................................... 45
`ZTE failed to meet its burden of producing evidence that the G’zOne
`practices a claim of any asserted patent................................................................ 46
`The Court should not reduce the damages award. ................................................ 47
`E.
`SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY’S WILLFULNESS VERDICT.
`........................................................................................................................................... 48
`A.
`ZTE USA knew of the asserted patents. ............................................................... 48
`1.
`Maxell presented substantial evidence that ZTE Corporation was
`aware of each asserted patent before the complaint. ................................48
`Maxell presented substantial evidence for the jury to impute ZTE
`Corporation’s knowledge of the patents to ZTE USA................................51
`ZTE USA knew or should have known its conduct risked infringement. ............ 53
`1.
`ZTE cannot defend by arguing it believed the patents were invalid..........53
`2.
`Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that ZTE knew or
`should have known of a high risk that ZTE was infringing. ......................55
`THE COURT SHOULD NOT REDUCE THE JURY’S DAMAGES AWARD AND
`REPLACE IT WITH ITS OWN DETERMINATION AS TO AN ONGOING
`ROYALTY RATE............................................................................................................ 58
`THE ’317 AND ’794 ARE VALID UNDER SECTION 101 .......................................... 61
`ZTE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL................................................................ 63
`A.
`Legal Standard ...................................................................................................... 63
`B.
`Public Events Did Not Deny ZTE A Fair Trial. ................................................... 64
`1.
`The Court properly screened for prejudice via voir dire...........................64
`2.
`ZTE has not demonstrated a presumption of prejudice.............................66
`3.
`ZTE has not demonstrated any actual prejudice. ......................................68
`The Closing Argument Does Not Warrant A New Trial. ..................................... 69
`
`C.
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`ii
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 4 of 92 PageID #: 18774
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`D.
`
`Admission Of Prior Licensing Negotiations To Establish Willfulness Does
`Not Warrant A New Trial. .................................................................................... 70
`1.
`FRE permits disclosure of prior licensing negotiations. ...........................71
`2.
`The NDA does not prohibit disclosure of prior licensing
`negotiations................................................................................................72
`ZTE invited any arguable error. ................................................................74
`3.
`A New Trial Is Not Warranted Based on ZTE’s Allegation Regarding the
`Entire Market Value Rule. .................................................................................... 74
`1.
`ZTE did not object to evidence of the total revenues of the accused
`products......................................................................................................74
`There was no error or prejudice................................................................77
`2.
`Ms. Mulhern’s Reference To The MMI Rate Does Not Warrant a New
`Trial. 78
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 80
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`VII.
`
`iii
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 5 of 92 PageID #: 18775
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
`707 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................35
`
`ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co.,
`501 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................1
`
`Am. Home Assur. Co. v. United Space All., LLC,
`378 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................................................1
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`258 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ...................................................................................57
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................1
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc.,
`876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................................44, 45, 54
`
`Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc.,
`693 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................69, 70
`
`Barry v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`230 F. Supp. 3d 630 (E.D. Tex. 2017).....................................................................................54
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`561 U.S. 593 (2010).................................................................................................................61
`
`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1274, 2016 WL 4778699 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016)..........................................48
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.,
`135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).............................................................................................................55
`
`Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
`539 U.S. 90 (2003)...................................................................................................................50
`
`Dura. Auto. Sys. Of Ind., Inc., v. CTS Corp.,
`285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................41, 42
`
`EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co.,
`731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................................1
`
`iv
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`

`

`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 6 of 92 PageID #: 18776
`
`Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`2017 WL 3034655 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2017) ...................................................................58, 59
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................1, 21
`
`Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd.,
`No. 2:15-CV-00011-RSP, 2018 WL 2149736 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018) ..................54, 58, 60
`
`France Telecom S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor Inc.,
`82 F. Supp. 3d 987 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .......................................................................................71
`
`Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
`563 U.S. 754 (2011).................................................................................................................51
`
`Hall v. Freese,
`735 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1984) ...................................................................................................69
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).......................................................................................................54, 56
`
`Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys.,
`340 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..............................................................................................2, 6
`
`IBM v. Groupon, Inc.,
`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100333 (D. Del. June 15, 2018).........................................................73
`
`InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co.,
`CV15-3011 PSG (MRWx), 2016 WL 4942032 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016)...............................53
`
`Ironworks Patents, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`Civ. No. 10-258-SLR, D.I. 748 (D. Del. Jun. 12, 2017)..........................................................79
`
`In re Isbell Records, Inc.,
`774 F.3d 859 (5th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................70
`
`James Corp. of Opelousas v. Tangie Const. Co.,
`7 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1993) .......................................................................................................76
`
`Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc.,
`628 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................23
`
`LinkCo, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd.,
`232 F. Supp. 2d 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)......................................................................................58
`
`Mayola v. Alabama,
`623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1980) .............................................................................................66, 67
`
`v
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`

`

`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 7 of 92 PageID #: 18777
`
`Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-on Inc.,
`288 F. Supp. 3d 872 (E.D. Wis. 2017).....................................................................................78
`
`MobileMedia Ideas, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`209 F. Supp. 3d 756 (D. Del. 2016).........................................................................................79
`
`Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011)...........................77
`
`Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Silergy Corp.,
`127 F.Supp.3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ...............................................................................50, 51
`
`In re MSTG, Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................78
`
`Narcisse v. Ill. C. G. R.R. Co.,
`620 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1980) ...................................................................................................63
`
`Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
`2:17-cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 3375192 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2018)...............................55
`
`Princeton Dig. Image Corp. v. Harmonix, Music Sys.,
`No. 12-1461-LPS-CJB, 2018 WL 1890200 (D. Del. Apr. 16, 2018) ......................................52
`
`ReefEdge Networks, LLC v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`29 F. Supp. 3d 455 (D. Del. 2014)...........................................................................................53
`
`Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp.,
`800 F.2d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1986)................................................................................................52
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`890 F.3d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................62
`
`Sentius Int’l v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2015 WL 451950 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015)...................................78
`
`Sheppard v. Maxwell,
`384 U.S. 333 (1966)...........................................................................................................67, 68
`
`Skilling v. U.S.,
`561 U.S. 358 (2010)......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co.,
`773 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................63
`
`Software Research, Inc. v. Dynatrace LLC,
`No. 18-cv-00232-EMC, 2018 WL 3241043 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2018) ....................................53
`
`vi
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 8 of 92 PageID #: 18778
`
`Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns LLC,
`225 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D. Kan. 2016)......................................................................................78
`
`SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys.,
`940 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 769 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................64, 75
`
`Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`802 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................58
`
`Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc.,
`211 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2000) .....................................................................................................1
`
`Thurmond v. Compaq Comput. Corp.,
`No. 1:99-CV-0711(TH), 2000 WL 33795090 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2000) ................................64
`
`U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`761 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................63, 78
`
`U.S. v. Chagra,
`669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................68
`
`U.S. v. Valas,
`822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................78
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)......................................................................................2, 75, 77
`
`United States v. Pratt,
`728 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................68
`
`Wallner v. Ziegler,
`470 F. App’x 230 (5th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................69
`
`Waterman v. McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
`No. 15-40458, 2016 WL 1127429 (5th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................80
`
`Welch v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-CV-271-TSL-JCG, 2015 WL 4066495 (S.D. Miss. July 2, 2015)...........................69
`
`WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
`837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................56
`
`ZiiLabs Inc., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`2015 WL 8293585 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2015)...............................................................71, 72, 73
`
`ZitoVault, LLC v. IBM Corp.,
`No. 3:16-CV-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971131 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018).............................53, 57
`
`vii
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 9 of 92 PageID #: 18779
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282..............................................................................................................................54
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5122 ...................................................................................................47
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 61...............................................................................................................63, 70, 80
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).................................................................................................................63, 75
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 408 ...........................................................................................................................71
`
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 10 of 92 PageID #: 18780
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`I.
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`The Court Should Deny ZTE’s Request for Judgment As A Matter Of Law.
