Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 1 of 37 PageID #: 1026
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`Lead Case No. 2:23-cv-00059-JRG
`Member Case No. 2:23-cv-00062-JRG
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al.,
`Defendants.
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
`LLC, d/b/a XFINITY, et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
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`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 2 of 37 PageID #: 1027
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`PAGE
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`THE ALLEGED INVENTION OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS .................................... 1
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS ........................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`“media player” (’251 Patent Claims 1 and 2) ......................................................... 3
`
`“media player application” (’751 Patent Claims 12, 13, 14, and 16)
`“media playing application” (’934 Patent Claims 17, 18, 19) ................................ 6
`
`“a synchronization code” / “the synchronization code”
`(’251 Patent Claims 1, 8, 9; ’751 Patent Claim 12) ................................................ 8
`
`“a unique identifier” / “the unique identifier” (’934 Patent Claim 17) ................... 9
`
`“synchronization code”
`(’251 Patent Claims 1, 8, and 9; ’751 Patent Claim 12) ....................................... 10
`
`“unique identifier” (’934 Patent Claim 17) ........................................................... 14
`
`“storing…based on the synchronization code” (’251 Patent Claim 1) ................. 15
`
`“first format” / “second format” (’751 Patent Claims 12 and 16) ........................ 17
`
`“first format” / “universal format” (’934 Patent Claim 17) .................................. 20
`
`“the first format of the first message” (’751 Patent Claim 12) ............................. 22
`
`K.
`
`Order of Method Claim Steps ............................................................................... 26
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 29
`
`
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 3 of 37 PageID #: 1028
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`PAGE
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 27
`
`Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC,
`474 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 19
`
`Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`448 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ 24
`
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 19
`
`CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 24
`
`CardWare Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd.,
`No. 2:22-cv-141-JRG-RSP, 2023 WL 5434763 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2023) ............................ 23
`
`Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 24
`
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`873 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................ 17
`
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`10 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................... 4
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................... 16, 26
`
`Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship,
`778 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Indacon, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,
`824 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................ 12
`
`Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`21 F.4th 801 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................... 8
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 4 of 37 PageID #: 1029
`
`Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,
`617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 12
`
`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
`No. 2:21-cv-00113-JRG, 2022 WL 811072 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2022) .................................. 12
`
`Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp.,
`No. 2:11-cv-00090-JRG, 2013 WL 2949959 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) ................................... 8
`
`Mantech Env’t Corp. v. Hudson Env’t Servs., Inc.,
`152 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................ 29
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .................................................................................................................. 23
`
`Neville v. Found. Constructors, Inc.,
`972 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................ 24
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................ 6, 7, 19
`
`Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc.,
`498 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Pause Tech., LLC v. TiVo, Inc.,
`419 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Red Rock Analytics, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
`No. 2:17-cv-101-RWS-RSP, 2018 WL 1806859 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2018) ........................... 27
`
`Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson,
`712 F.3d 549 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................... 4
`
`SmartPhone Techs. LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:10-cv-580-LED-JDL, 2013 WL 1136972 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2013) ............................ 19
`
`SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`998 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................ 19
`
`Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc.,
`987 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 5 of 37 PageID #: 1030
`
`Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc.,
`257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Nokia Sols. & Networks Oy,
`15 F.4th 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................. 18
`
`Tubular Rollers, LLC v. Maximus Oilfield Prod., LLC,
`No. 2021-2319, 2023 WL 4230371 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 2023) ................................................. 19
`
`WAPP Tech Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
`No. 4:21-cv-670, 2022 WL 2463569 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2022) ................................................ 23
`
`Wisconsin Alumni Rsch. Found. v. Apple, Inc.,
`905 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp.,
`769 F.3d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................ 16
`
`X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`440 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ...................................................................................... 9
`
`Zilkr Cloud Techs., LLC, v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2:22-cv-166, Dkt. 121, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2023) ................................................. 23
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 6 of 37 PageID #: 1031
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Court should adopt Defendants’ proposed constructions.1 Although Touchstream
`
`asserts that each disputed term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, it does not state
`
`what that plain and ordinary meaning is. “Giving a term its plain and ordinary meaning does not
`
`leave the term devoid of any meaning whatsoever. Instead, ‘the “ordinary meaning” of a claim
`
`term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.’” Wisconsin Alumni
`
`Rsch. Found. v. Apple, Inc., 905 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Phillips v. AWH
`
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Touchstream fails to consider how the
`
`skilled artisan would understand the terms in view of the specification and instead simply
`
`opposes Defendants’ proposals. In so doing, it either attempts to evade the intrinsic evidence or
`
`to ignore ambiguities inherent in the claims. The disputed terms must therefore be construed
`
`consistent with Defendants’ proposals to avoid jury confusion and to align with the applicant and
`
`examiner’s understanding when the claims were allowed.
