`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`R2 SOLUTIONS LLC,
` Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`DATABRICKS, INC.,
` Defendant
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
` CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-1147
` (Judge Mazzant)
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court is Plaintiff R2 Solutions LLC’s (“Plaintiff’s” or “R2’s”) Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief (Dkt. #53). Also before the Court is the Responsive Claim Construction Brief
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`(Dkt. #62) filed by Defendant (“Defendant” or “Databricks”), as well as Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt.
`
`#66). Further before the Court are the parties’ September 13, 2024 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim
`
`Construction Statement (Dkt. #51) and the parties’ November 22, 2024 P.R. 4-5(d) Joint Claim
`
`Construction Chart (Dkt. #69, Ex. A).
`
`The Court held a claim construction hearing on December 2, 2024, to determine the proper
`
`construction of the disputed claim terms in United States Patent No. 8,190,610.
`
`The Court issues this Claim Construction Memorandum Opinion and Order and hereby
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`incorporates-by-reference the claim construction hearing transcript.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff alleges infringement of United States Patent No. 8,190,610 (“the ’610 Patent” or
`
`“the patent-in-suit”). The ’610 Patent relates to computer data processing. The Abstract of the
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`’610 Patent states:
`
`An input data set is treated as a plurality of grouped sets of key/value pairs, which
`enhances the utility of the MapReduce programming methodology. By utilizing
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`Page 1 of 35
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`such a grouping, map processing can be carried out independently on two or more
`related but possibly heterogeneous datasets (e.g., related by being characterized by
`a common primary key). The intermediate results of the map processing (key/value
`pairs) for a particular key can be processed together in a single reduce function by
`applying a different iterator to intermediate values for each group. Different
`iterators can be arranged inside reduce functions in ways however desired.
`
`The Court previously construed disputed terms in the ’610 Patent in:
`
`R2 Solutions LLC v. Deezer, S.A., et al., Nos. 4:21-CV-90, 4:21-CV-91, 4:21-CV-
`122, 4:21-CV-174, Dkt. #54 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022) (referred to as “Deezer” or as
`“Walmart”); and
`
`R2 Solutions LLC v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4:22-CV-353-ALM, Dkt. #58
`(E.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2023) (referred to as “American Airlines”).
`
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
`
`967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The purpose of claim construction is to resolve the meanings and
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`technical scope of claim terms. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1997). When the parties dispute the scope of a claim term, “it is the court’s duty to resolve
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`it.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
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`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
`
`1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define the
`
`patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313–14; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
`
`Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the claims, the rest
`
`of the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Bell Atl. Network
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`Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as
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`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
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`“[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other
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`claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally
`
`used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as additional
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`limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.
`
`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. at 1315
`
`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim
`
`construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
`
`disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1996)); Teleflex. Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the
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`specification, a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than it
`
`would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
`
`Although the Court generally presumes terms possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption
`
`can be overcome by statements of clear disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
`
`Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This presumption does not
`
`arise when the patentee acts as his own lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite
`
`Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
`
`accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
`
`the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. For example, “[a]
`
`claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is rarely,
`
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`if ever, correct.’” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1381
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough the specification may aid
`
`the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments
`
`and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims.” Constant
`
`v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988); accord Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1323.
`
`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim construction
`
`because a patentee may define a term during prosecution of the patent. Home Diagnostics Inc. v.
`
`LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of the specification, a patent
`
`applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”). The well-established doctrine of
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`prosecution disclaimer “preclud[es] patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation
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`specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
`
`1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “Indeed, by distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art,
`
`an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.” Spectrum Int’l v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d
`
`1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). “As a basic principle of claim interpretation,
`
`prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects
`
`the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d
`
`at 1324. However, the prosecution history must show that the patentee clearly and unambiguously
`
`disclaimed or disavowed the proposed interpretation during prosecution to obtain claim allowance.
`
`Middleton Inc. v. 3M Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Statements will constitute
`
`disclaimer of scope only if they are “clear and unmistakable statements of disavowal.” See Cordis
`
`Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003). An “ambiguous disavowal”
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`
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`will not suffice. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 593 F.3d 1275, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
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`2010) (citation omitted).
`
`
`
`Although “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
`
`meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on the
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`relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and treatises
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`may help the Court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in
`
`the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also provide overly broad definitions or may
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`not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may
`
`aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but “conclusory,
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`unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful.” Id.
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`Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in
`
`determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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`
`
`The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
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`patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
`
`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`
`Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim indefiniteness is a
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`legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent
`
`claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Nautilus, 134
`
`S. Ct. 2120. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Sonix Tech. Co.
