Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 1 of 37 PageID #: 581
`
`
`SLYDE ANALYTICS LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`§
`
`§
`Case No. 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP
`§
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`§
`§
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS, AMERICA,
`INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`SLYDE ANALYTICS LLC’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 2 of 37 PageID #: 582
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`Governing Law ................................................................................................. 1
`
`III.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ............................................................ 1
`
`IV. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS ....................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`’033 Patent ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Term 1: “gear train” (Claims 1, 18, ’033 Patent”).................................... 2
`
`Term 2: “simulation of a mechanical watch movement comprising
`a gear train, said simulation being visible so as to indicate the time”
`(Claim 1, ’033 Patent”) .......................................................................... 4
`
`Term 3: “mechanical watch” (Claim 1, ’033 Patent”) .............................. 5
`
`Term 4: “synchronizing the displayed time by said displayed
`mechanical movement with that of said quartz oscillator” (Claim
`1, ’033 Patent”)...................................................................................... 6
`
`B.
`
`’922 Patent ....................................................................................................... 9
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Term 5: “cause said several available cards to scroll past” (Claims
`1 and 23, ’922 Patent”) .......................................................................... 9
`
`Term 6: “scrolling on a digital matrix display of several available
`cards” (Claim 9, ’922 Patent) ............................................................... 11
`
`Term 7: “A method for replacing an initially displayed card
`displayed by a wristwatch by a replacement card, the method
`having the following steps:” (Claim 9,’922 Patent) ............................... 12
`
`4.
`
`Term 8: “A wristwatch” (Claims 1, 23, 24, ’922 Patent) ........................ 14
`
`C.
`
`’678 Patent ..................................................................................................... 15
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Term 9: “A method combining gesture detection . . .” (Claim 1,
`’678 Patent) ......................................................................................... 15
`
`Term 10: “other processing means . . .” (Claim 1, ’678 Patent) /
`“other processing means . . .” (Claim 14, ’678 Patent) ........................... 16
`
`i
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 3 of 37 PageID #: 583
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`Term 11: “discriminating between gesture and no gesture” (Claims
`1, 14, ’678 Patent)................................................................................ 20
`
`Term 12: “using said microcontroller for detecting said gesture and
`for discriminating between gesture and no gesture based at least on
`signals from the touch panel” (Claim 1, ’678 Patent)............................. 23
`
`Term 13: “said gesture being a tap or a double tap” (Claim 11, ’678
`Patent) ................................................................................................. 24
`
`Term 14: “A wristwatch which can be operated in a plurality of
`power modes including a first power mode and a second power
`mode” (Claim 14, ’678 Patent) ............................................................. 26
`
`D.
`
`’085 Patent ..................................................................................................... 27
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Term 15: “A method for switching a wristwatch from a first power
`mode to a second power mode” (Claim 1, ’085 Patent).......................... 27
`
`Term 16: “a duration between the starting position and the final
`position is in a predefined range” (Claim 1, ’085 Patent) ....................... 28
`
`CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 29
`
`V.