`
`II.
`
`THE ALLEGED INVENTION OF THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`
`The three Asserted Patents all name David Strober as their sole inventor, share the same
`
`specification, and claim priority to the same provisional application filed on April 21, 2011.2
`
`The Asserted Patents admit that it was well known in the art that media could be “played on
`
`
`1 This brief uses the following abbreviations: Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies, Inc.
`(“Touchstream”); Defendants Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Comcast Cable
`Communications Management, LLC, Comcast of Houston, LLC, Comcast Corporation, Charter
`Communications, Inc., Charter Communications Operating, LLC, Time Warner Cable
`Enterprises LLC, Spectrum Management Holding Company, LLC, Spectrum Gulf Coast, LLC,
`and Charter Communications, LLC (collectively “Defendants”); U.S. Patent No. 8,356,251
`(“the ’251 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 11,048,751 (“the ’751 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 11,086,934
`(“the ’934 Patent,” and together collectively “Asserted Patents”); Exhibits to the Declaration of
`Alena Farber (“Ex.”); Touchstream’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. 36) (“Pl. Br.”).
`2 All specification citations in this brief are to the ’251 Patent.
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 7 of 37 PageID #: 1032
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`computers rather than television displays” and that one could “connect a computer to a television
`
`set in order to watch Web media.” ’251 Patent at 1:22–24. The claimed invention’s goal was
`
`straightforward: “[g]iven the desire to watch various World Wide Web media on a family’s
`
`primary television set, and to control this operation from the comfort of one’s couch, there is a
`
`need to operate a television set or other display remotely from a personal computing device, such
`
`as a mobile phone.” ’251 Patent at 1:32–36. The patent wished to “allow a user to perform a
`
`general Web search to locate and capture Web media,” ’251 Patent at 1:37–38, to allow sending
`
`a YouTube or Netflix video, for example, from the mobile phone to the larger screen.
`
`The purported invention accomplishes its goal via an intermediary server system that
`
`stores an association between a given mobile device and a given display device and translates
`
`commands sent in one format from the mobile device to a different format. More particularly,
`
`the display device provides a synchronization code by, for example, presenting the
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`synchronization code on a “splash page” from which the user may input the code into the mobile
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`device. ’251 Patent at 2:17–27, 5:14–23, Fig. 7A. The mobile device will then transmit the
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`synchronization code to the server system, which causes the server system to store an association
`
`of the mobile device and the display device. ’251 Patent at 1:50–52, 2:17–27, 5:36–41, 7:30–35,
`
`Fig. 4. Next, the user selects content to watch, which causes the mobile device to send a
`
`message to the server system identifying the name and location of a media player, a video file,
`
`and a universal command for controlling playback of the video file. ’251 Patent at 1:48–54,
`
`1:66–2:3, 4:27–35, 5:54–6:17, Fig. 3. The server system converts the universal command into
`
`the appropriate format for the particular media player. ’251 Patent at 2:3–7, 5:58–6:17, Fig. 5.
`
`The server system then stores a message including the media player name and location, the video
`
`file, and the converted command, before providing the message to the display device. ’251
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 8 of 37 PageID #: 1033
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`Patent at 2:7–9, 3:18–23, 6:3–6, 6:18–28. After receiving that message, the display device
`
`accesses the content provider and loads the media player and video identified in the
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`message. ’251 Patent 3:19–23. Finally, the display device executes the converted command,
`
`and the media player plays the referenced piece of content. ’251 Patent at 2:9–11, 6:50–61.
`
`The Asserted Patents do not purport to have invented a mobile phone,3 a display device,4
`
`a server system,5 a media player,6 or the formats used to send messages or commands between
`
`these components.7 Rather, the alleged invention is simply the transmission and translation of
`
`information between these well-known pre-existing components.
`
`III.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A.
`
`“media player” (’251 Patent Claims 1 and 2)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`
`Application software for playing back video
`content.
`
`No construction necessary. Touchstream
`proposes that the term be construed in
`accordance with its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction is, verbatim, the definition Touchstream asserted
`
`during prosecution of the ’251 Patent in which the term appears. Touchstream must be held to
`
`
`3 ’251 Patent at 1:34–36 (“there is a need to operate a television set or other display
`remotely from a personal computing device, such as a mobile phone”).
`4 ’251 Patent at 1:15–17 (“Such display devices include, for example, television displays
`used by consumers in their home for viewing videos and other media.”), 1:34–36.
