Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 6309
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`§
`Case No. 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP
`§
`
`§
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`§
`§
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`DEFENDANTS SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND SAMSUNG
`ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.’S NINTH COUNTERCLAIM AND TO STRIKE
`DEFENDANTS’ SIXTH AND SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
`
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`ET AL.,
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`Defendants.
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`
`
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`
`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 6310
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
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`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
`
` 
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................3 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`Inequitable Conduct .................................................................................................3 
`
`Unclean Hands .........................................................................................................4 
`
`Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses ....................................................................5 
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` 
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................6 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`Defendants’ Unenforceability / Inequitable Conduct Affirmative Defense
`Fails ..........................................................................................................................6 
`
`Defendants’ Unclean Hands Affirmative Defense Fails ..........................................9 
`
`Defendants’ Ninth Counterclaim is Insufficient ....................................................11 
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`
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` 
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` 
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`i
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 6311
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)......................................................................................6, 7, 8, 9
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`No. 14-80651-CV, 2014 WL 12652322 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2014) ..........................................8
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp.,
`No. 2:07-CV-271-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 11530949 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2010) ...........................3
`
`Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc.,
`269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001)............................................................................................4, 10
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...........................................................................................................2, 3, 9
`
`Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp.,
`603 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010)....................................................................................................3
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...........................................................................................................2, 3, 9
`
`Campmed Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Specialists on Call, Inc.,
`No. 4:16-cv-00452, 2017 WL 373463 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2017) .............................................5
`
`Certainteed Gypsum, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Bldg. Prod., Inc.,
`No. 19-CV-00802-LHK, 2021 WL 1405477 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) ..................................6
`
`Eon Corp. IP Hldgs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 6:10-CV-379-LED-JDL, 2011 WL 13134896 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2011) .....................3, 9
`
`Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2017 WL 275465 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) .................................10
`
`Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................3, 4, 6
`
`F.T.C. v. Think All Pub. L.L.C.,
`564 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2008) .......................................................................................5
`
`Gaudioso v. Mellon,
`269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1959).....................................................................................................10
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 6312
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp.,
`398 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Del. 2005) ...........................................................................................4
`
`iFLY Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GmbH,
`No. 2:14-CV-1080-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 3675136 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2016) .........................4
`
`Kaiser Aluminum v. Chem. Sales, Inc.,
`677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,
`290 U.S. 240 (1933) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Health Care Plan v. G&W Const. Co.,
`783 F.3d 1045 (6th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co.,
`324 U.S. 806 (1945) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`SecurityProfiling, LLC v. Trend Micro Am., Inc.,
`No. 6:16-CV-01165-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 5150682 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2017) ......................5
`
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickson & Co.,
`649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) .............................................................................4, 6
`
`Twin Rivers Eng'g, Inc. v. Fieldpiece Instruments, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1838-JRG, 2016 WL 7042232, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2016) ............................5
`
`Woodfield v. Bowman,
`193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 .....................................................................................................................2, 6
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.555 .............................................................................................................................6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ...............................................................................................................................3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..............................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)....................................................................................................................1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) .....................................................................................................................1, 5
`
`
`iii
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 6313
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`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant AGIS Software Development LLC (“AGIS” or
`
`“Plaintiff”) hereby moves to (i) dismiss Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs Samsung Electronics
`
`Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (collectively, “Samsung” or “Defendants”) Ninth
`
`Counterclaim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); and (ii) strike Defendants’ Sixth and Sixteenth
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`Affirmative Defenses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
`
`Defendants’ Sixth Defense alleges that U.S. Patent No. 8,213,970 (the “’970 Patent”) is
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`unenforceable because of inequitable conduct committed during the ’970 Patent reexamination.