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 4 of 37 PageID #: 584
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`AGIS Software Dev., LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`No. 2:17-cv-513-JRG, 2018 WL 4908169 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018) ................................... 1
`
`Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................. 13, 28
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 11, 22, 29
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................... 12
`
`Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
`320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 26
`
`C-Cation Techs., LLC v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-00059-JRG-
`RSP,
`2015 WL 1849014 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2015) ....................................................... 13, 27, 28
`
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................ 8
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................passim
`
`Clear with Computs., LLC v. AGCO Corp.,
`No. 6:12-CV-622, 2014 WL 2700376 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2014) ................................. 10, 12
`
`Dareltech, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 4:18cv702, 2020 WL 1248500 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2020)............................................. 9
`
`Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
`412 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................ 20
`
`EON Corp. IP Hldgs., LLC v. Verizon Clinton Ctr. Drive Corp.,
`736 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Tex. 2010)............................................................................. 15
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ 10
`
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 22, 29
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 5 of 37 PageID #: 585
`
`Konami Corp. v. Roxor Games, Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Tex. 2006)............................................................. 12, 13, 16, 26
`
`Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp.,
`790 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`Masimo Corp. v. Sotera Wireless, Inc.,
`No. 2022-1393, 2023 WL 6990542 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2023) ............................................ 18
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 12, 21, 29
`
`Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`742 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010)................................................................... 5
`
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................ 14
`
`Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc.,
`406 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Tex. 2005)................................................................................. 6
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 2, 5, 8, 21
`
`RFCyber Corp. v. Google LLC,
`No. 2:20-CV-274-JRG, 2021 WL 5357465 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) .............................. 16
`
`Salazar v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 2:16-CV-01096-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 5021986 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017)....................... 3
`
`Seoul Semiconductor Co. v. Nichia Corp.,
`596 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (E.D. Tex. 2009)............................................................................... 1
`
`SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 2:19-CV-115-JRG, 2020 WL 1536152 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2020)................................. 3
`
`Skedco, Inc. v. Strategic Operations, Inc.,
`685 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017).................................................................................... 22
`
`Versata Software, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
`No. 2:06-CV-358, 2008 WL 3914098 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2008) ........................................ 3
`
`Visible Connections, LLC v. Zoho Corp.,
`418 F. Supp. 3d 155 (W.D. Tex. 2019) ............................................................................. 28
`
`W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, LLC,
`370 F.3d 1343.................................................................................................................... 5
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 6 of 37 PageID #: 586
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6................................................................................................... 17, 18, 19
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 7 of 37 PageID #: 587
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(a) and the Court’s Third Amended Docket Control Order of October
`
`5, 2023 (Dkt. 33), Plaintiff Slyde Analytics LLC (“Slyde”) hereby submits its Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief. The asserted patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 9,804,678 (the “’678 Patent,” Ex.
`
`A), 10,198,085 (the “’085 Patent,” Ex. B), 8,588,033 (the “’033 Patent,” Ex. C), and 9,651,922
`
`(the “’922 Patent,” Ex. D) (together, the “Asserted Patents”). This brief is supported by the expert
`
`Declaration of Dr. Fabio Chiussi. Ex. E, Declaration of Dr. Fabio Chiussi Regarding Claim
`
`Construction.
`
`II.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`A.
`
`Governing Law
`
`The governing legal standards relating to claim construction are described in the Court’s
`
`opinion in AGIS Software Dev., LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc., No. 2:17-cv-513-JRG, 2018
`
`WL 4908169, at *3-5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018) and are hereby incorporated by reference. See also
`
`Seoul Semiconductor Co. v. Nichia Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
`
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`For this case, the relevant time period for interpreting the claims of the Asserted Patents is
`
`October 18, 2011 for the ’678 and ’085 Patents, the date being the filing date of the earliest
`
`application, Swiss Patent Application CH2011/1689, March 30, 2010 for the ’033 Patent, the filing
`
`date of the earliest application, Swiss Patent Application CH2010/0463, and July 3, 2009 for the
`
`’933 Patent, the filing date of the earliest application, Swiss Patent Application CH2009/1036.
`
`Plaintiff proposes that the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have at
`
`least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, with two to three years of
`
`experience in the field of UX/UI navigation, haptics, power management, or motion detection in
`
`mobile devices, smart watches, or other wearables. Ex. E, ¶ 59. Extensive experience and technical
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 8 of 37 PageID #: 588
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`training might substitute for educational requirements, while advanced degrees might substitute
`
`for experience, such as a relevant M.S. or Ph.D. Id.
`
`Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Fabio Chiussi is considered to be a POSITA at the time of the
`
`invention(s), and Dr. Chiussi has submitted an expert declaration regarding certain claim
`
`constructions from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Ex. E.
`
`IV. DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
`
`A.
`
`’033 Patent
`
`1.
`
`Term 1: “gear train” (Claims 1, 18, ’033 Patent”)
`
`Slyde’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`A combination of two or more gears that
`transmit motion from one shaft to another.
`
`
`
`A representative example of how the claim term “gear train” is used in the Asserted Claims
`
`as follows: “a microcontroller being arranged for reproducing on said electronic display the
`
`simulation of a mechanical watch movement comprising a gear train.” Ex. C, ’033 Patent at claim
`
`1 (emphasis added).
