Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 4875
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`
`R2 Solutions LLC,
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Databricks, Inc.,
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` Defendant.
`
`
`Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01147-ALM
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`
`Jury Trial Demanded
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 4876
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`“processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations: …
`based on the key in common.” (Claim 17) ........................................................................ 1
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`“mapping” / “map” / “mapped” (Claims 1, 17) ................................................................. 6
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`“reducing” / “reduce” (Claims 1, 17) ................................................................................ 7
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`“providing each data partition to a selected one of a plurality of mapping functions”
`(Claims 1, 17) .................................................................................................................... 8
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`“[processing] / [process] the intermediate data for each data group in a manner that is
`defined to correspond to that data group” (Claims 1, 5, 17, 21) ....................................... 9
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`“schema” (Claims 1, 17) ................................................................................................. 10
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`Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 10
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`D.
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`A.
`B.
`C.
`E.
`F.
`G.
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page ii
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 4877
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)....................................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 5
`
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Cardware Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 2:22-CV-141-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148405 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2023) ........ 9
`
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162504 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) ................... 5
`
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`Intelligent Agency, LLC v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
`No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610 (E.D. Tex. March 11, 2022) ........ 5, 6
`
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
`379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................... 2, 3, 4
`
`
`R2 Solutions LLC v. Walmart Inc.,
`No. 4:21-cv-00091-ALM, ECF 54 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022) ................................................ 5, 10
`
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`St. Isidore Research, LLC v. Comerica Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1390-JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2016) ......... 2, 3, 4
`
`
`Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
`849 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 9
`
`
`Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`Varta Microbattery GmbH v. Audio P’ship LLC,
`No. 2:21-CV-00400-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138991 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2023) ...... 9
`
`
`VDPP LLC v. Vizio, Inc.,
`No. 2021-2040, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7857 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2022) .................................. 3
`
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page iii
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 4878
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`WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`Nos. 2022-1063, 2022-1065, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27763 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2023)......... 2, 4
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`Rules, Statutes, and Authorities
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ....................................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 4879
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`R2 replies to Databricks’ responsive claim construction brief as follows:
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`A.
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`“processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
`… based on the key in common.” (Claim 17)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. Not subject to 35
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and not indefinite. See also
`the proposed constructions for “data group”
`and “a plurality of mapping functions that are
`each user-configurable.”
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`Defendant’s Construction
`Governed by pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
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`Function: “partitioning … based on the key in
`common.”
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`Structure: Indefinite.
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`Databricks argues the disputed phrase is means-plus-function because “processor and
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`memory,” standing alone, fail to connote sufficient structure. See, e.g., Resp. at 5. But this is red
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`herring. The disputed phrase is not the only structural language in the claim. Indeed, Claim 17
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`recites the algorithm performed by the “processor and memory.”
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`A claim has sufficient structure when it enables “a person of skill in the field to provide an
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`operative software program for the specified function.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d
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`1286, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376,
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`1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Claim 17 meets this standard. As discussed in R2’s opening brief and
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`attendant declaration, Claim 17 walks through, in painstaking detail (comprising two paragraphs
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`and two-dozen lines), exactly what the processor and memory must do. It requires that the
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`processor and memory “partition[] the data” in an explicit way, “provid[e] each data partition to a
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`selected one of a plurality of mapping functions” in an explicit way, map differently “so that
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`different lists of values are output for the corresponding different intermediate data,” and “reduce
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`the intermediate data” in an explicit way. It is hard to imagine how an algorithm could be more
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`particularly recited within a claim, and the recited processor and memory, coupled with the recited
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`algorithm, denotes sufficient structure. This is buttressed by the specification,1 which provides
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`exemplary computer programs in pseudocode and detailed diagrams explaining exactly how to
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`accomplish what is claimed. See ’610 pat. at Fig. 4, Fig. 5, 3:35 - 8:57; Davis Decl., ¶¶ 1, 38-39;
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`see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(holding that structural terms “accompanied by [] language reciting their respective objectives or
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`operations” communicate sufficient structure to a POSA).