`
`Samsung alleges that a prior indefiniteness determination of the claim term “symbol generator” in
`
`a related patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,031,728 (the “’728 Patent”), was material to the patentability of
`
`the claim term “means for presenting a recipient symbol on the geographical map corresponding
`
`to a correct geographical location of the recipient PDA/cell phone” added to claims in the ’970
`
`Patent during the reexamination. Samsung’s Ninth Counterclaim for a Declaratory Judgment of
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`Unenforceability incorporates this defense by reference. The Sixth Defense and Ninth
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`Counterclaim are deficient, however, because they do not plead how the prior decision that
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`“symbol generator” was indefinite for failure to disclose an algorithm for generating a symbol is
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`material to the patentability of claims incorporating a means for presenting, but not generating, a
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`symbol on a map. Because Samsung has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule
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`9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Sixth Defense should be stricken, and the Ninth
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`Counterclaim should be dismissed to the extent it is based on the Sixth Defense.
`
`Defendants’ Sixteenth Defense alleges that AGIS’s litigation attorneys violated the
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`protective order entered by the United States District for the Eastern District of Texas in AGIS
`
`Software Development LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00361-JRG (E.D. Tex.) during the ’970
`
`Patent reexamination by advising, consulting, and participating in the drafting of amended or
`
`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 6314
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`substitute claims even though they had received highly sensitive material from Google or
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`Samsung. Dkt. 80 ¶ 165. The Sixteenth Defense, however, pleads no evidence that any AGIS
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`litigation attorney participated in drafting any claims. Rather, Defendants contend that one can
`
`infer from certain attorneys’ attendance at examiner interviews after the submission of amended
`
`claims (along with counsel responsible for the amendments) that those attorneys participated in
`
`claim amendments. This inference fails to meet the plausibility standard under Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Accordingly, the
`
`Sixteenth Defense should be stricken, and the Ninth Counterclaim should be dismissed to the
`
`extent it is based on the Sixteenth Defense.
`
`
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`AGIS filed its Complaint on July 14, 2022, alleging infringement of the ’970 Patent and
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`U.S. Patent Nos. 9,467,838 (the “’838 Patent”), 9,749,829 (the “’829 Patent”), and 9,820,123 (the
`
`“’123 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). See Dkt. 1. AGIS amended its complaint on
`
`December 5, 2022, see Dkt. 29, and filed its Second Amended Complaint on June 16, 2023,
`
`asserting the same patents. Dkt. 69. On June 30, 2023, Defendants filed their Answer and
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`Counterclaims to the Second Amended Complaint which included sixteen defenses and nine
`
`counterclaims. Dkt. 80.
`
`In their Answer, Defendants allege that the ’970 Patent is unenforceable “because of
`
`inequitable conduct committed during reexamination of the ’970 patent and in particular AGIS’s
`
`withholding of information regarding an earlier litigation in which a district court determined and
`
`the Federal Circuit affirmed that claims of AGIS’s earlier U.S. Patent No. 7,031,728 . . . were
`
`invalid as indefinite because the claim term ‘symbol generator’ invoked means-plus-function
`
`claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, but the specification of the ’728 patent failed to disclose
`
`adequate structure corresponding to the ‘symbol generator’ claim term.” Dkt. 80, ¶ 95-147.
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 6315
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`Defendants’ Sixteenth Affirmative Defense relates to a claim of Unclean Hands, where
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`Defendants allege that AGIS violated the protective order of a prior litigation. Dkt. 80, ¶¶ 157-
`
`165. Defendants’ Answer also included a counterclaim for unenforceability of the ’970 Patent due
`
`to the same inequitable conduct and unclean hands allegations and incorporates by reference those
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`affirmative defenses. Dkt. 80, ¶¶ 43-46.
`
` LEGAL STANDARDS
`A.
