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`2905
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`EXHIBIT D8
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`2906
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`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`§
`
`§
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00361-JRG
`§
`(LEAD CASE)
`§
`
`§
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`§
`
`§
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC’S
`REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00362-JRG
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00359-JRG
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`WAZE MOBILE LIMITED,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
`LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
`AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`2907
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
`
`“SELECTED RESPONSE” ................................................................................................ 1
`
`“RESPONSE LIST”............................................................................................................ 2
`
`“RECIPIENT PDA / CELL PHONE” “SENDER PDA / CELL PHONE”........................ 4
`
`CLAIM 10 PREAMBLE .................................................................................................... 5
`
`“A DATA TRANSMISSION MEANS . . .” ...................................................................... 5
`
`“MEANS FOR ATTACHING . . .” .................................................................................... 6
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`VII.
`
`“MEANS FOR REQUIRING . . .” ..................................................................................... 7
`
`VIII. “MEANS FOR RECEIVING AND DISPLAYING . . .” LIMITATIONS ........................ 8
`
`IX.
`
`X.
`
`XI.
`
`“MEANS FOR PERIODICALLY RESENDING . . .” ...................................................... 8
`
`CLAIM 2 MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION TERMS ............................................................... 9
`
`“SPATIAL COORDINATES” ......................................................................................... 11
`
`XII.
`
`“SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS) MESSAGES” ................................................... 12
`
`XIII. “FACILITATING INITIATION OF INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP). . .” ....................... 12
`
`XIV. “RECEIVING A MESSAGE FROM A SECOND DEVICE” ......................................... 13
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`2908
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................7
`
`Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`2015 WL 8073722 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015) .....................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................9
`
`EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc.,
`741 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Tex. 2010) .......................................................................................5
`
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc.,
`523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................1
`
`Infernal Tech., LLC v. Sony Interactive Entm’t Am., LLC,
`2020 WL 3050821 (E.D. Tex. June 8, 2020) .....................................................................1, 2, 5
`
`LBS Innovations, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 1929423 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2020) ...........................................................................5
`
`Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp.,
`2006 WL 1751779 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006) ...........................................................................1
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999)............................................................................................6, 10
`
`RevoLaze LLC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,
`2020 WL 697891 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) .............................................................................3
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................13
`
`TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc.,
`2014 WL 2810016 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) ...........................................................................1
`
`Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Verizon Commn’s, Inc.,
`2020 WL 805271 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020) ...........................................................................12
`
`WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................9
`
`ii
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`2909
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`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................................................................................................9
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(c) and the Court’s Docket Control Order of April 8, 2020 (Dkt. 68),
`
`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development, LLC (“AGIS”) hereby submits its Reply Claim
`
`Construction Brief.
`
`As a preliminary matter, Defendants take contrary positions with regard to prior claim
`
`constructions. On the one hand, Defendants assert that the prior claim constructions ordered by
`
`this Court regarding the same Patents-in-Suit should not be adopted. On the other hand,
`
`Defendants fail to provide any strong reason why select constructions from the IPRs should be
`
`fully adopted. The cases cited by AGIS highlight the “importance of uniformity in the treatment
`
`of a given patent” which favors “consistent claim construction for a given patent.” See Maurice
`
`Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., 2006 WL 1751779, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006);
`
`TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc., 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) (“Nonetheless,
`
`previous claim constructions in cases involving the same patent are entitled to substantial
`
`weight, and the Court has determined that it will not depart from those constructions absent a
`
`strong reason for doing so.”). The “importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent”
`
`suggests a level of deference to previous claim constructions of disputed claim terms. Infernal
`
`Tech., LLC v. Sony Interactive Entm’t Am., LLC, 2020 WL 3050821, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 8,
`
`2020) (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
`
`Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, AGIS respectfully requests that the Court adopt its
`
`proposed constructions for the disputed terms and phrases of the Asserted Patents.
`
`I.
