`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`SOLAS OLED LTD.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`Civil Action No. 2:21-CV-00105-JRG
`
`
`DEFENDANTS SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND SAMSUNG
`ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: 1403
`
`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 1
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`’767 Patent Overview ............................................................................................ 3
`B.
`Agreed Term .......................................................................................................... 5
`C.
`Disputed Terms ...................................................................................................... 5
`1.
`“plurality of gesture-interpretation-state modules”
`(Claims 2, 3, and 6) .................................................................................... 5
`“the position-processing logic being accommodated in, and
`running on, a first integrated circuit and the gesture-processing
`logic being accommodated in, and running on, one or more
`separate integrated circuits” (Claim 11) .................................................... 9
`“the gesture-processing logic” (Claim 13) ............................................... 13
`3.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 16
`
`2.
`
`i
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 3 of 21 PageID #: 1404
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,
`713 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................... 2
`Bushnell Hawthorne, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`813 F. App’x 522 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................ 16
`Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.,
`258 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 8
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 2
`In re Downing,
`754 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................ 16
`Light Transformation Techs. LLC v. Lighting Science Grp. Corp.,
`No. 2:12-cv-826-MHS-RSP, 2014 WL 3402125 (E.D. Tex. Jul. 11, 2014) ......................... 2, 12
`Mobile Telecommunications Techs., LLC v. Clearwire Corp.,
`2013 WL 3339050 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2013) ............................................................................... 8
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 2, 13
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`21 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ......................................................................................... 8, 11, 12
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... 1, 2
`SIMO Holdings Inc. v. Hong Kong uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd.,
`983 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................... 8
`Synqor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`No. 2:07-CV-497-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 2991037 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) ............................. 15
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 1
`Trustees of Columbia v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................... 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: 1405
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The constructions proposed by Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung
`
`Electronics America, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants” or “Samsung”) reflect the meaning (or lack
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`thereof) the terms at issue in U.S. Patent No. 8,526,767 (“the ’767 Patent”) would have to a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention based on the intrinsic
`
`evidence and, where applicable, extrinsic evidence showing a customary meaning. Samsung’s
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`proposals thus represent the meaning of the terms in the context of the ’767 Patent as confirmed
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`by the testimony of Dr. R. Jacob Baker, a POSITA at the time of the alleged invention. Ex. 1,
`
`Baker Decl, ¶¶ 34, 36-57.1 By contrast, Solas’s proposed constructions—which are not supported
`
`by any evidence from a POSITA—consist of attorney argument that ignores explicit claim
`
`language (construing “the gesture-processing logic” as “the logic”), merely states “no construction
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`necessary; plain and ordinary meaning,” or otherwise fails to provide assistance to the jury in
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`applying the asserted claim language.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
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`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). A POSITA “is deemed to read the claim term not
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`only in the context of the particular claim . . . but in the context of the entire patent, including the
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`specification.” Id. at 1313. “The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
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`meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the
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`specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
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`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). A “term’s ordinary meaning must be
`
`
`1 Exhibits cited herein are attached to the declaration of John Kappos, filed concurrently herewith.
`
`
`
`1
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: 1406
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`
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`considered in the context of all the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and
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`prosecution history.” Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1094 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2013). When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer then the customary meaning does not apply.
`
`See Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363-64
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually,
`
`it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Extrinsic evidence can also be useful, and courts have
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`“especially noted the help that technical dictionaries may provide . . . to better understand the
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`underlying technology and the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.” Id.
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`at 1317-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Expert testimony may also aid a court in
`
`understanding the underlying technology. See id.
`
`“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
`
`delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
`
`skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
`
`U.S. 898, 901 (2014). It is insufficient that “a court can ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claim.”
