Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 1 of 25 PageID #: 1632
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`
`R2 Solutions LLC,
`
` Plaintiff,
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`v.
`
`
`Databricks, Inc.,
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` Defendant.
`
`
`Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01147-ALM
`
`
`Jury Trial Demanded
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`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 2 of 25 PageID #: 1633
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
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`’610 Patent .................................................................................................................. 1
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`LEGAL STANDARDS .................................................................................................. 3
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`General Principles of Claim Construction .................................................................. 3
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`Plain and Ordinary Meaning ....................................................................................... 3
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`Reading Limitations into the Claims .......................................................................... 4
`
`I.
`II. OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY AT ISSUE.......................................................... 1
`A.
`III.
`A.
`B.
`C.
`IV.
`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`E.
`F.
`G.
`V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 19
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 5
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`“processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations: …
`based on the key in common.” (Claim 17) ................................................................. 5
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`“mapping” / “map” / “mapped” (Claims 1, 17) ........................................................ 10
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`“reducing” / “reduce” (Claims 1, 17) ........................................................................ 11
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`“providing each data partition to a selected one of a plurality of mapping
`functions” (Claims 1, 17) .......................................................................................... 13
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`“[processing] / [process] the intermediate data for each data group in a manner
`that is defined to correspond to that data group” (Claims 1, 5, 17, 21) .................... 17
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`“schema” (Claims 1, 17) ........................................................................................... 18
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`“the different schema and corresponding different intermediate data have a key
`in common” (Claims 1, 17) ....................................................................................... 19
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`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 3 of 25 PageID #: 1634
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
` 725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 4
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
` 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................... 7
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
` 856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................. 4, 14
`
`Cardware Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
` No. 2:22-CV-141-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148405 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2023) ...... 16
`
`Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys.,
` No. 15-cv-03853-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161809 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015) ................... 7
`
`Comark Communications v. Harris Corp.,
` 156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)................................................................................................... 4
`
`Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
` 848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)................................................................................................... 4
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
` No. 13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162504 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) ................... 7
`
`Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc.,
` 708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 9
`
`Intelligent Agency, LLC v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
` No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610 (E.D. Tex. March 11, 2022) ...... 6, 10
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
` 582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................... 5
`
`Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc.,
` No. 2:12-CV-00800-WCB, 2014 WL 3735222 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) ................................ 3
`
`Leibel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
` 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................... 5
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
` 379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................... 7, 9
`
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 4 of 25 PageID #: 1635
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`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
` 517 U.S. 370 (1996) .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
` 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................... 4
`
`Masco Corp. v. United States,
` 303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................... 6
`
`Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
` 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................... 6
`
`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
` 401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................... 3
`
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`248 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................... 10
`
`MV3 Partners LLC v. Roku, Inc.,
` Civ. No. 6:18-CV-00308-ADA, Dkt. No. 90 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2019) .................................... 3
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
` 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................... 3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
` 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 3, 4, 11, 13
`
`R2 Solutions LLC v. American Airlines, Inc.,
` Case No. 4:22-cv-00353-ALM, ECF 58 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2023) ............................................ 1
`
`R2 Solutions LLC v. Walmart Inc.,
` Case No. 4:21-cv-00091-ALM, ECF 54 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022) ....................................... 1, 17
`
`Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
` 849 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................. 14
`
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
` 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) .................................................................................................................. 3
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
` 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 4
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
` 103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................... 3
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 5 of 25 PageID #: 1636
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`
`Varta Microbattery GmbH v. Audio P’ship LLC,
` No. 2:21-CV-00400-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138991
`(E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2023) .............................................................................................. 13, 14, 16
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)................................................................................................. 3, 4
`
`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc.,
`232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................... 6
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`
`Rules, Statutues, and Authorities
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ....................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 9
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`35 U.S.C. 282(b) ........................................................................................................................... 16
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`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 53 Filed 10/29/24 Page 6 of 25 PageID #: 1637
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This case involves one patent: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,190,610 (Ex. 1). R2 Solutions files this
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`opening claim construction brief addressing this patent and its disputed terms and phrases. This
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`Court previously construed terms and phrases from this patent on two different occasions. See R2
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`Solutions LLC v. Walmart Inc., Case No. 4:21-cv-00091-ALM, ECF 54 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022);
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`R2 Solutions LLC v. American Airlines, Inc., Case No. 4:22-cv-00353-ALM, ECF 58 (E.D. Tex.
