Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 32 Filed 06/17/24 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 1034
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`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`R2 Solutions LLC,
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` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Databricks, Inc.,
`
` Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01147-ALM
`
`
`
`Jury Trial Demanded
`
`PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 32 Filed 06/17/24 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 1035
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 1
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 2
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`Public Interest Factors............................................................................................. 3
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`The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion in
`NDCA weigh against transfer. .................................................................... 3
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`Texas has a strong interest in deciding the issues of this case. ................... 4
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`Private Interest Factors ........................................................................................... 7
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`The relative ease of access to sources of proof does not favor transfer. ..... 7
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`Databricks has not identified any third-party witnesses who would
`be unwilling to testify. ................................................................................ 9
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`The cost of attendance for willing witnesses is neutral. ........................... 11
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`Practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious, and
`inexpensive weigh heavily against transfer. ............................................. 12
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13
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`i.
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`ii.
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`i.
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`ii.
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`iii.
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`iii.
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`A.
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`B.
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`ii
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
` 358 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`Adaptix, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship,
` No. 6:15-cv-00045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186704 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2015) ....................... 9
`
`Cooktek Induction Sys., LLC v. I/O Controls Corp.,
` 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100825 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2016) ......................................................... 4
`
`
`Dong Sik Yoo v. Kook Bin Im,
` 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, 2018 WL 549957 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2018) ............................. 8
`
`
`Gulf Oil Corp. P. Gilbert,
` 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947) ................................................................... 1
`
`
`Hoffman v. Blaski,
` 363 U.S. 335 (1960) .................................................................................................................... 2
`
`iFly Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GMBH,
` 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136537 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2015) .......................................................... 4
`
`
`In re Apple Inc.,
` 979 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`In re Genentech, Inc.,
` 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc.,
` 52 F.4th 625 (5th Cir. 2022) ........................................................................................... 1, 3, 8, 9
`
`
`In re Vistaprint Ltd.,
` 628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................. 12
`
`
`In re Volkswagen AG,
` 371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`
`In re Volkswagen,
` 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................. 12
`
`
`Lionra Tech. Limited v. Apple Inc.,
` No. W-22-CV-00351-ADA (W.D. Tex. May 9, 2023) .......................................................... 2, 9
`
`
`iii
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`

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`
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`Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
` 454 U.S. 235 (1981) ................................................................................................................ 1, 2
`
`
`Uniloc U.S. v. Huawei Device U.S.,
` 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234545 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2018) ......................................................... 9
`
`
`VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp.,
` 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56672 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007) ........................................................... 3
`
`Rules, Statutes and Regulations:
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ...................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(B) ........................................................................................................... 10
`
`iv
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`Defendant Databricks, Inc. (“Databricks”) asks this Court to transfer this case to the
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`Northern District of California (“NDCA”). While transfer to California may be convenient for
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`Databricks because its headquarters is there, mere convenience is not enough. Databricks must
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`show that NDCA is clearly more convenient than this District. See In re Planned Parenthood
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`Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2022). It has not done so. This District is both home
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`to R2 and much more convenient for R2’s witnesses. And while Databricks’ headquarters may be
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`in NDCA, it maintains a significant and telling presence in this District, with a number of highly
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`relevant employees. Finally, efficiency considerations strongly favor keeping the case in this
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`District. Because the public and private interest factors do not clearly weigh in favor of transfer,
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`the Court should deny Databricks’ motion.
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`I. LEGAL STANDARD
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`“[T]here is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum,
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`which may be overcome only when the private and public factors clearly point towards trial in the
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`alternative forum.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). “The determination of
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`‘convenience’ turns on a number of public and private interest factors, none of which can be said
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`to be of dispositive weight.” Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th
`
`Cir. 2004).1 “[T]he district court must weigh the private and public interest factors set forth in Gulf
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`Oil Corp. P. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947) to determine whether the
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`destination venue is clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff.” In re Planned
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`Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630 (internal citations omitted). The private interest factors include: “(1)
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`
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`1 Because transfer issues do not involve substantive patent law issues, Fifth Circuit law governs,
`not Federal Circuit law. See In re TS Tech United States Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
`2008).
