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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 2 of 109 PageID #:
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO.
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )(
`2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP
`
`)(
`
`(Lead Case)
`PLAINTIFF(S),
`)(
`
`)(
`MARSHALL, TEXAS
`versus
`)(
`)( OCTOBER 21, 2021
`T-MOBILE USA, INC., and
`)(
`)(
`T-MOBILE US, INC.,
`)(
`DEFENDANT(S).
`)(
`
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO.
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )(
`2:21-cv-00024-JRG-RSP
`
`)(
` (Member Case)
`PLAINTIFF(S),
`)(
`
`)(
`
`versus
`)(
`)(
`LYFT, INC.
`)(
`________________________________________________________
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )(
`CIVIL ACTION NO.
`
`)(
`2:21-cv-00026-JRG-RSP
`PLAINTIFF(S),
`)(
` (Member Case)
`
`)(
`versus
`)(
`
`)(
`Uber TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`)(
`)(
`d/b/a Uber,
`_______________________________________________________
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )(
`CIVIL ACTION NO.
`)(
`2:21-cv-00029-JRG-RSP
`
`PLAINTIFF(S),
`)(
` (Member Case)
`
`)(
`versus
`)(
`
`)(
`WHATSAPP, INC.
`)(
`_______________________________________________________
`TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
`BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROY S. PAYNE
`UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`FOR PLAINTIFFS - AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC:
`JENNIFER TRUELOVE, ESQ.
`VINCENT RUBINO, ESQ.
`ENRIQUE ITURRALDE, ESQ.
`
`FOR DEFENDANTS UBER & T-MOBILE:
`MELISSA SMITH, ESQ.
`MARK REITER, ESQ.
`MR. ROBERT VINCENT, ESQ.
`MR. NATHAN CURTIS, ESQ.
`MS. ASHBY MORGAN, ESQ.
`BILL HARMAN, CLIENT REPRESENTATIVE
`
`FOR DEFENDANT LYFT:
`KURT PANKRATZ, ESQ.
`MICHELLE EBER, ESQ.
`MEGAN WHITE, ESQ.
`
`SUSAN A. ZIELIE, FCRR, RMR
` FEDERAL OFFICIAL STENOGRAPHIC COURT REPORTER
` Official Stenographic Court Reporter
` United States District Court
` Eastern District of Texas
` Tyler Division
` 211 West Ferguson Street
` Tyler, Texas 75701
` 903-590-1065
`susan_zielie@txed.uscourts.gov
`
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`MARSHALL, TEXAS; THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2021
`1:30 P.M.
`THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated.
`For the record, we're here for the claim construction
`hearing in AGIS Software Development versus T-Mobile, et al,
`which is under lead Case Number 2:21-72 on our docket.
`Would counsel state their appearances for the record.
`MS. TRUELOVE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jennifer
`Truelove, Vincent Rubino and Enrique Iturralde here on behalf
`of plaintiff AGIS. And we are ready to proceed.
`THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Truelove.
`MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Melissa Smith
`on behalf of Uber. I'm joined by Mr. Mark Reiter, Mr. Robert
`Vincent, Mr. Nathan Curtis, Ms. Ashby Morgan. And we also have
`a client representative for Uber in the room, Mr. Bill Harman.
`And I'm appearing as well for T-Mo as well today, Your Honor.
`And both T-Mo and Uber are ready to proceed.
`THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Smith.
`MR. PANKRATZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kurt
`Pankratz here on behalf of defendant Lyft. Joining me today
`and who'll be presenting is Michelle Eber and Megan White.
`Thank you, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Pankratz.
`I will also note for the record that a little while ago
`we distributed to counsel for all parties a set of preliminary
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`constructions of most of the disputed terms. The purpose of
`offering those preliminary constructions is not to prevent any
`party from arguing whatever construction they think is
`appropriate on any of these terms. Rather, the intent is to
`let the parties know where the Court is after the initial
`review of the pleadings and the record in order to allow you to
`focus your arguments where you think the Court may have most
`gone astray.
`I do reserve the right to amend these constructions, and
`not uncommonly do amend them based on the arguments received at
`this hearing. So I hope that you will take them in that
`spirit.