`5 ’251 Patent at 2:66–3:1 (devices “connected to the Internet 21 or other computer
`network”), Fig. 1.
`6 ’251 Patent at 6:9–15 (giving “YouTube” and “Ted.com” as examples of media players
`and the corresponding command formatting for each).
`7 ’251 Patent at 5:54–58 (indicating JavaScript could be used to control a media player),
`6:9–15.
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 9 of 37 PageID #: 1034
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`that definition, which is consistent with the term’s usage in both the patent’s claims and
`
`specification.
`
`Touchstream could not have been more direct when it represented to the Patent Office
`
`that “it is clear that a ‘media player’ refers to application software for playing back the video
`
`content.” Ex. 1 (’251 File History, 2/22/2012 Response to Office Action) at 10. When an
`
`applicant offers such a clear definition during prosecution, courts construe the relevant term in
`
`accordance with the applicant’s chosen meaning. Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549,
`
`559 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (construing “device” to “mean a continuous sheet and to exclude stents
`
`having open mesh holes” based in part on statement during prosecution that “the device used is a
`
`sheet”); see Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 10 F.4th 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
`
`(construing “three-dimensional spreadsheet” to require a mathematical relation among cells on
`
`different spreadsheet pages based on applicant’s statement during prosecution that “a 3D
`
`spreadsheet defines a mathematical relation among cells on the different pages”); Fenner Invs.,
`
`Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (construing “personal identification
`
`number” to mean “a number associated with the user, not the device” based on applicant’s
`
`statement that “[t]he user is identified by a personal code”).
`
`The claims and specification of the ’251 Patent confirm this definition. First, they make
`
`clear that the claimed media player is application software, not hardware. The claims state that
`
`the display device “loads . . . media players.” ’251 Patent cl. 1, 22. The specification also
`
`explains that media players can be loaded by the display device, ’251 Patent 1:58–65, 3:18–33,
`
`6:32–49, Fig. 6, as well as unloaded, ’251 Patent 6:45–49. Neither the claims nor the
`
`specification ever discuss hardware media players, nor could hardware be loaded or unloaded by
`
`a device. The use of the term “loading” generally refers to software, not hardware. Indeed,
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 10 of 37 PageID #: 1035
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`during prosecution, Touchstream indicated that references to the display device loading and
`
`unloading media players support its chosen definition of a media player being “application
`
`software.” Ex. 1 at 10.
`
`Second, the claims of the ’251 Patent establish that the referenced “media player” must
`
`play back video content. The claims require presentation of “video content,” not “content” more
`
`broadly. ’251 Patent cl. 1, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26. Indeed, Touchstream concedes that the
`
`’251 Patent is limited to video content. Pl. Br. at 4. “[P]roper claim construction . . . demands
`
`interpretation of the entire claim in context, not a single element in isolation.” Pause Tech., LLC
`
`v. TiVo, Inc., 419 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Hockerson–Halberstadt, Inc. v.
`
`Converse Inc., 183 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (construing “circular storage buffer” based
`
`on operation of the buffer as described in other claim limitations). It is not only appropriate but
`
`necessary to construe the term based on how it is used in the context of the other claim
`
`limitations.
`
`Touchstream argues that an explicit construction is unnecessary and suggests that
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction may “deviat[e] from the terms’ ordinary meaning.” Pl. Br. at
`
`3. But Touchstream does not offer a plain and ordinary meaning of “media player” if it is not
`
`“application software for playing back video content.” Touchstream also suggests that a “juror
`
`will understand what is or is not a ‘media player,’” but provides no support for that assertion. Id.
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`Common sense tells us otherwise—in today’s world, jurors know what “software” is but will not
`
`be as comfortable with technical-sounding jargon like “media player.” They could erroneously
`
`conclude that physical devices that play media, such as a VCR or DVD player, qualify, which
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`would contradict the intrinsic record as explained above.
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 11 of 37 PageID #: 1036
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`Thus, the Court should enter the definition asserted by Touchstream during prosecution
`
`and construe “media player” to mean “application software for playing back video content.”
`
`B.
`
`“media player application” (’751 Patent Claims 12, 13, 14, and 16)
`“media playing application” (’934 Patent Claims 17, 18, 19)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Application software for playing back
`content.
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary. Touchstream
`proposes that the term be construed in
`accordance with its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction is based on Touchstream’s statements during
`
`prosecution of the patent family and accounts for the difference between the claims of the ’751
`
`and ’934 Patents and those of the ’251 Patent.
`
`Much like the “media player” recited in the ’251 Patent, the ’751 and ’934 Patents recite
`
`a “media play[er/ing] application.” See, e.g., ’251 Patent cl. 1;’751 Patent cl. 12; ’934 Patent cl.