`
`Inequitable Conduct
`
`Inequitable conduct may be established by providing clear and convincing evidence of:
`
`“(1) material prior art, (2) knowledge chargeable to the patent applicant of prior art and its
`
`materiality, and (3) the applicant’s failure to disclose the prior art to the PTO with intent to
`
`mislead.” Ameranth, Inc. v. Menusoft Sys. Corp., No. 2:07-CV-271-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 11530949,
`
`at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2010) (quoting Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603
`
`F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`In evaluating the sufficiency of inequitable conduct allegations on a motion to dismiss, the
`
`Court looks to Federal Circuit precedent, not regional circuit law. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart
`
`Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In the Federal Circuit, “inequitable conduct
`
`allegations meet the heightened pleading standard in Rule 9(b) by identifying ‘the specific, who,
`
`what, when, where, and how’ of the alleged inequitable conduct occurred.” Eon Corp. IP Hldgs.,
`
`LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-379-LED-JDL, 2011 WL 13134896, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
`
`Dec. 13, 2011) (citing Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326). While a court must accept as true the factual
`
`allegations in a pleading, “the court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions as true.” Id. (citing
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “Thus, even under Rule 8, ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the
`
`elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Id. (citing
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 6316
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`To plead “knowledge” and “intent,” the Federal Circuit states that:
`
`[A]lthough “knowledge” and “intent” may be averred generally, a
`pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include
`sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may
`reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld
`material
`information or of
`the
`falsity of
`the material
`misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented
`this
`information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.
`
`Exergen Corp., 575 F.3d at 1328-29. “Intent and materiality are separate requirements,” and a
`
`“district court should not use a ‘sliding scale,’ where a weak showing of intent may be found
`
`sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice versa” because “the materiality
`
`required to establish inequitable conduct is but-for materiality.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton
`
`Dickson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
`
`B.
`
`Unclean Hands
`
`The doctrine of unclean hands is based on the principle that “he who comes into equity
`
`must come with clean hands.” iFLY Holdings LLC v. Indoor Skydiving Germany GmbH, No. 2:14-
`
`CV-1080-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 3675136, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2016) (citing Precision
`
`Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). To prove the defense
`
`of unclean hands, “a defendant must show that the patentee conducted itself as to shock the moral
`
`sensibilities of the judge, or stated otherwise, that the patentee’s conduct was offensive to the
`
`dictates of natural justice.” Id. (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 398
`
`F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (D. Del. 2005)). To invoke “unclean hands,” there must be an
`
`“unconscionable act by the patentee that has an ’immediate and necessary relation to the equity’
`
`of the relief the patentee seeks.” Id. at *2 (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,
`
`290 U.S. 240, 245-56 (1933)). A party seeking to invoke a defense of unclean hands must prove
`
`its defense by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (citing Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc.,
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`269 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 6317
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`C. Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
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`Rule 12(f) provides “a clear mechanism for the court to save time and expense by
`
`eliminating insufficient defenses from the pleadings when those items lack merit or are otherwise
`
`unavailing.” Twin Rivers Eng’g, Inc. v. Fieldpiece Instruments, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1838-JRG, 2016
`
`WL 7042232, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2016) (Gilstrap, J.) (citing Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324
`
`Health Care Plan v. G&W Const. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015)). “[A] [Fed. R. Civ.
`
`P.] 12(f) motion to dismiss a[n affirmative] defense is proper when the defense is insufficient as a
`
`matter of law.” Id. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum v. Chem. Sales, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir.
`
`1982)).
`
`“To find that a defense is insufficient as a matter of law, the Court considers whether the
`
`defense is applicable to the instant case and whether the pleadings give plaintiff fair notice of the
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`defense.” Twin Rivers Eng’g., 2016 WL 7042232, at *1 (citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d
`
`354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also SecurityProfiling, LLC v. Trend Micro Am., Inc., No. 6:16-CV-
`
`01165-RWS-JDL, 2017 WL 5150682, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2017); Campmed Cas. & Indem.
