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`Exhibit C
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 80-3 Filed 06/30/23 Page 2 of 37 PageID #: 4760
`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 80-3 Filed 06/30/23 Page 2 of 37 PagelD #: 4760
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`CASENO: 14-80651-CV-MIDDLEBROOKS
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`ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION
`SYSTEMS, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`V.
`
`LIFE360, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`/
`
`MARKMAN ORDER
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`On November4, 2014, the Court held a claim construction hearing. Based on the Parties’
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`submissions and arguments at the hearing, the Court issues the following claim construction
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`order.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND.
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`On May16, 2014, Plaintiff Advanced Ground Information Systems, Inc. (‘AGIS”) filed a
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`complaint, alleging patent
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`infringement by Defendant Life360,
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`Inc.
`
`(“Life360”).
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`(DE 1).
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`Life360 has developed a smartphone software application, that AGIS alleges infringes the
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`following four patents: U.S. Patent No. 7,031,728 (the “‘728 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,672,681
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`(the “‘681 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,764,954 (the “954 Patent”); and U.S. Patent No.
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`8,126,441 (the “*441 patent”) (collectively, “natents-in-suit”).' While the specifications vary
`
`from another,
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`the patents-in-suit
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`relate to a method and apparatus
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`for establishing a
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`communication network for participants having mobile devices. The ‘728 patent wasfiled first,
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`' The named inventorof the patents-in-suit, Malcolm K. Beyer,Jr. (“Applicant”), is the founder
`and CEO of AGIS.
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`
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`while the ‘681 patent, the ‘954 patent, and the ‘441 patent were filed as continuations-in-part of
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`the ‘728 patent. AGIS alleges that Life360 infringes claims 3, 7 and 10 of the ‘728 patent,
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`claims 1, 5, and 9 of the ‘681 Patent, claims 1 and 2 of the ‘954 Patent, and claims 1-8 of the
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`“441 Patent.
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`A. The ‘728 Patent.
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`The ‘728 Patent describes a mobile device with a display screen. See, e.g., ‘728 Patent,
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`1:6-15, 11:10-42. The screen depicts the location and status of other participants in the
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`communication network on a map.
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`/d. at 11:10-42. Symbols are generated on each of the
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`participants’ cellular phones representing the latitude and longitude of other participants.
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`Jd. at
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`3:46-48. A participant in the communication network may initiate a telephonecall, send a text
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`message, or exchange data or pictures with other participants on the network by touching a
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`symbolrepresentative of the other participant on the screen.
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`/d. at 11:10-42.
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`B. The ‘681 Patent.
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`The ‘681 Patent claimspriority from the ‘728 Patent as a continuation-in-part, and claims
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`a system and method for creating and modifying the items displayed on the touch screen displays
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`of the participants’ mobile devices. See, e.g., ‘681 Patent, 9:60-11:56. Specifically, the focus of
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`the ‘681 Patent is to enable “a designated administrator using a personal computer (PC) or other
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`input device” to “reprogram all user and network participants’ cell phone devices to change,
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`modify or create new virtual soft switch names and symbols for a different operating
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`environment.” Jd. at 1:64-2:14.
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`C. The ‘954 Patent.
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`The ‘954 Patent expands uponthe teachings of the ‘728 Patent and describes systemsthat
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`allow users “to set up either a public peer to peer communications network where all can access
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`
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`or a private peer to peer communications network ... .”
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`‘728 Patent at 1:52-57.
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`In one
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`embodiment,
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`the ‘954 Patent claims a method wherein a participant’s mobile device may
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`communicate with a computer server
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`from which the participants may download map
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`information to their mobile devices. See id. at 7:25-64, 10:32-44.
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`In another embodiment, the
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`‘954 Patent discloses a method wherein soft switches are depicted on the touch screen display of
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`the mobile device, but also may be hiddenin orderto increase the available display area for other
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`purposes.
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`/d. at 10:56-11:16.
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`D. The ‘441 Patent.
