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`Case 2:22-cv-00443-JRG Document 42-4 Filed 01/16/24 Page 1 of 34 PagelD #: 517
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`EXHIBIT D
`EXHIBIT D
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`
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`
`
`
`Plaintiff.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 9:14-cv-80651-DMM
`
`
`ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION
`SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`LIFE360, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.’S
`REBUTTAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
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`
`
`I.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS WHERE LIFE360 IMPROPERLY SEEKS TO
`INVOKE 112(6).................................................................................................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`“symbol generator” ................................................................................................. 2
`
`“CPU software for selectively polling other participants” ..................................... 6
`
`“CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other
`participants with a cellular phone” ......................................................................... 8
`
`II.
`
`TERMS THAT LIFE360 SEEKS TO CONSTRUE WITH NEGATIVE LIMITATIONS
`IN ORDER TO ESCAPE INFRINGEMENT..................................................................... 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`“entered items of interest” .................................................................................... 10
`
`“soft switch”.......................................................................................................... 11
`
`“soft switch matrix” .............................................................................................. 13
`
`“peer to peer network” .......................................................................................... 13
`
`“SMS polling message” ........................................................................................ 16
`
`“automatically transmitting” ................................................................................. 17
`
`“without any selection criteria or manual input of
`relationship data” .................................................................................................. 19
`
`“common interest network” .................................................................................. 20
`
`“establishing, over a private remote server excluding a
`website or a web browser, a communications network”....................................... 21
`
`“PRIVATE . . . NETWORK” ........................................................................................... 24
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25
`
`
`
`i
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
`707 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013)......................................................................................... 12
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc.,
`132 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2001) .............................................................................. 7
`
`Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`570 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ................................................................................ 6
`
`Becton, Dickson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................... 24
`
`Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-263-TJW-CE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35784 (E.D. Tex. 2010) .............. 4, 7
`
`EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`No. 2013-1330, slip. op. (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2014) ...................................................... 10, 12
`
`Fitnessage Servs., Inc. v. Polar Electro, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-01444-MMD-GWF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17158 (D. Nev. 2014) ......... 5, 7
`
`Green Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC,
`620 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................... 1
`
`ICN Photonics, Ltd. v. Cynosure, Inc.,
`73 Fed. App’x. 425 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................. 23
`
`Invensys Sys, Inc.. v. Emerson Elec. Co.,
`2014 WL 3884165 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014) ..................................................................... 4
`
`Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................... 1, 3, 7
`
`Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp.,
`309 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002)......................................................................................... 19
`
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
`382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................... 3
`
`Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006)........................................................................................... 3
`
`ii
`
`

`

`
`
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) ..................................................................................................... 1, 2
`
`Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000)......................................................................................... 17
`
`Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................... 10, 11
`
`Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
`806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986)........................................................................................... 1
`
`Personalized Media Commc’n, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................. 3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 11, 24
`
`Pi-Net Int’l Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
`2014 WL 1997039 (D. Del. May 14, 2014) ........................................................................ 4
`
`RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,
`No. 3:12-CV-208, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98840 (S.D. Tex. 2013) .................................. 6
`
`Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc.,
`413 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................... 21
`
`SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)......................................................................................... 10
`
`Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc.,
`No. 04 C 5312, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80153 (N.D. Ill. October 31, 2006) ................. 4, 7
`
`Transperfect Global, Inc. v. MotionPoint Corp.,
`No. C 10–2590 CW, 2013 WL 2299621 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2013) .................................. 4
`
`Typhoon Touch Tech., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)........................................................................................... 5
`
`Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown,
`939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991)......................................................................................... 20
`
`Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
`581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009)......................................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(4) ........................................................................................................................ 21
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(6) ................................................................................................................. passim
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`
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`Pursuant to the parties’ [Joint Proposed] Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 31–1), Plaintiff
`
`Advanced Ground Information Systems, Inc. respectfully submits this rebuttal brief in support of
`
`its proposed claim constructions in the above-captioned case.
`
`I.
`
`CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS WHERE LIFE360 IMPROPERLY SEEKS TO
`INVOKE 112(6)
`
`Life360 seeks to construe the terms “symbol generator,” “CPU software for selectively
`
`polling other participants,” and “CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other
`
`participants with a cellular phone” as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), even though these claim
`
`terms are not in “means-plus-function” format. These terms do not use the phrase “means for”;
`
`and, therefore, Life360 has the burden to prove that the claims do not provide sufficient structure
`
`if it seeks a construction under § 112(6). Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas
`
`Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Life360 provides no evidence to meet this
`
`burden.
`
`Life360 further seeks a ruling that, should these terms be construed as “means-plus-
`
`function” terms, the claims including these terms are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) because
`
`the specifications allegedly fail to describe a corresponding algorithm. Indefiniteness, although
`
`ultimately a question of law, is an issue based on “underlying factual determinations,” Green
`
`Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and the
`
`ultimate issue is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the
`
`claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806
`
`F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112. Patents are presumed valid; and the
`
`accused infringer has the burden of establishing invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. See
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130, n.10 (2014). AGIS has
`
`1
`
`

