`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`T-MOBILE USA, INC. and T-MOBILE US,
`INC.,
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`LYFT, INC.,
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`
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`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a
`UBER,
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`
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`WHATSAPP, INC.,
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`
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`Defendants.
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`§
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`JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PARTIALLY DISPUTED PROPOSED
`PROTECTIVE ORDER AND STIPULATED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 502(d)
`ORDER AND CLAWBACK AGREEMENT
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`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00072-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Case No. 2:21-cv-00024-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Case No. 2:21-cv-00026-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00029-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
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`Pursuant to the Court’s Order dated April 19, 2021 (Dkt. 15), Plaintiff AGIS Software
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`Development LLC (“AGIS”) and Defendants T-Mobile USA, Inc., T-Mobile US, Inc., Lyft, Inc.,
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`Uber Technologies, Inc., d/b/a Uber, and WhatsApp, Inc. (“Defendants”) (collectively, the
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`“Parties”), hereby submit the Partially Disputed Proposed Protective Order attached as Exhibit
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`A and the Stipulated Federal Rules of Evidence 502(d) Order and Clawback Agreement attached
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`as Exhibit B.
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 2 of 11 PageID #: 1952
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`The Parties have indicated their competing proposals using highlighting and square
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`brackets in Exhibit A (the Parties’ respective proposals are indicated with Plaintiff’s Proposal
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`and Defendants’ Proposal). The Parties were able to reach agreement on almost all provisions of
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`the Protective Order, but have two disputes regarding (1) whether the Protective Order should
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`include a so-called “acquisition bar” preventing individuals with access to designated discovery
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`from subsequently engaging in activities related to the acquisition of patents related to the
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`subject matter of that designated discovery, (2) whether the scope of an otherwise agreed upon
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`“prosecution bar” should extend to designated discovery. The Parties’ competing proposals and
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`arguments in favor of their proposals are presented below:
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`Plaintiff’s Position
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`
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`AGIS submits that Defendants’ proposed acquisition and prosecution bars are
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`inappropriate. First, Defendants’ proposed acquisition bar relates to (a) acquiring patents or
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`patent applications relating to both the field of the invention of the patents-in-suit and
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`Defendants’ designated discovery, and (b) advising or counseling its clients regarding such
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`acquisitions during the pendency of this case and for two years after the final disposition of this
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`action. Second, Defendants propose to extend the scope of an agreed upon prosecution bar from
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`the field of the invention of the patents-in-suit to include Defendants’ designated discovery.
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`Defendants bear the burden of showing that each proposed bar is appropriate because (1) the risk
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`of inadvertent disclosure exists; and (2) the balance of interests suggest a bar is appropriate. In
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`re Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`
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`Regarding the proposed acquisition bar, Defendants have not shown good cause to
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`prevent Plaintiff’s counsel from any activities relating to acquiring patents or patent applications
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`relating to both the field of the invention of the patents-in-suit and Defendants’ designated
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`2
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 3 of 11 PageID #: 1953
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`discovery, and advising or counseling its clients regarding such acquisitions, for two years after
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`the final disposition of this action. Defendants have not shown that there is a real risk of
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`inadvertent disclosure or that the balance of interests indicates a bar is appropriate. The balance
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`of interests does not favor the bar, and Defendants cannot demonstrate that any potential harm
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`may occur without the bar. By contrast, imposing the bar will drastically harm both Plaintiff’s
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`counsel and other parties, including AGIS, who would be denied the counsel of their choice. See
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`In re Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1379 (“[T]he district court must balance the risk against the
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`potential harm to the opposing party from restrictions imposed on that party’s right to have the
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`benefit of counsel of its choice.”). Moreover, the proposed acquisition bar is overbroad and
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`unascertainable because the bar extends to Defendants’ designated discovery, which can include
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`documents and testimony concerning irrelevant matters. Because Defendants have failed to
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`show that there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure and that the balance of interests favors a bar,
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`the Court should decline to enter Defendants’ proposed Acquisition Bar. Jenam Tech., LLC v.
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`Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 4:19-cv-00250-ALM-KPJ, 2020 WL 757097, at *1-*2 (E.D. Tex.
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`Feb. 4, 2020) (“The Court finds Defendants have not met their burden, particularly considering
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`the broad restriction the proposed Acquisition Bar would impose upon Plaintiff’s counsel and
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`Defendants’ failure to demonstrate the potential harm of not including the Bar.”).
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`
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`Regarding Defendants’ proposal to broaden the scope of the prosecution bar to the
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`Defendants’ designated discovery, Defendants similarly have not met their burden. Basing the
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`prosecution bar on Defendants’ designated documents and testimony renders the prosecution bar
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`overbroad and unascertainable, which can include documents and testimony concerning
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`irrelevant matters. The proposed breadth of the prosecution bar is harmful to Plaintiff’s counsel
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`and other parties and extends well beyond the scope of cases in this District. See AGIS Software
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`3
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 4 of 11 PageID #: 1954
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`Dev. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00361-JRG, Dkt. 89 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2020); see also
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`Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00123-JRG, Dkt. 53 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2019).