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`1
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`
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`the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure
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`the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other
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`practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen
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`AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6). The public
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`factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local
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`interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law
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`that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws of the
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`application of foreign law.” Id. “Courts evaluate these factors based on the situation which existed
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`at the time of filing, rather than relying on hindsight knowledge of the defendant’s forum
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`preference.” Lionra Tech. Limited v. Apple Inc., No. W-22-CV-00351-ADA, slip op. at 19 (W.D.
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`Tex. May 9, 2023) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960)) (attached as Ex. 31).
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`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
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`Databricks failed to show that NDCA is clearly more convenient than this District. It
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`certainly is not convenient for R2—R2 is located here, its president lives in Austin, and transfer to
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`NDCA would delay R2’s right to trial by well over a year. Further, Databricks’ claim that NDCA
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`is more convenient than EDTX is undercut by Databricks’ 300 Texas employees and its Plano
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`office. Despite Databricks’ assertion that “[n]o relevant witnesses are located here” (Mot. at 1),
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`one of the Texas employees is Databricks’ Director of Technical Solutions for the accused
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`products. That makes him perhaps the most relevant witness. Moreover, Databricks failed to offer
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`any evidence that materials are more accessible in NDCA as compared to EDTX, failed to offer
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`any evidence that non-party witnesses it identified are unwilling to come to trial, failed to show
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`that it would be more cost efficient for willing witnesses to have trial in NDCA, and ignored the
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`2
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`
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`judicial economies that stem from keeping the case in EDTX. This case belongs in the Eastern
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`District of Texas.
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`A.
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`Public Interest Factors
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`Courts in this District typically treat two of the public interest factors as neutral in patent
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`cases: (1) familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (2) the avoidance of
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`unnecessary problems of conflicts of law. See, e.g., VCode Holdings, Inc. v. Cognex Corp., 2007
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`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56672, at *10–11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007). The two remaining factors—the
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`administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion and the local interest in having local
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`issues decided at home—weigh against transfer.
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`i.
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`The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion in
`NDCA weigh against transfer.
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`“To the extent that court congestion is relevant, the speed with which a case can come to
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`
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`trial and be resolved may be a factor.” In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “to the extent docket efficiency can be reliably estimated, the
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`district court is better placed to do so,” and the fact that a case “appears to be timely proceeding to
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`trial [in the current venue] … counsels against transfer.” In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at
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`631. This case will go to trial much faster in this District than in NDCA, weighing strongly against
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`transfer.
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`Transferring this case to NDCA would cause significant delay. The average time to trial in
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`NDCA for patent cases since 2020 is over sixteen months longer than EDTX (1311 days in NDCA
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`versus 815 days in EDTX). See Ex. 1.2 For the quarter ending December 31, 2023, the Federal
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`
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`2 All numbered Exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Carder W. Brooks, which is included
`with this Response as Exhibit A.
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`3
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`Court Management Statistics show that the median time to trial in all civil cases is 21.4 months in
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`EDTX and 48.9 months in NDCA. See Ex. 2 at 2, 3. These statistics also show that only 8% of
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`civil cases in EDTX are over three years old, while 21.7% of civil cases in NDCA are over three
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`years. Id. This is not a case in which the statistics show only a minor differences between two
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`districts—the differences are indisputable. This case will most certainly proceed to trial much
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`quicker in this Court than NDCA. This factor weighs heavily against transfer.3
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`ii.
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`Texas has a strong interest in deciding the issues of this case.