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`I know there are a lot of terms, and I'm happy to hear
`the arguments in whatever order counsel think would be most
`efficient; and, certainly, to group the terms if counsel think
`that would be efficient.
`Having said that, I'll turn it over first to counsel for
`plaintiff.
`MR. RUBINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Rubino.
`MR. RUBINO: Good afternoon.
`So it probably would be helpful to go in the order of
`the proposed constructions. There are some we could agree. It
`looks like we are already prepared to address them in the
`alphabetical order.
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`We would address terms like C-1 through C-4 together as
`one, and would also propose to address the Markush terms, which
`would be W, X and Z, together.
`THE COURT: All right.
`Whenever you're ready.
`MR. RUBINO: I am not sure if counsel for Uber has
`something to say.
`THE COURT: All right. I'm happy to hear.
`Mr. Reiter, is there something that you want to say?
`MR. REITER: I was just going to say good afternoon,
`Your Honor.
`I think that makes sense. If we just go in the order in
`which the Court has laid out the terms, I think the groups that
`Mr. Rubino has identified for the most part makes sense. We
`may have some additional groupings as we go through the day.
`There may be some terms that we'll defer on, and I suspect some
`terms that they'll defer on. And as we get to them, perhaps
`we'll just make that election at that time, if that's okay with
`the Court.
`THE COURT: That is perfectly fine.
`MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: Thank you.
`MR. RUBINO: Your Honor, as we go forward with the terms
`-- and, similarly, the terms which I believe are the first
`disputed terms -- for the record, AGIS is going to be
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`withdrawing its allegations of infringement with regard to
`Claim 11 of the '970 patent, which is term T, which seems to
`have some of the similar terms.
`And, at present, I haven't heard anything to the
`contrary, but I believe that would obviate the issue of having
`to address that term of indefiniteness here. Counsel for AGIS
`disputes indefiniteness, but it's no longer relevant to this
`case.
`
`THE COURT: All right, Mr. Rubino.
`MR. RUBINO: For the three terms -- sorry -- four terms
`that remain, C-1 through C-4, AGIS agrees with the preliminary
`construction. That was the argument set forth in its brief.
`The one of skilled in the art could clearly understand the
`scope of the claims from the language of what is in the
`preamble after it said "similarly equipped cellular phone," and
`then list the components of those similarly equipped cellular
`which, is in the Court's preliminary construction. We don't
`think there's any question that one of skill in the art could
`understand what those components mean and what it would mean to
`be similarly equipped.
`Of course, to the contrary, not similarly equipped would
`be identically equipped. In other words, the claims don't
`require identity of equipment; merely similarly equipment. And
`that similarly equipment is set forth in each of the preambles
`with the list of items that define it.
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`THE COURT: Now, I'm not sure if the intent of those
`remarks was to alter the proposed construction or to agree with
`them.
`
`MR. RUBINO: Apologies, Your Honor. We agree with the
`proposed construction. I started with that.
`THE COURT: You did. I just wanted to make sure that
`you weren't making a distinction between whether the identified
`equipment somehow was similar or identical to that listed.
`MR. RUBINO: Thank you, Your Honor. I believe that's
`what's listed is similar equipment, CPU, GPS navigational
`system, as opposed to identical equipment, like the same model
`of CPU or the same model of GPS equipment.
`THE COURT: All right.
`MR. RUBINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
`MR. CURTIS: May it please the Court, Nathan Curtis
`representing Uber. Going to be speaking on behalf of
`defendants here.
`Are we able to bring up the slide presentation?
`And, Your Honor, as Your Honor would expect, defendants
`disagree with the preliminary proposed constructions of items
`C-1 through C-4. Defendants agreed with the preliminary
`proposed indefiniteness finding for item T; but, as the Court
`recently heard, that claim is being dropped.
`The defendants believe that the Court's thinking, at
`least on claim T, is informative of the indefinite issues that
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`are facing with respect to these other claims.
`And there's one core reason -- that I'll get to in just
`a moment, Your Honor -- as to why the defendants believe that
`the proposed tentative constructions are not correct, but I
`want to sort of set the stage for where we're at with respect
`to these terms.
