Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 24 Filed 07/18/24 Page 1 of 26 PageID #: 985
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`Oke UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`EIREOG INNOVATIONS LTD.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case No. 2:24-cv-00239-JRG
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`v.
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`LENOVO GROUP LIMITED,
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT LENOVO GROUP LIMITED’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 24 Filed 07/18/24 Page 2 of 26 PageID #: 986
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`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
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`V.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
`Background ........................................................................................................................ 1
`Legal Standard ................................................................................................................... 3
`The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over LGH ............................................................ 4
`A.
`There Is No General Jurisdiction Over LGL. ........................................................ 4
`B.
`There Is No Specific Jurisdiction Over LGL. ........................................................ 5
`1.
`LGL Has Not Directed Any Activities At Texas. ...................................... 6
`2.
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`Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Lie Under An Agency Or Alter Ego
`Theory. ....................................................................................................... 8
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`3.
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`4.
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`Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Lie Under A Stream-Of-Commerce
`Theory. ..................................................................................................... 14
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`Exercising Specific Jurisdiction Over LGL Would Be
`Unreasonable............................................................................................ 16
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`C.
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`Rule 4(k)(2) Does Not Provide an Alternate Basis for Personal
`Jurisdiction. .......................................................................................................... 18
`Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 19
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`Case 2:24-cv-00239-JRG Document 24 Filed 07/18/24 Page 3 of 26 PageID #: 987
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`3G Licensing, S.A. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`No. 1:17-cv-84-LPS, 2019 WL 3974539 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2019), report and
`recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 7635823 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2019) ......................... passim
`
`ACQIS LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`572 F. Supp. 3d 291 (W.D. Tex. 2021)............................................................................ passim
`
`Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB,
`205 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................13
`
`Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ...........................................................................................8
`
`Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987) .....................................................................................................14, 16, 17
`
`Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd.,
`566 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................3
`
`AX Wireless LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, 2023 WL 7105701 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023) ................... passim
`
`B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. Zodiac Aerospace,
`No. 2:16-cv-01417-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 7140299 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018),
`report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 354883 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28,
`2019) ..........................................................................................................................................8
`
`Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc.,
`556 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................10
`
`BRFHH Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr.,
`49 F.4th 520 (5th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................10
`
`Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.,
`582 U.S. 255 (2017) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
`471 U.S. 462 (1985) .....................................................................................................4, 5, 7, 17
`
`CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Signify N.V.,
`628 F. Supp. 3d 996 (C.D. Cal. 2022) .......................................................................................8
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`
`
`Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc.,
`924 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2019) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co.,
`792 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................9
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`571 U.S. 117 (2014) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Quimbey ex rel. Faure v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-559, 2015 WL 13651236 (D.N.M. Sept. 22, 2015) ..................................................8
`
`Fellowship Filtering Techs. v. Alibaba.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-2049-JRG, 2016 WL 6917272 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2016) .......................10, 11, 13
`
`Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
`592 U.S. 351 (2021) .......................................................................................................3, 4, 5, 7
`
`Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc.,
`379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
`564 U.S. 915 (2011) ...............................................................................................................3, 5
`
`In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
`624 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Hanson v. Denckla,
`357 U.S. 235 (1958) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp.,
`710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983) .............................................................................................9, 13
`
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
`326 U.S. 310 (1945) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc.,
`952 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2015) .....................................................................................................9
`
`Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,
`681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................18
`
`NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc.,
`859 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3
`
`Orange Elec. Co. Ltd. v. Autel Intelligent Tech. Corp. Ltd.,
`No. 2:21-cv-240-JRG, Dkt. No. 217-1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2024) ..........................................18
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`
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`Pat. Rts. Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc.,
`603 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................16, 17
`
`PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
`235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007) ......................................................................................................9
`
`Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy,
`829 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................14, 15
`
`Theta IP, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,
`No. 1:22-cv-3441, 2024 WL 1283706 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2024) .................................... passim
`
`Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prod., Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................7
`
`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
`444 U.S. 286 (1980) ...............................................................................................................4, 7
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fourteenth Amendment ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) ........................................................................................3
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`Rule 4(k)(2) ....................................................................................................................................18
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`United States Constitution .............................................................................................................18
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`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
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`Whether this case should be dismissed because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
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`defendant Lenovo Group Limited.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`An Irish non-practicing patentee, Eireog Innovations Limited (“Eireog”) has sued a Hong
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`Kong holding entity, Lenovo Group Limited (“LGL”), for patent infringement. Neither company
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`has ties to this District. Eireog is a privately held Irish company organized and existing under the
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`laws of Ireland, with its principal place of business in Dublin. Eireog conducts no non-litigation
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`activity in Texas. LGL is a holding company that makes no products, sells no products, and does
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`not avail itself of the laws of Texas. LGL has not made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported
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`anything accused of infringement, in Texas or anywhere else. LGL has neither physical locations
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`nor employees in Texas or elsewhere in the United States.