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`Id. at 911 (emphasis original). Where there are multiple potential constructions and the intrinsic
`
`record does not provide a reasonable basis to decide between the constructions, the claim is
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`indefinite. See Light Transformation Techs. LLC v. Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-826-
`
`MHS-RSP, 2014 WL 3402125, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2014). Further, claim terms that lack
`
`antecedent basis within the claim likewise may be indefinite “where such basis is not otherwise
`
`present by implication or the meaning is not reasonably ascertainable.” Halliburton Energy Servs.,
`
`Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`
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`2
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: 1407
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`
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`’767 Patent Overview
`
`The ’767 Patent is entitled “Gesture Recognition” and generally relates to a “state machine
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`gesture recognition algorithm for interpreting streams of coordinates received from a touch
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`sensor.” ’767 Patent (Dkt. No. 1-2) at Abstract. At a high level, gesture recognition refers to
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`certain processes by which touch inputs on a display are interpreted for use as inputs to devices
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`such as notebooks, tablets, and mobile phones. ’767 Patent at 1:60-3:7. The ’767 Patent is
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`particularly directed to “distinct” “one-touch state-machine module[s]” that “analyze the time
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`series of data” as part of the claimed devices and methods. See generally id. at Claims 1-14. Each
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`one-touch state-machine module uses touch position and timing data to recognize a one-touch
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`gesture and then directly outputs the one-touch gesture to a “multi-touch state-machine module.”
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`See, e.g., id. at 21:3-19. Based on the outputs of the one-touch state-machine modules, the multi-
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`touch state-machine module recognizes a multi-touch gesture. See, e.g., id. at 21:20-26. Each
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`“single-touch state machine” tracks “all of the required information from a single touch. Multiple
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`single-touch state machines are then combined to handle multiple touch gestures instead of
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`creating a more complex multi-touch state machine.” Id. at 14:14-18. Thus, as shown below in
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`Figure 6, “Touch 1 and Touch 2 are processed by the 2-touch state machine, which tracks the
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`separation and angle between the touches, and generates stretch, pinch, and rotate events as the
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`distance and/or angle between the touches changes.” Id. at 14:38-42, Fig. 6.
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`
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`3
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: 1408
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`According to the ’767 Patent, “[t]his [2-state] state machine can also generate more
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`complex gestures . . . using a combination of the states and generated events of the two input state
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`machines.” Id. at 14:43-46. For example, if “one state machine is in state ‘Pressed’ and the other
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`has just generated a ‘Tap’ event, then the 2-touch state machine can generate a ‘Press and Tap’
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`event.” Id. at 14:46-49. A purported “key advantage” of this “N-touch state machine” approach
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`is that “the same code base is used for handling single touches, and 2-, 3- or if needed higher
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`numbers of touches are processed using separate additional code. The approach is therefore
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`scalable and modular with the usual benefits that brings in terms of saving of programmer time
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`and reliability.” Id. at 15:4-9.
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`4
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: 1409
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`
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`B.
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`Agreed Term
`
`Term
`“A single integrated circuit comprising:” (Claim 13)
`
`Agreed Construction
`The preamble is limiting.
`
`C.
`
`Disputed Terms
`
`1.
`
`“plurality of gesture-interpretation-state modules”
`(Claims 2, 3, and 6)
`
`Samsung’s Proposed Construction
`“two or more state modules for interpreting touch
`position and timing data to determine gestures”
`
`Solas’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and
`ordinary meaning
`
`The parties’ disagreement on the first disputed term focuses on the “gesture-interpretation”
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`aspect of the overall phrase. As Samsung’s proposed construction reflects, the entirety of the
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`specification and the claims describe the “plurality of gesture-interpretation-state modules” as
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`“two or more state modules for interpreting touch position and timing data to determine gestures.”
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`For example, in the section entitled “Background of the Invention,” the ’767 Patent explains that
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`it is directed towards “gesture recognition by processing of time series of positional inputs” to
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`“identify a . . . gesture” and “distinguish[] between a significant number of gestures . . . .” ’767
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`Patent (Dkt. No. 1-2) at 1:13-14, 2:67-3:1.2 More specifically, the alleged invention comprises “a
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`position processing unit for calculating a position of an interaction with the [touch] sensitive area
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`. . . and output[ting] a time series of data indicative of interaction positions on the sensor” and “a
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`gesture processing unit” “coded with gesture recognition code comprising a plurality of linked
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`state modules” for “analyz[ing] the time series data to distinguish one or more gesture inputs
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`therefrom.” Id. at 3:16-23. Each of these plurality of linked state modules (i.e., state-machine
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`2 All emphasis added unless indicated otherwise.