`
`“SELECTED RESPONSE”
`
`Defendants argue that the term “selected response” of claim 10 should be construed as
`
`“recipient selected response message.” Defendants seek to improperly limit the term “selected
`
`response” by relying on the Court’s construction of a different limitation in a different claim, i.e.,
`
`“manual response” of claim 1. But Defendants provide no reason to import this new limitation
`
`
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`

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`from a construction of a different limitation. Claim 10 does not require that the “selected
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`response” is a message. See Ex. B at Claim 10. Rather, claim 10 discloses “transmitting a
`
`selected required response from the response list,” and further requires “whether said selected
`
`response is a chosen option from the response list. . .” Id. Thus, Claim 10 mandates that
`
`“selected response” is broader than a “recipient selected response message” because it has to be
`
`an “option” that is chosen. While there can be a message corresponding to the chosen option,
`
`Claim 10 requires the term to encompass an option. Because this description of “selected
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`response” as “a chosen option” is recited expressly in the language of Claim 10, no construction
`
`is necessary. Defendants cannot show otherwise; there is no requirement that the “selected
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`response” must be “an actual content-bearing message,” as Defendants contend. Dkt. 120 at 9.
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`Claim 1 does not mirror Claim 10, and this Court should not disturb the patentee’s decision to
`
`pursue different coverage in Claim 10. As opposed to “manual response” in Claim 1, the
`
`patentee elected to recite “selected response” as a “chosen option” in Claim 10 and that election
`
`must be respected.
`
`There is no disclaimer or disavowal. Defendants mislead the Court by citing to portions
`
`of the prosecution history for the “manual response” term of Claim 1 only. See, e.g., Dkt. 120 at
`
`11-12. Thus, “selected response” in Claim 10 should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`II.
`
`“RESPONSE LIST”
`
`Without leave of the Court, Defendants deviate from their P.R. 4-3 disclosure to assert a
`
`new indefiniteness contention. Defendants’ new indefiniteness contention does not narrow any
`
`dispute; it introduces new issues after AGIS’s opening claim construction brief and flouts the
`
`Court’s Docket Control Order and the Local Patent Rules. Thus, the Court should find
`
`Defendants’ disclosed P.R. 4-3 construction for this term to be withdrawn, and the Court should
`
`2
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`

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`not permit Defendants to proceed on the new indefiniteness contention. See RevoLaze LLC v.
`
`J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 2020 WL 697891, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)
`
`To the extent the Court considers the new indefiniteness contention, Defendants have not
`
`established that the term “the response list” fails to inform a POSITA about the scope of the
`
`invention with reasonable certainty. Because this is a new indefiniteness contention raised by
`
`Defendants for the first time, no party has submitted any expert testimony regarding the
`
`understanding of a POSITA. Defendants’ new argument should fail for lack of evidence
`
`regarding a POSITA’s knowledge or understanding and for the following reasons.
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`First, Defendants conflate the existence of multiple embodiments for a finding that a term
`
`has multiple interpretations. AGIS’s opening brief made clear that the term “response list”
`
`should not exclude any of the embodiments reasonably covered by the ’970 Patent, including the
`
`two embodiments expressly recited at 7:17-20. See, Dkt. 116 at 8. Now that Defendants have
`
`pivoted to a new argument, they conflate the identification of two embodiments for
`
`“interpretations” to allege a indefiniteness contention that is legally and factually unsupportable.
`
`Defendants cite to no case law for the proposition that a patent term must find support in a sole
`
`embodiment or that a claim term is limited to one embodiment.
