Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 10319
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. et
`al.,
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`Defendants.
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`TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS,
`LLC, D/B/A XFINITY, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`Lead Case No. 2:23-cv-00059-JRG
`Member Case No. 2:23-cv-00062-JRG
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`PLAINTIFF TOUCHSTREAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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`Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies, Inc. (“Touchstream”) hereby moves the Court for an
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`order in limine to preclude any attorney or witness from (1) making any reference, mention,
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`statement, suggestion, or allusion to, (2) giving any testimony concerning, or (3) introducing any
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`exhibits before the jury or panel concerning any of the following matters.
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 10320
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`MIL NO. 1: Motion to Exclude Evidence and Argument Using Marketing Materials to
`Define Claim Scope
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`Charter should be excluded from arguing or offering into evidence any marketing materials
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`or marketplace language used to describe Touchstream’s product for purposes of defining claim
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`scope. Any argument or evidence of this is excluded under the Court’s MIL No. 18, is not relevant,
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`and is highly prejudicial to Touchstream.
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`Touchstream produced a plethora of marketing materials in this case. These materials
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`include various emails, articles, descriptions on public websites, statements made in video
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`demonstrations, and more. Charter included many of these documents on its exhibit list, including
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`at least:
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`• TS_COMCAST_0092875
`• TS_COMCAST_00085948
`• TS_COMCAT_00074440
`• TS_COMCAST_00091246
`• TS_COMCAST_00090069
`• TS_CHARTER_00065853
`• TS_CHARTER_00065854
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`• TS_CHARTER_00065855
`• TS_CHARTER_00018225
`• TS_CHARTER_00024624
`• TS_CHARTER_00075498
`• TS_COMCAST_00024848
`• COM_00105419
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`Additionally, Charter has designated testimony from various fact witnesses discussing business
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`development efforts and how the witnesses would have described Touchstream’s product
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`offerings. For example, Charter has designated the following testimony:
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`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 21:15-19.
`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 23:6-24:4.
`• Ex. B, Rinzler Dep. Tr. at 40:17-42:4.
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`At instance, in depositions in this case, Charter asked witnesses everal times to confirm that
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`Touchstream advertised its technology as
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` See, e.g., Ex. E, Strober Dep. Tr. at 24:19-25:7. Charter thus appears poised to
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`use such marketing language to try to confuse the jury into thinking it is a limitation of the patent
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`claims that an infringing solution cannot use wires or boxes. Such argument and evidence should
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 10321
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`be excluded under FRE 403. It is clear that Charter intends to offer these documents and testimony
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`into evidence for the purpose of differentiating its Accused Products by comparing them to
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`Touchstream’s commercial embodiments and marketing statements about the same. This is
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`improper for several reasons.
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`First, exclusion of evidence and argument of marketplace language is consistent with this
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`Court’s standing MIL No. 18, which states: “[t]he parties shall be precluded from introducing
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`evidence, testimony, or argument for purposes of infringement or non-infringement comparing the
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`accused product or method to the preferred embodiments, the specification, or any non-accused
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`product or method.” See 08-11-2023 Patent Standing Order on Motions in Limine at 3. Charter’s
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`initial exhibit list demonstrates its intent to offer statements from Touchstream’s employees and
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`agents to describe the patented invention. But arguments comparing Charter’s Accused
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`Functionalities with embodiments of Touchstream’s technologies risks confusing the jury about
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`the issues they must decide.
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`Second, it is well established under Federal Circuit law that such comparisons are irrelevant
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`and prejudicial in a jury trial on infringement. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
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`517 U.S. 370, 373, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1388, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1996) (“The claim ‘define[s] the
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`scope of a patent grant’”) (citing 3 E. Lipscomb, Walker on Patents § 11:1, pp. 280 (3d ed. 1985));
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`B.E. Wallace Prod. Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 490, 495 (1992) (“claims are not to be
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`construed using the patentee’s commercial product”) (citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore
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`Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Such evidence and argument are not relevant to
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`infringement, invalidity, or damages under FED. R. EVID. 402 and are highly prejudicial to
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`Touchstream under FED. R. EVID. 403. The jury may be misled into believing that marketing
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`materials provide insight into Touchstream’s patented technology, or that statements about non-
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 10322
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`accused Touchstream products accurately depict or somehow limit the scope of the Asserted
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`Claims. Neither is true, and allowing evidence and arguments as such would misrepresent the
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`proper evaluation for the jury to determine infringement. See, e.g., Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew,
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`Inc., No. 2:15-CV-01047-RSP, 2016 WL 7049397, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2016) (denying
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`defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s
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`“marketing efforts affect the scope of patent claims”).