`
`Plaintiff proposes the term “gear train” should be construed according to its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning because a POSITA would understand this claim term without further
`
`construction. In contrast, Defendants’ proposal introduces new unclaimed terms (e.g., “shaft” and
`
`“transmit motion”), and would only give rise to confusion and ambiguity in the context of the
`
`claimed mechanical simulation displayed on a screen. This proposal is, at best, superfluous.
`
`Defendants’ reliance on dictionary definitions is further improper because “gear train” is not
`
`confusing or ambiguous, and is readily understandable to a lay juror. See Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]hile extrinsic evidence ‘can shed useful light on the
`
`relevant art,’ we have explained that it is ‘less significant than the intrinsic record in determining
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 9 of 37 PageID #: 589
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`‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’’”). Specifically, Defendants propose that “gear
`
`train” be construed as “a combination of two more gears that transmit motion from one shaft to
`
`another.” However, Defendants’ proposal introduces additional limitations and components,
`
`including a “shaft.” The claims and specification of the ’033 Patent do not recite “shaft,” nor is it
`
`necessary to understand the claims and the invention. See Versata Software, Inc. v. Sun
`
`Microsystems, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-358, 2008 WL 3914098, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2008)
`
`(“‘Sun’s proposed construction is incomplete at best, because the specification does not refer to
`
`‘operations’ or ‘behavior.’ The plaintiffs are correct that the specification is silent to these terms,
`
`and Sun reaches to extrinsic evidence to support the inclusion of ‘operations’ or ‘behavior.’”); see
`
`also Salazar v. HTC Corp., No. 2:16-CV-01096-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 5021986, at *7 (E.D. Tex.
`
`Nov. 3, 2017) (“The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments. Specifically, the Court is
`
`not convinced that a change of the word is appropriate or helpful or the inclusion of the phrase
`
`‘through the selector’ is warranted.”).
`
`Here, Defendants cannot demonstrate that this claim term is ambiguous, such that reliance
`
`on extrinsic evidence is necessary. See SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:19-CV-115-
`
`JRG, 2020 WL 1536152, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2020) (“[R]eliance on dictionary definitions at
`
`the expense of the specification had the effect of ‘focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning
`
`of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.’”).
`
`Accordingly, this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction should be rejected.
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 10 of 37 PageID #: 590
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`2.
`
`Term 2: “simulation of a mechanical watch movement
`comprising a gear train, said simulation being visible so as to
`indicate the time” (Claim 1, ’033 Patent”)
`
`Slyde’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`A simulation of a mechanical watch with a
`gear train where the positions of the internal
`components and the resulting time are
`calculated and displayed according to the
`components’ interactions.
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction is superfluous, introduces ambiguity, and attempts to
`
`improperly limit this claim term. As a preliminary matter, Defendants’ proposal introduces an
`
`additional limitation: that the “positions of the internal components and the resulting time are
`
`calculated.” Defendants’ proposal is not supported by the claims or specification.
`
`As a threshold matter, Defendants seek to introduce an unclaimed requirement that the
`
`“resulting time” be “calculated.” There is no basis to read this limitation into the claims. While
`
`Defendants apparently seek to limit the claims to certain disclosed embodiments, generally
`
`discussing “a realistic simulation of a complex mechanical movement to be calculated and
`
`displayed in real time,” neither do they identify any lexicography or clear and unambiguous
`
`disclaimer. Nor does the calculation of movements discussed in the specification even necessarily
`
`require a separate calculation of time, as Defendants’ proposal apparently requires. See e.g., Ex.
`
`C, 2:53-58. Indeed, a similar limitation reciting “wherein the displayed time depends on said
`
`simulation” is already recited in Claim 9, which depends on Claim 1. Defendants’ proposal further
`
`violates the principle of claim differentiation by attempting to import this limitation to Claim 1.