`
`Further, Defendants improperly isolate the “response list” term from the surrounding
`
`claim language in order to create the appearance of ambiguity. There are multiple lists recited in
`
`Claim 1. First, Claim 1 recites “a list of required possible responses” that is included in “a
`
`forced message alert software application program.” Second, Claim 1 recites “a list of possible
`
`required responses” contained in the “forced message alert software packet.” These first and
`
`second lists are not the same lists because one is manifested in an application program and the
`
`other in a packet. The circumstances can dictate whether the first and second lists are the same
`
`3
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`

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`or different because each of the options included in the application program do not necessarily
`
`need to be included in the packet that is transmitted to the recipient. Ex. B at Fig. 4. For
`
`example, the options in the packet can differ from the pre-installed options provided by the
`
`application program. This makes sense because a sender can choose and customize options to
`
`include in the packet to the recipient. There is no claim limitation mandating where or how a
`
`sender chooses or customizes options for inclusion to the packet. Third, Claim 1 recites a
`
`“response list” that is displayed to the recipient for selection. This is the response list transmitted
`
`with the packet that is received and the options shown to the recipient for selection. Fourth,
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`Claim 2 recites “response list to be shown on the display of the recipient,” “said response list is
`
`shown on the display,” and “selected from the response list,” and “response list from the display
`
`of the recipient.” Because each of these Claim 2 response lists are recited in the context of
`
`displayed lists, they also each correspond to the second, packetized “response list” that is
`
`received by the recipient and displayed to the recipient for selection. Accordingly, Defendants
`
`cannot establish that the term “response list” is indefinite when read in the context of the claim
`
`as a whole and not in isolation. Additionally, Defendants’ new indefiniteness contention fails
`
`because Defendants do not address the parties’ proposed corresponding structures for the means-
`
`plus-function limitations in Claims 1 and 2.
`
`III.
`
`“RECIPIENT PDA / CELL PHONE” “SENDER PDA / CELL PHONE”
`
`The terms “recipient PDA / cell phone” and “sender PDA / cell phone” are
`
`uncomplicated and do not require construction. Defendants pursue a non-infringement theory by
`
`adding confusing and unhelpful ownership/possession restrictions on devices. The claims do not
`
`preclude the same individual from owning all devices. The claims do not preclude a device from
`
`being a sender in one instance and a recipient in another. The claims do not require any
`
`limitation as to “different individuals.” Dkt. 120 at 16. Defendants’ citations do not preclude
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`4
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`

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`situations where the recipient PDA/cell phone may be a sender PDA/cell phone in a different
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`instance. Defendants’ non-infringement theory runs against the ’970 Patent which describes
`
`(and claims) that the devices are similarly equipped with the application program, which
`
`demonstrates that the circumstances will dictate which device is the sender or recipient. Ex. B at
`
`Claims 1, 2, 10, 13. The Court should adopt plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`IV. CLAIM 10 PREAMBLE
`
`Claim 10 discloses a structurally complete invention and its preamble merely states a
`
`purpose or intended use of the invention. See Infernal Tech., LLC, 2020 WL 3050821, at *12;
`
`EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. Sensus USA Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 783, 790 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
`
`The preamble is not limiting because it does not set forth essential structure of the invention not
`
`found in the body of the claim. The preamble does not provide the sole relevant antecedent basis
`
`for any term. The preamble is not necessary for understanding the limitations of the claim.
`
`Defendants have not identified any prosecution history that relies on the preamble. Specifically,
`
`“wherein the receipt, acknowledgement, and response to said forced message alert is forced by a
`
`forced message alert software application program” states an intended result. LBS Innovations,
`
`LLC v. Apple Inc., 2020 WL 1929423, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2020). Defendants’ conclusory
`
`arguments lack support in the claim, and the Court should reject their construction.
`
`V.
`
`“A DATA TRANSMISSION MEANS . . .”
`
`Defendants do not provide a strong reason for the Court to deviate from the prior
`
`construction. This Court is not required to adopt PTAB constructions. See Contentguard
`
`Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 WL 8073722, at *46 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015).
`
`Defendants’ proposal is a non-infringement argument that seeks to overturn the prior
`
`construction to exclude a server from the corresponding structure. Despite identifying multiple
`
`instances in which the data transmission means is TCP/IP or other communications protocol,
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`5
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`Defendants inexplicably limit the corresponding structure to a “PDA/cell phone. . . .”