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`
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`5
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 1410
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`
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`modules) in the gesture processing unit includes “an idle-state module and a plurality of gesture-
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`interpretation-state modules.” Id. at Claims 1-3 and 6. Samsung’s proposed construction of
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`“gesture-interpretation-state modules” as “state modules for interpreting touch position and timing
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`data to determine gestures” is therefore supported by the patent specification and claims and gives
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`meaning to the term “gesture-interpretation-state modules.”
`
`As captured by Samsung’s proposed construction, the specification consistently describes
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`the gesture-interpretation-state machine modules as interpreting touch position and timing data to
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`determine gestures. See, e.g., ’767 Patent (Dkt. No. 1-2) at 2:48-50 (“a time series of x, y
`
`coordinates . . . are . . . processed by software, or firmware generated from higher level software,
`
`to distinguish the nature of the gesture that has been input”), 2:66-3:13 (“[I]t is difficult to
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`reliably and efficiently add code to identify a new gesture . . . This is because in general at any
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`intermediate point in a time series of x,y,t data the input may relate to a plurality of possible
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`gestures, thereby making the coding for recognizing one gesture generally dependent on or linked
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`to the coding for recognizing another gesture . . . The invention solves this problem by adopting
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`a state machine approach to designing and writing the gesture recognition algorithm.”). Every
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`embodiment in the ’767 Patent comprises gesture-interpretation-state machine modules that
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`interpret touch position and timing data to determine gestures. For example, the first embodiment,
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`captured in Figure 1 of the ’767 Patent, explains that:
`
`The Idle state will undergo a transition into a Touched state if the user presses the
`touch surface with one finger….
`When the Touched state is entered a timeout is started, i.e. a timer is set running
`which expires after a preset time. This is used to distinguish between short
`duration gestures such as flicks and taps, and long duration gestures such as a
`press. The initial touch location is stored. This is used to decide if the user has
`moved their finger. When in the Touched state the timeout expiry is checked, and
`the distance moved from the initial touch location is calculated….
`If the user moves by more than a specified distance from the initial touch location,
`the state machine enters the Flick Pending state.
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`
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`6
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: 1411
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`
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`See, e.g., id. at 8:50-52, 8:55-63, 8:65-67.
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`In fact, for each embodiment, the ’767 Patent goes into great detail regarding how the
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`alleged invention uses position and timing data to determine gestures. See, e.g., id. at 8:47-10:50
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`(describing first embodiment), 10:51-11:60 (describing second embodiment), 11:61-14:19
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`(describing third embodiment), 14:25-33. As one example describes:
`
`The Touched state occurs when a user has touched the touch surface. When the
`Touched State is entered a timeout is started, i.e. a timer is set running which
`expires after a preset time. This is used to distinguish between short duration
`gestures such as flicks and taps, and long duration gestures such as a press…. If the
`user releases their touch, the state machine enters the Second Tap Pending state.
`Subsequent actions will determine if a tap, double tap, or other gesture is later
`generated….
`The Second Tap Pending state occurs after a user has tapped the touch surface. On
`entry a timeout is started. This is used to decide if the user has made a tap gesture.
`The initial touch location is stored. This is used to decide if the user is making a
`double tap gesture. The timeout expiry is checked. If the timeout expires, a tap
`event is generated and the state machine enters the Idle state…. The timeout
`parameter in the Second Tap Pending state determines how long after the user
`releases a touch a tap event is generated. If the user touches the Surface again before
`the timeout expires, a double tap event could potentially be generated. The
`maximum time permitted from initial touch to generate an event in this state is the
`sum of the timeout periods for the Touch state and the Second Tap Pending state.
`
`Id. at 8:54-9:3, 9:11-17, 9:26-9:32.
`
`Indeed, the very purpose of the claimed “gesture-interpretation-state modules” is to
`
`interpret touch position and timing data to determine gestures. For instance, the ’767 Patent
`
`explains:
`
`The data output from the touch tracking stage or unit are streams of x,y coordinates
`collated by time and particular touch tracked over time . . . .