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`Nor were these statements directed to a technical audience who could be considered
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`persons of ordinary skill in the art. For example, many of the marketing materials implicated in
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`this Motion were created or include statements from persons such as Touchstream CEO Herb
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`Mitschele or inventor David Strober. Neither of these individuals are, or claim to be, experts in
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`patents; they were merely describing the technology in layman’s terms to a lay audience. See, e.g.,
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`Strober Dep. Tr. at 70:1-72:11 (“[f]or marketing purposes, this was an accurate way of explaining
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`to nontechnical people what we do”); id. (“at the time when we [wrote] this, it was trying to explain
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`technical and new ways of doing things to an audience that may not be technical and may not
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`understand the new way of doing it”); id. (“the purpose of explaining this to someone that’s
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`nontechnical, I think, this was as – the best we could do to explain that at the time.”); see also id.,
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`at 74:13-75:20 (explaining that “my response would change on who I was talking to and how I
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`responded”).
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`Additionally, exclusion of these materials, which are irrelevant to Charter’s claims and
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`defenses, would not be prejudicial to Charter. As explained in Touchstream’s Motion to Strike Dr.
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`Shamos’s “Three Anys” opinions, Touchstream’s marketing statements about its own products
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`and non-descript “patented technology” are irrelevant to damages or any other issue. Dkt. 94.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 10323
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`Touchstream requests the Court exclude the use of marketing materials and marketplace
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`language by Charter in this manner, and all arguments relating to the same.
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`MIL NO. 2: Motion to Exclude Evidence and Argument that Touchstream was Ineffective
`at Business, or the Like
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`Charter’s pretrial disclosures include evidence and argument that Touchstream was
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`ineffective and unsuccessful in its business ventures. For example, Charter has designated
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`numerous lines of disparaging testimony from the deposition transcripts of various fact witnesses:
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`• Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr. at 15:7-16:5 (discussing why Lulla felt Touchstream
`). Ex. A, Lulla Dep. Tr.
`• Ex. A Lulla Dep. Tr. at 62:23-63:20 (discussing
`efforts).
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` business development
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`Charter also included exhibits on its exhibit list such as:
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`• TS_CHARTER_00070966
`• TS_COMCAST_00074440
`• TS_COMCAST_00090069
`• CHARTER_TS0060069
`• CHARTER_TS0060042
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`• TS_CHARTER_00081834
`• TS_COMCAST_00091246
`• TS_CHARTER_00075498
`• CHARTER_TS0060117
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`These lines of testimony and documents appear aimed to portray Touchstream’s attempts to
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`develop business in a disparaging way. But this evidence and argument is not relevant under FRE
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`402 to issues of infringement or validity, nor is it helpful for damages. Further, allowing this
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`evidence and argument in at trial would be highly prejudicial to Touchstream under FRE 403.
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`This Court’s MIL No. 11 states, “The parties shall be precluded from introducing evidence,
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`testimony, or argument referring to any other person or entity in disparaging ways,” beyond
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`referring to a party as a “non-practicing entity.” 08-11-2023 Patent Standing Order on Motions in
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`Limine at 3. Documents and testimony that Touchstream was ineffective, unsuccessful, or the like
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`at business would disparage Touchstream and therefore be subject to this MIL. The jury may be
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`unfairly prejudiced against Touchstream and may be persuaded that simply because a party’s
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 10324
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`business was unsuccessful, that party should not be awarded a valid patent or that its patent rights
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`cannot be infringed.
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`In addition, such evidence and argument are not relevant to damages. Damages theories
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`necessarily assume that the patent-in-suit is valid and enforceable, that the alleged infringer has
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`infringed, and that the parties are willing negotiators at a hypothetical negotiation. See, e.g., Lucent
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`Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Disparagement of
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`Touchstream’s business, or its product, would not be relevant to either party’s state of mind at the
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`hypothetical negotiation, or to any of the Georgia-Pacific factors. Indeed, the only use for
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`documents and testimony showing that Touchstream was ineffective at business is to disparage
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`Touchstream in front of the jury, which would be improperly prejudicial under FRE 403.
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`DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 DF, 2010 WL 11538713, at *5-6
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`(E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2010) (excluding testimony regarding business failures or successes). The jury
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`may believe that Touchstream’s unsuccessful business endeavors should limit its recovery, or
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`worse, prevent Touchstream from recovering at all. Accordingly, any evidence or argument to the
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`like should be excluded.
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`For at least the above reasons, the Court should exclude evidence and argument that
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`Touchstream was ineffective at business, or the like.