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`Apr. 3, 2023). The Court’s prior orders explicitly address one of the phrases at issue here.
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`II.
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`OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY AT ISSUE
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`A.
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`’610 Patent
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`The ’610 patent generally relates to the processing of large sets of data (often known today
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`as “big data”). The claimed inventions provide for more dynamic, customizable, and efficient
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`processing of large data sets over prior art methods. See, e.g., ’610 pat. at 2:58–61, 4:18–22. The
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`inventions thus increase efficiency and reduce processor execution time. See id. at 2:64–67
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`(explaining that the claimed invention “can make the processing of the output data more efficient
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`and/or convenient”).
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`Specifically, the ’610 patent states that the disclosed inventions “enhance[] the utility of
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`the MapReduce programming methodology.” Id. at Abstract; see also id. at 1:31–33, 1:66–2:2.
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`MapReduce methods consist of a map procedure to filter and/or sort data, and a reduce procedure
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`that “reduces” the data via some type of operation (for example, a counting, frequency
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`determination, or other summary operation). The ’610 patent explains that “conventional
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`MapReduce implementations do not have facility to efficiently process data from heterogeneous
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`sources” and that “it is impractical to perform joins over two relational tables that have different
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`schemas.” Id. at 3:9–20. To solve these problems, the ’610 patent discloses inventions where user-
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`configurable mapping functions are applied to data from discrete data sources that can have
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`different schema, followed by a reduce function on intermediate data based on a common key. As
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`the specification explains:
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`[T]he MapReduce concept may be utilized to carry out map processing
`independently on two or more related datasets (e.g., related by being characterized
`by a common key) even when the related data sets are heterogeneous with respect
`to each other, such as data tables organized according to different schema. The
`intermediate results of the map processing (key/value pairs) for a particular key can
`be processed together in a single reduce function by applying a different iterator to
`intermediate values for each group. In this way, operations on the two or more
`related datasets may be carried out more efficiently or in a way not even possible
`with the conventional MapReduce architecture.
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`Id. at 8:47–58.
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`An embodiment is shown below in FIG. 4, with, e.g., map tasks 402 and 404 (with
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`representative tables 302 and 304), partitioned data 406 and 408, and reduce tasks 410 and 412:
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`The map tasks 402 and 404 operate on two separate data groups, E and D, to produce intermediate
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`data, E’ and D’. Id. at 3:65–4:13. Each set of intermediate data is identifiable with the data group
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`from which it originated. The intermediate data is partitioned (406 and 408) and subsequently
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`passed to the reduce functions 410 and 412 to merge all of the intermediate data. Id. at 4:14–59.
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`The merger results in an output data group that is a useful joinder of the input data groups, such as
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`can be seen in, e.g., Figure 5 at 502.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`General Principles of Claim Construction
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`Claim construction is a legal question for the Court. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
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`Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372
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`(1996)). “When the parties raise an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of [the] … claims,
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`the court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
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`Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, “claim construction is a matter of resolution
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`of disputed meanings and technical scope, not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical
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`Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It is, thus, unnecessary for the Court
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`to construe terms that are not difficult to understand or that do not have particular technical
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`meanings. See, e.g., MV3 Partners LLC v. Roku, Inc., No. 6:18-CV-00308-ADA, ECF 90 at 6
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`(W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2019) (citing Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc., Case No. 2:12-CV-
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`00800-WCB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102136, at *7-9 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2014)).
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`B.
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`Plain and Ordinary Meaning
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`The “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp.