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`Databricks’ argument to the contrary is incorrect. As a threshold matter, Databricks’
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`analysis is fundamentally flawed, expending ten pages to argue that “processor and memory” are
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`not, by themselves, sufficient. Such a position is often misplaced by its proponent. See St. Isidore
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`Research, LLC v. Comerica Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1390-JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866, at *45
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`(E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2016) (courts often find that “the term ‘processor’ itself connotes sufficient
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`structure”); see also WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, Nos. 2022-1063, 2022-1065, 2023 U.S.
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`App. LEXIS 27763, at *13-14 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2023) (“Google has not cited any cases holding
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`that the term ‘memory’ is a nonce term or devoid of sufficient structure so as to invoke § 112 ¶ 6
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`and we are aware of no such cases.”). Moreover, it ignores how structure is indicated in computer
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`software cases2 and is otherwise not responsive to R2’s arguments.3 Claim 17 denotes sufficient
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`structure—and is not means-plus-function—because it delineates the objectives and operations
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`(not just high-level functional language) to be performed by the processor and memory such that
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`1 It is proper to look to the specification for context when determining if a limitation is means-plus
`function. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1296.
`2 See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1298 (“Rather, to one of skill in the art, the ‘structure’ of computer
`software is understood through, for example, an outline of an algorithm, a flowchart, or a
`specific set of instructions or rules.”).
`3 Databricks’ expert’s analysis suffers the same flaw, focusing on why the “‘processor and
`memory’ term [standing alone] would not connote any specific structure” and fails to consider the
`claimed algorithm as part of the structure. Resp. at 8.
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`a POSA can provide a software program to accomplish the claim. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1286,
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`1299; see also Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320-21. Databricks’ minimal “rebuttal” to this point
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`does nothing but lay bare its misapplication of the means-plus-functions standard. See Resp. at 9.
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`Databricks argues that to have sufficient structure, the claim must spell out how processors and
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`memory fundamentally work and communicate. See id. (asserting 112, ¶ 6 applies because the
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`claim does not “identify what processing the ‘processor’ performs to achieve the ‘partitioning,’
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`‘mapping,’ and ‘reducing … [or how the processor] communicates with the recited ‘memory’).
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`But this is not the law. Structure is determined through the eyes of a POSA, and a POSA does not
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`need the patent to explain how processors and memory work and communicate. All a POSA needs
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`is enough “to provide an operative software program for the specified function.” Apple, 757 F.3d
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`at 1299. This is exactly what Claim 17 (in the context of the specification) delivers.
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`Similarly, Databricks argues that the “processor and memory” is a “black box,” and that
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`the patent does not “explain what specialized programming is required for a processor and memory
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`to perform the claimed function.” Resp. at 9. But this is not a black box scenario. See VDPP LLC
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`v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2021-2040, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7857, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2022) (“a
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`skilled artisan would not understand ‘processors’ and ‘storage’ to merely be black boxes for
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`performance of a function” because “they existed in the prior art at the time of the invention.”). As
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`discussed above, each of these structures is well known, and the algorithm each must be
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`programmed to perform is meticulously described in the claim and expounded upon in the
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`specification. See ’610 pat. at Fig. 4, Fig. 5, 3:35 - 8:57.
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`Databricks attempts to compare this case to St. Isidore. That case is inapposite, however,
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`because the disputed limitations do not recite an algorithm. See Resp. at 6-7. The limitations are
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`high-level phrases containing “processor configured to verify …” and “processor configured to
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`identify …,” which are devoid of specifics as to how to go about verifying or identifying. See St.
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`Isidore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866 at *31-53. In contrast, Claim 17 explicitly teaches the
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`partitioning, mapping, and reducing that the processor and memory must perform.
