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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et
`al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
`LLC, D/B/A XFINITY, et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`Lead Case No. 2:23-cv-00059-JRG
`Member Case No. 2:23-cv-00062-JRG
`
`
`TOUCHSTREAM’S SUR-REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO
`CHARTER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 10376
`
`
`I.
`
` Introduction
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`Charter’s Reply underscores the numerous factual disputes underlying each of its bases for
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`summary judgment. First, Charter’s non-infringement argument for Spectrum Guide STBs is
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`premised on the alleged inability for its Spectrum TV App (“STVA”) to start playback of more
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`than one of the following video content types—linear TV, VOD, and DVR. For linear TV, Charter
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`admits the STVA can start playback. For VOD, Charter also does not deny that it represented for
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`years in sworn testimony and interrogatory responses that its STBs all function in materially the
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`same way for initiating VOD—that a physical STB remote is required to start playback. And
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`Charter admits these representations were proven false as to one type of STB by Touchstream’s
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`expert who was able to start VOD playback from the STVA for one guide creating a genuine fact
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`issue as to the remaining guides that Charter has represented all work the same way. For DVR,
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`Charter further admits that its 30(b)(6) witness testified that the STVA can start DVR playback in
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`all STBs other than for “a very small percentage” of users, but Charter now claims that its corporate
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`designee was wrong because he was merely “speculating.” Regardless, other documents and
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`evidence support that the STVA can start DVR playback. Charter’s Motion thus relies on disputed
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`facts and credibility determinations that are inappropriately decided on summary judgment.
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`Second, Charter’s non-infringement arguments regarding the “synchronization code” and
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`“unique identifier” terms in the Asserted Claims rely on factual disputes regarding whether
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`Charter’s Accused Services satisfy these limitations under their plain and ordinary meaning to a
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`POSITA. Charter seeks to avoid the jury’s resolution of these factual disputes by manufacturing
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`belated claim construction arguments premised on alleged prosecution disclaimer. But
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`Touchstream’s infringement allegations are based on the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms
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`and, in any event, Charter cannot show clear and unmistakable prosecution history disclaimer.
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`1
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 10377
`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 3 of 14 PagelD #: 10377
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`Touchstream’s infringementallegations rely on straightforward interpretations of the plain claim
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`language. Touchstream respectfully requests the Court to deny Charter’s Motion.
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`IL.
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`Fact Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment for Spectrum Guide STBs.
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`The Court should deny Charter’s non-infringement argumentfor its Spectrum Guide STBs
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`because each argument relies on disputed issues of material fact and fundamental credibility
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`determinations of Charterandits witnesses.
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`Forlinear TV, Charter argues there are no messages identifying a “piece of content” or a
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`“video file” for linear TV broadcasts. To support this assertion, Charter argues that its 30(b)(6)
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`witness, Mr. Frusciano,i” (Reply Br.
`
`at 1). But Mr. Frusciano’s verbatim testimonyis to the contrary:
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`Q. And then, depending on the type of content that the user is attempting to play,
`there may be different identifiers that identify the content, is that correct?
`
`A. Yes,itis.
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`(Resp. Ex. 5, at 29:15-30:7) (emphasis added). Charter cannot square its corporate witness
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`testimony with its assertion that linear TV messages do notidentify a piece of content or a video
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`file. Indeed, Touchstream’s expert’s testing demonstrated howa userselects a piece of content or
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`video file on the STVAfor live TV, and how the STVA delivers the message to the STB:
`
`TeDees
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`$2, E206 Live with Kelly
`PeLes
`
`a es)
`
`TLee
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 10378
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`(Touchstream Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 176-178). Ample evidence refutes Charter’s assertion that linear TV
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`messages do not identify a piece of content or video file.
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`For VOD, Charter argues Touchstream cannot meet its burden of proof to show Spectrum
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`Guide STBs support VOD playback from the STVA. (Reply Br. at 2-3). But Charter does not deny
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`that it consistently told Touchstream and other parties for years—through verified interrogatory
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`response and sworn corporate testimony—that its STBs all operated similarly with respect to VOD
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`playback functionality, including that the STVA could not initiate playback of VOD but rather
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`launched an asset details screen requiring confirmation through a physical remote. And Charter
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`admits these representations were proven false through Dr. Wicker’s testing of the STVA on
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`Charter’s ODN guide. (Reply Br. at 2). Yet Charter argues that Dr. Wicker’s VOD playback testing
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`is insufficient because he did not use a Spectrum Guide STB. (See id.). Charter is wrong.