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`Defendants omit the portions of the specification that link a server to the function of facilitating
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`the transmission of electronic files between said PDA/cell phones in different locations. See,
`
`e.g., Ex. B at 2:36-38 (“A communication network server can act as a forwarder...”); id. at
`
`3:52-54, 4:1-3, 2:38-41. The specification also discloses that the server’s function “is to
`
`retransmit the messages . . . in the communications network.” Id. at 7:58-63. Accordingly, the
`
`Court should not limit the corresponding structure to one PDA/cell phone.
`
`VI.
`
`“MEANS FOR ATTACHING . . .”
`
`Defendants present no strong reason for the Court to abandon its prior construction in
`
`favor of a PTAB construction. See Contentguard Holdings, Inc., 2015 WL 8073722, at *46.
`
`Defendants contend, incorrectly, that the structure is limited to a “PDA/cell phone configured to
`
`perform a portion of the forced message alert software application program.” Dkt. 120 at 24.
`
`This new construction excludes certain embodiments disclosed by the specification, specifically
`
`the disclosures regarding “to transmit an automatic acknowledgment to the sender PDA/cell
`
`phone as soon as said forced message alert is received by the recipient PDA/cell phone.” While
`
`the structure proposed by Defendants may be used to perform the function, the specification is
`
`not limited to the one embodiment. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d
`
`1250, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When multiple embodiments in the specification correspond to
`
`the claimed function, proper application of § 112 ¶ 6 generally reads the claim element to
`
`embrace each of those embodiments . . . .”). Defendants merely seek to selectively adopt
`
`portions of the embodiments of Figs. 2, 3A, 3B, and 4 while excluding others, despite their
`
`relevance to the claimed function. See, e.g., Ex. B at 7:20-22 (“When the forced text or voice
`
`alert is received, the user operator is presented with the required response list.”); see also id. at
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`7:24-27 (“If the alert is a voice message, the message keeps repeating at a defined rate until the
`
`6
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`

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`user operator selects from the required response list.”); id. at 8:34-36 (“If no acknowledgment is
`
`received, the sender PC or PDA/cell phone continues to transmit the forced alert at a predefined
`
`rate until acknowledged.”). Defendants’ proposed construction excludes “a PC,” despite citing
`
`to portions of the specification that disclose “a PC or PDA/cell phone.” Accordingly,
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected.
`
`VII. “MEANS FOR REQUIRING . . .”
`
`Defendants present no strong reason for the Court to abandon its prior construction in
`
`favor of a PTAB construction. Defendants argue that the corresponding structure is “not the
`
`physical device alone without any forced message alert software.” Dkt. 120 at 29. But
`
`Defendants misconstrue the prior construction; such an interpretation of the corresponding
`
`structure represents a misunderstanding of the law. The “forced message alert software
`
`application program” is not a general purpose machine; it is specialized software that performs
`
`numerous functions beyond the recited function of this means-plus-function limitation. The
`
`software is not a general purpose device. The prior construction properly identifies the special
`
`purpose machine, i.e., a PC or PDA cell phone specifically configured with the algorithm
`
`specified in the ’970 Patent at 8:37-57, and equivalents thereof. This corresponding structure is
`
`disclosed in the specification of the ’970 Patent. Further, Defendants propose that the
`
`corresponding structure should include the additional limitations that are not recited in the
`
`relevant portion of the specification reciting the algorithm, such as “clears the forced alert text
`
`data when a response is selected from the manual response list.” Dkt. 120 at 28. Further,
`
`Defendants exclude the portion of the specification regarding receipt of a voice message. ’Ex. B
`
`at 8:46-51; CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]
`
`claim term will cover nothing more than the corresponding structure or step disclosed in the
`
`specification, as well as equivalents thereto. . .”). Moreover, Defendants seek to exclude any
`
`7
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`

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`portion of the specification which discloses taking and releasing “effective control” of the
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`recipient PC or PDA/cell phone, despite the disclosures of the specification that the control is not
`
`released until “a response is selected or recorded and transmitted.” Ex. B at 8:37-39, 8:52-57.