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`Databricks also points to an adjudged means-plus-function limitation in the WSOU case
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`using the word, “processor” (Resp. at 7-8); but the case actually undercuts Databricks’ argument
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`here. In WSOU, a different disputed limitation reads, “at least one memory including computer
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`program code, where the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured, with
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`the at least one processor, to cause the apparatus to at least … [followed by an algorithm].” WSOU,
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`2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27763 at *3-4. The court deemed this not means-plus-function, stating that
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`a POSA “reading the claim in light of the specification would understand that the recited computer
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`program code is stored in a memory structure and running on the processor.” Id. at *12. The court
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`also noted specifically that the limitation “recites multiple elements and their connections to one
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`another,” and although “terms like ‘computer program code,’ ‘memory,’ and ‘processor’ may be
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`broad, the recited combination of these multiple broadly named structures informs the skilled
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`artisan’s relative understanding of what each structure is and what it is not, as well as how the
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`various structures relate to one another.” Id. This is precisely the situation here, where the
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`“processor and memory” combination, coupled with the precise algorithm, informs a POSA of the
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`structure to accomplish the claim.
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`Databricks further asserts that law cited by R2 is inapplicable. This is wrong. Mr. Davis is
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`explicit that Claim 17 explains “how the ‘processor’ and ‘memory’ operate within the context of
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`the claimed invention” (Davis Decl., ¶ 39), putting this case squarely within the purview of Linear
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`Tech, Intelligent Agency, and Finjan. See Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1319-21; Intelligent Agency,
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`LLC v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610, at *39 (E.D. Tex.
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 4883
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`
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`March 11, 2022); Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., No. 13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`162504, at *31-32 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015). And like the claim in Apple v. Motorola, Claim 17
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`does not “nakedly recite [processor and memory] without further description in the remaining
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`claim language and specification”; it does just the opposite. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1301.
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`Further still, Databricks alleges that R2’s extensive identification of exemplary processors
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`and memory and their definitions is insufficient for the Court to find structure. See Resp. at 11-12.
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`While this is incorrect, it also incorrectly presupposes “processor and memory” to be the only
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`structural language.
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`Lastly, Databricks is wrong that R2’s identification of structure is untimely. R2’s position
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`is, and always has been, that Claim 17 is not means-plus-function and not indefinite. See, e.g., ECF
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`51-1 at 1. Databricks bears the burden of proving indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence.
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`See Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That R2 fully
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`elucidated its arguments in briefing is entirely proper, and Databricks has cited to no law
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`suggesting that R2’s identification of structure in briefing is somehow late. Indeed, this Court’s
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`previous claim construction order involving this patent dispatches Databricks’ position. In that
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`case, R2 chose not to substantively address indefiniteness in its opening brief. Nevertheless, this
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`Court held that “Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ assertions of indefiniteness and has merely forfeited
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`the opportunity to have the first word, so to speak, on the indefiniteness arguments that Defendants
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`choose to continue to assert.” See R2 Solutions LLC v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 4:21-cv-00091-
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`ALM, ECF 54 at 11-13 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022).
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`Further, Databricks’ standard for finding structure in the specification is draconian and
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`unsupported by the law. Indeed, even though the patent explicitly improves upon a known
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`technology (MapReduce), Databricks argues that the specification must provide exacting details
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`of such known technology, such as a partitioning algorithm that “determines the number of
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`partitions to create.” See Resp. at 13. This is tantamount to arguing that the patentee is required to
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`invent a different technology. The inventors did not invent partitioning, mapping, or reducing.
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`Rather, they improved upon a technology that implemented partitioning, mapping, and reducing,
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`and those improvements are exhaustively identified and described in the specification. Figures 4
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`and 5, along with the accompanying discussions, provide detailed flow diagrams demonstrating
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`the movement and processing of data from one phase to the next, as well as detailed pseudocode
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`depicting how exemplary functions can be implemented in code. These algorithms are clearly
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`linked and associated with the functions recited in Claim 17, meaning that the claim simply cannot
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`be indefinite. See Intelligent Agency, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610, at *14.
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`B.
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`“mapping” / “map” / “mapped” (Claims 1, 17)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Defendant’s Construction
`“[processing] / [process] / [processed] key/value pairs to
`generate intermediate key/value pairs”
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`Databricks’ construction should be rejected for several reasons. First, Databricks finds
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`lexicography where there is none. The “standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are
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`exacting. To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” GE Lighting Sols., LLC
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`v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Merely explaining what a map function
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`“basically” does in the background section of the patent falls well short of this standard. Indeed,
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`the use of the word “basically” at the beginning of the statement indicates that the patentee is not
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`defining the term and is, instead, offering a streamlined explanation to help the reader quickly
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`grasp the technical scope and field. It bears mention that this patent has been construed twice by
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`this Court, and not a single defendant argued the term is the subject of lexicography.