`
`v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`ANALYSIS
`
`Agreed Claim Terms
`
`
`
`In their September 13, 2024 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Pre-Hearing Statement
`
`(Dkt. #51, at 1–2) and in their November 22, 2024 P.R. 4-5(d) Joint Claim Construction Chart
`
`(Dkt. #69, Ex. A, at pp. 9–11), the parties submitted the following agreed-upon constructions,
`
`which the Court hereby adopts as agreed-upon:
`
`Term
`
`“A method of processing data of a data set over a
`distributed system, wherein the data set comprises
`a plurality of data groups,
`the method
`comprising:”
`(Claim 1)
`
`“A computer system including a plurality of
`computing devices,
`the
`computer
`system
`configured to process data of a data set, wherein
`the data set comprises a plurality of data groups,
`the computer system comprises at least one
`processor and memory that are operable to
`perform the following operations:”
`(Claim 17)
`
`“data group”
`(Claims 1–5, 17–21)
`
`“plurality of mapping functions that are each user-
`configurable”
`(Claims 1, 17)
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`Limiting preamble in Claim 1.
`
`Limiting preamble in Claim 17.
`
`“a group of data and a mechanism for
`identifying data from that group”
`
`“two or more mapping functions that are
`each configurable by a user”
`
`
`
`
`
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`Page 6 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 7 of 35 PageID #: 4933
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`Disputed Claim Terms
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`1. “processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
`. . . based on the key in common”
`
`
`
`“processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
`. . . based on the key in common”
`(Claim 17)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning. Not subject to
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and not indefinite.
`See also the proposed constructions for “data
`group” and “a plurality of mapping functions
`that are each user-configurable.”
`
`Governed by pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`Function:
`“partitioning the data of each one of the data
`groups into a plurality of data partitions that
`each have a plurality of key-value pairs and
`providing each data partition to a selected one
`of a plurality of mapping functions that are
`each user-configurable
`to
`independently
`output a plurality of lists of values for each of
`a set of keys found in such map function’s
`corresponding
`data
`partition
`to
`form
`corresponding intermediate data for that data
`group and identifiable to that data group,
`wherein the data of a first data group has a
`different schema than the data of a second data
`group and the data of the first data group is
`mapped differently than the data of the second
`data group so that different lists of values are
`output
`for
`the corresponding different
`intermediate data, wherein
`the different
`schema
`and
`corresponding
`different
`intermediate data have a key in common; and
`reduce the intermediate data for the data
`groups to at least one output data group,
`including processing the intermediate data for
`each data group in a manner that is defined to
`correspond to that data group so as to result in
`a merging of the corresponding different
`intermediate data based on
`the key
`in
`common.”
`Structure: Indefinite.
`
`
`
`
`
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`Page 7 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 8 of 35 PageID #: 4934
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`(Dkt. #51, Ex. A, at p. 1; id., Ex. B, at pp. 1–3; Dkt. #53, at p. 5; Dkt. #62, at pp. 3–4; Dkt. #69,
`
`Ex. A, at pp. 1–2).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`a. The Parties’ Positions
`
`Plaintiff argues that “Databricks fails to overcome the presumption that the phrase is not []
`
`governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and further fails to establish indefiniteness.” (Dkt. #53, at p. 5).
`
`Plaintiff argues that the claim itself outlines objectives and operations, and that the specification,
`
`as well as the prosecution history, demonstrate that processors and memory were well-known.
`
`(Id., at pp. 6–10). Alternatively, Plaintiff submits that, if the Court finds that § 112, ¶ 6 applies,
`
`then “the Court should find the phrase not indefinite because structure is found in at least Figures 4
`
`and 5 and the accompanying discussion.” (Id., at p. 10).
`
`
`
`Defendant responds that “‘processor and memory that are operable to perform the
`
`following operations’ fails to connote sufficient structure for performing the claimed function,”
`
`and “[t]he term is indefinite because the patent discloses no steps or algorithm clearly linked to the
`
`term.” (Dkt. #62, at p. 4; see id., at pp. 13–17). Defendant urges that “the claim is purely functional
`
`and recites the results of ‘partitioning,’ ‘mapping,’ and ‘reducing’ without identifying sufficient
`
`structure for the entirety of the claimed function.” (Id., at p. 9). Defendant also argues that
`
`“[b]ecause a generic processor and memory can only provide structure for their generic functions
`
`like accessing, storing, and retrieving data, they cannot provide structure for the specialized
`
`function here.” (Id., at p. 11) (citation omitted).