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`MIL NO. 3: Motion To Exclude Prior Art References Only Disclosed In An Expert Report
`As “State Of The Art”
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`Charter appears ready to offer to the jury 41 references that are not disclosed invalidity
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`combinations. This would confuse the jury and should be precluded at trial. Charter’s technical
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`expert provided 157 pages of material in his invalidity report on these references for the “historical
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`development of the state of the art,” many of which were not disclosed in Charter’s invalidity
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 10325
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`contentions. Moreover, almost all of them are patents or patent applications, heightening the risk
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`these references will invite the jury to confuse them with Charter’s elected invalidity theories.
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`Providing a morass of patents under the pretense of describing the state of the art is
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`improper. While there is a place for demonstrating what a person of skill in the art would have
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`known at the time of the invention, courts preclude parties from offering them where they serve
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`no true purpose in illuminating that state of the art. Better Mouse Co., LLC v. SteelSeries ApS, No.
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`2:14-CV-198-RSP, 2016 WL 3611560, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) (“[T]he Court has often
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`barred parties from using unelected references to discuss the state of the art when the use of those
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`references risks juror confusion.”). This appears to be the case here. Where the accused infringer
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`offers such a high number of prior art references, it carries an even more acute risk of juror
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`confusion, as the sheer number of references all but guarantees improper application of those
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`references as invalidity combinations. Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-CV-00036-RWS, 2021
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`WL 3021253, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2021) (“The Court is unable to determine a specific, limited
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`purpose for which more than 50 patents and patent applications may be used other than to invite
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`the jury to improperly consider them as evidence of invalidity.”).
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`To be sure, Charter has not elected to pursue these references as its invalidity combinations,
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`and its expert did not provide any claim-by-claim analysis of how they would allegedly invalidate
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`the Asserted Patents. Ex. C, Shamos Dep. Tr. 167:25-169:5. Charter has no real purpose in offering
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`these references at trial, and they will only risk confusing the jury on the actual invalidity theories
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`Charter advances at trial.
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`The Court should preclude Charter from offering testimony or evidence on prior art
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`references it only disclosed through its expert’s report’s state of the art section.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 10326
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`MIL NO. 4: Motion to Exclude Evidence and Argument Regarding Ownership or
`Financial Interests in Touchstream
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`Touchstream anticipates that Charter may attempt to elicit testimony or introduce argument
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`on the identities of Touchstream’s shareholders and their respective interests. Aside from showing
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`potential witness bias, there is no probative value to such evidence and argument; it will not help
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`the jury determine whether Charter infringed the patents at issue and should be excluded under
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`Rules 402 and 403 as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
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`In the past, Charter has attempted (and failed) to obtain materials identifying individuals
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`with a financial interest in Touchstream. (See Dkt. No. 68 at 2 (Order denying Comcast’s motion
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`to compel) (Defendants served discovery requests for “[d]ocuments sufficient to identify any party
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`with a financial interest in [Plaintiff] or [Plaintiff’s] activities, including any formal or informal
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`profit–sharing agreement(s), arrangement(s) or understanding(s) concerning any litigation relating
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`to any of the Patents–in–Suit” and interrogatories requesting Plaintiff to “[i]dentify all persons that
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`hold a financial interest in [Plaintiff], the asserted patents, or this litigation, including any
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`individuals identified in [Plaintiff’s] initial disclosures and any potential or actual witnesses in this
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`case (whether deposition, trial or otherwise, and the extent and nature of each such person’s
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`financial interests.”)).
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`While Touchstream identified several of its shareholders that were specifically listed as
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`potential witnesses, it refused to produce irrelevant ownership interests, and the Court accordingly
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`denied further requests to produce additional information concerning those with financial interests
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`on relevance grounds. (Id. at 6). Specifically, the Court found that Comcast “failed to demonstrate
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`that the identities of any persons with a Financial Interest are relevant to this case.” (Id. at 4–5).
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`Likewise, at trial, evidence and argument concerning Touchstream’s stakeholders is
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`irrelevant. Touchstream recognizes that such evidence showing any ownership of the company
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 10327
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`for witnesses testifying in the case may be permissible for the narrow and limited purpose of
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`showing potential bias. However, introducing ownership information about other individuals not
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`present in the courtroom would likely confuse the jury, waste time, and be unfairly prejudicial to
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`Touchstream.
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`For instance, the jury may be misled that Touchstream’s stakeholders––not Touchstream–
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`–own this litigation. See United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A corporation]
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`is a separate legal entity, with an existence independent of individuals who compose it. A
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`corporation is not in reality a person, but the law regards it as distinct and separate from the
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`individual stockholders. It has a real existence with rights and liabilities as a separate legal entity.”)