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`In addressing a Rule 50(B) motion, the Court determines whether “the state of proof is
`
`such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its
`
`verdict.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. United Space All., LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004). “A
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`jury verdict must stand unless there is a lack of substantial evidence, in the light most favorable
`
`to the successful party, to support the verdict.” Id.
`
`Substantial evidence is that which would cause reasonable jurors “in the exercise of
`
`impartial judgment [to] reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d
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`887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A court should “draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
`
`favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that we might regard as more
`
`reasonable.” EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth
`
`Circuit is “especially deferential” to jury verdicts, and it does not “tamper lightly with … a
`
`judgment that is representative of the good common sense of the American people.” Id. at 451-
`
`52.
`
`“A determination of infringement is a question of fact that is reviewed for substantial
`
`evidence when tried to a jury.” ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1311
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding” of infringement can be
`
`found from the testimony of expert witnesses, even if contested. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung
`
`Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 2016); EEOC, 731 F.3d at 452 (“it is the function
`
`of the jury… [to] determine the credibility of witnesses”). The “jury verdict should be upheld if
`
`there is sufficient evidence to support any of the plaintiff's alternative factual theories.” Ericsson,
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`Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 11 of 92 PageID #: 18781
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`“When issues of claim construction have not been properly raised in connection with the
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`jury instructions, it is improper for the district court to adopt a new or more detailed claim
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`construction in connection with the JMOL motion.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., 340
`
`F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Disputes about the meaning of claim language are reviewed
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`only for a lack of substantial evidence under the “traditional rule for review of jury verdicts of
`
`factual issues.” Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`B.
`
`’794 Patent
`
`1.
`
`The record includes substantial evidence that the ZMAX 2 includes a
`controller for controlling operation based on remaining capacity.
`
`ZTE does not dispute that the ZMAX 2 includes a controller that controls operation of the
`
`phone’s functional devices. See Dkt. 257 at 32:7-33:14, 33:15-25 (
`
`). Instead, it argues there was no evidence that this
`
`controller performs “based on … remaining [battery] capacity.” Mot. 3-5. But Maxell offered
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`evidence supporting three independent grounds for the jury to find this limitation satisfied. While
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`any one ground is sufficient, the Court should reject ZTE’s motion on all three.
`
`First, the ZMAX 2 infringes by controlling several function devices in “power saver
`
`mode.” Dr. Phinney testified that, while in that mode, the ZMAX 2 “control[s] operation of the
`
`function devices based on the remaining capacity
`
`. He stated that when the phone entered “power saver” mode,
`
`“the WiFi dropped” and Bluetooth was disabled. Dkt. 239 at 60:25-61:16. Dr. Phinney also
`
`testified that
`
`.” Dkt. 257 at 37:9-10.
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`Dr. Phinney’s testimony shows that, when in “power saver mode,” the ZMAX 2 (not the
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 12 of 92 PageID #: 18782
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`user) sends power consumption reduction instructions to control these function devices:
`
`Q. So in [Power Saver mode], is the user issuing the power consumption
`reduction instruction?
`A. No.
`Q. Who’s issuing it?
`A. The controller issues it. It’s like a thing that occurs within the guts of the phone
`to actually make function devices reduce power consumption.
`
`Dkt. 258 at 62:13-19.
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`Also, when the ZMAX 2 reaches critically low capacity, it initiates a “controlled”
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`shutdown.
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`ZTE argues that ZMAX 2’s power reduction actions do not infringe because it “does not
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`enter power saver mode unless a user authorizes it to do so” when prompted. Mot. 3. But that is
`
`irrelevant. Claim 1 does not require that the controller control operation of the function device
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`“based only on” the remaining capacity or “on nothing but” the remaining capacity. The claim
`
`does not preclude a user from authorizing the mode. User authorization is immaterial to whether
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`the actions the phone takes in “power saver mode” are “based on … remaining capacity.”