`It is these data that are the input . . . to . . . the gesture recognition stage or unit,
`[where] gesture recognition processing is carried out using the state machine
`code of the invention. The data output from the gesture recognition stage or unit
`are recognized gestures (including simple touches) and the times at or over which
`they occur.
`
`Id. at 18:60-19:3. This makes sense, as the word “gesture” means a “type of input to a computer
`
`
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`7
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 1412
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`
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`where the meaning depends on the time-related positions input from the device.” Ex. 2, A
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`Dictionary of Computing (2008) (defining “gesture”). Accordingly, both the intrinsic and extrinsic
`
`evidence is clear—“gesture interpretation” means “interpreting touch position and timing data to
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`determine gestures.” Likewise, consistent with the disclosures of the ’767 Patent, along with well-
`
`established precedent, “plurality” means “two or more.” See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total
`
`Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In accordance with standard
`
`dictionary definitions, . . . ‘plurality,’ when used in a claim, refers to two or more items.”); SIMO
`
`Holdings Inc. v. Hong Kong uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., 983 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
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`(“phrase ‘a plurality of’ means ‘at least two of’”); Mobile Telecomms. Techs., LLC v. Clearwire
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`Corp., No. 2:12-cv-308-JRG-RSP, 2013 WL 3339050, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2013) (collecting
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`cases).
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`Solas, however, seeks to avoid construction of the term and essentially argues for reading
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`this limitation out of the claims entirely. See Opening Br. at 7-12 (“These limitations already
`
`capture the notion that the gesture-interpretation-state modules must make some determination
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`with respect to gesture . . . The claim already requires that the gesture-processing logic analyze
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`the time series of data that is indicative of the interaction positions (touches) present on the touch
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`sensor. The requirement of analyzing a time series of touch positions, directly or indirectly, is
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`already present.”). More specifically, a “plain and ordinary meaning” construction, as Solas
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`suggests, would be improper as it would neither resolve the parties’ dispute nor clarify the scope
`
`of the claims. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2008). Nor will Solas’s proposal assist the jury in understanding the meaning of gesture
`
`interpretation. In arguing that this term essentially has no meaning not already captured elsewhere
`
`in the claims, see, e.g., Opening Br. at 10-12, Solas advocates for reading this limitation out of the
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`
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`8
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 12 of 21 PageID #: 1413
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`
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`claims altogether and refuses to address the parties’ actual dispute over the claim term, or whether
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`there is even an actual dispute over the claim term. Instead, Solas asserts that the term is “readily
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`understandable” and thus there “is no need to construe it.” See id. at 7-12. The Court should
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`resolve the parties’ dispute and construe “plurality of gesture-interpretation-state modules” as “two
`
`or more state modules for interpreting touch position and timing data to determine gestures.”
`
`2.
`
`“the position-processing logic being accommodated in, and running
`on, a first integrated circuit and the gesture-processing logic being
`accommodated in, and running on, one or more separate integrated
`circuits” (Claim 11)
`
`Samsung’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
`
`Solas’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary; plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Claim 11 recites “the position-processing logic being accommodated in, and running on, a
`
`first integrated circuit and the gesture-processing logic being accommodated in, and running on,
`
`one or more separate integrated circuits.” There being no plain meaning of logic “accommodated
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`in” integrated circuit, this term is rendered indefinite because nothing in the claims, specification,
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`file history, or extrinsic evidence otherwise explains what the inventors intended for logic to be
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`“accommodated in” a circuit to meaning at the relevant time of the ’767 Patent’s filing (see Ex. 1,
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`Baker Decl., ¶ 46). This term is thus indefinite despite Solas’s arguments to the contrary.
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`Starting with the claim language, it provides no indication as to the meaning of the term.
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`The phrase “being accommodated in” only appears in Claim 11 and in unasserted Claim 10, but
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`neither provides any clarity as to what is meant by this term. See generally ’767 Patent (Dkt. No.