`
`17. However, while the ’251 Patent describes “a particular media player for playing the video
`
`content,” ’251 Patent cl. 1 (emphasis added), the ’751 and ’934 Patents claims do not specify the
`
`type of content. Rather, the ’751 Patent claims a “first media player application being selected to
`
`play a first piece of content,” and the ’934 Patent recites “controlling . . . how the selected first
`
`type of media playing application plays the referenced piece of content,” ’751 Patent cl. 12; ’934
`
`Patent cl. 17. The common terminology and functions of these components suggest that the
`
`terms should be construed to have similar meanings with allowance for non-video content in the
`
`later two patents. See Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
`
`(“same claim term in the same patent or related patents carries the same construed meaning”).
`
`Indeed, Touchstream addresses “media play[er/ing] application” together with “media player” in
`
`its brief, suggesting the terms should be construed similarly. Pl. Br. at 3–4.
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 12 of 37 PageID #: 1037
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`Crucially, “statements from prosecution of a familial patent relating to the same subject
`
`matter as the claim language at issue in the patent being construed . . . are relevant in construing
`
`the claims at issue.” Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`Thus, Touchstream’s statement to the PTO that “media player” in the ’251 Patent “clear[ly] . . .
`
`refers to application software for playing back the video content,” Ex. 1 at 10, establishes that the
`
`“media play[er/ing] application” of the other Asserted Patents must also be application software
`
`for playing back content. All three Asserted Patents are part of the same patent family, share the
`
`same specification, and are directed to methods for translating commands among associated
`
`devices to control media. Here, Touchstream filed the applications leading to the ’751 and ’934
`
`Patents after making its statement during prosecution of the ’251 Patent and that statement must
`
`inform the meaning of this term in the later applications. Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1333.
`
`The claims and specification are in accord with Defendants’ construction. First, the
`
`claim language confirms that the “media play[er/ing] application” is not any type of application
`
`software but specifically one for playing back content. See ’751 Patent cl. 12 (reciting a “media
`
`player . . . to play a first piece of content” and “controlling . . . how the selected first media
`
`player application plays the referenced first piece of content.”); ’934 Patent cl. 17 (reciting “a
`
`piece of content associated with a first type of media playing application” and “controlling . . .
`
`how the selected first type of media playing application plays the referenced piece of content.”).
`
`Second, the only component disclosed in the specification that could serve as a “media
`
`play[er/ing] application” is a “media player,” which, as discussed above, must be application
`
`software that may be uploaded or downloaded. See supra p. 4–5; Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron
`
`Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that, when the claim term at issue does
`
`not appear in the specification, the term may be construed to be coextensive with the
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 13 of 37 PageID #: 1038
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`corresponding term in the specification); Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp., No. 2:11-cv-00090-
`
`JRG, 2013 WL 2949959, at *9, *16 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) (same).
`
`Touchstream provides no alternative construction to these terms, but simply states that
`
`they should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Because the Asserted Patents share a
`
`specification but have certain differences in claim scope, however, it is important to clarify for
`
`the jury what that plain meaning is and in what ways it is the same as and different from the
`
`“media player” of the ’251 Patent. Moreover, the “media playing application” term was
`
`specifically added during prosecution at the Examiner’s suggestion to distinguish it from the
`
`patent’s earlier recitation of the broader term “media playing element(s).” See, e.g., Ex. 6 (’934
`
`File History, 10/28/2020 Response to Office Action) at 9; Ex. 7 (’934 File History, 3/3/2021
`
`Response to Office Action) at 2–6, 8 (“[t]he Examiner suggested clarification relating to this
`
`phrasing,” which the applicant implemented by replacing “media playing element” with “media
`
`playing application.”). Thus, the applicant and examiner considered a media playing
`
`“application” to be meaningfully different, and more narrow, than a media playing “element,”
`
`and it is important to give effect to that distinction, which is done through Defendants’
`
`construction. Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 809–10 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The term
`
`requires application software for playing back content, not just any generic element.
`
`Accordingly, the Court should adopt Defendants’ construction, which will inform the
`
`jury of the important distinctions between terms and ensure that it applies the meaning the
`
`applicant and examiner understood at the time the claims were allowed.
`
`C.
`
`“a synchronization code” / “the synchronization code” (’251 Patent Claims 1,
`8, 9; ’751 Patent Claim 12)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`
`Must be the same “synchronization code”
`throughout the claim.
`
`No construction necessary. Touchstream
`proposes that the term be construed in
`
`8
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 14 of 37 PageID #: 1039
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`accordance with its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`
`The antecedent-basis relationship between “a synchronization code” and “the
`
`synchronization code” creates a presumption that the two instances of “synchronization code”
`
`refer to the same code. See X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1036 (N.D.
