Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 4913
`
`United States District Court
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-1147
`Judge Mazzant
`
`
`§§§§
`
`
`
`§§
`
`
`§
`
`R2 SOLUTIONS LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`DATABRICKS INC.,
`Defendant.
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`
`
`Pending before this Court is Defendant Databricks Inc.’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the
`
`Northern District of California Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. #20). Having considered the
`
`Motion and relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant infringed U.S.
`
`Patent No. 8,190,610 (“the ’610 Patent”) (Dkt. #1 at p. 12). The ’610 Patent, entitled
`
`“MapReduce for Distributed Database Processing,” issued to Plaintiff on May 29, 2012 (Dkt. #1
`
`¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that Defendant knew of and directly or indirectly infringed
`
`on the ’610 Patent (Dkt. #1 ¶ 43).
`
`On May 21, 2024, Defendant filed its Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District
`
`of California Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. #20). In its Motion, Defendant claimed that
`
`the Northern District of California (“NDCA”) is a more convenient venue to litigate this case
`
`than this district because the patented technology was designed and developed in NDCA, the
`
`material witnesses are in NDCA, and Plaintiff has multiple connections to California (Dkt. #20 at
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 4914
`
`pp. 9–10). On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
`
`Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. #30). On June 25, 2024, Defendant filed its
`
`Reply (Dkt. #36). On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply (Dkt. #38). On September 4, 2024,
`
`the Court subsequently held a hearing regarding the Motions (See Dkt. #49). On November 8,
`
`2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Supplemental Evidence in support of its Motion (Dkt. #58).
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Section 1404 permits a district court to transfer any civil case “[f]or the convenience of
`
`parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might
`
`have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the
`
`district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to ‘an individualized, case-by-case
`
`consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
`
`(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). The purpose of § 1404 “is to
`
`prevent the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect the litigants, witnesses and the
`
`public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense . . . .’” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (quoting
`
`Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 27 (1960)).
`
`In a patent case, a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is governed by the law of
`
`the regional circuit, in this case the Fifth Circuit. In re TS Tech U.S. Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2008). The threshold inquiry when determining eligibility for transfer is “whether the judicial
`
`district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been
`
`filed,” or whether all parties consent to a particular jurisdiction. In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,
`
`203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Volkswagen I”). Once that threshold inquiry is met, the Fifth Circuit has
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 4915
`
`held that the determination of convenience turns on eight factors, where “[n]o factor is of
`
`dispositive weight.” In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2023).
`
`The four private interest factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
`
`(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
`
`attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
`
`expeditious and inexpensive. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
`
`banc) (“Volkswagen II”).
`
`The four public interest factors include: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from
`
`court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
`
`familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
`
`problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id. These factors are neither
`
`exhaustive nor exclusive. Id.
`
`The party seeking transfer of venue must show good cause for the transfer. Id. The moving
`
`party must show that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the transferor venue.
`
`Id.; TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358. The plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally not a factor in this analysis,
`
`but rather contributes to the defendant’s burden to show good cause for the transfer. Volkswagen
`
`II, 545 F.3d at 315 n.10 (“[W]hile a plaintiff has the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial
`
`division appropriate under the general venue statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise
`
`of this privilege.”). However, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the
`
`venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. at 315. And while the
`
`multi-factor analysis is informative, ultimately, “the district court has broad discretion in deciding
`
`whether to order a transfer.” Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 4916
`
`Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987)). “[A] district court abuses
`
`its discretion by denying transfer when ‘not a single relevant factor favors the [plaintiff’s] chosen
`
`venue.’” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318). A district court also
`
`“abuses its discretion by denying a motion to transfer when ‘virtually all of the events and
`
`witnesses regarding the case . . . are in the transferee forum.’” Id. at 366 (quoting In re Radmax,
`
`Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2013)).
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`The threshold inquiry on a § 1404(a) motion to transfer is “whether the judicial district to
`
`which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been filed.”
