Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 1501
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Before the Court is Defendant Lenovo Group Limited’s (“LGL”) Motion to Dismiss for
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`Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 24.) Having considered the Motion, the
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`subsequent briefing, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Motion should be
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`DENIED.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Eireog Innovations Limited (“Eireog”) filed suit on April 11, 2024, alleging that
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`LGL infringes four United States patents. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1.) Eireog filed its Amended Complaint
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`against LGL on June 4, 2024, alleging that LGL infringes five United States patents. (Dkt. No. 12
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`EIREOG INNOVATIONS LTD.,
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`v.
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`LENOVO GROUP LIMITED,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`EIREOG INNOVATIONS LTD.,
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`v.
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`HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE
`COMPANY,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00239-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00279-JRG-RSP
`(MEMBER CASE)
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`§
`§
`§
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`§
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`§
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` §
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`§
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 1502
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`¶ 1.) Eireog asserts that some of LGL’s products using Intel-based CPUs, including Lenovo-
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`branded servers, workstations, laptops, and desktops, infringe the asserted patents. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 4,
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`15.) LGL is a Chinese company with its principal place of business in Hong Kong. (Dkt. No. 12 ¶
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`3; Dkt. No. 24 at 2.) Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo US”) and Lenovo Global Technology
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`(United States) Inc. (“Lenovo Global Tech.”) are wholly owned subsidiaries of LGL. (Dkt. No. 12
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`¶¶ 5-7; see also Dkt. No. 24 at 2-3.) Lenovo US and Lenovo Tech are headquartered in Morrisville,
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`North Carolina. (Dkt. No. 12 ¶¶ 5-7.)
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`LGL moves to dismiss Eireog’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A.
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`Specific Personal Jurisdiction
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`“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if the court
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`does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Cunningham v. CBC Conglomerate, LLC,
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`359 F. Supp. 3d 471, 476 (E.D. Tex. 2019). Where a claim involves substantive questions of patent
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`law, the Court applies Federal Circuit law to evaluate personal jurisdiction. NexLearn, LLC v. Allen
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`Interactions, Inc., 859 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, the Fifth Circuit relies on the
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`same analysis as the Federal Circuit in deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists. Packless
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`Metal Hose, Inc. v. Extek Energy Equip. (Zhejiang) Co., 2011 WL 504048, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Tex.
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`Feb. 10, 2011).
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`Personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant where a forum state’s long-arm statute permits
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`service of process and where assertion of personal jurisdiction does not violate due process.
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`NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1375. Due to Texas’s long-arm statute being “coextensive with the Due
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`Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the two inquiries merge.” Carmona v. Leo Ship
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`Mgmt., Inc., 924 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2019). To satisfy due process, a defendant must have
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`2
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 1503
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`“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
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`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
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`316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted). “The Federal Circuit applies a three-prong test to
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`determine if specific jurisdiction exists: (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed activities
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`at residents of the forum; (2) whether the claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3)
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`whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy
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`Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the burden to show that
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`the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum under the first two prongs. Elecs. for Imaging,
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`Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Upon a showing of minimum contacts, the
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`defendant bears the burden to prove unreasonableness. Id. In rare circumstances, a defendant may
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`defeat the exercise of personal jurisdiction by “present[ing] a compelling case that the presence of
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`some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v.
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`Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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`The minimum contacts test is satisfied if a defendant “delivers its products into the stream
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`of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.”