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`Second, as set forth in R2’s opening brief, Databricks’ construction is nonsensical because
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`it turns an adjective into a verb and destroys the coherency of the entire claim. Databricks tries to
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`defend this in a footnote by claiming that a jury would figure it out. See Resp. at 18, n. 11. But
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`why make the jury figure it out when the claim already makes the meaning clear?
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`Third, Databricks alleges that its construction is consistent with the claims and
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`specification. Of course it is—it renders claim language superfluous.
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`Fourth, and finally, Databricks’ allegation that there is a “need to construe” the term
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`because of R2’s high-level explanation of what the map procedure in traditional MapReduce does
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`is dubious. R2 did not say that the plain and ordinary meaning of “map” is to “filter and/or sort
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`data.” Practically speaking, the result of a map procedure in traditional MapReduce is data that is
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`filtered or sorted, and this is what R2 was articulating in the background section of its brief. But
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`R2 is not “attempt[ing] to redefine” the term “mapping” by explaining, in laymen’s terms, its
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`result. In short, the claim itself explains what the mapping function is and what it does, and there
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`is no need to import a redundant definition into the claims.
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`C.
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`“reducing” / “reduce” (Claims 1, 17)4
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`Defendant’s Construction
`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. New: “[merging] / [merge] all intermediate data values sharing
`the same key into a single key-value pair or a list of values
`associated with the key”
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`Databricks’ construction should be rejected. Just as above, there is no lexicography. The
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`background explanation regarding typical MapReduce does not constitute a clear intent by the
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`patentee to define the terms, which is demonstrated by the fact that Databricks’ proposal is not
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`verbatim from the specification and is instead a mix-and-match of whatever disclosure Databricks
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`4 It bears mention that Databricks shifted its position. It championed a certain construction
`originally and then changed it when R2 pointed out how confusing it is. See Resp. at 21.
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`saw fit to cram into its construction. And R2’s high-level background discussion does not show
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`that there is a “need to construe” the terms. Databricks’ allegation about R2’s purported confusion
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`falls flat—the only confusion to be concerned about is the jury’s if it is forced to try to replace a
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`single word with a twenty-four-word definition that is redundant of the claim language. The claims
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`themselves explain the terms. The terms need no construction and should be afforded their plain
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`and ordinary meanings.
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`D.
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`“providing each data partition to a selected one of a plurality of mapping
`functions” (Claims 1, 17)5
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction Defendant’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. New: “providing each data partition to one of a plurality of
`different mapping functions where each mapping function is
`selected for a partition based on the data group the partition
`originated from”
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`Databricks is wrong that R2 disavowed claim scope, and the fact that Databricks changed
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`its proposal in light of R2’s arguments speaks volumes. See Resp. at 22. Indeed, Databricks
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`contends that disavowal mandates a specific construction, but Databricks has now proposed two
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`different constructions, with two different scopes, both based on the same statement by R2. The
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`law is clear that when a statement is ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations,
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`“it cannot rise to the level of clear and mistakable disclaimer.” Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
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`856 F.3d 1353, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Databricks has now offered two different interpretations
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`of the same statement, which should, by itself, put disclaimer to rest.
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`It is also demonstrably false that “R2 relied on its disclaimer” to distinguish the prior art in
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`the IPR proceeding. While R2 argued that the prior art does not teach delineating data based on
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`data groups, nowhere did it argue that the prior art failed to teach that a mapping function is
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`5 Again, Databricks shifted positions in light of R2’s opening arguments. See Resp. at 22.