`
`Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d 201 at 203. “Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the
`
`judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
`
`infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Here, the
`
`Court finds—and the parties do not dispute—that venue would have been proper in NDCA.
`
`Indeed, Defendant is headquartered in Northern California, and the accused instrumentalities
`
`were designed and developed there (Dkt. #20 at p. 11).
`
`The Court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion turns on a multi-factor transfer analysis.
`
`After reviewing each factor, the Court has determined that two favor transfer, two disfavor
`
`transfer, and the remaining are neutral. The Court is apprised of this circuit’s approach to avoid a
`
`mere tallying of the factors in resolving this dispute. See In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 290 n.8
`
`(5th Cir. 2013) (“We do not suggest—nor has this court held—that a raw counting of the factors
`
`in each side, weighing each the same and deciding transfer only on the resulting ‘score,’ is the
`
`proper methodology.”); see also SQIP, LLC v. Cambria Co., LLC, No. 4:23-CV-202-SDJ, 2024
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 4917
`
`WL 1346498, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2024) (“[C]ourts are not to merely tally the factors on
`
`each side.”). To that end, the Court considered not only each factor’s outcome but also its weight
`
`to determine whether the actual convenience of NDCA as a forum is “clearly more convenient”
`
`than that of this district. In re Chamber of Commerce of United States of Am., 105 F.4th 297, 310 (5th
`
`Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 508 (5th Cir. 2024)) (establishing that a venue is
`
`“clearly more convenient” when “the marginal gain in convenience will be significant” and
`
`“evidence makes it plainly obvious . . . that those marginal gains will actually materialize in the
`
`transferee venue.”). While the Court acknowledges that this case represents a close call,
`
`transferring such a case to NDCA would yield minor, if any, gains at best, rather than the significant
`
`gain required to actually materialize in NDCA to warrant transfer. See id. Thus, the Court finds
`
`that the motion should be DENIED and explains its rationale as to each factor in turn below.
`
`I.
`
`The Private Interest Factors
`A.
`Defendant argues that this factor favors transfer because the allegedly relevant documents
`
`The “Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof” Factor Is Neutral
`
`relating to the preliminary research, testing, design, and implementation of the accused
`
`product—Apache Spark—were “generated and are currently maintained in the NDCA” (Dkt.
`
`#20 at p. 8). Further, key document custodians reside in NDCA, including Reynold Xin,
`
`Defendant’s co-founder and Chief Architect (Dkt. #20 at p. 8). Although Defendant maintains
`
`thirteen employees in the Plano office, which is located in the Sherman division of this District,
`
`Defendant claims that these employees are irrelevant because they work in customer support, not
`
`in research or development (Dkt. #20 at p. 8). Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff’s relevant
`
`documents and custodians are also “likely maintained” in California (Dkt. #30 at p. 9).
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 4918
`
`Plaintiff does not dispute that relevant documents are primarily generated and stored in
`
`NDCA (Dkt. #30 at pp. 7–8). Instead, Plaintiff emphasizes that “where documents are ‘primarily
`
`generated’ has no bearing on where those documents are accessible from” (Dkt. #30 at p. 8).
`
`Plaintiff also points out that “substantially all (if not all) of [its] documents are presently located
`
`on servers at the offices of its outside counsel in Fort Worth” (Dkt. #30 at p. 9).
`
`This factor is neutral because the bulk of the relevant evidence is equally accessible in either
`
`venue. “[W]hen ‘the vast majority of the evidence [is] electronic, and therefore equally accessible
`
`in either forum[,]’ this factor bears less strongly on the transfer analysis.” Tik Tok, 85 F.4th at 358
`
`(citing In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2022)). Here,
`
`Defendant admits that “the majority of documents in this case are . . . electronically maintained”
`
`(Dkt. #49 at p. 19; Dkt. #49 at p. 40). Defendant also claims that relevant evidence is stored “either
`
`on the cloud or on individual servers,” and that there “might be” evidence stored in “notebooks”
`
`in NDCA. Yet, the mere possibility that relevant physical evidence might be stored in NDCA
`
`cannot outweigh the fact that the overwhelming bulk of evidence is digital and, therefore, as
`
`accessible in this district as it is in NDCA (Dkt. #49 at p. 46). Thus, this factor is neutral.