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`Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
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`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)). The existence of an
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`“established distribution channel into the forum” is a “significant factor” when evaluating the
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`strength of a non-movant’s stream-of-commerce theory. See id. at 1565 n.15. The Supreme Court
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`has, however, introduced a split of authority as to what is required to establish minimum contacts
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`under a stream-of-commerce theory. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly refused to endorse either
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`articulation of the stream-of-commerce theory. See, e.g., id. at 1566 (“We need not join this debate
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`here, since we find that, under either version of the stream of commerce theory, plaintiff made the
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`3
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 1504
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`required jurisdictional showing.”); see also AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d
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`1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Thus, Beverly Hills Fan counsels that we refrain from taking a
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`position on the proper articulation of the stream-of-commerce theory where the facts of a particular
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`case mandate exercising or declining to exercise personal jurisdiction under any articulation of
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`that theory.”). Instead, the Federal Circuit’s approach is to determine whether the plaintiff can
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`establish minimum contacts—or has failed to establish minimum contacts—under both theories,
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`making the choice between theories unnecessary. AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 1364. The Federal Circuit
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`has explained that defendants fall under the stream-of-commerce theory where “defendants, acting
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`in consort, placed the accused [product] in the stream of commerce, they knew the likely
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`destination of the products, and their conduct and connections with the forum state were such that
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`they should reasonably have anticipated being brought into court there.” Beverly Hills Fan, 21
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`F.3d at 1566 (emphasis added).
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`“When the district court’s determination of personal jurisdiction is based on affidavits and
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`other written materials, and no jurisdictional hearing is conducted, the plaintiff usually bears only
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`a prima facie burden.” Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`“To make that showing, [the plaintiff] need only demonstrate facts that, if true, would support
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`jurisdiction over the Defendants.” Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 888 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`“Unless directly contravened, [the plaintiff’s] version of the facts is taken as true, and conflicts
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`between the facts contained in declarations submitted by the two sides must be resolved in [the
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`plaintiff’s] favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction
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`exists.” Id.
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`B.
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`Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(2)
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`Personal jurisdiction may exist under Rule 4(k)(2) where “(A) the defendant is not subject
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`to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is
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`4
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 1505
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`consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). A court may
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`exercise jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) if “(1) the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, (2)
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`the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, and (3) the
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`exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air
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`Ltda., 890 F.3d 995, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Come
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`de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The three-step due process analysis
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`under specific jurisdiction and Rule 4(k)(2) are similar. Id. However, Rule 4(k)(2) “contemplates
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`a defendant’s contacts with the entire United States, as opposed to the state in which the district
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`court sits.” Id. (quoting Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1295).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Specific Jurisdiction1
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`1.
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`LGL has Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Texas
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`LGL argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction because LGL does not direct any
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`activities at Texas. (Dkt. No. 24 at 6-8.) LGL asserts that it is merely a holding company that does
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`not place anything into the stream of commerce. (Id.) LGL argues that it does not control its
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`subsidiaries’ activities concerning the accused products. (Id. at 8-10.) LGL argues that the Court
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`should not depart from controlling law rejecting personal jurisdiction over a parent company when
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`the plaintiff’s allegations are directed to the actions of a subsidiary. (Id. at 8.) LGL asserts that
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`“LGL has purposefully chosen to structure its conduct such that it should not be rendered liable to
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`suit in any venue in the United States,” “a choice that LGL is entitled to make and is a choice that
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`is routinely respected by the United States legal system.” (Id.)
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`In support of its Motion, LGL attached a declaration from Adrian Chim, Director of Group
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`1 Here, general jurisdiction is not at issue. Therefore, the Court’s analysis is limited to whether LGL is subject to
`specific jurisdiction in Texas.
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`5
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 1506
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`Financial Reporting and Accounting Policy at Lenovo Hong Kong Services Limited (the “Chim
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`Declaration”). (Dkt. No. 24-1.) The Chim Declaration states that LGL is a holding company that
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`“does not itself manufacture, sell, offer for sale, export, import, or otherwise distribute any
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`Lenovo-branded products” and does not “itself distribute any Lenovo-branded products through
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`established distribution channels.” (Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 3.) The Chim Declaration admits that Lenovo
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`US, LGL’s wholly owned subsidiary, “is the entity responsible for selling Lenovo-branded
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`computing device products in the United States.” (Id. ¶ 6.) The Chim Declaration admits that
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`Lenovo Global Tech, LGL’s wholly owned subsidiary, “is the entity responsible for selling
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`Lenovo-branded server products in the United States.” (Id. ¶ 7.) LGL contends that Eireog’s
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`allegations that LGL controls its subsidiaries’ activities concerning the accused products are
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`“conclusory and . . . contradicted by the Chim Declaration.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 9.)