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`In his infringement report, Dr. Wicker opined that his testing of VOD playback for ODN
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`guide was representative of the other STB guides. In particular, Dr. Wicker opined that: (1) Charter
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`consistently represented the STVA could not initiate playback of VOD on any guides, (2) his
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`testing of the exemplary ODN guide proved this representation false, and (3) based on Charter’s
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`consistent representations about the similarities among guides with respect to VOD playback, he
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`believes the other guides operate similarly for VOD playback. (Touchstream Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 165-166).
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`While Dr. Wicker observed certain differences throughout his report about other aspects of ODN
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`and Spectrum Guide STBs (see, e.g., Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 144-145 (describing differences in the conversion
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`step)), Dr. Wicker made explicit his understanding—based on his testing and Charter’s
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`representations of similarities among guides—that VOD could be played directly from the STVA
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`without use of a physical remote. (Touchstream Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 165-166). Charter fails to cite a single
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`case requiring, as a matter of law, Dr. Wicker to test every STB guide to confirm similarities in
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`3
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 10379
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`each accused functionality to prove infringement. This is particularly true where, as here, Charter
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`maintained that VOD playback functionality was materially identical across all STBs.
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`Rather, courts routinely find methodologies like Dr. Wicker’s sufficient to show
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`infringement, including in circumstances where the defendant did not misrepresent the
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`functionality of the accused products as Charter did here. See Kenexa Brassing, Inc. v. Taleo Corp.,
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`751 F.Supp.2d 735, 747 (D. Del. 2010) (granting summary judgment of infringement, and rejecting
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`defendant’s argument that plaintiff was required to show representativeness of every product,
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`reasoning in part that “Defendants cannot group their products together when asked whether they
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`differ, then turn around and claim that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showing that they
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`operate in the same way.”); TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1308,
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`85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“While it is true that Dr. Gibson testified in detail with
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`respect to only one type of device, there is nothing improper about an expert testifying in detail
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`about a particular device and then stating that the same analysis applies to other allegedly
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`infringing devices that operate similarly, without discussing each type of device in detail.”);
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`Coleman Company, Inc. v. Team Worldwide Corporation, No. 2:20-cv-351, 2022 WL 1837942,
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`*2–*3 (E.D. Va. 2022) (“TWW asserts that Dr. Singhose does not rely on sufficient facts because
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`he did not individually test each accused product, and while it concedes that ‘representative
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`analysis is useful,’ it contends that this is only so when there is a reliable basis for comparison.
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`However, Dr. Singhose's representative analysis and reliance on exterior features does provide a
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`sufficient basis for his opinion; whether that basis is reliable or persuasive enough to be accepted
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`by a jury must be considered to go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.”).
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`4
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 10380
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`For DVR, Charter argues, based on its own expert’s observed rebuttal testing through a
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`previously undisclosed and thus unquestioned Charter engineer, that it is undisputed that the STVA
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`could not play DVR on Spectrum Guide STBs. But there is ample evidence to the contrary.
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`First, Charter does not deny that its technical 30(b)(6) witness, Mr. Frusciano, testified that
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`only a “very small percentage” of Charter customers cannot use the STVA to play DVR on their
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`STBs, despite Spectrum Guide STBs comprising approximately
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`of Charter’s customer base.
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`Instead, Charter argues Mr. Frusciano’s testimony on this topic was based on “speculation,”
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`despite Mr. Frusciano’s designation as a 30(b)(6) witness on this topic and Charter’s other
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`technical 30(b)(6) witness, Mr. Paiz, testifying that Mr. Frusciano is the subject matter expert.
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`(Reply at 3; Touchstream Ex. 6 at 42:9-23). Charter also claims Mr. Frusciano’s testimony is
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`inaccurate because only a small percentage of Spectrum Guide STBs have DVR hardware
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`installed. (Reply at 3-4). But in support of this statement Charter identifies a single document, not
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`cited in its opening brief, with ambiguous figures and no witness testimony interpreting them.
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`Nothing in this document unequivocally shows that “a majority of Spectrum Guide STBs do not
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`have DVR hardware and are incapable of DVR at all.” (Reply at 3-4).