`
`B.
`
`The “Availability of Compulsory Process to Secure Witness Attendance”
`Factor Is Neutral
`
`Defendant argues that this factor favors transfer for three reasons. First, multiple non-party
`
`witnesses—namely, two of three inventors listed in the asserted patent—reside in NDCA and,
`
`therefore, are subject to the court’s subpoena powers (Dkt. #20 at p. 9). Second, those powers
`
`extend to two witnesses knowledgeable about the asserted patent’s foundational technology (Dkt.
`
`#20 at p. 10). Third, those powers also extend to six individuals knowledgeable about relevant prior
`
`art systems (Dkt. #20 at p. 10).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 4919
`
`Plaintiff contends that this factor should carry “no weight” because Defendant has not
`
`shown that any of the third-party witnesses would be unwilling to testify (Dkt. #30 at p. 9). Plaintiff
`
`also contends that Defendant can only speculate as to what constitutes “relevant prior art”
`
`because invalidity contentions have not yet been served in this case (Dkt. #30 at p. 9).1 In Plaintiff’s
`
`view, allowing Defendant to “consider prior art witnesses without requiring [Defendant] to
`
`actually use the references invites substantial gamesmanship in identifying references to inflate the
`
`number of relevant prior art witnesses” (Dkt. #30 at pp. 13–14) (citing Lionra Tech. Limited v. Apple
`
`Inc., No. W-22-CV-351-ADA, slip. op. at 39 (W.D. Tex. May 9, 2023)). Plaintiff further clarifies
`
`that compulsory process is available in this district but not NDCA for at least one relevant third-
`
`party witness: Paul Reidy, a Texas resident who negotiated licensing agreements for the patent-in-
`
`suit and, consequently, has information relevant to Plaintiff’s damages case (Dkt. #30 at p. 10).
`
`As to the Plaintiff’s proposed witnesses with damages-related knowledge, Defendant
`
`contends that any convenience to them must be weighed against the convenience of the Plaintiff’s
`
`employees based in NDCA with the same knowledge (Dkt. #35 at p. 3). Defendant then argues
`
`that although less weight should be afforded to this factor if the witnesses are not shown to be
`
`unwilling, “no case law suggests that can be entirely discounted where proof of unwillingness is
`
`lacking” (Dkt. #35 at p. 3). As to Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant can only speculate about
`
`what constitutes prior art at this stage of litigation, Defendant explains that multiple parties relied
`
`on some of the cited prior art references in IPRs before the PTAB, and others were cited by the
`
`asserted patent itself (Dkt. #35 at p. 3). Accordingly, Defendant claims that the prior art can
`
`
`1 The Court recognizes that this deadline has since passed, but the Court evaluates the motion based on the facts
`existing at the time the parties briefed the issue. See Abstrax, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 2:14-CV-158-JRG, 2014
`WL 5677834, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014) (quoting In re EMC Corp., 501 Fed. Appx. 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013))
`(“Motions to transfer venue are to be decided based on the situation which existed when suit was instituted.”).
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 4920
`
`appropriately be considered relevant even though the parties have not yet served invalidity
`
`contentions (Dkt. #35 at p. 3).