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`Eireog responds that its “Amended Complaint alleges facts demonstrating that LGL has
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`sufficient minimum contacts with Texas under the stream of commerce theory.” (Dkt. No. 40 at
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`5.) Eireog alleges that LGL “alone and through its U.S.-based subsidiaries (such as Lenovo US
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`and Lenovo Tech.), places such infringing products into the stream of commerce via established
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`distribution channels knowing or understanding that such products would be sold and used in the
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`United States, including in the Eastern District of Texas” (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 9).) Eireog also
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`alleges that LGL “is responsible for importing, making, marketing, distributing, offering for sale,
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`and/or selling Lenovo-branded servers, workstations, laptops, and desktops in the United States
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`(directly or through its wholly-owned subsidiaries), including in this District.” (Id. (citing Dkt. No.
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`12 ¶ 3).) Eireog asserts that evidence supports the allegations in its Amended Complaint, including
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`LGL’s website (Lenovo.com) and LGL’s 2022/23 Annual Report. (Id. at 6-7.) Eireog also asserts
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`that Lenovo US and Lenovo Tech are registered to do business in Texas. (Id. at 7 (citing Dkt. No.
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`6
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`12 ¶¶ 6-7).)
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`Further, Eireog argues that LGL portrays itself and its subsidiaries as a single company.
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`(Id. at 6-8.) Specifically, Eireog argues that LGL “documents demonstrate that (1) Lenovo U.S. is
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`a wholly owned subsidiary of LGL, (2) the board of directors of LGL controls the entire Lenovo
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`family, including Lenovo U.S., and (3) the corporate officers have dual roles in both LGL and its
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`subsidiaries. (Id. at 18 (citing Dkt. No. 40-5 (LGL 2022/23 Annual Report) at 8-13, 61, 80, 279,
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`281; Dkt. No. 40-6 (ESG Report) at 11).) Eireog also identifies locations of authorized sellers and
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`sales representatives that sell, or at least offer for sale, the accused products in Texas. (Id. (citing
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`Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 4).) Eireog presents additional evidence that a factual conflict exists concerning
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`whether LGL has a United States presence and whether LGL shares its management-level
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`employees with its US-based subsidiaries. (Id. at 9-10, 18.)
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`LGL’s reply reiterates its argument that Eireog cannot establish that LGL places anything
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`into the stream of commerce. (Dkt. No. 47 at 1-6.) LGL asserts that Eireog’s opposition does “not
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`rebut the facts set forth in the Chim declaration.” (Id. at 1.) In response to Eireog’s citation to
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`statements from LGL’s 2022/2023 Annual Report, LGL’s Environment, Social, and Governance
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`Report (“ESG Report”), and LGL’s website, LGL asserts that the cited “excerpts are not tied
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`specifically to LGL and instead describe LGL’s subsidiaries.” (Id. at 2-3.) LGL also asserts that
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`the individuals Eireog identified as potential LGL US-based employees are not LGL employees.
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`(Id. at 3.) LGL then contends that even if LGL had US-based employees, “there is no suggestion
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`those employees would play a role in the manufacturing, sale, and distribution of Lenovo-branded
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`products, and their presence would not alter the personal jurisdiction analysis as a result.” (Id. at
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`4.) LGL asserts that “corporate formalities are not mere niceties that can be ignored in the personal
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`jurisdiction analysis.” (Id. at 6.)