`

`
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`provided expert testimony demonstrating that the claim terms are not indefinite, while Life360,
`
`providing only attorney argument, fails to carry its burden.
`
`A.
`
`“symbol generator”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
`
`Does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)/112(f)
`Invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and is indefinite.
`Structure: An undisclosed algorithm or software function
`Function: generate symbols that represent each of the participants’ cell phones in
`the communication network on the display screen (’728 Patent, claim 3; ’681
`Patent, claim 5);
`generate symbols on said touch display screen (’728 Patent, claim 10; ’681
`Patent, claim 9)
`’728 patent, claims 3, 10
`’681 patent, claims 5, 9
`
` “Symbol generator” does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). AGIS stated in its opening
`
`brief, and its expert Dr. Goldberg agreed, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
`
`understood that the term “symbol generator” was a term well-understood in the art. See, e.g.,
`
`Declaration of Benjamin Goldberg (“Goldberg Decl.”), Dkt. No. 48, Ex. E, ¶¶ 20–21.
`
`Specifically, Dr. Goldberg opined that the term “symbol generator” would have been sufficient
`
`to identify software code that was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill. Id. Dr.
`
`Goldberg further opined that one of skill would have understood “symbol generator” to refer to
`
`classes of software subroutines that were known to generate symbols on a display. Id. at ¶ 21.
`
`Life360’s statements regarding the interpretation of the term “symbol generator” by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art are unsubstantiated by both the intrinsic record and any extrinsic
`
`evidence. Life360’s brief does not cite any expert testimony and merely makes conclusory
`
`statements regarding the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art.1
`
`
`1
`Life360 has the burden of proving that any claim term should be treated as 35 U.S.C. §
`112(6) by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130, n.10. Life360
`did not provide any expert testimony regarding the understanding of one of skill in the art in
`
`2
`
`

`

`
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`As Life360 admits, the term “symbol generator” does not contain the specific phrase
`
`“means for” (Dkt. No. 47, p. 15); and thus, there is a strong presumption that §112(6) does not
`
`apply. See, e.g., Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2004) (“Our cases make clear . . . that the presumption flowing from the absence of the term
`
`‘means’ is a strong one that is not readily overcome.”). The presumption can be overcome only
`
`if the claim language fails to connote any structure, and instead relies entirely on purely
`
`functional language. See Inventio, 649 F.3d at 1355–56.
`
`Life360’s conclusory attorney argument that “symbol generator” was not generally
`
`known to one skilled in the art does not rebut this presumption.
`
`Life360’s argument that “symbol generator” is a “coined term lacking a clear meaning” is
`
`incorrect and unsupported by the evidence. Further, Life360’s reliance on Personalized Media
`
`Commc’n, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n in this regard is misplaced. 161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998). In Personalized Media, the Federal Circuit found that § 112(6) did not apply to the claim
`
`term “digital detector,” because, like “symbol generator,” the term recited sufficient structure,
`
`and was not a “coined term lacking clear meaning.” See id. at 705. In the present case, the
`
`disclosures of the ’728 and ’681 patents, along with the testimony of Dr. Goldberg, establish that
`
`“symbol generator” was well understood in the art, connotes structure, and thus is not a “coined
`
`term” lacking a clear meaning.
`
`Life360 cites additional cases in which courts found that terms such as “mechanism” and
`
`“module” served as synonyms for the term “means” in the limitations there at-issue, but none of
`
`these cases apply here. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353–
`
`
`either the Joint Claim Construction Statement or in its opening brief. (See generally Dkt. Nos.
`44, 45, 47.) AGIS objects to any attempt by Life360 to include any expert testimony in its
`rebuttal submissions that should have been included in Life360’s affirmative evidence.
`
`3
`
`