`
`Co. v. Specialists on Call, Inc., No. 4:16-cv-00452, 2017 WL 373463, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26,
`
`2017). While “in some cases, merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense . . . may be
`
`sufficient,” in others this “falls well short of the minimum particulars needed to identify the
`
`affirmative defense in question and thus notify [the plaintiff of the defendant’s] intention to rely
`
`on the specific . . . defense.” Woodfield, 193 F.3d at 362. Moreover, affirmative defenses may not
`
`be “mere denials of an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Twin Rivers Engineering, 2016
`
`WL 7042232, at *1 (citing F.T.C. v. Think All Pub. L.L.C., 564 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665–66 (E.D.
`
`Tex. 2008)).
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 6318
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` ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Defendants’ Unenforceability / Inequitable Conduct Affirmative
`Defense Fails
`
`Defendants’ Sixth Affirmative Defense fails as a matter of law because it does not plead
`
`“but-for materiality” with sufficient particularity. See Exergen Corp., 575 F.3d at 1328 (“In sum,
`
`to plead the ‘circumstances of inequitable conduct with the requisite ‘particularity’ under Rule
`
`9(b), the pleading must identify the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material
`
`misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.”); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at
`
`1291. Defendants’ argument is based on an alleged breach of a duty of candor and good faith
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.555, which has a heightened standard. See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328-
`
`29.
`
`Defendants have failed to plead inequitable conduct with the requisite particularity because
`
`they have failed to identify “how” the prior finding that the “symbol generator” term in the ’728
`
`Patent was indefinite was material to the allowability of claims incorporating the “means for
`
`presenting a recipient symbol” term in the ’970 Patent reexamination. Certainteed Gypsum, Inc.
`
`v. Pacific Coast Bldg. Prod., Inc., No. 19-CV-00802-LHK, 2021 WL 1405477, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Apr. 14, 2021) (citing Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291) (“However, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid
`
`of specific allegations that could support a finding that ‘the PTO would not have allowed a claim
`
`had it been aware of the undisclosed [related litigation].”).
`
`In the Life360 case, the Federal Circuit found that the term “symbol generator” was subject
`
`to § 112, ¶ 6 and denoted a computer-implemented function of generating symbols. Advanced
`
`Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court held that
`
`“symbol generator” was indefinite because the specification of the patent in suit did not disclose
`
`an algorithm for generating symbols. Id.
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 6319
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`Here, the PTO allowed claims in the ’970 Patent reexamination including the term “means
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`for presenting a recipient symbol on the geographical map corresponding to a correct geographical
`
`location of the recipient PDA/cell phone.” The Examiner explained that the corresponding
`
`structure for the function of presenting a symbol on a geographic map was the LCD display of the
`
`sender PDA/cell phone and the algorithm for displaying the symbol on the correct location on a
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`geographic map. Dkt. 80, ¶ 102 (citing Ex. B at 1893).
`
`There can be no serious dispute that the “means for presenting a recipient symbol” term
`
`does not involve the function of “generating a symbol.” The claim term does not include the term
`
`“generating” or similar words that suggest the generation or creation of a symbol. Rather, the
`
`“means for presenting a recipient symbol” calls for presenting (or placing or showing) a symbol
`
`on a location of a map which is displayed on an LCD display. Importantly, the Examiner did not
`
`find that the “means for presenting” included the functionality of “generating a symbol.” The
`
`Examiner’s reasons for allowance presumed the existence or availability of a symbol for display.
`
`Given that the “means for presenting a recipient symbol” does not involve symbol generation,
`
`Defendants have failed to show how the absence of an algorithm in the specification for
`
`“generating a symbol” is material to the allowability of claims to a “means for presenting a
`
`recipient symbol.”
`
`Without a plausible link between the lack of a “symbol generator” in the specification and
`
`the allowability of a “means for presenting a recipient symbol,” Defendants resort to citing to
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`AGIS’s unsuccessful claim construction arguments in the Life360 case as evidence that a “means
`
`for presenting a recipient symbol” is really just a “symbol generator.” Dkt. 80, ¶ 119. According
`
`to Samsung, if AGIS had provided the Examiner with copies of its failed argument that the
`
`specification of the ’728 Patent disclosed corresponding structure for the “symbol generator,” the
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 6320
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`Examiner would have concluded that the “means for presenting a recipient symbol” proposed in
`
`the ’970 Patent reexamination included the unstated function of “generating a symbol.”