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`Thus, the jury had substantial evidence to conclude that, when in the “power saving
`
`mode,” the ZMAX 2 controls several function devices based on “remaining [battery] capacity,”
`
`namely, the WiFi, Bluetooth, and cellular modems, and the display.
`
`Second, the accused product infringes this limitation when in “battery saver mode.” The
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`ZMAX 2 enters “battery saver mode” only when the battery capacity depletes to a pre-set
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 13 of 92 PageID #: 18783
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`threshold (e.g., 15%). See Dkt. 257 at 32:21-23 (“when the battery is depleted to some level, NA,
`
`this is the 15 percent, the user is prompted to authorize the entry into power save mode.”). Dr.
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`Phinney testified that, when the phone enters the “battery saver mode,” “the controller …
`
`restrict[s] the background data so that your phone is able to put the … WiFi modem … to sleep
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`where there’s no user interaction.” Id. at 33:7-14. ZTE’s expert agreed that, in “battery saver
`
`mode,” the ZMAX 2 reduces the WiFi modem’s power consumption by restricting background
`
`data. See Dkt. 244 at 26:21-27:3 (“… because it’s doing less work it’s probably consuming less
`
`power.”). Thus, in the “battery saver mode,” the WiFi modem usage is reduced;
`
`Dkt. 257 at 40:17-21.
`
`Dr. Phinney further testified that, in “battery saver mode,” the phone controls the display
`
`by dimming it. See Dkt. 239 at 57:23-58:7. And similar to “power saver mode,” he testified that,
`
`when the ZMAX 2 reaches a critically low capacity, it initiates a “controlled” shutdown process,
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`whereby the controller sends “an instruction to stop the cellular modem.” Dkt. 257 at 44:10-14,
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`45:14-19. See also Dkt. 244 at 28:3-9 (Dr. Wolfe corroborating Dr. Phinney’s testimony).
`
`ZTE ignores the control of the display and the cellular modem altogether. Instead, ZTE
`
`argues that the controller purportedly “does not control operation of the WiFi modem based on
`
`remaining capacity” because Dr. Wolfe purportedly observed the WiFi modem “operat[ing]
`
`normally while the ZMAX 2 was in battery saver mode.” Mot. 4. But that disregards the fact
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`4
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 14 of 92 PageID #: 18784
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`that, during “battery saver mode,” the ZMAX 2 restricts usage of the WiFi, causing
`
`Further, ZTE is wrong that “Dr. Phinney did not provide any evidence to show that the
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`WiFi modem works in a low power way in battery saver mode.” Mot. 4.
`
`Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the ZMAX 2 infringes
`
`through its “battery saver mode,” wherein it controls the WiFi modem, display, and cellular
`
`modem’s operation based on remaining capacity.
`
`Third, the ZMAX 2 includes a controller that supplies or removes power from individual
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`function devices—another form of “control.” Dr. Phinney testified that,
`
`2.
`
`The record includes substantial evidence that the controller sends a power
`consumption reduction instruction to each function device in a set GA.
`
`ZTE is wrong to argue there is no evidence the ZMAX 2 sends a power consumption
`
`reduction instruction to any of the devices. Mot. 5-9. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s
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`5
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`Case 5:16-cv-00179-RWS Document 292 Filed 08/28/18 Page 15 of 92 PageID #: 18785
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`verdict that at least one device in GA (i.e., the WiFi modem, Bluetooth modem, or display) and
`
`one device in GB (i.e., the cellular modem) receives a power consumption reduction instruction.
`
`ZTE begins by obfuscating the claim requirement. ZTE asserts that, for “battery saver
`
`mode,” the “function devices in set GA” are the WiFi modem and display. Mot. 5. And, for
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`“power saver mode,” the WiFi modem, Bluetooth modem, and the display. Id. ZTE then asserts
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`that Maxell had “to show evidence of a power consumption reduction instruction to each of
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`these function devices.” Id. (emphasis added). This fails for two separate reasons.