`
`This factor is neutral. Both parties dispute the appropriate effect and weight that unwilling
`
`witnesses should have in this case, but neither party asserts that any non-party witness is unwilling
`
`to attend trial (See Dkt. #30 at pp. 2, 9). Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit maintains
`
`that “we cannot say that the district court commit[s] a clear abuse of discretion in holding that this
`
`factor is neutral when petitioners have failed to identify any unwilling non-party witness,” as is the
`
`case here. TikTok, 85 F.4th at 361. As for the factor’s weight, Plaintiff overstates the effect of
`
`unwillingness by claiming that the factor should carry “no weight” when no witness has
`
`demonstrated unwillingness to attend trial (Dkt. #30 at p. 13). More precisely, however, the Fifth
`
`Circuit states that, in such cases, this factor should only “receive less weight” in the analysis (Dkt.
`
`#35 at p. 7) (citing Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630–31) (emphasis added).
`
`Separately, on the question of whether Defendant can appropriately determine what prior
`
`art—and, by extension, what inventor—is relevant, Plaintiff aptly points out that such
`
`determinations are premature before the invalidity contentions deadline (Dkt. #35 at p. 3).
`
`Defendant claims that IPRs can establish relevant prior art, but those petitions were drafted in a
`
`different case with different parties asserting different claims (Dkt. #35 at p. 3). An IPR’s citation to
`
`prior art is no substitute for an independent analysis of the prior art’s relevance to this case; an IPR
`
`can include irrelevant prior art, and it can equally omit art that Defendant determines is relevant
`
`while preparing invalidity contentions. Thus, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
`
`The “Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses” Factor Favors Transfer
`
`C.
`Defendant argues that this factor favors transfer because several relevant individuals are
`
`based in NDCA. For example, Reynold Xin, a key witness with knowledge about the accused
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 4921
`
`product’s design and development, resides in NDCA (Dkt. #20 at p. 11). So too does the
`
`Defendant’s engineering team that designed and developed the accused instrumentalities (Dkt.
`
`#20 at p. 11). Thus, Defendant argues that NDCA is the more convenient venue for multiple,
`
`highly relevant party witnesses (Dkt. #20 at p. 11).
`
`Conversely, Defendant asserts that this district is the wrong venue because none of
`
`Defendant’s employees who worked on the accused product, nor custodians who created and
`
`maintain relevant documents, reside here (Dkt. #20 at p. 12). Some of the Defendant’s thirteen
`
`Plano employees have titles that “denote engineering work” (e.g., Technical Solutions Engineers),
`
`but they support customers and allegedly did not work on the accused product (Dkt. #20 at p. 12).
`
`As for Plaintiff’s witnesses, Defendant contends that they are also based in NDCA—particularly
`
`Eric Lucas, the Plaintiff’s president, who knows about the asserted patent’s sales and value (Dkt.
`
`#20 at p. 13). In sum, Defendant believes that the cost of trial attendance for willing witnesses on
`
`both sides would be lower in NDCA than in this district.
`
`In response, Plaintiff argues that this factor is “at least neutral” because multiple relevant
`
`witnesses that could testify on behalf of either party reside in this district (Dkt. #30 at p. 11). As to
`
`the Defendant’s witnesses, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants can only speculate that Reynold Xin,
`
`Defendant’s co-founder, will attend trial (Dkt. #30 at p. 11). Plaintiff further asserts that
`
`Defendant’s Director of Technical Solutions, a potential witness who leads the accused product’s
`
`solutions team, lives in Texas, not in NDCA (Dkt. #30 at p. 11). Moreover, Plaintiff claims that
`
`over one hundred of Defendant’s employees are “located in the DFW area and this District,”
`
`including twenty employees in Texas with knowledge of the accused products, each of whom
`
`“touts expertise” in the accused products or “holds a title indicating expertise in that area” (Dkt.
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:
`4922
`
`#30 at p. 11). As to the Plaintiff’s witnesses, Plaintiff states that its president is willing to testify at
`
`trial and knows about Plaintiff’s patent portfolio, company structure and financials, and asserted
`
`patent licensing (Dkt. #30 at p. 11).