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`1-2) at Claims 1-14. Claim 10 provides no more guidance than Claim 11 as it recites “the position-
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`processing logic and the gesture-processing logic being accommodated in, and run on, a single
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`integrated circuit.” See id. at Claims 10-11. The claims, therefore, would not have aided a
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`POSITA in determining the scope or meaning of “accommodated in.” Ex. 1, Baker Decl., ¶ 46.
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`9
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: 1414
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`
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`At most, the claim language indicates that “accommodated in” means something different than
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`“running on” because the latter is called out separately.
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`Second, the specification similarly does not provide any indication as to the meaning of
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`this term. Outside of Claims 10 and 11, the term “accommodated in” only appears in one
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`paragraph of the ’767 Patent:
`
`The position processing unit and the gesture processing unit may be accommodated
`in, and run on, a single integrated circuit, for example a microcontroller.
`Alternatively, the position processing unit may be accommodated in, and run on, a
`first integrated circuit, such as a microcontroller, and the gesture processing unit
`accommodated in, and run on, one or more separate integrated circuits, such as a
`personal computer or other complex system having its own central processing unit,
`graphics processing unit and/or digital signal processor with associated memory
`and bus communications.
`
`’767 Patent (Dkt. No. 1-2) at 5:12-21. But this paragraph uses language that is virtually identical
`
`to Claims 10 and 11 and does not provide any more guidance as to the meaning or scope of the
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`term. The rest of the specification is similarly unhelpful as it does not use or explain the
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`“accommodated in” term.
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`Third, the file history shows that the term “being accommodated in” was present in the
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`originally-filed claims and the term was not substantively discussed during prosecution. See Ex.
`
`3, Oct. 20, 2008 Claims, at 2. Thus, nothing in the intrinsic record would aid a POSITA to
`
`determine the scope and meaning of “being accommodated in.” Ex. 1, Baker Decl., ¶ 46.
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`Rather than providing a construction or attempting to clarify the claim term, Solas argues
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`that no construction is necessary and that the term should have its “plain and ordinary meaning.”
`
`But Solas provides no evidence that the term “being accommodated in” has a plain and ordinary
`
`meaning to a POSITA or that it was used in the relevant field during the relevant time period; in
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`fact, Solas points to no guidance as to the term’s meaning—even opting not to provide an expert
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`declaration on the term’s meaning to a POSITA. In sum, “being accommodated in” had no plain
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`
`
`10
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 1415
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`
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`and ordinary meaning to a POSITA (see id., ¶¶ 46–47), and Solas provides no intrinsic or extrinsic
`
`evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, a “plain and ordinary meaning” construction neither
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`facilitates a clear understanding of the meaning of the claim term nor provides sufficient guidance
`
`of the scope. See O2 Micro Int’l, 521 F.3d at 1361. For instance, a “plain and ordinary meaning”
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`construction would not help the jury understand if “being accommodated in” is different than
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`“running on,” and, if so, how they are different. See Ex. 1, Baker Decl., ¶ 46.
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`Ignoring Samsung’s dispute over the “accommodated in” term, Solas presents only
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`attorney argument directed to the claim language as a whole, asserting that “[t]he scope of claim 11
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`is delineated by the requirement that each of the two logics of claim 1 must be situated in separate
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`integrated circuits” (Opening Br. at 13) and “either the two logics and their respective media are
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`disposed on the same integrated circuit, or the two logics and their respective media are disposed
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`on separate integrated circuits” (id. at 13-14). See also id. at 13 (“Claim 11 is thus the converse
`
`of claim 10 (not asserted in this case), which requires that the two logics reside in the same
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`integrated circuit.”). Solas’s prosecution history arguments also ignore Samsung’s dispute over
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`the “being accommodated in” term, including its relationship to and difference from the recited
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`“running on” term, discussing only the examiner’s rejections of the pending claims based on prior
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`art references disclosing “the position-processing logic being accommodated in, and running on,
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`a first integrated circuit, and the gesture-processing logic being accommodated in, and running on,
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`one or more separate integrated circuits.” Id. at 14-15. Likewise, Solas’s discussions of dictionary
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`definitions of “accommodate” (id. at 15) ignore Samsung’s evidence that, in the context of Claim
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`11 of the ’767 Patent, a POSITA would not understand if and how “being accommodated in” is
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`different than “running on” (Ex. 1, Baker Decl., ¶ 46). Thus, a “plain and ordinary meaning”
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`construction would be improper as it would not resolve the parties’ dispute nor clarify the scope
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`
`
`11
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: 1416
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`
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`of the claims. See O2 Micro Int’l, 521 F.3d at 1361.