`
`Defendants’ contention is not only meritless, it undermines Defendants’ position. AGIS’s
`
`argument in the Life360 case that the specification of the ’728 Patent disclosed the structure of a
`
`“symbol generator” was rejected because the cited structure did not include an algorithm or
`
`description of how symbols presented on a map were “generated.” Advanced Ground Info. Sys.,
`
`Inc. v. Life360, Inc., No. 14-80651-CV, 2014 WL 12652322, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2014).
`
`Specifically, the structure identified by AGIS—“a database that includes a geographical display
`
`on the LCD display and software that coordinates the x and y coordinates on the LCD display
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`touch screen with the geographical display” and “software that places the symbols on the
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`geographical display that represent other cellular phone users that are part of the communications
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`net”—described how a symbol is displayed in an appropriate location on a map but not how the
`
`symbol being displayed was generated. Id. (citing ’728 Patent, 10:44-46).
`
`If the Examiner had reviewed this rejected argument and the district court and Federal
`
`Circuit’s indefiniteness rulings, the only reasonable conclusion the Examiner could have reached
`
`is that while the cited structure does not disclose an algorithm for “generating a symbol,” it does
`
`disclose structure for “presenting a recipient symbol” as claimed in the ’970 Patent. Defendants’
`
`argument that the Examiner would have conflated the functions of “generating a symbol” and
`
`“presenting a recipient symbol,” instead of recognizing the obvious distinction between those
`
`functions and the clear support for the “means for presenting a recipient symbol,” is implausible.
`
`Further, Defendants’ general statement that “the district court and Federal Circuit’s
`
`determinations were material to the patentability of claim 2 in the ’970 patent because they refuted
`
`and were inconsistent with positions AGIS took during the reexamination concerning amended
`
`8
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`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 6321
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`claim 2” are unsupported, and Defendants have pointed to no inconsistent positions that AGIS has
`
`taken in comparison to the plaintiff in the Life360 Litigation. Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. T-
`
`Mobile USA, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-379-LED-JDL, 2011 WL 13134896, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13,
`
`2011) (“While Eon is correct that merely indicating that the inventor was aware of both references
`
`is insufficient in and of itself to raise a reasonable inference of deceptive intent, the pleadings
`
`suggest that Dinkins continued to withhold the information while simultaneously making
`
`arguments to the PTO that could be contradicted by the withheld reference.”). The claim term
`
`“symbol generator” was not at issue on the ’970 Patent reexamination, nor did the Examiner or
`
`AGIS take the position that a “means for presenting a recipient symbol” include the function of
`
`generating a symbol.
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`Accordingly, AGIS respectfully requests that Defendants’ inequitable conduct defense,
`
`counterclaim, and paragraphs 95-147 of Defendants Answer to the Second Amended Complaint
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`be dismissed and stricken.
`
`B.
`
`Defendants’ Unclean Hands Affirmative Defense Fails
`
`Defendants’ unclean hands defense and counterclaim fail because Defendants have not
`
`plausibly pleaded that AGIS’s litigation counsel violated the protective order in the Google case
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`by advising, consulting, and participating in the drafting of amended or substitute claims.
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`Samsung’s inference that litigation attorneys impermissibly drafted amended claims because after
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`the claims were amended, they participated in interviews in which those amended claims were
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`discussed is implausible and should be rejected under Iqbal and Twombly.
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`The full prosecution history shows that while members of Fabricant LLP participated in
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`the ’970 Patent reexamination, an outside attorney, Jialin Zhong, handled the claim amendments.