`
`
`
`Plaintiff replies that “Claim 17 recites the algorithm performed by the ‘processor and
`
`memory,’” and “a POSA does not need the patent to explain how processors and memory work
`
`and communicate.” (Dkt. #66, at p. 1 & 3).
`
`
`
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`Page 8 of 35
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`b. Analysis
`
`Title 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (formerly § 112, ¶ 6) provides: “An element in a claim for a
`
`combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the
`
`recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
`
`the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
`
`thereof.” “In exchange for using this form of claiming, the patent specification must disclose with
`
`sufficient particularity the corresponding structure for performing the claimed function and clearly
`
`link that structure to the function.” Triton Tech of Tex., LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d
`
`1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`
`
`“[T]he failure to use the word ‘means’ . . . creates a rebuttable presumption . . . that § 112,
`
`para. 6 does not apply.” Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`
`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the
`
`presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the
`
`claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting
`
`sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1349 (citations and internal quotation
`
`marks omitted).
`
`
`
`Williamson, in an en banc portion of the decision, abrogated prior statements that the
`
`absence of the word “means” gives rise to a “strong” presumption against means-plus-function
`
`treatment. Id. (citation omitted). Williamson also abrogated prior statements that this presumption
`
`“is not readily overcome” and that this presumption cannot be overcome “without a showing that
`
`the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.” Id. (citations
`
`omitted). Instead, Williamson found, “[h]enceforth, we will apply the presumption as we have
`
`done prior to Lighting World . . . .” Id. (citing Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
`
`
`
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`Page 9 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 10 of 35 PageID #:
`4936
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`382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In a subsequent part of the decision not considered en banc,
`
`Williamson affirmed the district court’s finding that the term “distributed learning control module”
`
`was a means-plus-function term that was indefinite because of lack of corresponding structure,
`
`and in doing so Williamson stated that “‘module’ is a well-known nonce word.” 792 F.3d at 1350.
`
`
`
`Here, Claim 17 of the ’610 Patent recites (emphasis added):
`
`17. A computer system including a plurality of computing devices, the computer
`system configured to process data of a data set, wherein the data set comprises a
`plurality of data groups, the computer system comprises at least one processor and
`memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
`
`partitioning the data of each one of the data groups into a plurality of data
`partitions that each have a plurality of key-value pairs and providing each data
`partition to a selected one of a plurality of mapping functions that are each user-
`configurable to independently output a plurality of lists of values for each of a set
`of keys found in such map function’s corresponding data partition to form
`corresponding intermediate data for that data group and identifiable to that data
`group, wherein the data of a first data group has a different schema than the data of
`a second data group and the data of the first data group is mapped differently than
`the data of the second data group so that different lists of values are output for the
`corresponding different intermediate data, wherein the different schema and
`corresponding different intermediate data have a key in common; and
`
`reduce the intermediate data for the data groups to at least one output data
`group, including processing the intermediate data for each data group in a manner
`that is defined to correspond to that data group so as to result in a merging of the
`corresponding different intermediate data based on the key in common.
`
`This “processor and memory” term does not use any of the words identified by Williamson
`
`
`
`as a “nonce” word lacking structure. See id. Although “processor” and “memory” may refer to
`
`broad classes of structures, this breadth does not necessarily render the term non-structural. See
`
`Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l., 859 F.3d 1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding “wireless device
`
`means” not a means-plus-function term, noting that “it is sufficient if the claim term is used in
`
`common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, even if the term
`
`covers a broad class of structures and even if the term identifies the structures by their function”)
`
`(quoting TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 731 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
`
`
`
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`Page 10 of 35
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`4937
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`
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`Moreover, the entire body of the claim sets forth the objectives and operations of the
`
`processor. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1319–21 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004). Thus, the claim language itself provides sufficiently definite structure to one of skill in the
`
`art. See id. Defendant argues that Linear Tech is inapplicable because, in Defendant’s view,
`
`Plaintiff does not submit sufficient expert opinion. (Dkt. #63, at p. 10). Defendant’s argument is
`
`unpersuasive because the objectives and operations of the processor are recited in detail in the
`
`claim itself, as reproduced above.
`
`
`
`Also, as Plaintiff submits, prior art cited during prosecution includes discussion of
`
`processors and memory as being structural. (See Dkt. #53, Ex. 2, Ex. G, U.S. Patent No. 6,341,289
`
`at 6:43–51) (p. 582 of 611 of Ex. 2) (“Processor 10 may comprise a single integrated circuit, such
`
`as a microprocessor, or may comprise any suitable number of integrated circuit devices and/or
`
`circuit boards working in cooperation to accomplish the functions of a processor.”); see also id. at
`
`7:26–41 (“[M]emory 120 is used in its broadest sense, and can include Dynamic Random Access
`
`Memory (DRAM), Static RAM (SRAM), flash memory, cache memory, etc.”; “memory 120 may
`
`be a single type of memory component or may be composed of many different types of memory
`
`components”; “memory 120 and CPU 110 may be distributed across several different computers
`
`that collectively comprise system 100”).
