Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 10339
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et
`al.,
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`Defendants.
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
`LLC, D/B/A XFINITY, et al.,
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`Defendants.
`
`Lead Case No. 2:23-cv-00059-JRG
`Member Case No. 2:23-cv-00062-JRG
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`PLAINTIFF TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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`Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies, Inc. (“Touchstream”) hereby moves the Court for an
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`order in limine to preclude any attorney or witness from (1) making any reference, mention,
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`statement, suggestion, or allusion to, (2) giving any testimony concerning, or (3) introducing any
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`exhibits before the jury or panel concerning any of the following matters.
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 10340
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`MIL NO. 1 Motion to Exclude Evidence and Argument Using Marketing Materials to
`Define Claim Scope
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`Comcast should be excluded from arguing or offering into evidence any marketing
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`materials or marketplace language used to describe Touchstream’s product for purposes of
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`defining claim scope. Any argument or evidence of this is excluded under the Court’s MIL No.
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`18, is not relevant, and is highly prejudicial to Touchstream.
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`Touchstream produced a plethora of marketing materials in this case. These materials
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`include various emails, articles, descriptions on public websites, statements made in video
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`demonstrations, and more. Comcast included many of these documents on its exhibit list, including
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`at least:
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`• COM_00105419
`• TS_COMCAST_00014059
`• TS_COMCAST_00092857
`• TS_COMCAST_00022796
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`• TS_CHARTER_00065855
`• TS_COMCAST_00013929
`• TS_COMCAST_00065876
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`Additionally, Comcast has designated testimony from various fact witnesses discussing business
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`development efforts and how the witnesses would have described Touchstream’s product
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`offerings. For example, Comcast has designated the following testimony:
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`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 21:15-19.
`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 23:6-24:4.
`• Ex. B, Rinzler Dep. Tr. at 41:23-42:4.
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`At instance, in depositions in this case, Comcast
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` See, e.g., Ex. G, Strober Dep. Tr. at 24:19-25:7. Comcast thus appears poised to
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`use such marketing language to try to confuse the jury into thinking it is a limitation of the patent
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`claims that an infringing solution cannot use wires or boxes. Such argument and evidence should
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`be excluded under FRE 403. It is clear that Comcast intends to offer these documents and
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`2
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 10341
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`testimony into evidence for the purpose of differentiating its Accused Products by comparing them
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`to Touchstream’s commercial embodiments and marketing statements about the same. This is
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`improper for several reasons.
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`First, exclusion of evidence and argument of marketplace language is consistent with this
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`Court’s standing MIL No. 18, which states: “[t]he parties shall be precluded from introducing
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`evidence, testimony, or argument for purposes of infringement or non-infringement comparing the
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`accused product or method to the preferred embodiments, the specification, or any non-accused
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`product or method.” See 08-11-2023 Patent Standing Order on Motions in Limine at 3. Comcast’s
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`initial exhibit list demonstrates its intent to offer statements from Touchstream’s employees and
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`agents to describe the patented invention. But arguments comparing Comcast’s Accused
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`Functionalities with embodiments of Touchstream’s technologies risks confusing the jury about
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`the issues they must decide.
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`Second, it is well established under Federal Circuit law that such comparisons are irrelevant
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`and prejudicial in a jury trial on infringement. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
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`517 U.S. 370, 373, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1388, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996) (“The claim ‘define[s] the
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`scope of a patent grant’”) (citing 3 E. Lipscomb, Walker on Patents § 11:1, pp. 280 (3d ed. 1985));
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`B.E. Wallace Prod. Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 490, 495 (1992) (“claims are not to be
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`construed using the patentee’s commercial product”) (citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore
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`Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Such evidence and argument are not relevant to
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`infringement, invalidity, or damages under FED. R. EVID. 402 and are highly prejudicial to
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`Touchstream under FED. R. EVID. 403. The jury may be misled into believing that marketing
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`materials provide insight into Touchstream’s patented technology, or that statements about non-
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`accused Touchstream products accurately depict or somehow limit the scope of the Asserted
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`3
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 10342
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`Claims. Neither is true, and allowing evidence and arguments as such would misrepresent the
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`proper evaluation for the jury to determine infringement. See, e.g., Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew,
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`Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01047-RSP, 2016 WL 7049397, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2016) (denying
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`defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s
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`“marketing efforts affect the scope of patent claims”).