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`Mr. Zhong submitted the amendments to the PTO, Ex. 1 at 23, and he alone argued for the
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`allowance of the amended claims to the Examiners. Id. at 8. While Messrs. Rubino and Iturralde
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 6322
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`attended one or both of the interviews, their mere presence at those interviews and presentation of
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`arguments is not probative of whether they had previously participated in the drafting of
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`amendments. Id.
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`To the contrary, Messrs. Rubino and Iturralde’s role in the reexamination was expressly
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`permitted by the Protective Order. It states:
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`“The prohibitions in this Paragraph are not intended to and shall not preclude
`counsel who obtains, receives or otherwise learns of, in whole or in part, the other
`Party’s HIGHLY SENSITIVE MATERIAL of a technical nature from
`participating directly or indirectly in reexamination . . . provided that any attorney
`who obtains, receives, or otherwise learns, in whole or in party, the other Party’s
`HIGHLY SENSITIVE MATERIAL of a technical nature produced by another
`Party may not, directly or indirectly, advise, consult, or participate in the drafting
`of amended or substitute claims in the proceeding, and will not use any of the
`producing Party’s Protected Material in the proceeding.”
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`Dkt. 80-10, ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
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`Defendants’ allegation that the “single most reasonable inference from the record is that
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`Iturralde and Rubino each ‘advise[d], consult[ed], [and] participate[d] in the drafting of amended
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`or substitute claims’ during the reexamination of the ’970 patent” because they did what the
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`Protective Order expressly allows them to do—participate in the reexamination—should be
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`rejected. See Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB,
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`2017 WL 275465, at *7-10 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) (“What is missing from Lilly’s proof of
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`unclean hands is any evidence that Dr. Uckert’s participation” Defendants cannot point to any
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`conduct so “as to shock the moral sensibilities of the judge” or “offensive to the dictates of natural
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`justice” sufficient to establish unclean hands. See Gaudioso v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 882 (3d Cir.
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`1959); Aptix, 269 F.3d at 1375. Defendants seek to expand the breadth of the Protective Order’s
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`prohibitions by alleging that any involvement in a reexamination that involves claim amendments
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`is prima facie evidence of a violation. This is a naked attempt to weaponize the Protective Order
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`and interfere with counsel’s representation of their client in the litigation.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 6323
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`Defendants have presented no facts plausibly suggesting that any Fabricant LLP lawyer
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`participated in the drafting of any amendment claims in the ’970 Patent reexamination or otherwise
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`violated the Protective Order. Accordingly, Defendants’ Sixteenth Defense should be stricken and
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`their counterclaim for unclean hands based on a protective order violation should be dismissed.
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`C.
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`Defendants’ Ninth Counterclaim is Insufficient
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`Defendants’ Ninth Counterclaim which seeks declaratory judgment of unenforceability of
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`the ’970 Patent merely incorporates the allegations set forth in Defendants’ Sixth and Sixteenth
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`Affirmative Defenses. For the reasons identified above with respect to Defendants’ Affirmative
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`Defenses, Defendants’ counterclaim for unenforceability of the ’970 Patent should be dismissed.
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`Dated: July 21, 2023
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: ffabricant@fabricantllp.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@fabricantllp.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@fabricantllp.com
`FABRICANT LLP
`411 Theodore Fremd Avenue
`Suite 206 South
`Rye, New York 10580
`Telephone: (212) 257-5797
`Facsimile: (212) 257-5796
`
`Samuel F. Baxter
`Texas State Bar No. 01938000
`sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`Texas State Bar No. 24012906
`jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 E. Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
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`11
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 6324
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`Telephone: (903) 923-9000
`Facsimile: (903) 923-9099
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF AGIS
`SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 89 Filed 07/21/23 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 6325
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on July 21, 2023, all counsel of record who are
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`deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via
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`the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`
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`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
` Alfred R. Fabricant
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel for Plaintiff has met and conferred with
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`counsel for Defendants on July 21, 2023, and counsel for Defendants have indicated they oppose.
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`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
` Alfred R. Fabricant
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`