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`The ‘441 Patent further adds to the ideas of the ‘728 Patent. In one embodiment, the ‘441
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`Patent claims a “polling” method in whicha first participant sends a polling message to a second
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`participant which causes the second participant’s information, such as their location, to be
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`reported to the other participants in the network. See, e.g., ‘441 Patent, 8:29-63.
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`In another
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`embodiment, the ‘441 Patent claims a method for creating a communication network wherein the
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`participants share a commoninterest such as, for example, friendship. Jd. at 9:19-58.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD.
`
`A. Claim Construction.
`
`Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markmanv.
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`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
`
`Claim construction analysis begins by looking to the wordsof the claims. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa
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`N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The words of the claims are “generally
`
`given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to
`
`a person ofordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,i.e., as of the effective
`
`filing date of the patent application.” Phillips vy. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-1313 (Fed.
`
`
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`Cir. 2005). The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may be determinedsolely by
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`viewing the term within the context of the claim’s overall language. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314 (“[T]he use of a term within the claim provides a firm basis for construing the term.”).
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`Moreover,
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`the use of the term in other claims may provide guidance regarding its proper
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`construction. See id.
`
`(“Other claimsof the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can
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`also be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.”). Claims should
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`be construed “without reference to the accused device.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
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`Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Once the proper meaning of a
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`term used in a claim has been determined, the term must have the same meaningforall claimsin
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`which it appears. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (citations omitted).
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`A claim should also be construed in a manner that
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`is consistent with the patent’s
`
`specification. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“Claims must be read in view ofthe specification,
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`of which they are a part.”). Typically, the specification is the best guide for construing the
`
`claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Precedent forbids, however, a construction of claim
`
`terms that
`
`imposes limitations not found in the claims or supported by an unambiguous
`
`restriction in the specification or prosecution history. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d
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`1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`Anothertool to supply proper context for claim construction is the prosecution record and
`
`any statements made bythe patentee to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
`
`regarding the scope of the invention. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. A patent’s “prosecution
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`history .
`
`.
`
`. consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the
`
`prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citation
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`omitted). However,
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`the Federal Circuit has warned that “because the prosecution history
`
`
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`represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final
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`productofthat negotiation,it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thusis less useful for
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`claim construction purposes.” Jd.
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`“Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the
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`meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and
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`whetherthe inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope
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`narrower than it would otherwise be.”
`
`Jd. However,
`
`in order to conclude that a patentee
`
`narrowedhis claim, the disclaimer must have been with “reasonable clarity and deliberateness.”
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`Superguide Corp. v. Directv Enters.,
`
`Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotations
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`omitted),
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`District courts may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries or technical
`
`treatises, to help understand the underlying technology and the manner in which oneskilled in
`
`the art might use claim terms. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may
`
`aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning
`
`of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term’s
`
`definition is entirely unhelpful to a court.
`
`Jd. Ultimately, however, extrinsic evidenceis “less
`
`significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim
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`language,” and a court should discount any extrinsic evidence “that is clearly at odds with the
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`claim construction mandated by the claims themselves,
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`the written description, and the
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`prosecution history,
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`in other words, with the written record of the patent.” Jd at 1317-18
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`(quotations omitted).
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`B. Means-Plus-Function Claims.
`
`a.
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`Invocation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).
`
`
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`It is axiomatic that patent claims must“particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the
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`subject matter which the applicant regardsas his invention.” Function Media, L.L.C v. Google,
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`Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2006)).? However,
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`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, a claim element can be expressed as a means for
`
`performing a specified function without reciting the structure or material
`
`that performs the
`
`claimed function. 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). “The price that must be paid for use of that convenience
`
`is limitation of the claim to the means specified in the written description and equivalents
`
`thereof.” O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`If the specification is
`
`not clear as to the structure that the patentee intends to correspond to the claimed function, then
`
`the patentee “has not paid that price but
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`is rather attempting to claim in functional
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`terms
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`unboundedby anyreferenceto structure in the specification,” which is “impermissible under the
`
`statute.” Medical Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1212 (Fed.
`
`Cir, 2003).