`
`
`
`Defendant cites the Court’s decision in St. Isidore, which found that the presumption
`
`against means-plus-function treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 had been rebutted because “[i]n
`
`the context of the ‘processor configured to . . .’ terms, . . . each processor is defined only by the
`
`function that it performs.” St. Isidore Research, LLC v. Comerica Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1390-JRG-
`
`RSP, 2016 WL 4988246, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2016) (Payne, J.). St. Isidore itself noted that
`
`“[t]he Court has typically found ‘processor’ to connote sufficient structure to avoid the application
`
`
`
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`Page 11 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 12 of 35 PageID #:
`4938
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`of § 112, ¶ 6 in different circumstances.” Id., at *15. The Court’s analysis in SyncPoint is
`
`applicable. See SyncPoint Imaging, LLC v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., No. 2:15-CV-247, 2016 WL
`
`55118, at *20 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) (Payne, J.) (“‘processor’ connotes structure”); see also id.,
`
`at *18–*21. Also, the Federal Circuit has reinforced this analysis, finding that a “processing” term
`
`connoted structure:
`
`As used in the claims of the ’591 patent, the term “digital processing unit” clearly
`serves as a stand-in for a “general purpose computer” or a “central processing unit,”
`each of which would be understood as a reference to structure in this case, not
`simply any device that can perform a particular function.
`
`Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The
`
`opinions of Defendant’s expert to the contrary are unpersuasive. (See Dkt. #62, Ex. 1, Sept. 13,
`
`2024 Weissman Decl. ¶¶ 56–61).
`
`
`
`Defendant’s reliance on Advanced Ground Information Systems is similarly unpersuasive.
`
`See Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`
`(“The term ‘symbol generator’ invokes the application of § 112, ¶ 6 because it fails to describe a
`
`sufficient structure and otherwise recites abstract elements ‘for’ causing actions . . . or elements
`
`‘that can’ perform functions.”). As discussed above, “processor” and “memory” connote structure
`
`in the present case.
`
`
`
`Defendant also cites the Federal Circuit’s non-precedential opinion in WSOU Investments
`
`LLC v. Google LLC, Nos. 2022-1063, 2022-1065, 2023 WL 6889033, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19,
`
`2023). As to the term there at issue—“said processor configured to provide a pre-emptive user
`
`output when the sub-set of pixels approaches an edge of the set of available pixels”—the Federal
`
`Circuit applied § 112, ¶ 6, noting that “[i]n this case, as the district court correctly noted, the
`
`specification treats the word ‘processor’ so broadly as to generically be any structure that
`
`manipulates data.” Id., at *4. No such showing has been made in the present case. On the contrary,
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`Page 12 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 13 of 35 PageID #:
`4939
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`the specification uses the terms “processor” and “memory” to refer to classes of structures. The
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`non-precedential VDPP case cited in Plaintiff’s reply brief, as well as the precedential Dyfan
`
`decision discussed in VDPP, are of further persuasive value in this regard. VDPP, LLC v. Vizio,
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`Inc., No. 2021-2040, 2022 WL 885771, at *3–*4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2022) (reversing means-plus-
`
`function treatment of “a processor adapted to”) (discussing Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th
`
`1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding that “code” and “application” limitations were not means-plus-
`
`function)).
`
`
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`Because “processor” and “memory” connote structure, Defendant’s reliance on authorities
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`regarding functional configuration are inapplicable. See MTD Prods. Inc. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336,
`
`1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he claim language reciting what the mechanical control assembly is
`
`‘configured to’ do is functional.”); see also Rain Computing, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989
`
`F.3d 1002, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[T]he purely functional claim language reciting what the ‘user
`
`identification module’ is configured to do provides no structure.”). Also, because § 112, ¶ 6 does
`
`not apply, Defendant’s cited authority regarding general-purpose processors as corresponding
`
`structure (and the algorithm requirement associated therewith) is inapplicable. See In re Katz
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`Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`
`
`At the December 2, 2024 hearing, Defendant urged that the claim language merely recites
`
`results, analogizing to Sidney Harris’s cartoon depicting a mathematical proof that includes
`
`“Then a Miracle Occurs . . .,” but while Defendant’s argument perhaps might pertain to a challenge
`
`regarding enablement or written description, Defendant’s argument does not compel any finding
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`of means-plus-function or indefiniteness because, as discussed above, “processor and memory”
`
`connote structure.