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`Nor were these statements directed to a technical audience who could be considered
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`persons of ordinary skill in the art. For example, many of the marketing materials implicated in
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`this Motion were created or include statements from persons such as Touchstream CEO Herb
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`Mitschele or inventor David Strober. Neither of these individuals are, or claim to be, experts in
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`patents; they were merely describing the technology in layman’s terms to a lay audience. See, e.g.,
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`Ex. G, Strober Dep. Tr. at 70:1-72:11 (“[f]or marketing purposes, this was an accurate way of
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`explaining to nontechnical people what we do”); id. (“at the time when we [wrote] this, it was
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`trying to explain technical and new ways of doing things to an audience that may not be technical
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`and may not understand the new way of doing it”); id. (“the purpose of explaining this to someone
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`that’s nontechnical, I think, this was as – the best we could do to explain that at the time.”); see
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`also id., at 74:13-75:20 (explaining that “my response would change on who I was talking to and
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`how I responded”).
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`Additionally, exclusion of these materials, which are irrelevant to Comcasts’s claims and
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`defenses, would not be prejudicial to Comcast. As explained in Touchstream’s Motion to Strike
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`Dr. Shamos’s “Three Anys” opinions in the Charter case, Touchstream’s marketing statements
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`about its own products and non-descript “patented technology” are irrelevant to damages or any
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`other issue. Dkt. 94.
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`4
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 10343
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`Touchstream requests the Court exclude the use of marketing materials and marketplace
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`language by Comcast in this manner, and all arguments relating to the same.
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`MIL NO. 2 Motion to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Touchstream was Ineffective
`at Business, or the Like
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`Comcast’s pretrial disclosures include evidence and argument that Touchstream was
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`ineffective and unsuccessful in its business ventures. For example, Comcast has designated
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`numerous lines of disparaging testimony from the deposition transcripts of various fact witnesses:
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`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 15:7-16:5 (
`).
`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 62:23-63:20 (
`).
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`Comcast also included exhibits on its exhibit list such as:
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`• COM_00091288
`• TS_COMCAST_00086487
`• COM_00101614
`• TS_COMCAST_00013929
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`• TS_COMCAST_00014059
`• COM_00101606
`• COM_00091331
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`These lines of testimony and documents appear aimed to portray Touchstream’s attempts to
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`develop business in a disparaging way. But this evidence and argument is not relevant under FRE
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`402 to issues of infringement or validity, nor is it helpful for damages. Further, allowing this
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`evidence and argument in at trial would be highly prejudicial to Touchstream under FRE 403.
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`This Court’s MIL No. 11 states, “The parties shall be precluded from introducing evidence,
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`testimony, or argument referring to any other person or entity in disparaging ways,” beyond
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`referring to a party as a “non-practicing entity.” 08-11-2023 Patent Standing Order on Motions in
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`Limine at 3. Documents and testimony that Touchstream was ineffective, unsuccessful, or the like
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`at business would disparage Touchstream and therefore be subject to this MIL. The jury may be
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`unfairly prejudiced against Touchstream and may be persuaded that simply because a party’s
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`5
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 10344
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`business was unsuccessful, that party should not be awarded a valid patent or that its patent rights
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`cannot be infringed.
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`In addition, such evidence and argument are not relevant to damages. Damages theories
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`necessarily assume that the patent-in-suit is valid and enforceable, that the alleged infringer has
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`infringed, and that the parties are willing negotiators at a hypothetical negotiation. See, e.g., Lucent
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`Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Disparagement of
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`Touchstream’s business, or its product, would not be relevant to either party’s state of mind at the
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`hypothetical negotiation, or to any of the Georgia-Pacific factors. Indeed, the only use for
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`documents and testimony showing that Touchstream was ineffective at business is to disparage
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`Touchstream in front of the jury, which would be improperly prejudicial under FRE 403.
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`DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2010 WL 11538713, at *5-6
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`(E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2010) (excluding testimony regarding business failures or successes). The jury
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`may believe that Touchstream’s unsuccessful business endeavors should limit its recovery, or
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`worse, prevent Touchstream from recovering at all. Accordingly, any evidence or argument to the
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`like should be excluded.
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`For at least the above reasons, the Court should exclude evidence and argument that
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`Touchstream was ineffective at business, or the like.
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`MIL NO. 3 Comcast should be excluded from eliciting testimony beyond the personal
`knowledge of its witnesses.