`

`
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`54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that § 112(6) applied to the term “colorant selection mechanism”
`
`because, inter alia, the patentee explicitly used the phrase “colorant selection mechanism” as a
`
`synonym for “mechanism” and “means”); Invensys Sys., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 6:12-cv-
`
`779, 2014 WL 3884165, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014) (applying § 112(6) after finding that
`
`the claim term “module for” was not known in the art and was a synonym for “means for”);
`
`Transperfect Global, Inc. v. MotionPoint Corp., No. C 10–2590 CW, 2013 WL 2299621, at *7
`
`(N.D. Cal. May 24, 2013) (applying § 112(6) after finding that the term “module” did not
`
`connote structure and was constructively drafted as means-plus-function limitation).
`
`Life360’s reliance on Pi-Net Int’l Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. is also misplaced. 2014
`
`WL 1997039 (D. Del. May 14, 2014). In Pi-Net, the court construed “computer system
`
`executing the back-end transactional application for processing the transaction request in real-
`
`time,” a lengthy and elaborate functional phrase without any known structural meaning, as
`
`invoking § 112(6). Id. at *12–13. By contrast, the term “symbol generator” in the present case
`
`refers to a well-known software structure for performing the routine function of calling forth a
`
`symbol and placing it on the map. Similar terms, relating to routine software functions, that are
`
`understood to connote standard software structure to those skilled in the art, have been
`
`repeatedly held not to invoke § 112(6). See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No.
`
`04 C 5312, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80153, at *36–45 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2006) (finding that §
`
`112(6) did not apply to the term “program code” because the term was known to designate
`
`structure to those skilled in the art); Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-
`
`263-TJW-CE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35784, at *39–50 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (declining to
`
`apply § 112(6) to the terms “advertising selector,” “programmatic elements for,” and “user
`
`response processing modules” because the terms recited sufficient structure and had a well
`
`4
`
`

`

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`understood meaning in the art); Fitnessage Servs., Inc. v. Polar Electro, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01444-
`
`MMD-GWF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17158, at *11–16 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2014) (rejecting the
`
`application of § 112(6) to the term “said processor from said inputted data determining an overall
`
`corresponding fitness age for the individual,” because “processor” sufficiently designated
`
`structure for determining overall fitness age “in the common parlance of software engineering”).
`
`Like the claim terms in these cases, the term “symbol generator” was well understood in the art
`
`and recites sufficient structure. See Goldberg Decl., ¶ 21. Life360 offers no evidence to the
`
`contrary and fails to rebut the presumption that § 112(6) does not apply.
`
`Even if “symbol generator” were found to be subject to § 112(6), the claim term is not
`
`indefinite because the patent specifications adequately disclose an algorithm sufficient to
`
`connote structure. For example, in one embodiment of the ’681 and ’728 patents, the
`
`specification discloses a software algorithm that is executed on the CPU that (1) relates “x and y
`
`coordinates” on the mobile device’s screen to the longitude and latitude of other network
`
`participants, (2) and thereby depicts a symbol on the mobile device’s screen indicative of the
`
`location of the network participants. See, e.g., ’681 patent, 4:63–64, 6:24–31, 7:14–19; see also
`
`’728 patent, 8:45–50, 7:31–37, 10:40–46. Utilizing these steps, the symbol generator generates
`
`and displays symbols on the display screen that represent other participants. See Goldberg Decl.,
`
`¶ 22. These algorithmic steps describe examples of how the symbol generator can generate
`
`symbols that represent each of the participants’ cell phones in the communication network on the
`
`display screen, and they do more than merely recite the function of the symbol generator. See
`
`Goldberg Decl., ¶ 22; ’728 patent, 10:40-46; ’681 patent, 7:14–19; Typhoon Touch Tech., Inc. v.
`
`Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, even if this term were
`
`construed under § 112(6), it would not be indefinite. Id.
`
`5
`
`