`As the screen shows, there are five different terms --
`now four -- each reciting "similarly equipped." In some cases
`the phone. In some cases, it's a PDA cellular phone.
`And the issue here, in the law, is whether or not the
`intrinsic record provides object boundaries for determining the
`scope of a subjective term or a term like "similarly equipped."
`And as this Court's preliminary found with respect to
`item T, where the claims did not recite any specific equipment,
`there was indefiniteness. I think that's at least a
`recognition preliminarily that the specification did not
`provide any sort of guidance on what it means for a cellphone
`in the abstract to be similarly equipped.
`And the way this matters for this case, Your Honor, is
`-- a couple of examples here to show the Court -- is the
`question that is to be faced for infringement and for my client
`to know whether or not it is infringing these claims is are
`these two phones similarly confirmed.
`On the left, you have an iPhone 3. Has a physical home
`button. It has an older version of software. It has a
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`specific set of apps.
`On the right, you have the iPhone 13. Ten generations
`later. Faster processer. More memory. Different type of
`screen with no physical home button.
`When you start comparing to an Android device that has
`different software. Different types of buttons. You can go
`back in time where now you have a physical tactile keyboard.
`Even further back in time where you have more tactile buttons.
`You have to use a stylus to touch the screen. There's whole
`range of features of equipment that is going to needed to
`determined whether or not it is similar.
`THE COURT: Mr. Curtis, if this claim just said
`"similarly equipped" and that's all, then, obviously, we'd be
`in a different situation. But that's not where we are.
`MR. CURTIS: You are correct, Your Honor, that the
`claims are all slightly different. And I have a slide here
`that's going to put up all the claims at once.
`So we see, as the Court recognizes, that there are
`additional limitations in these claims. And so, for example,
`Claim 7 on the top left says: Each having a similarly equipped
`cellular phone that includes voice communication, free and
`operator selected text messages, photograph and video -- and
`now it gets to the physical equipment -- a CPU, a GPS
`navigation system and a touchscreen display. And then
`comprising the steps of, and it goes on further.
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`The issue we face with these claims, as it shows more on
`this next screen -- on the right, there's another example of
`this -- that the claims already recite very specific features.
`In this one, a CPU, a GPS navigation system and a touchscreen
`display. Those feature are already recited in the claim. The
`limitation of being a similarly equipped cellular phone is
`separate. It is a separate term of the claim. So, being a
`separate term, it needs to have a separate meaning.
`If the claim is to be interpreted where "similarly
`equipped" means just what is highlighted on the screen, then
`the similarly equipped has been rendered superfluous. And
`that's what the Electra Instrument case tells us, you're not
`supposed to render a superfluous limitation.
`That's where these -- the tentative constructions
`unfortunately do that, is by defining "similarly equipped" by
`using other terms that are already existing in the claim is
`rendered similarly equipped redundant.
`Imagine crossing out the word similarly and it said:
`Having a PDA cellphone that includes a CPU, a GPS navigation
`system, and a touchscreen display. That claim would have the
`same meaning as a claim with the words "similarly equipped" in
`it, and it shows that the word needs to have some meaning;
`there needs to be something more than "similarly equipped."
`The question is: Does that the specification provide that
`something more?
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`Here, it doesn't. I think the court recognized that
`with respect to the Claim 11 of the '970 patent. That, on its
`own, "similarly equipped" doesn't give us the guidance. The
`specification doesn't give us the guidance. And, looking
`through the plaintiff's brief and their expert declaration,
`those two don't give us the guidance that we need to make these
`kind of determinations.
`THE COURT: There is no requirement that terms be read
`in isolation. Why shouldn't "similarly equipped" be read and
`understood in the phrase that it's used in?
`MR. CURTIS: Good question, Your Honor. Because here's
`a term of degree. It's asking to make a comparison of how
`similar the CPU, GPS navigation system, and touchscreen display
`are. You're reading the claim in the context as a whole. And,
`certainly, defendants agree with that. But you have to look at
`the word "similarly equipped" and what do those add to the
`claim being there versus not being there. And so, by being
`there, they have to add something more than just repeating the
`further phrases later in that limitation.