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`7
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`Eireog’s sur-reply reiterates its argument that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction
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`over LGL under the stream of commerce theory. (Dkt. No. 50 at 1-5.) Eireog emphasizes its
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`argument that LGL portrays itself and its subsidiaries as a single company. (Id. at 2.) Eireog argues
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`that contrary to LGL’s assertion that the 2022/2023 Annual Report refers to the global family of
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`companies as Lenovo, the Annual Report is entitled “Lenovo Group Limited 2022/23 Annual
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`Report,” reinforcing Eireog’s contention “that there is no distinction between the acts of LGL and
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`those of its subsidiaries.” (Id. at 2 (emphasis added by Eireog).) Eireog also argues that LGL’s
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`website (Lenovo.com), does not distinguish between LGL and its subsidiaries. (Id. at 4.) Eireog
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`further points out that LGL fails to address that LGL’s wholly owned subsidiaries provide for the
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`distribution of IT products in the United States, LGL’s wholly owned subsidiaries are registered
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`to do business in Texas, and LGL has a presence in Texas through its third-party retailers. (Id. at
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`2-3.) Eireog also asserts that evidence contradicts LGL’s assertion that it has no US-based
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`employees. (Id. at 3-4.)
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`Viewing Eireog’s allegations as true and the factual conflicts in Eireog’s favor, the Court
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`finds that Eireog has made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction in Texas. Eireog’s
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`Amended Complaint alleges that LGL at least acts in concert with its wholly owned subsidiaries
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`to deliver the accused products into the Texas market under a stream of commerce theory. Eireog
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`alleges that LGL’s distribution channel—comprising its wholly owned subsidiaries—is arranged
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`in a way that LGL “knew, or reasonably could have foreseen, that a termination point of the
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`channel” was Texas. Beverly Hills, 21 F.3d at 1564. LGL’s status as a holding company does not
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`remove it from this Court’s personal jurisdiction. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
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`Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 779 (5th Cir. 2018).
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`LGL attempts to use the Chim Declaration to detach LGL from its subsidiaries. (See
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`8
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`generally Dkt. 24-1.) However, the Chim Declaration fails to rebut all Eireog’s allegations and
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`supporting evidence. For example, Mr. Chim is the Director of Group Financial Reporting and
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`Accounting Policy at Lenovo Hong Kong Services Limited, not LGL. (Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 1.) The
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`fact that Mr. Chim opines on the relationship between LGL and its subsidiaries as an employee of
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`an LGL subsidiary indicates that there is at least some degree of lack of separateness between LGL
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`and its subsidiaries. As another example, the Chim Declaration contends that LGL has no
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`employees or place of business in the United States. (Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 3.) However, Eireog presents
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`evidence that LGL has employees living and working in the United States, including in Texas.
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`(Dkt. No. 40 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 50 at 3-4.) Eireog further presents evidence that LGL provides
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`pension plans, savings plans, and deferred compensation benefits to certain United States regular,
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`full-time, and part-time employees. (Dkt. No. 40 at 18 (citing Dkt. No. 40-5 (LGL 2022/23 Annual
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`Report) at 162-64.) To the extent the Chim Declaration conflicts with Eireog’s well-pleaded
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`allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court must view the well-pleaded allegations in the
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`light most favorable to Eireog. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en
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`banc) (courts “must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
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`favor of the nonmoving party”).
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`Throughout its Motion, LGL argues that courts in other districts have already addressed
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`the issue of personal jurisdiction over LGL, holding that LGL is not subject to personal jurisdiction
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`in those districts under either an agency or stream of commerce theory. (E.g., Dkt. No. 24 at 11,
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`15-16.) However, the Court does not find those authorities persuasive in this case. Here, as
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`discussed above, there are open factual disputes as to whether LGL created, controls, or directs its
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`subsidiaries to place the allegedly infringing products into the stream of commerce in Texas.
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`Instead, the Court finds the decisions of other Texas district courts, including another court
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`9
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`in this district, more persuasive. In those cases, the courts found jurisdiction over LGL based on
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`its conduct related to some of the same accused products and based on similar evidence and
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`reasoning. See AX Wireless LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, 2023 WL
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`7105701 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-
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`RSP, Dkt. No. 119 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2023) and ACQIS LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., 572 F. Supp.