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`Rather than having a clear plain and ordinary meaning, as Solas wrongly suggests, a
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`POSITA would be unsure if the term “being accommodated in” means that some or all of “the
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`position-processing logic” is in the Random Access Memory of the “first integrated circuit.” Ex.
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`1, Baker Decl., ¶ 48. Or, for example, if “being accommodated in” instead means that some or all
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`of “the position-processing logic” is in non-volatile memory, such as a hard drive or flash memory,
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`that is accessed by the “first integrated circuit.” Id. Or, for example, if “being accommodated in”
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`alternatively means that some or all of “the position-processing logic” is in DRAM that is accessed
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`by the “first integrated circuit.” Id. Nothing in the cited intrinsic and extrinsic evidence would
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`allow a POSITA to distinguish between these differing interpretations, and thus a POSITA would
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`have no way to ascertain the scope of the claim term. Id. Where there are multiple potential
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`constructions and the intrinsic record does not provide a reasonable basis to decide between the
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`constructions, the claim is indefinite. See Light Transformation Techs., 2014 WL 3402125, at *8.
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`Instead of addressing these multiple potential constructions, or affirming that one is correct
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`(and, if so, which is correct), Solas refuses to address the central disputed issue over the claim
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`term, and instead asserts only that Samsung’s position is “not credible.” See Opening Br. at 15-
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`16. Indeed, Solas refuses to address whether “being accommodated in” means one or more—or
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`any—of the potential constructions above. Solas instead resorts to accusing Samsung of
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`“challenging the word ‘in’” and implies, without providing any actual clarity as to the scope of the
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`claim term, that at least some of these multiple potential constructions comprise being “outside
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`[rather than accommodated in] an integrated circuit” (see Opening Br. at 15-16). See O2 Micro
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`Int’l, 521 F.3d at 1361 (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the
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`‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate . . . when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning
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`12
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`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: 1417
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`
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`does not resolve the parties’ dispute, [such as when the parties] dispute the scope of that claim
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`term.”).
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`Accordingly, here, because the disputed term—“the position-processing logic being
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`accommodated in, and running on, a first integrated circuit and the gesture-processing logic being
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`accommodated in, and running on, one or more separate integrated circuits”—fails to inform,
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`“with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention,” the claim is
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`indefinite. See Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901.
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`3.
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`“the gesture-processing logic” (Claim 13)
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`Samsung’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
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`Solas’s Proposed Construction
`“the logic”
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`There are two related problems with “the gesture-processing logic” term in claim 13 that
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`render it indefinite. First, the term lacks antecedent basis—“the” gesture processing logic is a clear
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`reference to a prior unspecified logic in the claim. Second, the specification fails to otherwise give
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`clear indication as to what particular logic it purportedly relates. In combination, these two
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`problems render the term uninterpretable to a POSITA and thus indefinite. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at
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`2129.
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`a.
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`The Phrase Lacks Antecedent Basis on Its Face
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`Claim 13 does not recite a “gesture-processing logic” to which the term “the gesture-
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`processing logic” could be referencing. Thus, there can be no legitimate dispute that the phrase
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`lacks antecedent basis on its face. See Ex. 1, Baker Decl., ¶ 55 (explaining that it is unclear what
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`earlier limitation in the claims is being referenced by the phrase “the gesture-processing logic”).
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`Solas proposes rewriting the term “the gesture-processing logic” to recite merely “the logic.”
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`13
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`Case 2:21-cv-00105-JRG-RSP Document 66 Filed 11/23/21 Page 17 of 21 PageID #: 1418
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`
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`Opening Br. at 16-19. However, Solas does not point to any intrinsic support writing two words—
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`“gesture-processing”—out of the claim language. See id.
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`b.
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`The Word “Logic” Is Insufficient to Determine Antecedent
`B