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`First, ZTE cannot rest on this supposed limitation in Claim 1 because it never before
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`argued it. ZTE cannot narrow the claim language through post-trial briefing. See Hewlett-
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`Packard, 340 F.3d at 1320. ZTE misunderstands the claim. Claim 1 requires one or more
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`“function device” as part of “the set GA” and one or more “function device” of “a set GB.” See
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`’794 Patent at 8:39-46. Thus the claims no doubt require at least two devices that receive a power
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`reduction instruction at different times; at least one device must be in each of set GA and GB.
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`For set GA, Dr. Phinney identified three potential components that qualify: the WiFi modem,
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`Bluetooth modem, and display. Dkt. 257 20:24-21:22; Ex. 4, PDX-029 at 50. So long as one of
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`those components receives the relevant power shutdown instruction, there is a “function device”
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`and the claim is infringed. Put differently, whether a component receives a relevant instruction
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`defines whether a component qualifies as a “function device.” ZTE’s assertion (Mot. 5) that
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`Maxell had to prove each of the WiFi modem, the Bluetooth modem, and the display received
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`such an instruction is flatly wrong. See also Dkt. 240 at 29:21-25 and Dkt. 258 at 65:21-66:10.
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`Second, the jury had sufficient evidence to find that all three devices receive power
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`consumption reduction instructions. But Maxell only had to offer proof of one.
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`For example, Dr. Phinney testified that the operation of the device confirms that
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`instructions were sent to the “function devices.” That is, the results of the power saver and
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`battery saver modes—i.e., reduced power consumption in various components—indicate that the
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`controller issues consumption reduction instructions. When the phone enters the “power saver
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`mode,” for example, it dims the display and turns off or disables certain modems. See, e.g., Dkt.
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`257 at 33:1-6. Dr. Phinney explained that when the phone enters these modes it “need[s] to
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`actually send instructions to things to tell them to reduce their power consumption.” Dkt. 257 at
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`39:8-10; see also id. at 39:21-40:1; Dkt. 258 at 31:19-23.
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`With respect to the display function, Dr. Phinney walked through a video of the phone’s
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`entry into “battery saver mode,” at which point the display dims. Dkt. 239 at 56:5-59:7.
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`As Dr. Phinney explained, the accused device necessarily issues a power consumption
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`reduction instruction to direct the function device what to do (e.g., power down):
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`[T]here’s something in the phone that makes the determination it’s time to enter
`one of these power saving modes. So if you think about that determination in
`software, it’s now sort of telling other software components, you know okay,
`we’re entering this mode. And you see that instruction … having different forms
`but ultimately having the same effect at the end on hardware. So it’s possible to
`identify different forms of the instruction, but they all really have the same effect.
`They’re bearing the same information about what is to be done by the fact the
`phone has entered a power saving mode.
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`Id. at 48:15-49:1. This was evidence enough to support the verdict: Maxell need not provide the
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`precise label of the signal; it merely had to provide evidence to allow a reasonable jury to make
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`the inference that the device sends a signal of the sort claimed. Dr. Phinney did precisely that.
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`Dr. Phinney, however, went further and showed particular signals that a reasonable jury
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`could find were the claimed instruction. For the display,
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`. But the ultimate point remains: Dr. Phinney testified that a claimed
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`signal must be sent, and the jury was reasonable to agree.
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`The jury also could have found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Court
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`instructed that ZTE infringes if the differences between an element of the accused product and of
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`the claim are “insubstantial.” See Dkt. 223 at Section 5.3. The jury could have concluded the
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`difference—that the PWM is not the claimed instruction but is caused by it—was insubstantial
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`and ZTE infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. See Dkt. 257 at 47:23-49:10.
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`Dr. Phinney also provided sufficient evidence to show that the WiFi and Bluetooth
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`modems receive the claimed consumption reduction instruction. This is yet another basis on
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`which the jury’s verdict is supported. He testified that the ZMAX 2’s WiFi and Bluetooth
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`modem is disabled when the phone enters “power saver mode.” Dkt. 239 at 60:6-61:16. This
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`implies that the modem receives a consumption reduction instruction (either literally or under the
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`doctrine of equivalents) when it enters “power saver mode.” ZTE does n