`
`This factor favors transfer. As Defendant notes, relevant potential witnesses reside in
`
`NDCA, including Defendant’s Chief Architect of the accused product and engineers aiding with
`
`design and development (Dkt. #20 at p. 11). Plaintiff claims that witnesses for both parties reside
`
`in this district, but that raises two issues. First, the only witness in this district that the Court can
`
`be reasonably certain has relevant technical information is Defendant’s Director of Technical
`
`Solutions (Dkt. #30 at p. 11). Plaintiff claims that twenty other Texas employees have relevant
`
`technical knowledge, but Defendant alleges that each employee named in that list focused on
`
`customer support and did not work on the accused product (Dkt. #35 at p. 4). Second, Plaintiff
`
`identifies a Director of Technical Solutions as a potential witness, but it is unclear whether this
`
`witness knows as much about the accused product’s research, design, and development as the
`
`product’s Chief Architect. The Director may, in some sense, have technical knowledge because
`
`he understands the accused product’s implementation, customer application integration, and
`
`sales, but those are aspects of the product one degree removed from the focus of patent
`
`infringement (i.e., how the accused product’s design and function compare to the asserted claims).
`
`Thus, the Court finds that this factor favors transfer.
`
`D.
`
`“All Other Practical Problems that Make Trial of a Case Expeditious”
`Disfavor Transfer
`
`Defendant believes that this factor is neutral because this case “is in its early stages and no
`
`related co-pending litigation [exists] in this District” (Dkt. #20 at p. 13). Defendant also believes
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:
`4923
`
`that transferring this case to NDCA will generally minimize costs and other practical, travel-related
`
`logistics, as both parties’ witnesses are in or near NDCA (Dkt. #20 at p. 13).
`
`Plaintiff believes that this factor weighs against transfer because it would “create significant
`
`diseconomies” by stripping this case from this Court—one that has experience with this patent
`
`based on sixteen prior cases, two of which involved “claim construction hearing[s] and lengthy
`
`opinions” related to the same asserted patent (Dkt. #30 at p. 12). To avoid any inefficiency
`
`associated with forcing another court to “start from scratch,” Plaintiff argues that this case should
`
`stay in this district (Dkt. #30 at p. 12).
`
`In Defendant’s view, while cases involving the same asserted patent have come before this
`
`Court, those cases involved different parties, claims, and factual issues (Dkt. #35 at p. 5).
`
`Consequently, Defendant claims that Plaintiff overstates the judicial inefficiency that transferring
`
`this case to NDCA would create (Dkt. #35 at p. 5).
`
`This factor weighs against transfer, but only slightly. Both parties acknowledge that this
`
`Court has handled prior litigation involving the same asserted patent, including a Markman hearing
`
`(See, e.g., Dkt. #49 at p. 17). The parties differ, however, on whether the Court’s prior experience
`
`is significant enough to warrant keeping this case for fear of imposing inefficiency on an NDCA
`
`court (See, e.g., Dkt. #49 at p. 18). This Court’s experience is a “permissible consideration[]” in
`
`“ruling on a motion to transfer venue,” but it does not carry much weight. In re EMC Corp., 501
`
`F. App’x 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Defendant cites a Federal Circuit case stating that this alone is
`
`“too tenuous a reason to support a denial of transfer,” but the district court in that case used a
`
`“previous claim construction in a case that settled more than five years before the filing of th[e]
`
`lawsuit,” whereas, here, the earliest claim construction order issued on January 4, 2022 (Dkt. #30,
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:
`4924
`
`Exhibit 36; Dkt. #30, Exhibit 37). In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 562 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2011). In the interest of maximizing judicial economy, however limited that may be, the Court
`
`is compelled to leverage its past experience in handling this litigation and finds that this factor
`
`weighs against transfer.
`
`II.
`
`The Public Interest Factors
`E.