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`R2’s presence in this District and lack of ties to NDCA demonstrate this Court’s interest in
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`deciding this case. And while Databricks being headquartered in San Francisco gives NDCA an
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`interest, Databricks also makes this District its home, enhancing this Court’s interest. See ECF 1
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`at ¶¶ 2-6. Thus, this factor disfavors transfer.
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`Databricks is incorrect that R2 has only “limited ties” to this District and that it “likely has
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`no sources of proof in this District or even in the State of Texas.” Mot. at 5, 8. R2 is a Texas LLC
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`seeking to enforce its patents in its home District. See Cooktek Induction Sys., LLC v. I/O Controls
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`Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100825, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2016) (“Because Plaintiff is
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`located in Texas, and the owner of the patent at issue, this case does have a significant connection
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`to this district.”); see also iFly Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GMBH, 2015 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 136537, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2015) (“Texas residents have a strong interest in
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`deciding a patent infringement dispute involving a patent owned by a Texas company.”). R2 was
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`
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`3 Databricks’ reliance on Cellspin Soft to argue that this factor is neutral is misplaced. See Mot. at
`13 (citing Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-0455-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`171889, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 2023)). The plaintiff there did not appear to offer any evidence
`on the record that the time to trial in NDCA would be longer than in EDTX. See, e.g., Ex. 32 (Opp.
`to Mot. to Transfer Venue, 19, Cellspin Soft, No. 2:22-cv-0455-JRG-RSP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`171889). R2 has offered evidence here.
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`4
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`formed in Texas in 2016, and it has maintained places of business in Austin, Texas or in this
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`District the entire time. See Exs. 3-6; Ex. B at §§ 2-4, 6-7.* R2 conducts businessactivities in
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`EDTXandthis State in the form of, at least, managementofits substantial patent portfolio of over
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`2,000 U.S. patents (and 5,000 patents worldwide) and substantial licensing efforts. Ex. B at § 11.
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`Such business activities are spearheaded and carried out by R2’s President, Craig Yudell,? who
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`maintains a work addressin this District and works extensively from his residence in Austin. Jd.
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`at §§ 7, 11. Both R2 and its predecessor-in-interest to the asserted patents, a business called
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`Excalibur IP, LLC (with its own ties to Texas), have negotiated dozens of licenses for R2’s
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`portfolio outside of litigation. Jd. at §§ 9-11. Those licensing efforts are ongoing, and R2 plans to
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`continue its patent enforcement and non-litigation licensing efforts in this District and this State.
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`Id. at § 12. In fact, many of the patents in R2’s portfolio do not expire until the 2030s. Jd. at § 11.
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`Databricks’ relationship with Texas andthis District only embellishes this Court’s interest.
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`Databricks maintains a significant business presence in Texas and this District via its Plano
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`operations center. Indeed, notwithstandingits bald assertion that “[n]o relevant witnesses ... are
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`located here” (Mot. at 1), Databricks employs 300 people in Texas (see Ex. 7), with LinkedIn
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`showing 112 in the DFW metroplex (see Ex. 8) and 25 specifically in Plano (see Ex. 9). See also
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`ECF1 at §§ 4-6. Databricks’ Planoofficeis its on/y Texas office, meaning that the Plano office is
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`Databricks’ Texas hub. See Ex. 10.
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`* Exhibit B to this Response is the Declaration of Craig Yudell, R2 Solutions’ President.
`> Databricks alleges multiple times that Eric Lucas is R2 Solutions’ president. He is not. Craig
`Yudell has been R2 Solutions’ president since 2021. See Ex. B, § 2.
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`5
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`. ECF 20-2, § 12. Note that Databricks wascareful in its wording.