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`Comcast should be precluded from offering testimony from its current or former employees
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`that is outside the scope of the employee’s personal knowledge. From its witness list and
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`preparation of its witnesses for deposition, it is apparent that Comcast plans to offer its employees,
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`as fact witnesses, to testify as to factual bases of how its systems function, based only on
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`conversations they had with other Comcast engineers as part of this lawsuit. These engineers are
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 10345
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`not experts, and thus their testimony should be limited to facts for which they have personal
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`knowledge. FED. R. EVID. 602. This is a long-standing and basic feature of the rules of evidence:
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`a witness must have perceived a fact themselves to testify to it.
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`Moreover, this requirement does not conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)
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`which allows corporate representatives to testify as to general knowledge of a corporation in a
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`deposition. Deposition testimony is different than trial testimony, as the Fifth Circuit has explained.
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`In Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech. Inc., the Fifth Circuit held a witness improperly testified
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`to facts they had no personal knowledge of, even though they were offered as a 30(b)(6) witness.
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`404 F. App’x 899, 907–08 (5th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff there offered its employee’s testimony as
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`to an internal investigation, but the witness did not conduct the investigation himself and did not
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`know of the investigation before educating himself in preparation for his testimony. Id. at 907.
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`Instead, the witness only knew of the facts of the investigation through his conversations with
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`others in preparation for the litigation. Id. The Fifth Circuit considered Federal Rule of Evidence
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`602 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), concluding “a corporate representative may not
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`testify to matters outside his own personal knowledge,” lest they be permitted to repeat ‘rank
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`hearsay’” Id. (quoting Deutsche Shell Tanker Gesellschaft mbH v. Placid Refining Co., 993 F.2d
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`466, 473 n. 29 (5th Cir.1993)); see also Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2014) (“We apply regional circuit law to evidentiary issues.”). The same rule should apply
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`here.
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`The Court should prevent Comcast from offering testimony that is hearsay and based on
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`facts of which the witness lacks personal knowledge. Comcast offered technical fact witnesses
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`with knowledge cabined to particular technical areas of Comcast’s systems. For instance, Comcast
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`provided a witness that testified as to its mobile application, and another witness that testified to
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`7
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 8 of 17 PagelD #: 10346
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`an noOToS Ps°mAoO¥ tors w
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`Even if Comcast had a duty to educate Mr. Cohen in preparation for his 30(b)(6)
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`deposition—whichit did not as Comcast did not designate him for topics outside of the mobile
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`applications—such testimonyoutside the scope of personal knowledge is improperat trial. 7X7
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`Operations, LP v. City ofMckinney, Texas, No. 4:20-CV-353, 2023 WL 161942, at *7—8 (E.D.Tex.
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`Jan. 11, 2023) (citing Union Pumpv. Centrifugal Tech, 404 F. App’x 899, 907-08); see also Antero
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`Res. Corp. v. C & R Downhole Drilling, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00668-Y, 2019 WL 13193894, at *3
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`(N.D. Tex. June 20, 2019) (“[T]Jestimony regarding subject matter as to which [...] corporate
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`representatives outrightly disavowed personal knowledge, deferred responses to other corporate
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`representatives or experts, or did not provide an answer based upon counsel's directive should be
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`excluded at trial.”). Comcast should be precluded from offering this testimony, or any similar
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`testimony, that falls outside the personal knowledge of its fact witnesses.
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`MIL NO. 4 Preclude Comcast from offering testimony, evidence, or argument that it does
`not infringe because it practices the prior art.
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`Comcast appears ready to offer the argument that it does not infringe because its Accused
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`Functionalities work the way the prior art did. This is improper. “[T]here is no ‘practicing the prior
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`art’ defense to literal infringement.” Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc.,
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`279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For starters, this line of argument confuses the concepts of
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`invalidity and non-infringement, which have different standards of proof and different analyses.
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`Nobelbiz, Inc. v. Glob. Connect, L.L.C., No. 6:12-CV-244, 2015 WL 11089488, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
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`July 16, 2015) (citing Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys, Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363
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`(Fed. Cir. 2008)). A defendant must prove that each and every limitation of an asserted claim is
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`invalid by clear and convincing evidence, while plaintiff bears the burden of proof for
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`infringement. Id. Argument or testimony at trial purporting that Comcast practices the prior art is
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`therefore improper and confusing to the jury.
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`Nonetheless, Comcast’s expert, Dr. Jeffay, appears prepared to offer just such an opinion.