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`None of this is a surprise to Eireog. It filed suit knowing that different, legally distinct
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`corporations—Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo US”) and Lenovo Global Technology
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`(United States) Inc. (“Lenovo Global Tech”)—are responsible for the accused activities in the
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`United States, and those distinct corporations are properly subject to suit in other venues. Eireog’s
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`choice of forum cannot trump the basic requirements of haling a foreign defendant into an
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`unforeseen court. Under these facts, an exercise of personal jurisdiction over the sole named
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`defendant, LGL, is contrary to the law and the interests of justice.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Eireog filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this action on June 4, 2024. See Dkt.
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`No. 12. In its FAC, Eireog alleges that LGL infringes five patents. In general, Eireog contends
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`that various Lenovo-branded computing and server products infringe the claims of the asserted
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`patents by virtue of purported processor interrupt management and cache processing functionality,
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`allegedly claimed in the asserted patents. In its FAC, Eireog provides a series of conclusory
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`allegations to further its assertion that personal jurisdiction lies in this case. Eireog alleges,
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`without support, that LGL “does business in Texas and in the Eastern District of Texas, directly or
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`through intermediaries.” Id. ¶ 3. Eireog similarly speculates that LGL places the accused products
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`“into the stream of commerce via established distribution channels knowing or understanding that
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`such products would be sold and used in the United States, including in the Eastern District of
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`Texas.” Id. ¶ 4. And Eireog alleges that LGL and its subsidiaries “operate as agents of one another
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`and vicariously as parts of the same business group to work in concert together.” Id. ¶ 8.
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`The true facts are that LGL conducts no activities in or directed to this forum or even in
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`the United States. LGL, the only named defendant, is a holding company based in Hong Kong
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`that serves as a direct and indirect parent company for its subsidiaries. See Ex. 1, Declaration of
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`Adrian Chim (“Chim Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3. LGL does not manufacture, sell, offer for sale, export,
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`import, or otherwise distribute any Lenovo-branded products. Id. ¶ 3; see also Ex. 2, 2023/24
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`Environmental, Social and Governance Report, Lenovo Group Limited at 10, n. 1 (LGL is a
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`“holding company” that “does not design, develop, manufacture, or distribute products or
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`services, or control any activities of the Company’s subsidiaries”). Moreover, LGL does not
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`operate in the United States, nor does it make products for or offer services to customers in the
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`United States, via Lenovo.com or otherwise. Chim Decl. ¶ 4.
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`The Lenovo-branded computing and server products that are accused in this case are
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`imported and sold by the LGL subsidiaries Lenovo US and Lenovo Global Tech, respectively,
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`which are separate corporations from one another and separate corporations from parent LGL. Id.
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`¶¶ 3, 6-7. Lenovo US buys computing products from Lenovo PC HK, another LGL subsidiary,
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`then imports them into the United States for sale. Id. ¶ 6. Lenovo Global Tech buys server
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`products from Lenovo Global Technology HK Ltd., itself another LGL subsidiary, then imports
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`them into the United States for sale. Id. ¶ 7. LGL has no involvement in the daily business
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`activities and decisions of Lenovo US or Lenovo Global Tech that pertain to the use, sale,
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`offering for sale, marketing, distribution, or importation of Lenovo-branded products in the
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`United States. Id. ¶ 8. Lenovo US, Lenovo Global Tech, and LGL have entirely distinct sets of
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`officers and directors, file separate tax returns, and maintain separate properties. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a
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`complaint on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. As applied
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`to patent claims, the existence of personal jurisdiction is evaluated under Federal Circuit law.