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`Second, Charter does not deny that it disclosed its contention that the STVA cannot play
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`DVR on Spectrum Guide STBs for the first time in an interrogatory response served ten days after
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`the close of fact discovery and one business day before the deadline for Dr. Wicker’s infringement
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`report. Charter does not even offer an excuse for its late disclosure. Instead, Charter attempts to
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`shift blame to Touchstream for providing vague infringement contentions. But Touchstream’s
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`infringement contentions were clear: “Spectrum performs [the accused method claim]. For
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`instance, Spectrum TV application users can control presentation of video content on a
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`Spectrum TV set-top box (STB) that loads content from any one of a plurality of sources including
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`5
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 10381
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`live TV channels, DVR recordings, and on-demand movies and television programs.” (Charter
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`Ex. 20 at Ex. A, pp. 1). In response, Charter only stated that “the sources of media content are not
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`media players,” as required by the claim language. (Charter Ex. 21 at Ex. A, pp. 2). Charter never
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`stated that its Spectrum Guide STBs do not infringe because the Spectrum TV application does
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`not support DVR playback on Spectrum Guide STBs. That contention was only provided in its
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`supplemental interrogatory response well after the close of fact discovery. Given the timing of this
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`disclosure, it raises more fact issue than it resolves, and further shows why the Court should deny
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`Charter’s motion.
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`Finally, Charter ignores Dr. Wicker’s testimony that Charter’s “new allegation is
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`inconsistent with all of the other evidence I have reviewed in this case, including sworn testimony
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`from Charter’s corporate witnesses . . ., Charter’s prior interrogatory responses, and the documents
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`that I have reviewed indicating that DVR playback is available in [each of Charter’s STB guides].”
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`(Touchstream Ex. 7 at ¶ 167). Indeed, similar to VOD, Dr. Wicker also pointed to his testing and
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`source code review of the ODN STBs, as well as Charter’s misrepresentations about VOD, as
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`further evidence supporting representativeness of the ODN guide. (See id.).
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`Charter’s argument that Spectrum Guide STBs do not infringe relies heavily on disputed
`
`facts, contradictory evidence, and witness credibility. The Court should reject it.
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`III.
`
`
`
` Fact Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement for the ’251
`Patent.
`
`A. Charter’s server system assigns a synchronization code.
`
`The ’251 patent requires “assigning, by a server system, a synchronization code to the
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`display device.” ’251 Pat., 11:26-27. It does not require the server system to ‘generate’ a
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`synchronization code. Nor does it require the synchronization code to be totally unique and never
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`before used in another context. (See Reply at 5-7; ’251 Pat. Claims 9, 10, at 12:22-29). Charter
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`6
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 10382
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`argues that Touchstream conflates “receiving” with “assigning.” (Reply at 5-6). But Charter
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`ignores evidence that its
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`
`
` (Touchstream Op. Br. at 21-23).
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`Charter’s Reply seeks to frame this issue as a claim construction dispute. (Reply at 6). In
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`doing so, Charter advances similar arguments the Court already rejected during Markman. (See
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`Dkt. 40, at 40-2, 40-3). There, Charter—citing the same examiner amendment—argued the claims
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`require user involvement in transferring the synchronization code from a display device to a
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`personal computing device. (Id.). The Court disagreed. (Dkt. 74, at 14-15). Similarly, here Charter
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`seemingly argues for a disavowal of claim scope without explicit demonstration of a “clear and
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`unmistakable” statement narrowing the claims through prosecution history. See Ericsson Inc. v.
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`TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 161 F. Supp. 3d 438, 453 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (“Defendants do
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`not identify any statement of alleged disclaimer or disavowal.”). Charter cannot meet its heavy
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`burden to show the scope of the “assigning” language is narrower than its ordinary meaning.
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`The prosecution history provides no such clear or unmistakable disavowal. For example,
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`Touchstream never argued why the ‘assigning,’ ‘receiving,’ or ‘storing’ limitations differentiated
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`the claims at issue from the prior art. The only prior appearance of “assigning” regarded another
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`claim covering generation of random unique session identifiers. Charter Reply. Ex. 22, at 46.
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`Nothing in the prior art required claim 1 to be limited to Charter’s idiosyncratic interpretation of
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`“assigning,” and there is no evidence that claim 1 was allowed over the prior art because of this
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`language. See Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A disclaimer
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`must be ‘clear and unmistakable,’ and unclear prosecution history cannot be used to limit claims.”).