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`For example,
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` Ex. E, Jeffay
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`Rebuttal Rep., ¶ 117. In fact, throughout his Report on Non-Infringement, Dr. Jeffay repeatedly
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`compares Comcast’s Accused Functionality to the prior art. Ex. E, Jeffay Rebuttal Rep., ¶¶ 44,
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`114, 117, 124, 140, 143. To the extent Dr. Jeffay may want to offer that opinion in the context of
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`9
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 10348
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`invalidity, it should have been disclosed as part of Comcast’s invalidity theories. If offered in its
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`current state, it should at least be struck as untimely. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2); Dkt. 61, First
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`Amended Docket Control Order, at 4 (deadline to serve disclosures for party with burden of proof
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`was June 24, 2024, Dr. Jeffay’s invalidity opinion on
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` was disclosed July 15, 2024).
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`But Dr. Jeffay does not appear to offer these opinions as bona-fide invalidity theories—instead he
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`couches them in terms of infringement, which is improper. Comcast should be precluded from
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`offering any such testimony.
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`MIL NO. 5 Motion to Preclude Evidence and Argument on Un-Asserted Trade Secret
`Issues
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`In this case, Touchstream accuses Comcast of infringing Touchstream’s patent claims,
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`which are public information, and of doing so willfully. Comcast’s state of mind is at issue,
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`Touchstream’s is not. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 105, 136 S. Ct. 1923,
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`1933, 195 L. Ed. 2d 278 (2016) (“The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or
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`knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was
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`objectively reckless.”). Comcast has nonetheless indicated that at trial it wants to “attack the
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`victim,” questioning Touchstream witnesses on such irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial topics as:
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`(1) what steps Touchstream takes to protect the security of its partners’ information; (2) whether
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`Touchstream sought or entered an NDA with certain parties; and (3) whether Touchstream
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`disclosed any confidential information to Comcast and others.
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`These avenues are unfairly prejudicial because they seek to paint Touchstream as a bad
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`actor generally, but not in connection with any issue the jury will decide in this case. These avenues
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`are also confusing because they incorrectly suggest Touchstream must show that Comcast obtained
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`confidential information from Touchstream when in truth the rights Comcast is accused of
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`infringing are publicly disclosed in patent filings. Because this information is likewise not relevant
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 10349
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`to any issue in this case, or at the very least any probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice
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`and the likelihood of confusion, the Court should preclude this line of argument from Comcast.
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`Touchstream has disclosed that it intends to call as live witnesses Mr. David Strober, the
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`inventor and original founder of Touchstream, and Mr. Herb Mitschele, a co-founder and CEO of
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`Touchstream. While the parties by agreement have not exchanged deposition designations for trial
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`for these live witnesses, at those depositions defendants asked several questions on subjects that
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`would not be proper for trial. Comcast, after meeting and conferring on this issue, did not agree to
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`forego these issues at trial.
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`Examples of improper questions and topics from the deposition of Mr. Mitschele are:
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`(Mitschele Dep.Tr., at 267:4-6)
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` (Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 176:4-6)
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` (Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 188:7-9)
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` (Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 260:10-12)
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` (Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 264:18-20)
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`o This line of questioning is especially confusing and prejudicial, as
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` (See Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 496:2-
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`12)
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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` (Mitschele Dep. Tr., at 441:20-22)
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`Examples of improper questions and topics from the deposition of Mr. Strober are:
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`•
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`•
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` (Strober Dep. Tr., at 209:16-19)
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 10350
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`210:4-9)
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`•
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`•
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` (Strober Dep. Tr., at 210:15-19)
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`(Strober Dep. Tr., at
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` (Strober Dep. Tr., at 212:25-213:4)
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`While the parties have not completed all designations and counter-designations for trial,
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`the following exemplary excerpts from the depositions of other Touchstream personnel, such as
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`Mr. Jamie Cohen and Mr. Michael Rinzler, would also be improper subjects for trial:
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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`•
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` (Cohen Dep. Tr., at 162:25-163:3)
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`(Cohen Dep. Tr., at 237:17-21)
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`238:2)
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`(Cohen Dep. Tr., at 229:6-8)
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` (Cohen Dep. Tr., at 229:11-13)
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`(Cohen Dep. Tr., at 229:20-22)
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`Dep. Tr., at 132:14-15)
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`at 132:17-18)
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`Tr., at 133:9-10)
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`12
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` (Cohen Dep Tr., at 237:23-
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` (Rinzler
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` (Rinzler Dep. Tr.,
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` (Rinzler Dep. Tr., at 133:6-7)
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` (Rinzler Dep.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 10351
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`None of these are proper subject matter for trial, as they appear designed to create a
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`distracting sideshow on Touchstream’s actions and state of mind when (unlike Comcast) nobody
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`has accused Touchstream of wrongdoing and these actions are not relevant to any issue. The Court
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`should grant Touchstream’s motions, precluding this information and focusing on the issues the
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`jury will actually decide.