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`NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc., 859 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal
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`Circuit’s inquiry asks “whether a forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of process and
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`whether assertion of personal jurisdiction violates due process.” Id. (quoting Autogenomics, Inc. v.
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`Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “Because Texas’s long arm
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`statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the two
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`inquiries merge.” Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc., 924 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations
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`omitted).
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`Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction if one
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`of two types of jurisdiction lies: general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co. v.
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`Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 352 (2021). General jurisdiction extends to any and
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`all claims brought against a defendant, but it lies “only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’
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`in the [forum] State.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
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`915, 919 (2011)). For a corporation, general jurisdiction typically lies in its “place of
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`incorporation and principal place of business.” Id. at 359.
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`Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, “covers defendants less intimately connected with a
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`State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Id. For the exercise of specific jurisdiction to be
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`proper, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
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`principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
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`subject to the State’s regulation.’” Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
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`San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).
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`The Due Process Clause permits the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant only
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`if there are sufficient “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state “such that
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`the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
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`justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). Such contacts
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`exist if the defendant has “‘purposefully directed’ its activities at residents of the forum” and “the
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`litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King
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`Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citations omitted). In other words, a defendant is
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`subject to jurisdiction only if it conducted activity in the forum state such that it should
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`“reasonably anticipate being haled into court” there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
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`444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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`IV.
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`THE COURT LACKS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER LGH
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`A.
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`There Is No General Jurisdiction Over LGL.
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`Although Eireog does not allege that LGL is subject to general jurisdiction in this District,
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`LGL addresses this issue to demonstrate that LGL is not subject to general jurisdiction in this
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`District. The exercise of general jurisdiction is proper only when the defendant is “essentially at
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`home” in the forum state; for corporations, this typically occurs at a defendant’s place of
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`incorporation and its place of business. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 358-59. As Eireog admits,
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`LGL is a foreign company organized under the laws of China with headquarters in Hong Kong.
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`Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 3. Thus, neither of the usual prerequisites for general jurisdiction are present here.
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`Absent those two prerequisites, Eireog must allege that LGL’s affiliations with Texas are
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`“so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler
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`AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). Eireog’s
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`allegations on this point are threadbare—Eireog merely speculates that LGL “does business in
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`Texas and in the Eastern District of Texas, directly or through intermediaries,” in connection with
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`the sale, marketing, and distribution of Lenovo-branded computer products. Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 3. Even
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`if it were true that LGL conducts such activities in Texas (which it does not) and those contacts
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`were deemed sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction, LGL presumably would be
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`subject to general jurisdiction in all 50 states—because Lenovo-branded products are sold
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`nationwide. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 (“[T]he same global reach would presumably be
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`available in every other State in which [the defendant’s subsidiary’s] sales are sizable.”); see also
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`Chim Decl. ¶¶ 3-9. As the Supreme Court explained in Daimler, exercising jurisdiction in that
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`scenario is “exorbitant” and would prevent defendants from “structur[ing] their primary conduct
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`with some minimum assurance as to whether that conduct will and will not render them liable to
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`suit.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
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`In short, LGL has no contacts with Texas that are sufficiently “continuous and systematic”
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`so as to “render [it] essentially at home” in Texas. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Thus, there can
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`be no general jurisdiction over LGL.
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`B.
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`There Is No Specific Jurisdiction Over LGL.
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`LGL is not subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas either. Specific jurisdiction lies when
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`there is “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity
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`or occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”
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`Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted). LGL has not directed any activities at Texas.
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`Eireog’s FAC suggests two baseless theories under which specific jurisdiction might lie: (1) the
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`activities of LGL’s subsidiaries can be imputed to LGL under an agency or “alter ego” theory;
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`and (2) LGL and its subsidiaries act together to place the accused products into the stream of
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`commerce, knowing that the products would be sold and used in the United States and specifically
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`in Texas. See Dkt. No. 12 ¶¶ 8-9. Neither theory supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction
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`against LGL.
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`This Court is not the first to address the issue of personal jurisdiction over LGL. Courts in
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`the District of Delaware and the Northern District of Illinois have held that LGL is not subject to
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`personal jurisdiction in those districts under either an agency or a stream-of-commerce theory. See
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`3G Licensing, S.A. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 1:17-cv-84-LPS, 2019 WL 3974539, at *4-9 (D. Del.