`

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`B.
`
` “CPU software for selectively polling other participants”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims
`
`No separate construction necessary (see agreed-to construction of “selectively
`polling other participants” (Dkt. No. 45))
`
`Does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)/112(f)
`Invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and is indefinite.
`Structure: An undisclosed algorithm or software function residing in the CPU of
`the cellular phone
`Function: selectively polls other participants [see agreed-to construction of
`“selectively polling other participants”]
`’728 patent, claim 10
`
`As was the case with the term “symbol generator,” Life360 asserts mere attorney
`
`argument that the term “CPU software for selectively polling other participants”2 should be
`
`subject to § 112(6). In contrast, AGIS relies on the intrinsic record and extrinsic evidence,
`
`including the expert testimony of Dr. Goldberg, to establish that that one of skill in the art would
`
`have understood this CPU polling software to be specific software code that was well known in
`
`the art. See, e.g., Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 23–25.
`
`As established by Dr. Goldberg, “CPU software for selectively polling other participants”
`
`connotes sufficient structure to one of ordinary skill and is thus not a “nonce” word or a “coined
`
`term lacking a clear meaning.” See id. Further, claim terms analogous to “CPU software for
`
`selectively polling other participants” have been construed in other cases to connote structure
`
`(i.e., § 112(6) was not applied). See, e.g., RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,No.
`
`3:12-CV-208, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98840, at *47–48 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 16, 2013) (holding that
`
`“computer software,” as used in the context of the claim limitation, was sufficient to avoid the
`
`application of § 112(f)); Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 887, 897–98
`
`(E.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that “computer code” for performing a function did not invoke §
`
`
`2
`The parties have agreed to a construction of “selectively polling other participants” as
`“selectively sending a command to the cellular phones of other participants to which those
`cellular phones respond.” (Dkt. No. 45, p. 2.)
`
`6
`
`

`

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`112(6)); Inventio, 649 F.3d at 1360 (holding that the “claimed ‘computing unit’ connotes
`
`sufficiently definite structure”); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc.,132 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1232 (N.D.
`
`Cal. 2001) (“‘[C]omputer code’ is not a generic term, but rather recites structure that is
`
`understood by those of skill in the art to be a type of device for accomplishing the stated
`
`functions.”). See also Trading Techs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80153, at *36–45 did not apply to
`
`the term “program code” because the term was known to designate structure to those skilled in
`
`the art); Beneficial, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35784, at *39–50 (declining to apply § 112(6) to the
`
`terms “advertising selector,” “programmatic elements for,” and “user response processing
`
`modules” because the terms recited sufficient structure and had well-understood meanings in the
`
`art); Fitnessage, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17158, at *11–16 (rejecting the application of § 112(6)
`
`to the term “processor” because it sufficiently designated structure for determining overall fitness
`
`age “in the common parlance of software engineering”).
`
`Moreover, even if “CPU software for selectively polling other participants” were found
`
`to be subject to § 112(6), the claim term is not indefinite because the specification of the ’728
`
`patent adequately discloses an algorithm sufficient to describe the structure. See Goldberg Decl.,
`
`¶¶ 26–27; ’728 patent, 4:39–46. For example, the specification of the ’728 patent discloses
`
`algorithms that achieve the claimed “selective polling,” including the disclosure of a selective
`
`polling algorithm whereby (1) “the cellular phone one operator selects, from a list, the other
`
`users (or all of them), that the operator desires to be part of the communications net,” (2) the
`
`“system then polls the selected phones to activate and become part of the communications net,”
`
`and (3) the “selected phones then transmit their positions to all the other phones in the
`
`established net.” See, e.g., ’728 patent, 4:39–46. Thus, in this embodiment, the CPU software
`
`7
`
`

`

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`detects a participant’s selection of the devices to be polled and sends a polling request to the
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`networking hardware. See Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 26–27.
`
`Additionally, Life360 now proposes, for the first time, that “CPU software” should be
`
`construed as “an undisclosed algorithm or software function residing in a CPU.” (Dkt. No. 47,
`
`pp. 20–22 (emphasis added).) But, the specifications of the patents-in-suit do not limit “CPU
`
`software” to software stored in a processor. In general, all software that is processed by a CPU is
`
`ultimately stored in a CPU as instructions prior to processing; thus, there can be no requirement
`
`that software must reside (at all times) in a CPU.
`
`C.
`
`“CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other participants with
`a cellular phone”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
`
`Does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)/112(f)
`Invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and is indefinite.
`Structure:
`An undisclosed algorithm or software function residing in the CPU of the
`cellular phone
`Function: causes the exchange of data with other participants with a cellular
`phone
`’681 patent, claim 9
`
`Life360’s argument that “CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other
`
`participants with a cellular phone” invokes § 112(6) fails for the same reasons as discussed
`
`above with regard to the term “CPU software for selectively polling other participants.” This
`
`term does not require construction and does not invoke § 112(6) because it connotes sufficient
`
`structure to one of ordinary skill in the art. As Dr. Goldberg opined, “CPU software that causes
`
`the exchange of data with other participants with a cellular phone” would have been understood
`
`by one of ordinary skill to be specific software code that was well known in the art. See
`
`Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 32–34.
`
`8
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`