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`What matters is that Databricks has a Texas hubin Plano
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`to serve its Texas workforce, which consists of 300+ individuals, including engineering and
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`computer/data scientists. See, e.g., Ex. A, § 33 (table summarizing twenty current Databricks
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`employees in Texas with knowledge highly relevant to the accused systems); see also Exs. 7-9,
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`» uw S
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`In essence, Databricks’ relevant business practices are not
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`localized to NDCA as
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`Databricks suggests. Residents in this District invoke the accused systems(see, e.g., ECF 1, §J 7-
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`9), and Databricks employs engineers in Texas andthis District, including its Director of Technical
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`Solutions to deal with accused system operationsall over the world. This is a case with substantial
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`local ties to this District on both sides. The same cannotbe said for NDCA. Thus,this District has
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`a greaterinterest in hearing this case.
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`B.
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`Private Interest Factors
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`Databricks failed to demonstrate that any of the private interest factors weigh in favor of
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`transfer. Databricks did not show that evidence is more accessible in NDCA,that there are any
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`unwilling witnesses for whom NDCA would be more convenient, that it will be easier for willing
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`witnesses to testify i NDCA,orthat any practical considerations favor NDCA.
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`i.
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`Therelative ease of access to sources of proof does not favor transfer.
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`Databricks’ argument that this factor weighs in favor of transfer is two-fold: (1) all of
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`Databricks’ relevant materials are located in NDCA,and (2) “R2 likely has no sources of proof in
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`this district or even in the State of Texas.” Mot. at 8. Databricks is wrong on both counts.
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`Second, Databricks is mistaken that “R2 likely has no sources of proofin this district or
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`even in the State of Texas.” Mot. at 8. As discussed above, R2 has important ties to Texas, and
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`substantially all (if not all) of R2’s documents are presently located on serversat the offices of its
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`outside counsel in Fort Worth. See Ex. B, § 14; see also Ex. A, § 34. Such documents include
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`information relevant to patent prosecution, ownership, infringement, damages (such as license
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`agreements involving the asserted patents), and validity (including variousasserted prior art). Jd.
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`No physical copies of these documents are located in NDCA.Jd.
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`For the purposes of analyzing this factor, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]he location of
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`evidence bears much morestrongly on the transfer analysis when ... the evidence is physical in
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`nature.” Jn re Planned Parenthood, 52 FAth at 630; see also In re Apple Inc. 979 F.3d 1332, 1339-
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`40 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Even if Databricks possesses physical evidence relevantto this case, it has not
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`shown as much, and has otherwise failed to show that any such documents are so voluminous as
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`to present a burden to transport them to EDTX. See Dong Sik Yoo v. Kook Bin Im, 2018 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 11246, 2018 WL 549957,at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2018) (“[T]he location of documents is
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`
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`given little weight in determining proper venue unless the documents ‘are so voluminous [that]
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`their transport is a major undertaking.’”) (citations omitted). Thus, this factor is neutral.
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`ii.
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`Databricks has not identified any third-party witnesses who would be
`unwilling to testify.
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`The majority of Databricks’ exhibits to its motion are offered to demonstrate that
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`
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`individuals Databricks deems relevant non-party witnesses are located in NDCA. But Databricks’
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`arguments on this point are flawed. Fifth Circuit precedent is clear: “the availability of compulsory
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`process receives less weight when it has not been alleged or shown that any witness would be
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`unwilling to testify.” In re Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630-31. In Planned Parenthood, the
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`Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s finding that “that this factor did not weigh in favor of transfer
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`[when] the [defendants] failed to identify any witnesses who would be unwilling to testify.” Id;
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`see also Uniloc U.S. v. Huawei Device U.S., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234545, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
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`6, 2018) (holding that the party seeking transfer bears the burden of identifying unwilling witnesses
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`who would benefit from transfer). Such is the case here. Databricks has not shown that any of the
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`third-party witnesses identified would be unwilling to testify, so this factor should be given no
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`weight.