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`Aug. 22, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 7635823 (D. Del. Sept. 19,
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`2019); Theta IP, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 1:22-cv-3441, 2024 WL 1283706, at *4-7
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`(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2024). However, courts in the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas have
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`denied motions to dismiss LGL for lack of personal jurisdiction. See AX Wireless LLC v. Lenovo
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`Grp. Ltd., No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, 2023 WL 7105701, at *1-6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023)
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`(report and recommendation) (mandamus petition dismissed without ruling); ACQIS LLC v.
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`Lenovo Grp. Ltd., 572 F. Supp. 3d 291, 305-07 (W.D. Tex. 2021). For the reasons explained
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`below, this Court should adopt the reasoning of the 3G Licensing and Theta IP decisions.
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`1.
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`LGL Has Not Directed Any Activities At Texas.
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`First, LGL has not directed any activities at Texas, let alone activities that relate to
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`Eireog’s allegations of patent infringement. As explained in the Chim Declaration, LGL is a
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`holding company that conducts no activity in the United States or in Texas. Chim Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.
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`Specifically, LGL does not “manufacture, sell, offer for sale, export, import, or otherwise
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`distribute any Lenovo-branded products.” Id. ¶ 3; see also Ex. 2 at 10, n. 1 (LGL is a “holding
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`company” that “does not design, develop, manufacture, or distribute products or services, or
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`control any activities of the Company’s subsidiaries”). It does not “make products for the United
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`States market[] or offer services to customers in the United States[]” nor does it have any
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`presence (physical or otherwise) in Texas or any other state. Chim Decl. ¶ 4. And LGL does not
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`control the activities of its subsidiaries with respect to any Lenovo-branded products, including
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`the accused products, in the United States or in Texas specifically. Id. ¶¶ 8-14.
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`LGL’s lack of contacts with Texas is critical because a key principle underlying the
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`Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is the concept of “purposeful availment.”
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`Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 359). That is, the defendant
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`“must take ‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
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`activities within the forum State.’” Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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`The reason for that requirement, the Court has explained, is that defendants must be able to
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`“structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
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`will not render them liable to suit.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting World-Wide
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`Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
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`The existence of the Lenovo.com website, which LGL does not operate, and its
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`accessibility from Texas and this District is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. See Dkt.
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`No. 12 ¶ 4; see also Chim Decl. ¶ 5. The Lenovo.com website is available to all customers
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`throughout the world with Internet access. Eireog has not identified something that demonstrates
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`that the Lenovo.com website is “directed at customers” in Texas or this District. See Trintec
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`Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prod., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Pedre’s
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`website is not directed at customers in the District of Columbia, but instead is available to all
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`customers throughout the country who have access to the Internet.”); see also Chim Decl. ¶ 5
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`(LGL does not itself engage in any sales, advertising, or marketing efforts targeting Texas or
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`anywhere in the United States).
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`By refraining from engaging in any contacts with Texas or the United States, LGL has
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`purposefully chosen to structure its conduct such that it should not be rendered liable to suit in any
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`venue in the United States. That is a choice that LGL is entitled to make and is a choice that is
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`routinely respected by the United States legal system. Courts routinely hold that a parent holding
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`company is not subject to suit when the plaintiff’s allegations are principally directed to the
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`actions of a subsidiary. See B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. Zodiac Aerospace, No. 2:16-cv-01417-JRG-
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`RSP, 2018 WL 7140299, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,
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`2019 WL 354883 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2019) (dismissing “holding companies” that “do not make
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`or sell anything”); CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Signify N.V., 628 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
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`(“Plaintiff does not establish that Defendant [a holding company] itself places any product in the
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`stream of commerce.”); Quimbey ex rel. Faure v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 14-cv-559, 2015
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`WL 13651236, at *7-8 (D.N.M. Sept. 22, 2015) (no specific jurisdiction where “[u]ncontroverted
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`evidence establishe[d] that [the defendant was] a holding company” that did not operate the
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`hospital where the alleged events occurred); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d
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`620, 622 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (no jurisdiction over “a holding company which neither transacts
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`business nor contracts to provide products or services in Illinois”).
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`Because LGL conducts no activities whatsoever in Texas, there can be no specific
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`jurisdiction over LGL.
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`2.
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`Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Lie Under An Agency Or Alter Ego
`Theory.