`And I think a very uninstructive decision on this, that
`we cited in the briefing and I want to go through in a little
`bit of detail because I think it's very informative, is a
`decision by this Court a few years ago in the ACQUIS versus
`Alcatel-Lucent case. In that case, the term at issue was
`"similar design," which is practically identical to the term at
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`issue here, which is "similarly equipped."
`In that case, there were sort of two issues that led to
`the Court finding indefiniteness. Number one was the sort of
`unclear what the aspects of the design should be compared.
`Now, at issue in that case were what we call computer
`modules. Right? A computer module would have a memory and a
`CPU, a processor, those types of items. It was unclear from
`the specification what aspects of the computer module should be
`compared to be similar in design.
`THE COURT: What was the surrounding claim language?
`MR. CURTIS: Yes, Your Honor.
`Rob, if you could bring up that decision, and go to page
`10. So if you'd scroll down, this is Claim 26.
`And so what you have, the claim limitation of similar
`design comes at the very end.
`Is there a way to make that smaller, Rob, so we can see
`the whole thing?
`What you get is the claim says a plurality a computer
`modules, each computer module comprising, and it lists a number
`of things, the processing unit, main memory, a low voltage
`differential signal channel, Ethernet controller. There's a
`whole host of items that are required to be in the computer
`module.
`At the very end, the very last limitation, it says:
`Wherein, each of the computer modules is similar in design to
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`each other.
`So, again, much like this case, there are things listed
`in the claim in the ACQUIS case where the Court found that --
`If you'd go back to the slide presentation, Rob.
`-- the Court ultimately held that the plaintiff was
`unable to articulate any point by which components or circuitry
`would cease to be similar. So if you're comparing the
`processing unit and the main memory, the Ethernet controller,
`how similar do they need to be to be similar in design?
`And I think, here, the defendants are facing the same
`difficulty. Is that, number one, it's unclear what aspects of
`"equipped" you're supposed to be comparing. And AGIS in this
`its brief and its expert said: Well, you're comparing hardware
`and/or software. They were very generic. Never specified what
`you're actually comparing.
`But, further, there's no articulation of how you
`compare. At what point does a screen cease to being similar to
`another screen? At what point does a GPS navigation cease
`being similar to another GPS navigation system?
`THE COURT: And that's why that claim is very different
`from the one here, where the sentence, the words immediately
`following "similarly equipped" describe what it means to be
`similarly equipped.
`MR. CURTIS: Your Honor, I would disagree with that in
`the sense that the words "similarly equipped" are separate.
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`They certainly introduce or in that same preamble, but the list
`is a separate list. The list is sort of the bare minimum that
`you must have to function for the claim.
`The whole point of these patents, as I've tried to
`express in the tutorial, is you have an ad hoc communication
`network where multiple are able to communicate with each over
`using similarly equipped phones, and to do so you have to have
`some level of similarity beyond simply having a GPS navigation
`system and a touchscreen display. There's an additional level
`of similarity required to achieve that purpose of the invention
`allowing the firefighters to communicate among each other
`during a crisis.
`THE COURT: Why is there more similarly required than is
`what is listed in the claim?
`MR. CURTIS: I think it goes back to the purpose of the
`claim. The fundamental purpose, as I mentioned, was to have
`this communication network allowing firefighters and police
`officers to communicate with each other, and they need to have
`more than just a phone with bare minimum equipment. They have
`to be similar enough so that they can be sending messages to
`each other, forced messages, which we'll talk about later.
`Touching the screens to communicate, these are sort of the
`features of these phones that must be enabled for these patents
`to achieve the purpose of the invention.
`So, for that reason, I think there needs to be more than
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`just this bare minimum and there needs to be some meaning given
`to similarly equipped; and that meaning is absent from the
`claims, Your Honor.
`If Your Honor has no further questions, I'll sit.
`THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Curtis.
`Mr. Rubino, my concern with the plaintiff's proposal
`that it just be plain and ordinary is that that would leave, I
`think, too much room for disagreement about what the similarity
`is that's required.