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`Furthermore, Databricks failed to establish the “relevancy and materiality of the
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`information such witnesses would provide” to help courts assess if they “would be deposed, called
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`to trial, or both.” Adaptix, Inc. v. Cellco P’ship, No. 6:15-cv-00045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`186704, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2015). No invalidity contentions have been served in this case,
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`so Databricks’ arguments regarding inventors of claimed prior art are “speculative and based on
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`art that might not be asserted.” Lionra Tech., No. W-22-CV-00351-ADA, slip op. at 39 (attached
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`as Ex. 31). Thus, such argument should be afforded little weight because “to allow parties to
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`consider prior art witnesses without requiring them to actually use the references invites substantial
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`9
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`gamesmanship in identifying references to inflate the number of relevant prior art witnesses.” Id.
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`Furthermore, as Databricks recognizes, the Dean/Ghemawat references were “specifically
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`mentioned in the asserted patents themselves” (Mot. at 10) and were before the USPTO during
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`prosecution, meaning that they are less likely to be asserted as prior art in this case. See id.
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`Additionally, this Court, not NDCA, has compulsory process over at least one highly
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`relevant witness who R2 solutions intends to depose and call to trial. Federal courts may compel a
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`witness’s attendance at trial, hearing, or deposition by subpoena if the court is located in the same
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`state where the witness “resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if the
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`person … is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.” Fed. R. Civ.
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`P. 45(c)(1)(B). Paul Reidy resides in Texas and possesses evidence relevant to R2’s damages case.
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`Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-6, 8-10; Ex. 33. Mr. Reidy was the President of Excalibur IP, LLC (“Excalibur”). Ex.
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`33. The patent-in-suit was previously owned by Excalibur, and Mr. Reidy previously owned R2.
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`Ex. 4; Ex. B, ¶¶ 6, 8. Mr. Reidy negotiated licensing agreements involving the patents-in-suit while
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`they were owned by Excalibur. Ex. B, ¶¶ 5, 9. This information is highly relevant to evaluating the
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`damages that R2 is owed by virtue of Databricks’ infringing activities. Traveling from Austin to
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`Sherman will not cause Mr. Reidy to incur substantial expense in comparison to traveling to
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`California. See KT Imaging, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35071, at * 10-11 (“While Spring is at least
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`four hours away by car from Sherman, it is easier for Spring employees to drive a few hours than
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`to fly to another state.”). If this Court determines that the distance between Austin and Sherman is
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`so great that it would inflict substantial expense on Mr. Reidy, R2 will pay Mr. Reidy’s travel
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`expenses. See id. at * 10–11 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2021) (“As KTI pledges to pay expenses for those
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`non-East Texas HP witnesses, they would not incur a substantial expense.”). Thus, compulsory
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`process is available in this District, and not NDCA, for at least one relevant third-party witness.
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`10
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`Because Databricksfailed to establish that any of the third-party witnessesit identified are
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`unwilling to testify, and because this Court and not NDCA has compulsory process available as to
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`Mr. Reidy,this factor is neutral.
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`ili.
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`The cost of attendance for willing witnesses is neutral.
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`Databricks’ arguments regarding cost of attendance echo those madewith respect to other
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`factors, namely, that the accused products were designed/developed in NDCA ad
`a See Mot. at 11. This fails for two reasons.Furst,
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`Second,
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`Databricks simply pretends that it does not have 300+ employees in Texas with easier access to
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`this Court. This includes Databricks’ Director of Technical Solutions, Mr. Raratharajan, a highly
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`relevant witness who “lead[s] the Spark and Cloud Technical Solutions team for the Americas”
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`and is the “[g]lobal lead for Spark Solutions Team.” See Ex. 11. It would clearly be more
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`convenient for Mr. Raratharajan to attend trial in this District than in NDCA. And further, R2
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`Solutions has identified over 100 Databricks employees located in the DFW area andthis District
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`(see Ex. 8), dozens of whom have material information as to the value and functionality of the
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`accused systems. See Ex. A, § 33 (table summarizing twenty current Databricks employees in
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`Texas with knowledgehighly relevant to the accused systems).Po
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`— —
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 32 Filed 06/17/24 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 1049
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`As for R2, Craig Yudell is its President, and he will willingly testify at trial. Ex. B at ¶¶ 2,
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`15. Mr. Yudell lives in Austin, Texas, and travel for trial in Sherman, Texas is more convenient
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`for him than NDCA. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16. He has relevant and extensive knowledge of at least: (i) the
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`R2 patent portfolio; (ii) company ownership, operations, and financials; and (iii) the licensing of
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`the asserted patents. Id. at ¶ 13. Accordingly, and on balance, this factor is at least neutral.