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`v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Importantly, the ordinary meaning of
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`a term is not determined in a vacuum. What matters is the ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art (“POSA”) in the context of the claimed invention. See Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices
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`Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the
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`term … in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written
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`description and the prosecution history.”). A POSA is deemed to have read the claim term in the
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`context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1482. Therefore, to ascertain the meaning of a
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`claim, the Court must look to the claim, the specification, and the patent’s prosecution history. Id.
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`at 1314–17.
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`The “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according
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`to their ordinary meaning are when the patentee (1) acts as his/her own lexicographer, or
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`(2) disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.
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`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To act as
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`lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” and
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`“clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. at 1365. To disavow the full scope of a claim
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`term, the patentee’s statements in the specification or prosecution history must represent “a clear
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`disavowal of claim scope.” Id. at 1366. When “an applicant’s statements are amenable to multiple
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`reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props.
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`Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Aylus Networks, Inc. v.
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`Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`C.
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`Reading Limitations into the Claims
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`Claims must also be read “in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Markman
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`v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “[T]he specification ‘is always
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`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best
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`guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d
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`at 1582). “‘Although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed
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`claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not
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`generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
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`1988)). “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
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`specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the
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`intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Leibel-Flarsheim Co. v.
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`Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
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`582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and
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`we will not limit him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification
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`into the claims.”).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`“processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
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`… based on the key in common.” (Claim 17)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. Not subject to 35
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and not indefinite. See also
`the proposed constructions for “data group”
`and “a plurality of mapping functions that are
`each user-configurable.”
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`Defendant’s Construction
`Governed by pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
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`Function: “partitioning … based on the key in
`common.”
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`Structure: Indefinite.
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`The phrase “processor and memory that are operable to perform the following operations:
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`… based on the key in common” (essentially, the entirely of Claim 17) should be given its plain
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`and ordinary meaning. Databricks’ only argument regarding this phrase is that it is means-plus-
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`function and the structure is indefinite. But Databricks fails to overcome the presumption that the
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`phrase is not is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and further fails to establish indefiniteness.
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`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (pre-
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`AIA); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc
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`in relevant portion). But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a
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`rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply if the term does not use the words “means”
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`or “steps for.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Williamson,
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`792 F.3d at 1348. The presumption can be overcome only if Databricks “demonstrates that the
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`claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting
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`sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Watts v.
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`XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`In this case, the subject claim does not recite the word “means” or “step for.” Therefore,
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`there is a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Databricks cannot rebut the
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`presumption because “the claim language, read in light of the specification, recites sufficiently
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`definite structure” to a POSA. Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366,
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`1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, a POSA would understand the structure
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`denoted by the disputed phrase for at least five reasons.
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`First, the claim itself outlines the “objectives” of the processor and memory recited in the
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`claim and how the processor and memory “operate[] within the context of the claimed invention.”
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`Intelligent Agency, LLC v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610,
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`at *39 (E.D. Tex. March 11, 2022). The entire claim sets out exactly what the processor and
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`memory must do. For example, and as Mr. Bill Davis (an expert in “computer information security,
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`distributed analytical systems for network detection and response platforms, and enterprise
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`dataflow management for indexing and search”) explains, “It is clear from the claim that the
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`processor and memory must, for example, partition data in a specific way, provide partitions to
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`mapping functions to create intermediate data in a specific way, and reduce the intermediate data
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`via processing that corresponds to the data groups in a specific way. This explains how the
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`‘processor’ and ‘memory’ operate within the context of the claimed invention, denoting sufficient
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`structure to a POSITA.” Ex. 2 (“Davis Decl.”), ¶¶ 1, 38-39. Thus, the claim language itself
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`provides sufficiently definite structure to one of skill in the art. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear
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`
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`Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1319-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding “circuit [for performing a function]” to
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`be sufficiently definite structure because the claim recited the “objectives and operations” of the
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`circuit); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
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`“heuristic [for performing a function]” to be sufficiently definite structure because the patent claim
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`described the operation and objectives of the heuristic); Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe
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`Sys., No. 15-cv-03853-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161809, at *11-*24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015)
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`(determining “code segment [for performing a function]” to be sufficiently definite structure
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`because the claim described the operation of the code segment); Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
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`No. 13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162504, at *31-*32 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015)
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`(determining “processor [for performing a function]” to be sufficiently definite structure because
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`the claim described how the processor functions with the other claim components).