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`(citations omitted).
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`Nor should Charter be permitted to introduce such evidence to argue for lower damages
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`based on how money may be ultimately distributed within Touchstream. Such an argument has
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`no relevance to damages and could only serve to confuse and mislead the jury. (See, e.g., MV3
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`Partners, LLC v. Roku, Inc., No. 18-cv00308-ADA, Dkt. No. 332 at 2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020)
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`(granting Plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 1 to exclude references to “how or to whom a damages
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`award to [Plaintiff] may be distributed, including its members’ ownership interests”); see also
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`Rembrandt Wireless Techs. LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:13-cv-213-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL
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`627430, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2015) (granting motion in limine as to “individuals with an
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`ownership interest in [plaintiff] (e.g., shareholders)”).
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`To properly focus the trial on those issues that are directly relevant to this lawsuit and
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`prevent undue prejudice, the Court should preclude Charter from introducing evidence or argument
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`concerning witnesses’ ownership interests for any purpose other than to show potential bias. If
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`Charter intends to elicit such evidence to show potential bias, the Court should require Charter to
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 10328
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`make a specific showing, outside the presence of the jury, that such evidence will be introduced to
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`show bias and not for any impermissible purpose.
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`MIL NO. 5: Motion to Exclude Arguments or Evidence of Touchstream’s Alleged Delay in
`Filing Suit
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`The timing of Touchstream’s decision to file suit against Charter, including any alleged
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`delay in filing, is not probative of any issue in this case and risks confusing the jury. Further, any
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`such evidence would be a transparent attempt to backdoor a laches defense into the jury trial,
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`despite the Supreme Court holding that laches is no longer a viable defense in patent cases and
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`laches was never a jury issue to begin with. See SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality
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`Baby Prod., LLC, 580 U.S. 328, 331-32 (2017). The Court should exclude this evidence under
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`Rules 402 and 403.
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`Evidence of Touchstream's alleged delay in filing suit is irrelevant and runs afoul of the
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`patent statute under Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court held that Congress already
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`mandated that the sole remedy for delay in filing suit is a six-year damages window, leaving no
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`“gap” for “gap-filling” equitable defenses like laches to operate. See id. at 961. Here, Touchstream
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`does not seek damages for any infringement occurring more than six years before Touchstream
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`filed suit. Any evidence of Touchstream's alleged delay is therefore not probative on damages. See
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`ExmarkMfg. Co. Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prod. Grp., LLC, 879 F.3d 1332, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
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`2018) (affirming the district court's decision to exclude evidence of delay in filing suit because
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`“the argument that delay in bringing suit somehow establishes [plaintiff's] perception of the value
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`of its invention is specious”) (internal citations omitted).
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`Any evidence Charter may offer of alleged delay is also irrelevant and highly prejudicial
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`to Touchstream’s claim of infringement and willfulness because it impermissibly invites the jury
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`to balance Charter’s conduct against Touchstream's actions. But the focus of the infringement and
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 10329
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`willfulness inquiries does not depend on the conduct of the party charging infringement. Rather,
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`it depends on the accused infringer's conduct, as infringement is a strict liability offense, and
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`willfulness is about an infringer's knowledge, beliefs, and actions.
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`Evidence of alleged delay creates the real danger of derailing a proper infringement inquiry.
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`Deposition testimony from Touchstream witnesses about the timing of Touchstream’s decision to
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`file this suit, or documents showing that Touchstream was considering filing a lawsuit against
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`Charter before it actually did so, would unfairly prompt the jury to infer that Charter should be
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`absolved for its infringement, or excused from a willfulness finding, because Touchstream did not
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`file suit sooner. (See, e.g., Ex. D (Herb Mitschele May 31, 2014 Dep. 428:12–430:8)). That is why
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`this Court has a standing MIL precluding evidence, testimony, or argument relating only to
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`equitable issues, as would be the case with delay if the laches doctrine still existed. See 08-11-
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`2023 Patent Standing Order on Motions in Limine No. 5.
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`Because the evidence of Touchstream's alleged delay is not probative of Charter’s conduct
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`and will only distract the jury by attempting to portray Touchstream as a bad actor (where
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`Touchstream's conduct is not at issue), this evidence should be excluded. See Exmark Mfg. Co.
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`Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prod. Grp., LLC, No. 8:10CV187, 2015 WL 5177759, at *2 (D.