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`Taking and releasing effective control of the device are necessary parts of the algorithm for
`
`requiring a response in order to clear the list from the display.
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`Accordingly, Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected.
`
`VIII. “MEANS FOR RECEIVING AND DISPLAYING . . .” LIMITATIONS
`
`Defendants present no strong reason for the Court to abandon its prior construction in
`
`favor of a PTAB construction. However, nothing in the specification compels the addition of
`
`any corresponding structure beyond “PDA/cell phone hardware including touch screen 16, and
`
`wireless transmitter or cellular modem; and equivalents thereof.” The specification discloses
`
`that the hardware includes “a modem . . . [and] can be used for cellular telephone calls and
`
`sending cellular SMS and TCP/IP or other messages using the PDA’s display 16 and CPU.” Ex.
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`B at 4:30-36. In contrast, Defendants exclude the cellular modem structure and improperly
`
`import a function (“receiv[ing] electronic transmissions with acknowledgement receipts”) into a
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`new structure to import a new limitation into the claim. Dkt. 120 at 30-32. The Court should
`
`reject Defendants’ attempt to limit the corresponding structure to WIFI, WIMAX, or P2P
`
`transmissions. The claim should not be recited to require the additional function of “receiving
`
`the automatic acknowledgment receipts.” Dkt. 120 at 32. Accordingly, the Board should reject
`
`the PTAB’s construction.
`
`IX.
`
`“MEANS FOR PERIODICALLY RESENDING . . .”
`
`Defendants present no strong reason for the Court to abandon the prior construction in
`
`favor of a PTAB construction. Defendants argue that the corresponding structure is “not the
`
`hardware device alone.” Dkt. 120 at 34. Again, this is a misconstruction of the law and the prior
`
`8
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`construction. The prior construction properly identifies the special purpose machine, i.e., a PC
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`or PDA/cell phone specifically configured with the algorithm specified in Ex. B at 7:64-8:8.
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`Defendants further argue that this portion of the specification “encompasses unrelated
`
`functions,” without identifying any particular “unrelated functions” or providing any case law to
`
`support the proposition that a structure can perform multiple functions. Defendants’ proposed
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`structure unnecessarily incorporates additional function into the structure. Dkt. 120 at 34. The
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`Court should reject the new construction and adopt the Court’s prior construction.
`
`X.
`
`CLAIM 2 MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION TERMS
`
`Defendants address all four Claim 2 means-plus-function terms collectively.
`
`For each term, Defendants incorrectly contend that the structure is “the forced message
`
`alert software on the recipient PDA/cell phone” based on the preamble’s recitation of the
`
`software. Again, this rationale represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. The
`
`search for corresponding structure is not limited to the claims, but the whole disclosure. 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112, par. 6 (“. . .such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
`
`material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”) This applies to
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`computer-implemented inventions. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2016) (“[T]he specification must contain sufficient descriptive text by which a person of
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`skill in the field of the invention would know and understand what structure corresponds to the
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`means limitation.”) (citation omitted); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339,
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`1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) “[i]n a means-plus-function claim in which the disclosed structure is a
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`computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is
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`not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to
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`perform the disclosed algorithm.”) (emphasis added). Here, Defendants improperly isolate the
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`claim language from the specification to find that the corresponding structure is limited to the
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`9
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`software alone. As this Court has found in its prior constructions, the ’970 Patent specification
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`discloses that the PC or PDA cell phone on which the forced message alert software application
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`program is installed implements the algorithms disclosed in the specification. With regard to
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`“control[ling] the recipient PDA/cell phone,” “allowing a manual response to be selected from
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`the response list,” and “clearing the text message and a response list from the display”
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`limitations, the ’970 Patent discloses that the PC or PDA/cell phone is configured to implement
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`the algorithm necessary to perform the claimed function. Defendants’ proposed construction
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`relies only on the software application program, despite the disclosures of the specification.