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`13
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 10352
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`Date: September 3, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
`
`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal
`Lead Counsel
`
`
`Ryan D. Dykal (pro hac vice)
`Jordan T. Bergsten (pro hac vice)
`Mark Schafer (pro hac vice)
`Philip A. Eckert (pro hac vice)
`Anita Liu (TX State Bar No. 24134054)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`1401 New York Ave, NW
`Washington, Dc, DC 20005
`(t) 202-274-1109
`rdykal@bsfllp.com
`jbergsten@bsfllp.com
`mschafer@bsfllp.com
`peckert@bsfllp.com
`aliu@bsfllp.com
`
`
`John Michael Lyons (pro hac vice)
`Sabina Mariella (pro hac vice)
`Sophie Roytblat (pro hac vice)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10001
`jlyons@bsfllp.com
`smariella@bsfllp.com
`sroytblat@bsfllp.com
`
`
`Melissa Smith (TX State Bar No. 24001351)
`GILLAM & SMITH LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`(t) 903-934-8450
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies,
`Inc.
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`14
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 10353
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`CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel has complied with the meet and confer
`requirement in Local Rule CV-7(h) on August 23, 2024 and that Defendants oppose all of the
`above motions. Participants in the conference included at least Ryan Dykal, Jordan Bergsten, Mark
`Schafer, Philip Eckert, Anita Liu, John Lyons, Rachel Martin, Melissa Brown, Dina Hayes,
`Micayla Hardisty, James Park, and Alena Farber. Counsel for the parties discussed their positions
`at the meet and confer regarding the proposed motions but reached an impasse, leaving an open
`issue for the Court to resolve.
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`
`
`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal                                                 
`Ryan D. Dykal
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that, on September 3, 2024, the foregoing was filed under seal with the
`Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and all counsel of record who are deemed to have
`consented to electronic service are being served with a notice of this document via the Court’s
`CM/ECF system. Further, I hereby certify that a courtesy copy of the foregoing was emailed to
`counsel for Defendants on September 3, 2024.
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`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal                                                 
`Ryan D. Dykal
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`15
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 10354
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`Counsel for Comcast:  
` 
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`Deron R Dacus 
`The Dacus Firm, PC 
`821 ESE Loop 323 
`Suite 430 
`Tyler, TX 75701 
`Tel: 903-705-1117 
`Fax: 903-581-2543 
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com 
`
`
`
`Thomas G. Saunders
`Wilmer Hale
`2100 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20007
`Tel.: 202-663-6536
`Fax: 202-663-6363
`thomas.saunders@wilmerhale.com
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`
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`Counsel for Charter:
`
`
`Deron R Dacus
`The Dacus Firm, PC
`821 ESE Loop 323
`Suite 430
`Tyler, TX 75701
`Tel: 903-705-1117
`Fax: 903-581-2543
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`
`
`
` 
` 
`
`David J. Lisson 
`Ashok Ramani 
`James Park 
`Micayla Hardisty 
`Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 
`1600 El Camino Real  
`Menlo Park, CA 94025 
`david.lisson@davispolk.com 
`ashok.ramani@davispolk.com 
`james.park@davispolk.com 
`micayla.hardisty@davispolk.com 
`dpw.comcast.touchstream@davispolk.com 
` 
`
`Alena Farber 
`Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 
`450 Lexington Avenue 
`New York, NY 10017 
`alena.farber@davispolk.com
`
`
`Daniel Reisner
`David Benyacar
`Elizabeth A. Long
`Melissa A. Brown
`Robert Stout
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`250 West 55th Street
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: 212-836-8000
`Fax: 212-836-8689
`daniel.reisner@arnoldporter.com
`david.benyacar@arnoldporter.com
`elizabeth.long@arnoldporter.com
`melissa.brown@arnoldporter.com
`robert.stout@arnoldporter.com
`A&P_EDTX60_Charter@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Dina M. Hayes
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`70 West Madison Street
`Suite 4200
`Chicago, IL 60602
`dina.hayes@arnoldporter.com
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`16
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 195 Filed 09/11/24 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 10355
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`
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`
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`Carson Anderson
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`3000 El Camino Real, Bldg 5, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`carson.anderson@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Marc A. Cohn
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`601 Massachusetts Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`marc.cohn@arnoldporter.com
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`17
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