`

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`Even if “CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other participants with a
`
`cellular phone” were found to be subject to § 112(6), the claim term is not indefinite because the
`
`specification of the ’681 patent adequately discloses algorithms sufficient to connote structure.
`
`See Goldberg Decl., ¶ 35–36; ’681 patent, 9:5–19. For example, the ’681 patent describes a
`
`“[c]onventional PDA/cellular phone[]” that includes conventional “digital messaging software”
`
`that transmits information to other cellular phone devices. See, e.g., ’681 patent, 5:14–24. In
`
`one exemplary embodiment, a data exchange algorithm is executed whereby the algorithm or
`
`software function executed by the CPU of the cellular phone (1) detects an operator’s touch of a
`
`soft switch, and (2) transmits the information associated with that soft switch to other network
`
`participants. See, e.g., id. at 9:43–54. In another exemplary embodiment, the software residing
`
`in the CPU (1) receives a polling message from another cellular phone, and (2) responds to the
`
`polling message with the location and status of the host cellular phone. See, e.g., id. at 9:5–19.
`
`Thus, the CPU software causes the exchange of data with other participants with a cellular
`
`phone. See Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 35–36.
`
`Additionally, Life360’s new argument that the CPU software resides within the CPU fails
`
`for the same reasons as stated above in Section I(B).
`
`II.
`
`TERMS THAT LIFE360 SEEKS TO CONSTRUE WITH NEGATIVE
`LIMITATIONS IN ORDER TO ESCAPE INFRINGEMENT
`
`Life360 seeks to insert negative limitations into the constructions of “entered items of
`
`interest” (to exclude fixed locations), “soft switch” (to exclude symbols), “soft switch matrix” (to
`
`exclude a single row matrix or a single column matrix), “peer to peer network” (to exclude the
`
`use of a server), and “SMS polling message” (to exclude IP messages). In doing so, however,
`
`Life360 fails to point to a clear disclaimer that would warrant adding such limitations. See, e.g.,
`
`9
`
`

`

`
`
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`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322–24 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (negative
`
`limitations should not be imported from the specification absent a very clear disclaimer).
`
`A.
`
`“entered items of interest”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Claims
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
`
`“items that have been added by, and are of interest to, one or more of the
`network participants” An “entered item of interest” is not a fixed location such
`as a business, house, hospital, or street location.
`’728 patent, claim 3
`’681 patent, claim 5
`
`Life360’s Opening Markman Brief fails to provide a legitimate explanation as to why
`
`“entered items of interest” should be construed, although Life360 expressly admits that it seeks a
`
`construction that excludes “a crime location” in an attempt to circumvent AGIS’s allegations of
`
`infringement. (Dkt. No. 47, p. 10.) This is improper. See, e.g., Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic
`
`Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Claims are properly construed without the
`
`objective of capturing or excluding the accused device.”); SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
`
`Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For at least this reason, Life360’s proposed
`
`construction should be rejected.
`
`Life360 argues that, because the claim refers both to “fixed locations” and “entered items
`
`of interest,” the term “entered items of interest” cannot include entering “fixed locations.” This
`
`argument is without merit. Not only is there no reason that these terms have to be mutually
`
`exclusive, but also Life360’s proposed construction is inconsistent with the patent specification,
`
`which describes entering fixed locations like buildings and facilities. See ’728 patent, 3:48–52;
`
`see also, ’681 patent, 7:19–25. A construction that is inconsistent with the specification or that
`
`excludes embodiments described in the specification is almost never correct. See, e.g., EPOS
`
`Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., No. 2013–1330, slip op. at 14–15 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 5, 2014); see
`
`10
`
`

`

`
`
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`
`also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Life360 fails to show any
`
`clear disavowal that would support its proposed negative construction. See, e.g., Omega Eng’g,
`
`334 F.3d at 1322–24.
`
`Life360’s reliance on cases for the general proposition that claim terms must be “distinct”
`
`is misplaced. While it is understood that claim terms must have “distinct” meanings, there is no
`
`requirement that claim terms have “non-overlapping” meanings. Indeed it is possible for two
`
`terms to be “distinct” but still overlap, such as when a depe