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`iv.
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`Practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious, and
`inexpensive weigh heavily against transfer.
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`Transferring this case to NDCA will create significant diseconomies. “[I]t is entirely within
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`the district court’s discretion to conclude that in a given case the § 1404(a) factors of public interest
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`or judicial economy can be of ‘paramount consideration.’” In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342,
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`1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Volkswagen, 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). This
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`Court has substantial experience with the patent-in-suit based on prior litigation—indeed, this
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`patent has been asserted in this Court in sixteen different cases (Ex. 36), “which included [claim
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`construction] hearing[s] and lengthy opinion[s] construing various claim terms” on two different
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`occasions. Id. at 1344; see also Exs. 34, 35.
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`For its part, Databricks does not analyze this factor and merely concludes its neutrality
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`“because the case is in its early stages, and there is no related co-pending litigation in this District.”
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`Mot. at 13. But this ignores the fact that it is entirely proper for the Court to “consider any judicial
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`economy benefits which would have been apparent at the time the suit was filed,” including “a
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`district court’s experience with a patent in prior litigation.” In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973,
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`976 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (non-precedential) (holding that “a district court’s experience with a patent
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`in prior litigation” is a “permissible consideration[]” in “ruling on a motion to transfer venue.”).
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`This Court is already familiar with the patent-in-suit, including claim construction issues. It would
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`be inefficient for another court to start from scratch. See In re Volkswagen, 566 F.3d at 1351
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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 32 Filed 06/17/24 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 1050
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`(“Although these cases may not involve precisely the same issues, there will be significant overlap
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`and a familiarity with the patents could preserve time and resources.”). Accordingly, this factor
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`weighs heavily against transfer.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Databricks has not demonstrated that the public and private factors weigh in favor of
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`transfer. Considering all relevant factors, Databricks failed to meet its burden and this Court should
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`deny Databricks’ motion. To the extent that the Court is inclined to transfer the case, R2 requests
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`that the Court order venue discovery to give R2 the opportunity to further substantiate that this
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`case belongs here.
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`Dated: June 10, 2024
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`13
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Edward R. Nelson III
`EDWARD R. NELSON III
`State Bar No. 00797142
`ed@nelbum.com
`BRENT N. BUMGARDNER
`State Bar No. 00795272
`brent@nelbum.com
`CHRISTOPHER G. GRANAGHAN
`State Bar No. 24078585
`chris@nelbum.com
`JOHN P. MURPHY
`State Bar No. 24056024
`murphy@nelbum.com
`CARDER W. BROOKS
`State Bar No. 24105536
`carder@nelbum.com
`NELSON BUMGARDNER CONROY PC
`3131 West 7th Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`817.377.9111
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`COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
`R2 SOLUTIONS LLC
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-01147-ALM Document 32 Filed 06/17/24 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 1051
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that the foregoing document was served via electronic mail upon all
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`counsel of record on this the 10th day of June, 2024.
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`/s/ Edward R. Nelson III
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`CERTIFICATE OF MOTION TO SEAL
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`Pursuant to Local Rule CV-5(a)(7), I hereby certify that an unopposed motion to seal was
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`electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF filing system on this the 10th day
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`of June, 2024 to file under seal this Response, Exhibit B, and Exhibit 4.
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`/s/ Edward R. Nelson III
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`14
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