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`3d 291 (W.D. Tex. 2021). In both those cases, this district and the Western District of Texas
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`rejected many of the same arguments that LGL presents here. This district found that the plaintiff
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`made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory by acting
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`in consort with its subsidiaries to deliver the accused product into the Untied States market,
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`including Texas. AX Wireless, 2023 WL 7105701, at *3-5 (Magistrate Payne recommending
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`denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff established a prima facie case
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`under a stream of commerce theory); see also AX Wireless, No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, Dkt. No.
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`119 at 6-10 (Judge Schroeder adopting Judge Payne’s recommendation).2 The Western District of
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`Texas also found that there was sufficient evidence to support personal jurisdiction over LGL
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`based on LGL’s contacts and purposeful availment under a stream of commerce theory. ACQIS,
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`572 F. Supp. 3d, 306.3
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`LGL chose to conduct business in Texas through its subsidiaries. LGL uses its multi-level
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`corporate structure to place the accused products in the stream of commerce—resulting in the
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`accused products being sold or offered for sale in Texas. LGL cannot now claim a due process
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`violation when Texas courts exercise jurisdiction over it for claims arising from or relating to these
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`2 In the alternative, Magistrate Payne also found personal jurisdiction proper under Rule 4(k)(2).
`3 The Western District of Texas also found that, in the alternative, the purposeful contacts by the other defendants—
`LGL subsidiaries, including Lenovo US—are imputable to LGL. Id. at 306-07.
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`10
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`sales.4
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`2.
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`Eireog’s Claims Arise from or Relate to LGL’s Texas Contacts
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`LGL argues that Eireog’s claims do not arise out of or relate to LGL’s Texas contacts
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`because LGL does not direct any activities at Texas. (Dkt. No. 24 at 6-8.) Eireog’s infringement
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`claims arise from LGL “making, using, offering for sale, selling and/or importing into the United
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`States the Accused Products.” (E.g., Dkt. No. 12 ¶¶ 17, 27, 37, 47, 57.) LGL, directly or indirectly,
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`places the accused products into the stream of commerce throughout the United States, including
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`Texas. Accordingly, Eireog’s claims for patent infringement arise from or relate to LGL’s contacts
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`with Texas.
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`3.
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`The Exercise of Jurisdiction is Reasonable and Fair
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`To evaluate whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair, the Court
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`weighs five factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum State; (3) the
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`plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
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`most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in
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`furthering substantive social policies. Patent Rts. Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc.,
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`603 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77). “When a defendant
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`seeks to rely on the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ factor to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction by
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`a court that otherwise would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, ‘he must present a
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`compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
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`unreasonable.’” Nuance, 626 F.3d at 1231 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
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`Under the first factor, LGL argues that “requiring LGL to litigate in Texas would be
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`unreasonable” because “LGL is a holding company that does not make or sell any products, . . .
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`4 Because the Court finds personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory proper, the Court need not address
`Eireog’s other theories.
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`11
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`does not conduct business in Texas, and maintains its headquarters and principal place of business
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`. . . in Hong Kong. (Dkt. No. 24 at 17.) As to the remaining factors, LGL argues that Texas has no
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`interest in resolving the present dispute because neither party has any Texas ties.5 (Id. at 17.) LGL
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`also contends that exercising jurisdiction would not result in efficiency and no interest would be
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`served because Eireog’s claims are not viable. (Id.)
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`The Court finds that while LGL may be slightly burdened by defending in a foreign forum,
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`“progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a lawsuit in a foreign
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`tribunal less burdensome.” Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1299 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
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`at 294). The second, third, and fourth factors further favor jurisdiction because both Texas and the
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`United States have an interest in enforcing federal patent laws and providing Eireog a forum to
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`efficiently pursue its claims for patent infringement and for the parties to efficiently resolve their
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`disputes. See id. (“The United States also has an interest in discouraging injuries that occur within
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`its boundaries, including injuries resulting from patent infringement.”). As to the fifth factor, the
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`United States and Texas have an interest in furthering their social policies to discourage patent
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`infringement.