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`Page 13 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 14 of 35 PageID #:
`4940
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`
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`The Court therefore hereby expressly rejects Defendant’s argument that this is a means-
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`plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Defendant presents no alternative proposed
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`construction, and no further construction is necessary.
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`
`
`
`
`The Court accordingly hereby construes this term to have its plain meaning.
`
`2. “mapping” / “map” / “mapped”
`
`“mapping”
`“map”
`“mapped”
`(Claims 1, 17)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendant’s Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`“[processing] / [process] / [processed] key /
`value pairs to generate intermediate key / value
`pairs”
`
`
`(Dkt. #51, Ex. A, at p. 2; id., Ex. B, at p. 3; Dkt. #53, at p. 10; Dkt. #62, at p. 17; Dkt. #69, Ex. A,
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`at p. 3).
`
`
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`
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`
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`a. The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiff argues that “the claims explain what the mapping functions do and the mapping
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`that they perform,” and “[t]he claims are also consistent with the specification, which is replete
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`with examples demonstrating what mapping functions are and what they do.” (Dkt. #53, at p. 10)
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`(citations omitted). Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s proposed constructions would render
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`other claim language superfluous. (Id., at p. 11).
`
`
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`Defendant responds that “the applicants acted as their own lexicographer,” and “the claims
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`and specification confirm that special meaning.” (Dkt. #62, at p. 18). Defendant also argues that
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`“R2’s attempt to redefine map under the guise of plain meaning is not only inconsistent with the
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`Page 14 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 15 of 35 PageID #:
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`claims and specification, but it will create jury confusion about the meaning of this technical term.”
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`(Id., at p. 20) (citation omitted).
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`
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`Plaintiff replies that “[m]erely explaining what a map function ‘basically’ does in the
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`background section of the patent falls well short of th[e] [lexicography] standard.” (Dkt. #66, at
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`p. 6).
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`b. Analysis
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`Claim 1 of the ’610 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
`
`1. A method of processing data of a data set over a distributed system, wherein the
`data set comprises a plurality of data groups, the method comprising:
`
`partitioning the data of each one of the data groups into a plurality of data
`partitions that each have a plurality of key-value pairs and providing each data
`partition to a selected one of a plurality of mapping functions that are each user-
`configurable to independently output a plurality of lists of values for each of a set
`of keys found in such map function’s corresponding data partition to form
`corresponding intermediate data for that data group and identifiable to that data
`group, wherein the data of a first data group has a different schema than the data of
`a second data group and the data of the first data group is mapped differently than
`the data of the second data group so that different lists of values are output for the
`corresponding different intermediate data, wherein the different schema and
`corresponding different intermediate data have a key in common; and
`
`reducing the intermediate data for the data groups to at least one output data
`group, including processing the intermediate data for each data group in a manner
`that is defined to correspond to that data group, so as to result in a merging of the
`corresponding different intermediate data based on the key in common,
`
`wherein the mapping and reducing operations are performed by a
`distributed system.
`
`The Background section of the specification states:
`
`MapReduce is a programming methodology to perform parallel computations over
`distributed (typically, very large) data sets. Some theory regarding the MapReduce
`programming methodology is described in “MapReduce: Simplified Data
`Processing on Large Clusters,” by Jeffrey Dean and Sanjay Ghemawat, appearing
`in OSDI’04: Sixth Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation,
`San Francisco, Calif., December, 2004 (hereafter, “Dean and Ghemawat”). A
`similar, but not identical, presentation is also provided in HTML form at the
`following URL: http://labs.google.com/papers/mapreduce-osdi04-slides/
`index.html (hereafter, “Dean and Ghemawat HTML).
`
`
`
`
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`Page 15 of 35
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 71 Filed 12/10/24 Page 16 of 35 PageID #:
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`Basically, a “map” function maps key-value pairs to new (intermediate) key-value
`pairs. A “reduce” function represents all mapped (intermediate) key-value pairs
`sharing the same key to a single key-value pair or a list of values. The “map” and
`“reduce” functions are typically user-provided. The map function iterates over a list
`of independent elements, performing an operation on each element as specified by
`the map function. The map function generates intermediate results. The reduce
`operation takes these intermediate results via a single iterator and combines
`elements as specified by the reduce function.
`
`’610 Patent at 1:6–27 (emphasis added); see id. at 2:21–24 (“The programmer specifies a map
`
`function that processes input key/value pairs and produces a set of

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