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`Second, there is no specific jurisdiction over LGL under an agency or alter ego theory.
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`Eireog speculates that LGL’s United States-based subsidiaries are LGL’s “agents” and
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`“vicariously” act at the direction and control of LGL with respect to the accused products. Dkt.
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`No. 12 ¶ 8. That allegation is conclusory and is contradicted by the Chim Declaration. Chim Decl.
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`¶¶ 6-14. The facts therefore do not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over LGL under
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`either theory.
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`As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the
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`jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing business there; the
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`mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the assertion of
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`jurisdiction over the foreign parent.” Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th
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`Cir. 1983); see also Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 346 (5th Cir.
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`2004) (“the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation may not be
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`based solely upon the contacts with the forum state of another corporate entity with which the
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`defendant may be affiliated.”). For the actions of a subsidiary to be imputed to a foreign parent,
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`the parent must “exert[] such domination and control over its subsidiary ‘that they do not in
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`reality constitute separate and distinct corporate entities’” but are instead “one and the same
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`corporation for purposes of jurisdiction.” Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159. (citation omitted). LGL
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`does not exert such dominion and control over its subsidiaries. See Chim Decl. ¶¶ 8-14.
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`Likewise, as the Federal Circuit explained in Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., to
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`establish jurisdiction under an agency theory, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant
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`exercises control over the activities of [a] third party.” 792 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`However, the degree of control exercised to establish jurisdiction must be “greater than that
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`normally associated with common ownership and directorship; the evidence must show that the
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`two entities cease to be separate so that the corporate fiction should be disregarded to prevent
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`fraud or injustice.” Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 952 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 2015)
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`(quoting PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Tex. 2007)). To the
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`extent that Federal Circuit law and Fifth Circuit law differ on the question of whether LGL’s
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`subsidiaries are its agents or alter egos, Fifth Circuit law controls because those issues are not
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`unique to patent law. See Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
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`2009) (“We apply the law of the regional circuit on non-patent issues.”).
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`Eireog offers nothing but speculation to suggest that LGL exercises control over its
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`subsidiaries with respect to the accused products. Eireog cites one passage from LGL’s 2022/23
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`Annual Report, which states in relevant part: “Lenovo Group Limited … and its subsidiaries …
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`develop, manufacture and market reliable, high-quality, secure and easy-to-use technology
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`products and services.” Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 8 (quoting Dkt. No. 12-1 at 192); but see Ex. 2 at 10, n. 1
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`(LGL is a “holding company” that “does not design, develop, manufacture, or distribute products
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`or services, or control any activities of the Company’s subsidiaries”). Eireog also alleges that the
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`report identifies certain wholly owned subsidiaries of LGL as “principal subsidiaries.” Id.
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`(quoting Dkt. No. 12-1 at 276). The statements Eireog cites are general statements about global
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`operations that are not tied to particular businesses, and thus offer no detail about the relationship
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`between LGL and its subsidiaries. As the Chim Declaration explains, LGL exercises no control
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`over those entities. See Chim Decl. ¶¶ 8-14. “[E]ven one hundred percent ownership of a
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`subsidiary is not a sufficient basis to disregard the corporate form.” Fellowship Filtering Techs. v.
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`Alibaba.com, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2049-JRG, 2016 WL 6917272, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2016)
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`(finding the actions of the Alibaba Group to be “nothing more than a typical parent-subsidiary
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`corporate relationship”). Finally, Eireog offers a conclusory allegation – which is not true – that
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`LGL infringes the asserted claims “directly and/or through subsidiaries or intermediaries.” Dkt.
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`No. 12 ¶ 11. The Court is not required to accept such conclusory allegations as true. See BRFHH
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`Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 49 F.4th 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2022) (at the pleading
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`stage, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” are not
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`accepted as true) (quoting In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir.
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`2010)); Fellowship Filtering, 2016 WL 6917272, at *5 (“such conclusory statements, without
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`more, do not counsel in favor of disregarding the corporate form.”).
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`The district court in 3G Licensing rejected an agency theory of personal jurisdiction with
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`respect to LGL. There, the plaintiff provided excerpts from an LGL annual report (similar to the
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`one cited in Eireog’s FAC) and made several conclusory allegations about the relationship
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`between LGL and its subsidiaries. 3G Licensing, 2019 WL 3974539, at *4-5,