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`Neb. Sept. 4, 2015), affd in part, 879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (granting plaintiff's motion in
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`limine and finding “evidence of delay in filing suit and/or laches is not relevant”).
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiff Touchstream’s motions in
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`limine.
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 10330
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`Date: September 3, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal
`Lead Counsel
`
`
`Ryan D. Dykal (pro hac vice)
`Jordan T. Bergsten (pro hac vice)
`Mark Schafer (pro hac vice)
`Philip A. Eckert (pro hac vice)
`Anita Liu (TX State Bar No. 24134054)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`1401 New York Ave, NW
`Washington, Dc, DC 20005
`(t) 202-274-1109
`rdykal@bsfllp.com
`jbergsten@bsfllp.com
`mschafer@bsfllp.com
`peckert@bsfllp.com
`aliu@bsfllp.com
`
`
`John Michael Lyons (pro hac vice)
`Sabina Mariella (pro hac vice)
`Sophie Roytblat (pro hac vice)
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10001
`jlyons@bsfllp.com
`smariella@bsfllp.com
`sroytblat@bsfllp.com
`
`
`Melissa Smith (TX State Bar No. 24001351)
`GILLAM & SMITH LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`(t) 903-934-8450
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Touchstream Technologies,
`Inc.
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`12
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 10331
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`CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel has complied with the meet and confer
`requirement in Local Rule CV-7(h) on August 23, 2024 and that Defendants oppose all of the
`above motions. Participants in the conference included at least Ryan Dykal, Jordan Bergsten, Mark
`Schafer, Philip Eckert, Anita Liu, John Lyons, Rachel Martin, Melissa Brown, Dina Hayes,
`Micayla Hardisty, James Park, and Alena Farber. Counsel for the parties discussed their positions
`at the meet and confer regarding the proposed motions but reached an impasse, leaving an open
`issue for the Court to resolve.
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`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal                                                 
`Ryan D. Dykal
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that, on September 3, 2024, the foregoing was filed under seal with the
`Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and all counsel of record who are deemed to have
`consented to electronic service are being served with a notice of this document via the Court’s
`CM/ECF system. Further, I hereby certify that a courtesy copy of the foregoing was emailed to
`counsel for Defendants on September 3, 2024.
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`/s/ Ryan D. Dykal                                                 
`Ryan D. Dykal
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`13
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 10332
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`Counsel for Comcast:  
` 
`
`Deron R Dacus 
`The Dacus Firm, PC 
`821 ESE Loop 323 
`Suite 430 
`Tyler, TX 75701 
`Tel: 903-705-1117 
`Fax: 903-581-2543 
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com 
`
`
`
`Thomas G. Saunders
`Wilmer Hale
`2100 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20007
`Tel.: 202-663-6536
`Fax: 202-663-6363
`thomas.saunders@wilmerhale.com
`
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`Counsel for Charter:
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`Deron R Dacus
`The Dacus Firm, PC
`821 ESE Loop 323
`Suite 430
`Tyler, TX 75701
`Tel: 903-705-1117
`Fax: 903-581-2543
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`
`
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` 
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`
`David J. Lisson 
`Ashok Ramani 
`James Park 
`Micayla Hardisty 
`Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 
`1600 El Camino Real  
`Menlo Park, CA 94025 
`david.lisson@davispolk.com 
`ashok.ramani@davispolk.com 
`james.park@davispolk.com 
`micayla.hardisty@davispolk.com 
`dpw.comcast.touchstream@davispolk.com 
` 
`
`Alena Farber 
`Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 
`450 Lexington Avenue 
`New York, NY 10017 
`alena.farber@davispolk.com
`
`
`Daniel Reisner
`David Benyacar
`Elizabeth A. Long
`Melissa A. Brown
`Robert Stout
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`250 West 55th Street
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: 212-836-8000
`Fax: 212-836-8689
`daniel.reisner@arnoldporter.com
`david.benyacar@arnoldporter.com
`elizabeth.long@arnoldporter.com
`melissa.brown@arnoldporter.com
`robert.stout@arnoldporter.com
`A&P_EDTX60_Charter@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Dina M. Hayes
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`70 West Madison Street
`Suite 4200
`Chicago, IL 60602
`dina.hayes@arnoldporter.com
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`14
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`Case 2:23-cv-00059-JRG Document 194 Filed 09/11/24 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 10333
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`Carson Anderson
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`3000 El Camino Real, Bldg 5, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, CA 94306
`carson.anderson@arnoldporter.com
`
`
`Marc A. Cohn
`Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
`601 Massachusetts Ave, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`marc.cohn@arnoldporter.com
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`15
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