`
`“Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion” Disfavor
`Transfer
`
`Defendant argues that this factor is neutral because the record does not indicate a basis to
`
`comparatively evaluate court efficiencies (Dkt. #20 at p. 13). Thus, according to the Defendant,
`
`any such comparison necessarily requires speculation (Dkt. #20 at p. 13). Plaintiff contends that
`
`this factor weighs against transfer because NDCA’s average time to trial is “over sixteen months
`
`longer” that that of this district, citing Federal Court Management Statistics purporting to show
`
`this case “will almost certainly proceed to trial much quicker in this Court than NDCA” (Dkt. #30
`
`at pp. 3–4) (“[s]tatistics show that the median time to trial in all civil cases in 21.4 months in EDTX
`
`and 48.9 months in NDCA.”). Defendant cautions against relying merely on statistics just as the
`
`Federal Circuit has because “case-disposition statistics may not always tell the whole story” (Dkt.
`
`#35 at p. 5) (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).2
`
`The Court finds that this factor weighs against transfer. Plaintiff attempts to substantiate
`
`its court congestion argument with statistics, but they are too general to be helpful (See Dkt. #30
`
`at pp. 7–8). Rather than compare NDCA with the Court’s docket specifically, for example, Plaintiff
`
`compares NDCA with the Eastern District of Texas docket generally (Dkt. #30 at p. 8). In any
`
`
`2 Defendant also cites to In re Adobe Inc. to argue that “solely” using statistics is improper, but that does not fairly
`describe what Plaintiff does in this case (Dkt. #35 at p. 9). 823 F. App’x 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Here, Plaintiff does
`not state or even imply that this is “solely” a statistical issue; it merely uses statistics as a means to support its point
`that this district will resolve the case faster than NDCA.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:
`4925
`
`case, the Federal Circuit makes clear that “to the extent docket efficiency can be reliably estimated,
`
`the district court is better placed to do so than this court.” Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 631.
`
`The Court’s docket is notoriously busy, but by all indications, this case is proceeding to trial at the
`
`pace set out in the Scheduling Order and will likely conclude faster in this Court than in NDCA
`
`(Dkt. #28 at pp. 1–5) (setting the final pretrial conference for July 21, 2025, approximately eight
`
`months from now). Thus, this factor weighs against transfer.
`
`F.
`
`The “Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home” Factor
`Favors Transfer
`
`This factor favors transfer. Defendant rightly points out that this factor focuses on the
`
`location of the events giving rise to the suit, not the parties’ connection to each forum. See, e.g.,
`
`TikTok, 85 F.4th at 364 (“We look not to ‘the parties’ significant connection to each forum . . . but
`
`rather the significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a
`
`suit.”) (citing Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435 (5th Cir. 2022)). Plaintiff alleges patent
`
`infringement, which imposes liability on a person or company that “makes, uses, offers to sell, or
`
`sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Here, Defendant
`
`designed and developed the accused product in the NDCA, which constitutes “making” and
`
`potentially “using” the accused product in an infringing way (Dkt. #20 at p. 14). By contrast,
`
`Plaintiff argues that this district has a stronger local interest because Defendant’s infringing acts
`
`(i.e., providing an internet-based accused product used in an infringing manner by Texas
`
`customers) occurred in this district. While this creates a local interest in this district, it is
`
`outweighed by the NDCA’s more significant interest stemming from the accused product’s
`
`research, design, and development in Sunnyvale, California (See Dkt. #49 at pp. 9–10).
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 70 Filed 12/02/24 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:
`4926
`
`The Remaining Factors are Neutral
`
`G.
`The Court agrees that the factors uncontested by the parties are neutral: (1) the familiarity
`
`of the forum with the governing law; and (2) the avoidance of conflict of laws issues (See Dkt. #20
`
`at p. 19; Dkt. #30 at p. 7).
`
`After reviewing each factor and accounting for its weight, the Court finds that Defendant
`
`has not met its burden to show that NDCA is “clearly more convenient” than this district.
`
`Accordingly, the Court will respect Plaintiff’s choice of venue and DENY the Motion.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`It is therefore ORDERED that Databricks, Inc.’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the
`
`Northern District of California Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. #20) is hereby DENIED.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`