`
`Defendants’ reliance on dictionary definitions to construe “simulation” is also improper. A
`
`“simulation” (e.g., comprising a “movement” and “gear train” “being visible so as to indicate
`
`time”) is readily understandable in the context of the claim. There is no legitimate basis to resort
`
`to extrinsic dictionaries, which “by their nature, provide an expansive array of definitions.”
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 11 of 37 PageID #: 591
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321; id. at 1322 (“resulting definitions therefore do not necessarily reflect
`
`the inventor’s goal of distinctly setting forth his invention as a person of ordinary skill in that
`
`particular art would understand it.”), Id. Here, Defendants’ proposal is unnecessary and does not
`
`require reliance on dictionary definitions. A POSITA, or even a lay juror, would understand the
`
`meaning of this term without relying on such dictionary definitions. See Mirror Worlds, LLC v.
`
`Apple, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884-85 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010) (“[T]he claim language is
`
`clear to a lay jury who will understand the term. . . . Therefore, the term does not require
`
`construction.’”) (citing Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 717, 738 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
`
`(“[A]lthough every word used in a claim has a meaning, not every word requires a construction.”)).
`
`Accordingly, this term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`3.
`
`Term 3: “mechanical watch” (Claim 1, ’033 Patent”)
`
`Slyde’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Watch that keeps time by mechanical means.
`
`Defendants’ proposal to construe “mechanical watch” as “watch that keeps time by
`
`mechanical means” is unnecessary, and apparently designed to create a confusing non-
`
`infringement position in the context of the claimed simulation of a mechanical watch to be
`
`“displayed.” See Ex. C, Claim 1. This term is plain on its face and does not require additional
`
`construction. In addition to introducing ambiguity, the plain meaning of this claim term is so clear
`
`that reliance on a dictionary is unnecessary. See W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, LLC, 370
`
`F.3d 1343, 1350 (“‘Single piece’ is sufficiently clear to make even resort to the dictionary
`
`unnecessary.”).
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction is further at odds with the language found in the claims
`
`and specification. For example, the specification recites that “[m]echanical movements make it
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 12 of 37 PageID #: 592
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`possible to display the time by means of hands or other indicators moving in near-continuous
`
`manner whilst making the reading comfortable.” Ex. C, 1:35-37. Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction omits the “mechanical movement” language recited in the specification in favor of an
`
`unclaimed “mechanical means,” and ignores the extensive discussion of mechanical movements
`
`and mechanical watches in the state of the art and the specification. A POSITA, and a lay juror,
`
`would understand the plain and ordinary meaning of this term without need for further
`
`construction. See Orion IP, LLC, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (“[A]lthough every word used in a claim
`
`has a meaning, not every word requires a construction.”); id. at 737-738 (“the Court has determined
`
`none of those terms required construction because they are all used in accordance with their
`
`ordinary lay meanings. These are common words familiar to most English speakers. Defendants
`
`did not argue that these terms carried a unique meaning in the art making their construction
`
`necessary. Instead, many of Defendants’ constructions seemed geared to their future non-
`
`infringement arguments.”). Accordingly, this claim term should be given its plain and ordinary
`
`meaning.
`
`4.
`
`Term 4: “synchronizing the displayed time by said displayed
`mechanical movement with that of said quartz oscillator”
`(Claim 1, ’033 Patent”)
`
`Slyde’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Adjusting the displayed time of the simulated
`mechanical watch movement to show the time
`determined by the quartz oscillator.
`
`
`
`Defendants propose that the term “synchronizing the displayed time by said displayed
`
`mechanical movement with that of said quartz oscillator” should be construed as “adjusting the
`
`displayed time of the simulated mechanical watch movement to show the time determined by the
`
`quartz oscillator.” There is no basis for Defendants’ attempt to read new requirements into the
`
`claim, which does not recite any limitation that the displayed “time” be “determined by the quartz
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 13 of 37 PageID #: 593
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`oscillator,” as opposed to that the mechanical movement merely be “synchroniz[ed]” with the
`
`oscillator (e.g., that simulated mechanisms move synchronously with a quartz oscillator).