`MR. RUBINO: Your Honor, I think at this point
`plaintiffs are agreeing with the construction set forth by the
`Court and would take the position that's appropriate.
`However, with regard to what similarity is required, I'd
`just like to take the Court back to where these patents and
`when in time these patents came about.
`In the 2003/4 timeframe, there wasn't really uniformity
`between devices in terms of do they have memory, do they have
`the ability to make a call, to send a message? Do they have
`touchscreens? Those are all things today that taken granted
`among mobile devices. And which is why, today, probably all
`mobile devices are similarly equipped in the parlance of the
`patent.
`The patent specification does describe "similarly
`equipped" as having some of these characterizations. And, as
`counsel just pointed out, the specification makes clear,
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 17 of 109 PageID #:
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`there's a reason why they have to be similarly equipped. You
`have to have the ability to communicate as between first
`responders. You need a touchscreen. They need to be able to
`read the messages. They need to be able to make a phone call.
`That's the point of the patent, is what defendant's counsel was
`talking about.
`From the perspective of these limitations, we would
`agree that the proposed constructions by the Court are
`sufficient and that the claims are sufficiently definite, and
`that we don't need to know what kind of CPU it is or what model
`of touchscreen display exists. And that having a touchscreen
`display, a CPU, and a memory, for example, in Claim 1 of the
`'970, that's sufficiently similar in the parlance of that
`claim.
`THE COURT: All right. And I would ask that you put
`something in writing in the record evidencing your decision not
`to further assert Claim 11 of the '970 so that it's not just
`something buried in the transcript here.
`MR. RUBINO: We will do so, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: All right.
`MR. RUBINO: If it please the Court, I can move on to
`the next term.
`THE COURT: That would be fine.
`MR. RUBINO: The next term is the database term, said
`database term. And that is going to be addressed by my
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 18 of 109 PageID #:
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`colleague, Mr. Enrique Iturralde.
`MR. ITURRALDE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Enrique
`Iturralde for the plaintiff.
`THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Iturralde.
`MR. ITURRALDE: With respect to the term, identified as
`letter D in the preliminary constructions, "said database
`including the generation of one or more symbols associated with
`a particular participating user," plaintiff accepts the
`proposed construction and reserves the right to respond to
`anything that -- any argument presented by defendants.
`THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Iturralde.
`MS. EBER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michelle Eber
`for defendants.
`THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Eber.
`MS. EBER: With respect to the preliminary construction,
`it appears that the Court believes that this term needs to be
`fixed in terms of whether a database can include the generation
`of one or more symbols.
`The preliminary construction seems to fix that problem
`by saying "the database including the one or more symbols
`generated by the application program."
`THE COURT: I would refer to it as construing the term
`as opposed to fixing it. But other than that ...
`MS. EBER: We will turn to slide 26.
`The problem that we have with that, Your Honor, is it's
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 19 of 109 PageID #:
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`inconsistent with what AGIS itself has said this claim term
`means. They say in their reply that the claims disclose a
`generation of symbols by both the application program and the
`database, meaning that even AGIS would contend that it's not
`that the database is including the symbol generated by the
`application program but that both application program and the
`database are generating symbols.
`THE COURT: Well, I understand your position to be that
`the database cannot generate.
`MS. EBER: That's exactly right, Your Honor. Yes. The
`database cannot generate symbols. The database is for storing.
`THE COURT: So you would disagree with AGIS that the
`database should be understood to be generating the symbol?
`MS. EBER: Correct, Your Honor.
`Our position is that the claim is indefinite because the
`claim term reads "the database including the generation of one
`or more symbols." And the database can't possibly be
`performing generating -- the active generated symbols.
`THE COURT: You're not arguing that the claim should be
`understood to require the database to do that?
`MS. EBER: Correct, Your Honor. Our position is that a
`person of ordinary skill would not understand the claim term if
`it required the database, including the generation of one or
`more symbols. That that's not understood by a person of
`ordinary skill in the art; and, therefore, it's indefinite.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 20 of 109 PageID #:
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`THE COURT: All right. But a person of ordinary skill
`wouldn't understand the claim to be requiring something that's
`impossible; would it?