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`“selected for a partition based on the data group the partition originated from.” The excerpts
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`included in Databricks’ response say nothing of the sort. See Resp. at 24, n. 19. Moreover, the fact
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`that R2 included a similar explanation in opposition to a 101 motion in co-pending litigation to
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`articulate why the claims are not abstract does not support disavowal. That briefing dealt with
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`patent eligibility, not claim scope, and it is not part of the intrinsic record. In essence, contrary to
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`Databricks’ suggestion, the Federal Circuit requires statements to be considered in context. See,
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`e.g., Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 849 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2017). As
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`explained in R2’s opening brief, the context of the subject statement makes clear that R2 was not
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`surrendering claim scope.
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`Finally, while Databricks tries to downplay the significance of the PTAB affording this
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`term its plain and ordinary meaning, the law is clear that this is a noteworthy consideration for
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`courts in determining whether claim scope was disavowed. See Varta Microbattery GmbH v. Audio
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`P’ship LLC, No. 2:21-CV-00400-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138991, at *10 (E.D. Tex.
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`Aug. 9, 2023) (explicitly noting that “the PTAB was able to determine whether to institute trial
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`without expressly construing any claims” in finding that the patentee did not disclaim scope during
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`IPR) (internal citations omitted); see also Cardware Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:22-CV-
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`141-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148405, at *17-18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2023) (explaining
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`it to be “of note” that the Board applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the disputed
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`limitation in finding no disclaimer). R2 did not clearly and unmistakably disavow claim scope,
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`and Databricks’ construction should be rejected.
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`E.
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`“[processing] / [process] the intermediate data for each data group in a
`manner that is defined to correspond to that data group” (Claims 1, 5, 17, 21)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
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`Defendant’s Construction
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 9
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
`4888
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`Plain and ordinary meaning.
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`“[processing] / [process] the intermediate data for each data
`group in a manner that is defined to correspond to the data
`group from which the intermediate data originated”
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`This Court already determined that the phrases “[processing] / [process] the intermediate
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`
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`data for each data group in a manner that is defined to correspond to that data group” should be
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`given their plain and ordinary meanings. See R2 Solutions LLC v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 4:21-
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`cv-00091-ALM, ECF 54 at 27-29. The claim construction process is confusing enough for the
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`jury. There is no reason to add constructions when the plain claim language will do. Replacing
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`“that data group” with “the data group from which the intermediate data originated” adds nothing
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`but extra words. The phrases mean the same thing. No construction of this phrase is necessary.
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`F.
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`“schema” (Claims 1, 17)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Defendant’s Construction
`“a set of attributes (such as DeptID, LastName, DeptName)
`and their properties (such as their data types: integer DeptID,
`string LastName, string DeptName)”
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`Databricks knows there are issues with its proposal: it reached out to R2, twice, offering
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`
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`new constructions to avoid having to argue about it. See Ex. A. R2 has offered to agree to construe
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`the term as “a set of attributes,” but Databricks is keen to make the term seem narrower than it is
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`by keeping the phrase “(such as DeptID, LastName, DeptName).” While R2 remains willing to
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`reach agreement with Databricks, there is no need to construe the term. Every POSA knows what
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`“schema” means, and supplanting a single word with a convoluted two-dozen-word explanation
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`does not help the jury, particularly when the context of the patent is more than sufficient to aid in
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`understanding the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. No construction is necessary.
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`G.
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`Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, R2 respectfully requests that this Court adopt R2’s constructions
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`and issue its order, accordingly.
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 10
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 66 Filed 11/19/24 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
`4889
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`Dated: November 19, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Edward R. Nelson III
`Edward R. Nelson, III
`State Bar No. 00797142
`Brent N. Bumgardner
`State Bar No. 00795272
`Christopher G. Granaghan
`State Bar No. 24078585
`John P. Murphy
`State Bar No. 24056024
`Carder W. Brooks
`State Bar No. 24105536
`
`NELSON BUMGARDNER CONROY PC
`3131 West 7th Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`817.377.9111 (telephone)
`ed@nelbum.com
`brent@nelbum.com
`chris@nelbum.com
`murphy@nelbum.com
`carder@nelbum.com
`
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`
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`COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
`R2 SOLUTIONS LLC
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been
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`delivered to all counsel of record on this the 19th day of November, 2024.
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`
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`/s/ Edward R. Nelson III
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`PLAINTIFF’S REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 11
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