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`Second, the specification extensively discusses a prior art reference that identifies specific
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`types (even brand names) of processors and memory that could be used in MapReduce
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`programming (which is what the ’610 patent aims to improve). See Ex. E to Davis Decl. at 3 (“For
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`example, one implementation may be suitable for a small shared-memory machine, another for a
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`large NUMA multi-processor, and yet another for an even larger collection of networked
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`machines.”; “Machines are typically dual-processor x86 processors running Linux, with 2-4 GB
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`of memory per machine.”); 4 (“The intermediate key/value pairs produced by the Map function
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`are buffered in memory.”; “If the amount of intermediate data is too large to fit in memory, an
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`external sort is used.”); 8 (“Each machine had two 2GHz Intel Xeon processors with Hyper-
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`Threading enabled, 4GB of memory, two 160GB IDE disks, and a gigabit Ethernet link.”); 11
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`(“We run on commodity processors to which a small number of disks are directly connected
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`instead of running directly on disk controller processors, but the general approach is similar.”).
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`Such discussion demonstrates “processor” and “memory” have well-understood and definite
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`structures to a POSA. See Davis Decl., ¶ 40.
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`Third, Databricks’ expert in the concluded IPR proceeding demonstrated his understanding
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`of “processor” and “memory” in his declaration supporting Databricks’ petition. Indeed, Dr. Lin
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`likened a processor and memory discussed in a prior art reference to the processor and memory
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`discussed in Claim 17; he also discussed a prior art “exemplary computer system” which included
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`processing units and memory. See Ex. C to Davis Decl., ¶¶ 154, 84; Davis Decl., ¶ 41. In other
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`words, Databricks understood processor and memory structures during the IPR, but apparently
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`does not understand them now. Id., ¶ 41.1
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`Fourth, prior art cited during prosecution of the ’610 patent includes ample discussion of
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`both processors and memory. See, e.g., Ex. G to Davis Decl. at 6:43-51 (“Processor 110 performs
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`computation and control functions of computer system 100, and comprises a suitable central
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`processing unit (CPU). Processor 10 may comprise a single integrated circuit, such as a
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`microprocessor, or may comprise any suitable number of integrated circuit devices and/or circuit
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`boards working in cooperation to accomplish the functions of a processor. Processor 110 suitably
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`executes object-oriented computer programs within main memory 120.”); 7:26-41 (“It should be
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`understood that for purposes of this application, in memory 120 is used in its broadest sense, and
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`can include Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), Static RAM (SRAM), flash memory,
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`cache memory, etc. While not explicitly shown in FIG. 1, memory 120 may be a single type of
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`memory component or may be composed of many different types of memory components. For
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`example, memory 120 and CPU 110 may be distributed across several different computers that
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`1 It bears mention that neither Databricks nor its expert asserted that this phrase required
`construction during IPR and, instead, accorded the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex.
`C to Davis Decl., ¶ 66.
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`collectively comprise system 100. It should also be understood that programs in memory 120 can
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`include any and all forms of computer programs, including Source code, intermediate code,
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`machine code, and any other representation of a computer program.”); Ex. H to Davis Decl., ¶ 61;
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`Davis Decl., ¶ 42. Again, this demonstrates that “processor” and “memory” were, and are, readily
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`understood structures. Id., ¶ 42.
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`Finally, both “processor” and “memory” have dictionary definitions pre-dating the ’610
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`patent, which “plainly indicate” that these terms denote structure. See Ex. I to Davis Decl.; Davis
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`Decl., ¶ 44; see also Linear Tech. Corp., 379 F.3d at 1320 (“Technical dictionaries, which are
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`evidence of the understandings of persons of skill in the technical arts, plainly indicate that the
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`term ‘circuit’ connotes structure.”) (internal citations omitted). In short, Databricks’ position2 that
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`the claim does not connote sufficient structure to a POSA is wrong.