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`7
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 10383
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`Charter’s cited cases are not to the contrary. Festo and Howlink both considered
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`prosecution history estoppel in the context of Doctrine of Equivalents, which is not at issue here.
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`(Reply at 6, citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733, 122
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`S. Ct. 1831, 1838, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002); Howlink Glob. LLC v. AT&T, Inc., No.
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`222CV00040JRGRSP, 2023 WL 4112111, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 30, 2023), report and
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`recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-0040-JRG-RSP, 2023 WL 4111382 (E.D. Tex. June 21,
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`2023)). And Olaplex only underscores the impropriety of Charter’s reading out MAC addresses as
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`synchronization codes, as the Court there explained it is disfavored to “render another limitation
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`superfluous,” which is exactly what Charter seeks to do with dependent claim 9. Olaplex, Inc. v.
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`L'Oreal USA, Inc., 845 F. App'x 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2021); ’251 Pat. at 12:22-25. Charter fails to
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`show these amendments clearly and unmistakably disclaim scope of claim 1 to narrow the claim
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`in a way that conforms to Charter’s interpretation of the “assigning” term.
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`Finally, Charter’s Reply disputes the import of its expert’s testimony about using a MAC
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`address of a display device to satisfy the “assigning” term for invalidity purposes. (Reply at 7).
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`Such fact and credibility disputes, however, must be resolved by the jury. At bottom, Touchstream’s
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`infringement allegations are based on a straightforward interpretation of the plain claim language,
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`and the Court should reject Charter’s belated claim scope disclaimer argument.
`
`B. Charter’s sever system stores a record establishing an association between a personal
`computing device and display device.
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`In its Reply, Charter does not dispute its server system stores a record of the user’s STB in
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`a User Account, and Charter does not dispute a user must log into their account on their mobile
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`application in order to use it. (Reply at 23-25). The user’s mobile device is thus associated with
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`their chosen STB through the user account information stored in Charter’s server systems. Id.
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`Charter states that “[t]he association between a user’s STBs and the user’s account is not an
`
`8
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 10384
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`association between any STB and the user’s mobile device.” But Charter ignores the factual record
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`that a user must use the same credentials stored in the server system to operate the STVA running
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`on the user’s mobile device. (Touchstream Op. Br., ASOF ¶¶ 34-36).
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`Charter’s argument implies that, in order to infringe, its servers must store a record
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`assigning a unique identifier of a mobile device to the STB in a one-to-one correspondence. (Reply
`
`8). But that is not the plain meaning of establishing an association. There is no requirement that
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`the stored record include a unique identifier for a particular mobile device—only that the record
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`“establish[es] an association.” ’251 Pat. 11:32-34. By storing a record establishing an association
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`between the Charter user’s account credentials—which that user provides to the STVA for using
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`the “Send-to-TV” on his mobile device—with that user’s STB MAC address, Charter’s server
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`system is able to route messages from the STVA. (Touchstream Op. Br., ASOF ¶¶ 34-36). Charter’s
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`argument thus relies on fact disputes underlying the application of the plain and ordinary meaning
`
`of the “storing” limitation in claim 1. Charter’s argument is inappropriate for summary judgment.
`
`IV.
`
` Fact Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement for the ’751
`Patent.
`
`Charter’s Reply repeats its arguments regarding the ’251 Patent for the ’751 Patent. (Reply
`
`at 9). It fails for the same reasons described above and in Touchstream’s Opposition. As
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`Touchstream identified in its Opposition, there are many instances where Charter’s STBs obtain a
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`MAC address. (Touchstream Op. Br., ASOF ¶¶ 36-37).
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`Charter takes issue with one of these instances, but its argument actually supports
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`Touchstream’s infringement argument. Indeed, Charter argues “Touchstream’s
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`(Reply at 9). Charter thus admits that its
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`9
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 10385
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`. And while Charter
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`appears to argue that the “obtaining” step can only be met through the receipt of a message from
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`a different network component containing the MAC address, the ’751 Patent includes no such
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`requirement that the “obtaining” step must be equivalent to “receiving by a separate network
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`component.” The Court should reject Charter’s attempt to narrow the claim scope in this manner.
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`V.
`
` Fact Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement for the ’934
`Patent.