`
`Defendants’ improper creation of new limitations is underlined by the presence of those
`
`limitations in dependent claims. For example, dependent Claim 9 separately recites a limitation
`
`“wherein the displayed time depends on said simulation.” Defendants’ proposal importing this
`
`limitation into Claim 1, along with the (unclaimed) requirement that an oscillator, “determine” the
`
`time.
`
`Defendants’ proposed requirement that a quartz oscillator “determine” the time also risks
`
`confusing the jury, as an oscillator merely oscillates at a frequency to supply a reference signal for
`
`other electronic components. Indeed, as the specification notes, a quartz oscillator in a watch
`
`merely outputs a “reference signal,” or provides “indications” to a microcontroller. See Ex. C,
`
`5:29-33, 8:42-44. Defendants’ apparent proposal requiring that the oscillator itself determine time
`
`reads the claims too narrowly.
`
`Defendants’ reliance on dictionary definitions to construe the term “synchronizing” is also
`
`improper. This term is readily understandable to require that displayed time based on a simulated
`
`movement be synchronized with the oscillator (e.g., based on its output reference signal). In
`
`contrast, the dictionary definitions relied upon by Defendants use language at odds with
`
`Defendants’ own proposal. For example, the Collins Dictionary defines “synchronize” as “to
`
`indicate or cause to indicate the same time.” It does not rely on or use the “adjusting” language
`
`that Defendants propose. While the New Oxford American Dictionary relied upon by Defendants
`
`does utilize the “adjusting” language offered by Defendants, it goes on to describe “the same time
`
`as another,” as found in the Collins Dictionary. However, this language is notably absent from
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction. Nonetheless, the term “synchronize” is readily discernible to
`
`7
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 14 of 37 PageID #: 594
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`a POSITA, such that reliance on a dictionary is necessary. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical
`
`Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e question the need to consult a dictionary to
`
`determine the meaning of such well-known terms. Courts, including the Texas Digital Systems
`
`court, regularly forgo detailed dictionary analyses if the term is as commonplace as ‘conformable’
`
`or ‘pliable.’ Indeed, Bard itself ‘submits that merely rephrasing or paraphrasing the plain language
`
`of a claim by substituting synonyms does not represent genuine claim construction.’”) (citations
`
`omitted); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (“The resulting definitions therefore do not necessarily reflect
`
`the inventor’s goal of distinctly setting forth his invention as a person of ordinary skill in that
`
`particular art would understand it.”).
`
`Like C.R. Bard, Defendants merely rephrase or substitute synonyms here. The claims use
`
`of “synchronization” is in accordance with the disclosures with the specification. For example, the
`
`specification describes one “advantageous embodiment” where “the time of the simulated
`
`movement can be synchronized with the time determined by the quartz movement, in order to reset
`
`the simulated mechanical movement. This synchronization can be performed automatically, for
`
`example, periodically, or in case of variations exceeding a predetermined threshold, and/or at the
`
`user’s request through an appropriate command.” Ex. C, 3:67-4:6. Further, the specification
`
`discloses the following:
`
`The time displayed at any time thus results form this simulation and
`can for example be disturbed by accelerations of the simulated
`regulating organ or by imperfections of the movement. This time
`can thus differ from the generally more precise time calculated by
`the microcontroller 10 on the basis of the indications of the quartz
`oscillator 11. In one embodiment, the time displayed by the
`simulated and displayed mechanical movement is thus synchronized
`with the quartz time, either automatically at regular intervals or
`when the difference exceeds a threshold or manually by the user
`interacting on one of the push-buttons 41 or on the touch sensor.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 15 of 37 PageID #: 595
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`Id., 8:39-50. Accordingly, interchanging “adjusting” does not accurately capture the intention of
`
`the inventor and the disclosures of the specification.
`
`
`
`Similarly, Defendants seek to construe displayed mechanical movement as “simulated
`
`mechanical watch movement.” However, this language is redundant of language that is already
`
`recited in Claim 1. Claim 1 recites, in part,
`
`a microcontroller being arranged for reproducing on said electronic
`display the simulation of a mechanical watch movement
`comprising a gear train, said simulation being visible so as to
`indicate the time, said microcontroller being further arranged for
`synchronizing the displayed time by said displayed mechanical
`movement with that of said quartz oscillator.