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`Even if the Court deems § 112, ¶ 6 applicable, the claim would not be indefinite because
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`the specification provides sufficient structure. See Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d
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`1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (if a term is found to be a means-plus-function term, “the specification
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`must contain sufficient descriptive text by which a person of skill in the field of the invention
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`would know and understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation”) (“When dealing
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`with a ‘special purpose computer-implemented means-plus-function limitation,’ we require the
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`specification to disclose the algorithm for performing the function.”) (internal citations omitted).
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`Figures 4 and 5 and the accompanying discussions at column 3, line 35 through column 8, line 15
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`and column 8, lines 15 through 57 set out algorithms that perform the functions recited by Claim
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`2 Databricks’ arguments regarding the disputed limitation are found in the Declaration of Dr. Jon
`B. Weissman, which Databricks served concurrently with the filing of the parties’ Joint Claim
`Construction and Prehearing Statement. Dr. Weissman’s declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit
`3.
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`17. Each of these figures and their accompanying explanations walk through an embodiment of
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`the claimed functions in detail. These algorithms are undoubtedly “corresponding structure[s]”
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`that the specification “clearly links or associates” with the “function recited in” Claim 17.
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`Intelligent Agency, No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43610, at *14 (quoting
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`Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted).
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`The Court should thus reject Databricks’ argument that the disputed phrase is means-plus-
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`function and accord it plain and ordinary meaning. In the alternative, if the Court were to find that
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`the disputed phrase is subject to § 112, ¶ 6, the Court should find the phrase not indefinite because
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`structure is found in at least Figures 4 and 5 and the accompanying discussion.
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`B.
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`“mapping” / “map” / “mapped” (Claims 1, 17)
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`R2 Solutions’ Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Defendant’s Construction
`“[processing] / [process] / [processed]
`key/value pairs to generate intermediate
`key/value pairs”
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`The terms “mapping”/ “map” / “mapped” should be given their plain and ordinary
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`
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`meanings. The claims themselves elucidate exactly what these terms mean, requiring that the
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`mapping functions are “each user-configurable to independently output a plurality of lists of values
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`for each of a set of keys found in such map function’s corresponding data partition to form
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`corresponding intermediate data for that data group and identifiable to that data group.” In other
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`words, the claims explain what the mapping functions do and the mapping that they perform. The
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`claims are also consistent with the specification, which is replete with examples demonstrating
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`what mapping functions are and what they do. See ’610 pat. at Abstract; 2:1-42; 3:48-57; 6:18-35;
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`7:36-8:58; FIG. 1 (and related text); FIG. 2 (and related text); FIG. 3 (and related text); FIG. 4
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`(and related text); FIG. 5 (and related text). No constructions are needed in light of the claim
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`language.
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`Databricks’ proposed constructions are nonsensical. The terms “mapping” and “map” are
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`used almost exclusively as adjectives to describe a particular function (i.e., “mapping function”
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`and “map function”). Conversely, Databricks’ constructions treat the terms as verbs. Supplanting
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`the disputed terms with Databricks’ proposed constructions would, thus, lead to illiterate claim
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`limitations (e.g., “mapping function” would be mutated to “processing key/value pairs to generate
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`intermediate key/value pairs function”) that make little sense.
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`Setting aside the incongruity of Databricks’ proposal, its construction would render the
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`plain claim language inconsequential—indeed, the claims specify that the partitions input to the
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`mapping functions have key-value pairs, and that the mapping functions output “a plurality of lists
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`of values for each of a set of keys … to form corresponding intermediate data.” These features are
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`already recited in the claims; yet Databricks seeks to include them in the constructions. Allowing
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`Databricks its constructions, and accepting Databricks’ constructions, renders the claim language
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`impermissibly superfluous. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-17. The Court should reject
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`Databricks’ constructions and