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`Accordingly, the Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over LGL is both
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`reasonable and fair.
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`B.
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`Rule 4(k)(2)
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`Alternatively, the Court also has personal jurisdiction over LGL pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2).
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`LGL argues that Rule 4(k)(2) does not provide an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction
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`because LGL does not conduct business in the United States. (Dkt. No. 24 at 18.) In response,
`
`
`5 LGL also argues that “Eireog’s allegations of U.S. activity are directed at Lenovo US and Lenovo Global Tech, who
`are subject to suit in other venues that would have a more particularized local interest in deciding this case.” (Dkt. No.
`24 at 17.) However, LGL has not moved to dismiss this case for improper venue. LGL’s Motion is limited to lack of
`personal jurisdiction. (See generally id.)
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 1513
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`Eireog argues that “LGL delivers its infringing products into the stream of commerce with the
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`expectation that they will be purchased in the United States generally.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 20.)
`
`1.
`
`Eireog’s Patent Infringement Claims Arise Under Federal Law
`
`The first prong of Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the claim against the defendant arises under
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`federal law. Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1290. It is undisputed that federal patent law governs Eireog’s
`
`patent infringement allegations. 28 U.S.C. § 1338; Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1296 (“The claim of patent
`
`infringement presents a federal question”). Therefore, the first prong of Rule 4(k)(2) is satisfied.
`
`2.
`
`LGL Contends it is Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in any United
`States Forum
`
`The second prong of Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the defendant is not subject to the personal
`
`jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction. Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1290. If the defendant
`
`“contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other where suit is
`
`possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).” Merial, Ltd. v. Cipla, Ltd., 681 F.3d
`
`1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, a defendant who wants to preclude the use of Rule 4(k)(2)
`
`has only to name some other state in which the suit could proceed. Id.
`
`Here, LGL contends that it cannot be sued in Texas. (E.g., Dkt. No. 24 at 8.) However,
`
`LGL does not name any other state where the suit could proceed. (See generally id. at 6-8, 18.)
`
`Therefore, the second prong of Rule 4(k)(2) is satisfied.
`
`3.
`
`The Court’s Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Comports with Due
`Process
`
`The third prong of Rule 4(k)(2) requires that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
`
`comports with due process. Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1290. This analysis “contemplates a defendant’s
`
`contacts with the entire United States, as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.” Id.
`
`at 1295 (emphasis added). To determine whether a defendant has minimum contacts, the court
`
`considers whether “(1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum;
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 56 Filed 10/17/24 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 1514
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`(2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activities with the forum; and (3) assertion
`
`of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” M-I Drilling, 890 F.3d at 1000. Thus, Rule 4(k)(2)
`
`serves as a federal long-arm statute. Id. at 1296.
`
`Here, given that the Court has already concluded that it has personal jurisdiction over LGL
`
`based on its contacts with Texas, the Court also finds that it has personal jurisdiction over LGL
`
`based on its contacts directed to the United States at large. LGL has sufficient minimum contacts
`
`with the United States under the stream of commerce theory. (See supra Section III.A.1.) Eireog’s
`
`claims arise out of or related to LGL’s activities in the United States. (See supra Section III.A.2.)
`
`Finally, the Court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over LGL is reasonable and fair. (See supra
`
`Section III.A.3.)
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`Accordingly, in the alternative, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over LGL
`
`under Rule 4(k)(2).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`Having considered the Motion, the Court finds that it should be and hereby is DENIED.
`
`
`
`14
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`.
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`____________________________________
`RODNEY GILSTRAP
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`So ORDERED and SIGNED this 16th day of October, 2024.
`
`