`
`Ex. C, Claim 1 (emphasis added). To require that “displayed mechanical movement” be construed
`
`as “simulated mechanical watch movement” would be redundant and unnecessary. See Dareltech,
`
`LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 4:18cv702, 2020 WL 1248500, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2020)
`
`(“The parties’ constructions reads into the terms a number of unnecessary elements. . . . Thus, the
`
`parties’ constructions are at best redundant of the claim language and unnecessarily confusing.”).
`
`Accordingly, the Court should reject Defendants’ proposed construction and construe this
`
`term according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`B.
`
`’922 Patent
`
`1.
`
`Term 5: “cause said several available cards to scroll past”
`(Claims 1 and 23, ’922 Patent”)
`
`Slyde’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`To scroll more than one card across the
`display in response to one movement of at
`least one finger.
`
`
`The claim term “cause said several available cards to scroll past” does not require
`
`construction and the meaning of this phrase is clear on its face to a POSITA, and even a lay juror.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 16 of 37 PageID #: 596
`
`Defendants do not identify any lexicography or disavowal to justify their attempt to rewrite
`
`this claim term. See GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`
`(“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure from the plain meaning in
`
`two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). There is none.
`
`The first portion of Defendants’ proposal reciting “to scroll more than one card across the
`
`display” unnecessarily and imprecisely rewrites the existing claim language. The second portion
`
`of Defendants’ proposal requiring “in response to one movement of at least one finger” is divorced
`
`from this limitation entirely. Indeed, Claim 1 separately recites “a processing circuit specifically
`
`laid out so as to interpret the signals from the touch-sensitive glass, for selecting a card from several
`
`available cards depending on these signals and for displaying said card on the entire digital matrix
`
`display” and “wherein said touch-sensitive glass is a two-dimensional glass for detecting a
`
`movement of at least one finger at any place on the touch-sensitive glass along at least two different
`
`directions.” Defendants’ proposal, at best, improperly rewords and duplicates these limitations
`
`outside their context in the claims. See Clear with Computs., LLC v. AGCO Corp., No. 6:12-CV-
`
`622, 2014 WL 2700376, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 13, 2014) (“Likewise, Defendants’ proposed
`
`references to a ‘tangible’ product and the ‘customer’s desired features and uses’ in their proposal
`
`for the ’739 claims are addressed by surrounding claim language and should not be imported into
`
`the construction of the term ‘customized proposal.’ In sum, Defendants’ proposals are nothing
`
`more than reading the plain meaning of these terms in the context of the claims as whole; therefore
`
`constructions are unnecessary.”).
`
`Defendants’ proposal also apparently attempts to create a non-infringement position by
`
`reading in a limitation to require only “one movement” to cause cards to “scroll.” There is no such
`
`requirement in the claim for scrolling to be based on a single movement. Indeed, dependent claims
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00083-RWS-RSP Document 71 Filed 06/21/24 Page 17 of 37 PageID #: 597
`
`contemplate that “movements of the finger on the card” (plural) are within the scope of the claim
`
`which this proposal contradicts. This construction would also exclude embodiments in the
`
`specification contemplating “movements to reach the same target card.” Ex. D, ‘922 Patent , 8:33-
`
`34. This arbitrary requirement is further in tension with the recitation of the capability to detect
`
`movement “along at least two different directions.” Id., Claim 1.
`
`Moreover, the specification discloses that “[s]crolling the cards in the horizonal or vertical
`
`direction is achieved by moving the finger on the glass in the corresponding direction” and “the
`
`user can easily consult the cards available and choose a particular card with simple movements of
`
`the finger in the horizonal or vertical direction.” Id., 7:21-26 (emphasis added). The claim does
`
`not preclude that only one card may be available in an exemplary embodiment and Defendants’
`
`attempt to limit the phrase to “more than one card” unduly limits the scope of this term.
`
`Finally, by reading in the “at least one finger” limitation, Defendants render meaningless
`
`the claim limitations that p