`
`Whether an element of a claim is in means-plus-function form is a claim construction
`
`question. See Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Am. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
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`2011). Use of the term “means” creates a presumption that the element is to be construed in
`
`accordance with § 112(6). See Betcon, Dickinson & Co. v. Healthcare Grp., 616 F.3d 1249,
`
`1262 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). This presumption may be rebutted, however, when the
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`claim elementrecites sufficiently definite structure or material to perform the claimed function.’
`
`* Because the patents-in-suit were issued prior to the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America
`Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub.L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), the citations to § 112 in this
`opinionrefer to the statute as it existed prior to the AIA.
`3 To determine whether a claim term that lacks the word “means”is subject to § 112the court
`must consider the words of the claims themselves,
`the written description,
`the prosecution
`history, and any relevant intrinsic evidence. See Jnventio AG, 649 F.3d at 1356.
`
`6
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`
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`See Inventio AG, 649 F.3d at 1356. Simply put, use of the word “means” creates a rebuttable
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`presumption that the drafter intended to invoke § 112(6), while failure to use the words “means”
`
`creates a rebuttable presumption that the drafter did not intend the claims to be governed by §
`
`112(6). See Personalized Media Communications v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 704
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`(Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`In determining whether these presumptions have been rebutted, the challenger
`
`must establish by a preponderance ofthe evidencethat the claimsare to be governed by §112(6).
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`ApexInc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`Once the Court determines § 112(6) applies, construction of a means-plus-function
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`limitation involves two steps. First, the court mustidentify the claimed function. See Telemac
`
`Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001). After identifying
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`the claimed function, the court must then determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the
`
`specification correspondsto the claimed function. See id.
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`In order to qualify as corresponding,
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`the structure must not only perform the claimed function, but the specification must clearly
`
`associate the structure with performance ofthe function. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.
`
`Jude Medical, Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(citations omitted). If the specification
`
`does not disclose sufficient structure to perform a claimed function, the claim term may be
`
`indefinite. See id. at 1113-19.
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`b.
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`Indefiniteness of Means-Plus-Function Claims.
`
`For computer-implemented systems and methods invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(6),
`
`the
`
`corresponding structure(s) or act(s) in the specification must amount to “more than simply a
`
`general purpose computer or microprocessor” to satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35
`U.S.C. § 112(2). Aristocrat Techs. Australia v. Intern. Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008). The mere disclosure of a general purpose computer or microprocessor that performs
`
`
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`a recited function is insufficient to avoid the prohibition on “pure functional claiming.”
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`Id.
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`Rather, in instances where functions are to be performed by conventional computer hardware and
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`data processing equipment, it is a software process being executed by the hardware that performs
`the function.
`Jd. A means-plus-function limitation corresponding to the mere disclosure of
`
`software implemented on a computer is invalid as indefinite without the disclosure of some
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`corresponding algorithm that is executed by that computer. See Function Media, 708 F.3d at
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`1318. The specification must include such an algorithm, expressed “in any understandable terms
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`including as a mathematical formula,
`
`in prose, or a flow chart, or in any other mannerthat
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`provides sufficient structure.” Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit, Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2012).
`
`The requirement for a specific algorithm is imposed on computer-implemented patent
`
`claims invoking § 112(6) “[b]ecause general purpose computers can be programmed to perform
`
`very different tasks in very different ways,” and “simply disclosing a computeras the structure”
`
`is insufficient. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. Without disclosing any corresponding structure,
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`“one of skill simply cannot perceive the bounds of the invention.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
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`Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As a result, the Federal Circuit has typically
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`analyzed means-plus-function claim limitations corresponding to software, or hardware having
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`software, as indefinite for a lack of corresponding structure.
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`See, e.g., Blackboard v.
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`Desire2Learn, 574 F.3d 1371, 1382-87 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`III.
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`DISCUSSION.
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`A. Means-Plus-Function Claims.
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`i.
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`“symbol generator”
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`4768
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`4770
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`4771
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`4772
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`4774
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`4775
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`4777
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`4778
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`4779
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`4791
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`4792
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`4794
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`4795
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