`Charter’s admissions make denying summary judgment straightforward. Charter admits
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`that the STBs in the Accused Services provide their MAC address to Charter’s server system.
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`(Charter SOF ¶ 25). Charter also admits that the Charter server system forwards those same STB
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`MAC addresses received from the STB to the mobile device running the STVA. (Charter SOF ¶¶
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`28-29). Charter does not dispute that both the STB and STVA are in communication with its server
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`system. Rather, Charter argues the STVA must be in communication with Charter’s server system
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`at precisely the time that the STB sends the MAC address to the server system for forwarding.
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`(Reply at 10). But that is not what claim 17 requires, and the Court should reject Charter importing
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`a temporal element into this claim that is unsupported by the plain and ordinary meaning.
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`VI. Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Charter’s Motion.
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`10
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 10386
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`Date: September 4, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal
`Lead Counsel
`
`
`Ryan D. Dykal (pro hac vice)
`Jordan T. Bergsten (pro hac vice)
`Mark Schafer (pro hac vice)
`Philip A. Eckert (pro hac vice)
`Anita Liu (TX State Bar No. 24134054)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`1401 New York Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`(t) 202-274-1109
`rdykal@bsfllp.com
`jbergsten@bsfllp.com
`mschafer@bsfllp.com
`peckert@bsfllp.com
`aliu@bsfllp.com
`
`
`John Michael Lyons (pro hac vice)
`Sabina Mariella (pro hac vice)
`Sophie Roytblat (pro hac vice)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10001
`jlyons@bsfllp.com
`smariella@bsfllp.com
`sroytblat@bsfllp.com
`
`
`Melissa Smith (TX State Bar No. 24001351)
`GILLAM & SMITH LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`(t) 903-934-8450
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies,
`Inc.
`
`
`
`11
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 10387
`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 13 of 14 PagelD #: 10387
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that, on September43, 2024, the foregoing was filed under seal with the
`Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and all counsel of record who are deemed to have
`consented to electronic service are being served with a notice of this document via the Court’s
`CM/ECFsystem. Further, I hereby certify that a courtesy copy of the foregoing was emailed to
`counsel for Defendants on September 4, 2024.
`
`/s/ Rvan D. Dykal
`Ryan D. Dykal
`
`Counselfor Comcast:
`
`Deron R Dacus
`THE DacwusFirm, PC
`821 ESE Loop 323
`Suite 430
`Tyler, TX 75701
`Tel: 903-705-1117
`Fax: 903-581-2543
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`
`Thomas G. Saunders
`
`WILMER HALE
`2100 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20007
`Tel.: 202-663-6536
`Fax: 202-663-6363
`thomas.saunders@wilmerhale.com
`
`David J. Lisson
`Ashok Ramani
`James Park
`Micayla Hardisty
`Davis POLK & WARDWELL LLP
`1600 El Camino Real
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`david.lisson@davispolk.com
`ashok.ramani@davispolk.com
`james.park@davispolk.com
`micayla.hardisty@davispolk.com
`dpw.comceast.touchstream@davispolk.com
`
`Alena Farber
`
`Davis POLK & WARDWELL LLP
`450 Lexington Avenue
`New York, NY 10017
`alena.farber@davispolk.com
`
`
`
`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 197 Filed 09/12/24 Page 14 of 14 PageID #: 10388
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`
`
`
`Counsel for Charter:
`
`
`Deron R Dacus
`THE DACUS FIRM, PC
`821 ESE Loop 323
`Suite 430
`Tyler, TX 75701
`Tel: 903-705-1117
`Fax: 903-581-2543
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Daniel Reisner
`David Benyacar
`Elizabeth A. Long
`Melissa A. Brown
`Robert Stout
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`250 West 55th Street
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: 212-836-8000
`Fax: 212-836-8689
`daniel.reisner@arnoldporter.com
`david.benyacar@arnoldporter.com
`elizabeth.long@arnoldporter.com
`melissa.brown@arnoldporter.com
`robert.stout@arnoldporter.com
`A&P_EDTX60_Charter@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Dina M. Hayes
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`70 West Madison Street
`Suite 4200
`Chicago, IL 60602
`dina.hayes@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Carson Anderson
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`3000 El Camino Real, Bldg 5, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`carson.anderson@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Marc A. Cohn
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`601 Massachusetts Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`marc.cohn@arnoldporter.com
`
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