`
`Cal. 2020). That is Defendants’ construction. Touchstream agrees with that construction, but
`
`still argues against it. Specifically, Touchstream states: “The jury needs no guidance as to
`
`whether ‘a synchronization code’ and ‘the synchronization code’ refer to the same
`
`‘synchronization code’ because the jury is capable of understanding the words ‘a’ and ‘the.’”
`
`Pl. Br. at 5 (emphasis added). Touchstream cites no authority for the proposition that an agreed
`
`construction should be rejected because the jurors can allegedly figure it out on their own.
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`The fact is, Defendants’ construction is necessary because Touchstream’s infringement
`
`contentions suggest that it will point the jury to different “synchronization codes.” And while
`
`Touchstream concedes in its brief that “‘a synchronization code’ and ‘the synchronization code’
`
`refer to the same ‘synchronization code,’” Pl. Br. at 5, that brief cannot be presented to the jury
`
`at trial, e.g., to impeach an expert who might contradict Touchstream’s representation. The only
`
`way to ensure that the jury applies the agreed-upon construction is to provide it to the jury. The
`
`Court should therefore adopt the agreed construction that the synchronization code “must be the
`
`same ‘synchronization code’ throughout the claim.”
`
`D.
`
`“a unique identifier” / “the unique identifier” (’934 Patent Claim 17)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`
`Must be the same “unique identifier”
`throughout the claim.
`
`No construction necessary. Touchstream
`proposes that the term be construed in
`accordance with its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`9
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 15 of 37 PageID #: 1040
`
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`The issue with respect to the limitations “a unique identifier” and “the unique identifier”
`
`referring to the same “unique identifier” is the same as that addressed in Section III.C above with
`
`respect to “a synchronization code” and “the synchronization code.” Touchstream agrees that the
`
`unique identifiers must be the same as a matter of law, but does not want the claims construed,
`
`risking that the jury will never hear that they must be the same. Touchstream argues that “the
`
`antecedent basis rule renders Defendants’ construction redundant,” but provides no explanation
`
`as to how a jury would know the “antecedent basis rule.” One guiding purpose of claim
`
`construction is to avoid jury confusion. Because the parties agree that Defendants’ construction
`
`is correct, and because Touchstream cites no law that an agreed construction should be rejected
`
`because the jurors should know and apply claim construction principles themselves, Defendants’
`
`construction should be adopted.
`
`E.
`
`“synchronization code” (’251 Patent Claims 1, 8, and 9; ’751 Patent
`Claim 12)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Touchstream’s Proposed Construction
`
`A code which can be obtained by a user from
`the [display device / content presentation
`device] and provided by the user to the
`[personal computing device / remote
`computing device].
`
`No construction necessary. Touchstream
`proposes that the term be construed in
`accordance with its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`
`The claimed “synchronization code” is directed to the entire purported value proposition
`
`of Mr. Strober’s patents and his company, Shodogg: the ability of a user to cast video content
`
`from any personal computing device (like a mobile phone) to any arbitrary display device (like a
`
`TV)—not just display devices that have been pre-initialized for communication with the phone.
`
`See, e.g., ’251 Patent at 7:17–35 (describing user connecting to “personal computer with a
`
`display monitor” by accessing “website associated with the server system”), 8:9–18 (describing
`
`multiple users connected to singular display device), 8:33–37 (describing user connecting to
`
`10
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 40 Filed 04/18/24 Page 16 of 37 PageID #: 1041
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`multiple display devices in turn), 8:45–9:2 (describing multiple users “in different locations each
`
`of which has a separate display device”). The examiner required that the claims be limited to
`
`this feature during prosecution to overcome the prior art, and the term must be construed
`
`consistently with this feature.
`
`Admittedly, the specification describes an embodiment that does not require use of a
`
`synchronization code. In that embodiment, the user can select a display device that has been
`
`“previously . . . initialized for connection” to the phone: “In some implementations, the user can
`
`select the display device from a list of devices displayed on the mobile phone 20. The list can
`
`include a field populated with names or identifications of display devices that previously have
`
`been initialized for connection.” ’251 Patent at 5:10–14. As discussed below, however,
`
`Touchstream did not claim this embodiment.
`
`The specification describes the claimed embodiment as an “alternative” to user selection
`
`of a pre-initialized display device whereby “the user can select the display device by entering a
`
`synchronization code uniquely associated with the particular display device.” ’251 Patent at
`
`5:14–16. The reason the user must “enter” the synchronizat