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`Accordingly, the proper construction must recite the special purpose machine, i.e., a PC
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`or PDA/cell phone specifically configured with the algorithms identified for each recited
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`function in Claim 2.
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`Further, Defendants argue that AGIS’s proposed algorithms are “over-inclusive.” Dkt.
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`120 at 36-37. While the structure proposed by Defendants may be used to perform the function,
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`the specification does not indicate that it is limited to one embodiment. See Micro Chem., Inc. v.
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`Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When multiple
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`embodiments in the specification correspond to the claimed function, proper application of § 112
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`¶ 6 generally reads the claim element to embrace each of those embodiments . . . .”). Defendants’
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`proposed algorithms include portions of the specification which are included in AGIS’s proposed
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`structure, including descriptions of Fig. 4 which Defendants rely on for their proposed
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`construction. Dkt. 120 at 35-37. Defendants merely seek to selectively adopt portions of the
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`embodiments of Fig. 4, while excluding others including Figs. 2, 3A, and 3B, despite their
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`relevance to the claimed function. See, e.g., Ex. B at 7:22-24 (“In order to clear the forced text
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`message alert from the user operator’s PC or PDA/cell phone display, the user operator is
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`10
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`required to select a reply from this list.”); id. at 7:24-27 (“If the alert is a voice message, the
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`message keeps repeating at a defined rate until the user operator selects from the required
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`response list.”). Lastly, AGIS incorporates by reference its discussion regarding the “wireless
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`transmitter or cellular modem” structure from the foregoing discussion of the “means for
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`receiving and listing” claim limitations. See supra at 9-10. The specification of the ’970 Patent
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`discloses that the hardware includes “a modem . . . [and] can be used for cellular telephone calls
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`and sending cellular SMS and TCP/IP or other messages using the PDA’s display 16 and CPU.”
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`Ex. B at 4:30-36. Accordingly, Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected.
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`XI.
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`“SPATIAL COORDINATES”
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`Defendants argue that “spatial coordinates” should be limited to “two or more numbers
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`that together define a geographic position, such as latitude and longitude.” There is no
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`disclaimer or disavowal to support Defendants’ proposal. The disclosures of the Asserted
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`Patents do not compel such a construction that imports a specific embodiment from the
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`specification or imports a dependent limitation from a separate claim (e.g., Claim 22 of the ’251
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`Patent, Claim 12 of the ’123 Patent, Claim 21 of the ’838 Patent, ) which would effectively
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`render the dependent claims superfluous. Moreover, it is well-known that the spatial coordinates
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`may be implemented in numerous ways, including text strings. See, e.g., https://www.ibm.com/
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`support/knowledgecenter/SSGU8G_11.70.0/com.ibm.spatial.doc/ids_spat_267.htm.
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`Defendants’ argument that spatial coordinates cannot “represent a ‘display screen
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`location” and “selected position” contradicts the language of the claims which recite, for
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`example, “identifying the particular user-selectable symbol based, at least in part, on the spatial
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`coordinates represented by the selected position.” Ex. D at Claim 13. Introducing an example
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`embodiment into the claim is unnecessary and unhelpful to the jury. The term should be given its
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`plain and ordinary meaning.
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`XII. “SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS) MESSAGES”
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`Defendants still propose a construction that departs from this Court’s prior claim
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`construction. There is no disavowal or lexicography that justifies limiting the claim term “short
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`message service (SMS) messages” to include “that follow the Short Message Service protocol
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`defined in the GSM cellular phone standard,” as proposed by Defendants. Uniloc 2017 LLC v.
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`Verizon Commn’s, Inc., 2020 WL 805271, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020). Defendants’
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`proposal improperly limits the term to a particular embodiment that ties the short message
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`service (SMS) messages specifically to the GSM standard, an outdated 2G standard that is no
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`longer used by many networks across the United States. The proposal is unhelpful to the jury
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`because it introduces new terms that are not present in the specification and a technical standard
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`that is not explained in the specification. Defendants fail to inform the Court that short message
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`ser