`MS. EBER: Correct. It's impossible.
`THE COURT: Okay. I understand. And I agree with you,
`that it should not be read to require that.
`MS. EBER: If Your Honor has no more questions on this
`term, we can move to the next one.
`THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Eber.
`MR. RUBINO: Your Honor, the next term at issue is term
`E, the accessing and application program term.
`And plaintiff AGIS agrees with the Court's construction
`of plain and ordinary meaning; that, 35 USC 112-6 does not
`apply, and the claim term is not indefinite.
`I can get into more specifics if the Court has any
`questions. Otherwise, I can defer.
`THE COURT: Not at this point, Mr. Rubino. Thank you.
`MR. RUBINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
`MR. REITER: Your Honor, on behalf of defendants, while
`we respectfully disagree and preserve all objections to the
`term, for the preservation of time and moving things along,
`we'll go ahead and pass the argument at this point. I figured
`the Court wouldn't argue with that.
`THE COURT: I understand that, and I don't construe that
`as a waiver of your full rights in any way.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 21 of 109 PageID #:
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`MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: Certainly.
`MR. ITURRALDE: Your Honor, Enrique Iturralde for
`plaintiff AGIS.
`For the next term, term F, using the IP address
`previously, defendants argued that there is a typographical
`error in this limitation and that the typo should result in a
`finding of indefiniteness for the entire claim. Typographical
`errors do not rise to the level of indefiniteness.
`Here, this typo does not render the claim itself
`indefinite, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`recognize that the meaning of the claim -- would recognize the
`meaning of claim with reasonable certainty.
`THE COURT: What is the typo that you see in this?
`MR. ITURRALDE: The typo that defendants have pointed
`out is that using the IP address previously does not include
`any additional information about what IP address is being
`referenced. That's what the defendants assert. So a missing
`word or two.
`THE COURT: And that's what I'm asking. What is your
`position on what's missing?
`MR. ITURRALDE: Yes, Your Honor. To the extent the
`Court finds that it's necessary to clarify this term, we would
`submit that the term should be construed to mean using the IP
`address previously transmitted to the server.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 22 of 109 PageID #:
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`THE COURT: And so you're referring back to the earlier
`part of the limitation. Tell me specifically which IP address
`above you would be saying is referred to.
`MR. ITURRALDE: Yes, Your Honor. So after the word
`"or," there's an "or transmission of a network IP, network
`participant's IP address to a server which then transmits data
`to other network participants using the IP address previously"
`-- and then we would insert transmitted -- previously
`transmitted to the server.
`THE COURT: So you'd be referring back to the network
`participant's IP address?
`MR. ITURRALDE: Yes, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: All right.
`MR. ITURRALDE: I think the briefing is clear as to
`where the support for that is in the specification. And if
`Your Honor has any further questions, we can address those now
`or after defendants have a chance.
`THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and tell me what part
`of the specification you believe supports that.
`MR. ITURRALDE: Yes, Your Honor.
`This is in column 10, line 57, through column 11,
`line 15. This process is described in the specification in the
`context of anonymous communications. One example of anonymous
`communications in this part of the specification, when network
`users sign on to the network and shake hands with the server,
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`Case 2:22-cv-00263-JRG-RSP Document 68-19 Filed 06/16/23 Page 23 of 109 PageID #:
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`the network user transmits its IP address to the server and the
`server receives the network user's IP address. Because of this
`previous transmission, when a first network user wants to send
`a message to the second network user, the first network user
`does not need to know the IP address of the second network
`user.
`
`THE COURT: So you're suggesting then that the IP
`address previously at the end of the limitation that we're
`talking about, that that would be used by the server as the
`originating IP address of the message instead of the
`destination of it?
`MR. ITURRALDE: Your Honor, it would be the IP address
`of the first network user who initially signed on.
`THE COURT: So how is the server using it?
`MR. ITURRALDE: The server is using it as the address to
`identify the destination.
`THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying, in other words,
`that it's being sent to the IP address previously?
`MR. ITURRALDE: Yes, Your Honor.
`And so the way this works i
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