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`
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`Defendants’ Position
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`The provisions of the protective order proposed by Plaintiff do not provide adequate
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`protection to Defendants’ highly confidential information and source code. First, Plaintiff disputes
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`the propriety of an acquisition bar, barring attorneys and experts that access highly confidential
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`information from advising or counseling clients on the acquisition of patents or patent applications
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`pertaining to such information. Such a provision is necessary to protect against the inadvertent
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`disclosure of Defendants’ highly confidential information. The Federal Circuit has recognized that
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`attorneys and retained experts cannot always separate what they learned from legitimate sources
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`from what they learned by analyzing a defendant’s confidential information. See In re Deutsche
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`Bank Trust Co. Am., 605 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, courts routinely impose
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`acquisition bars on attorneys and experts. See, e.g., E-Contact Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No.
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`1:11-cv-426, 2012 WL 11924448, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2012); Catch A Wave Techs., Inc. v.
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`Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. C 12-05791, 2013 WL 9868422, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013). Here,
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`as the Court found in E-Contact Technologies., counsel for plaintiff here “has acquiesced to the
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`imposition of a patent prosecution bar, and, therefore, apparently agrees that there could possibly
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`be a risk of inadvertent disclosure of Defendants’ confidential information in the course of
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`representing their client before the PTO.” E-Contact Techs., 2012 WL 11924448, at *2. As the
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`Court further explained, “it is hard to conceive that there would be little or no risk of inadvertent
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`disclosure when these same attorneys advise their client in matters regarding acquisitions of
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`patents.” Id. Because Plaintiff is seeking discovery of Defendants’ highly confidential
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`4
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 1955
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`information, including source code, “the potential harm of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the
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`restriction imposed” by the acquisition bar. Id. Defendants do not doubt that Plaintiff’s attorneys’
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`and experts are of high moral character and would not intentionally use Defendants’ highly
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`confidential information outside of these litigations. Still, courts recognize that even with the best
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`intentions, it is extremely difficult to separate what one learns legitimately from what he or she
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`learns through a litigation. See Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control Inc., 682
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`F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Del. 1988) (“[A]ccepting that Mr. Greene is a man of great moral fiber, we
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`nonetheless question his human ability during future years of research to separate the applications
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`he has extrapolated from Sundstrand's documents from those he develops from his own ideas.).
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`Second, the scope of the prosecution and acquisition bars proposed by Plaintiff is far too
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`narrow. Plaintiff would limit the scope of the prosecution and acquisition bars to “location display
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`technology” and “the patents asserted in this Action and any patent or application claiming priority
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`to or otherwise related to the patents asserted in this Action.” Through discovery in this action,
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`however, Plaintiff and its experts will have access to highly confidential technical information that
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`does not fall into either of those two categories. That is, Defendants’ documents and source code
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`related to the accused features in this case will certainly contain information about other unaccused
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`features. Unless the prosecution and acquisition bars are broad enough to cover the full scope of
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`discovery to be provided to Plaintiff, there remains a risk of inadvertent disclosure of Defendants’
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`information.
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`Thus, Defendants respectfully request this Court impose the requested acquisition bar on
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`attorneys and experts who review Defendants’ confidential technical documents and source code to
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`prevent inadvertent disclosure, and that the prosecution and acquisition bars be broad enough to
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`cover the subject of any highly confidential or source code information disclosed in discovery.
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`5
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 1956
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`
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`Dated: June 2, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`FABRICANT LLP
`
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`
`
` /s/ Vincent J. Rubino, III
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: ffabricant@fabricantllp.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@fabricantllp.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@fabricantllp.com
`FABRICANT LLP
`411 Theodore Fremd Road, Suite 206 South
`Rye, New York 10580
`Telephone: (212) 257-5797
`Facsimile: (212) 257-5796
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF,
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC
`
`
`/s/ Nathan Curtis
`Melissa R. Smith
`State Bar No. 24001351
`Email: melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`
`Mark N. Reiter
`Texas Bar No. 16759900
`Email: mreiter@gibsondunn.com
`Robert A. Vincent
`Texas Bar No. 24056474
`Email: rvincent@gibsondunn.com
`Ashbey N. Morgan
`Texas Bar No. 24106339
`Email: anmorgan@gibsondunn.com
`Nathan R. Curtis
`Texas Bar No. 24078390
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`6
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 7 of 11 PageID #: 1957
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`
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`Email: ncurtis@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2100
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`Telephone: (214) 698-3360
`Facsimile: (214) 571-2907
`
`Ryan K. Iwahashi
`CA Bar No. 284766
`Email: riwahashi@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1881 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 849-5367
`Facsimile: (650) 849-5067
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`d/b/a UBER
`
`/s/ Miguel Bombach
`Melissa R. Smith
`State Bar No. 24001351
`Email: melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`
`Miguel Bombach
`Email: MBombach@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`11452 El Camino Real Ste. 300
`San Diego, CA 92130-2080
`Phone: (858) 720-5747
`Facsimile: (858) 720-5847
`
`Ryan J. McBrayer, WSBA No. 28338
`Email: RMcBrayer@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Phone: (206) 359-8000
`Fax: (206) 359-9000
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`7
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 8 of 11 PageID #: 1958
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
`T-MOBILE USA, INC. and T-MOBILE
`US, INC.
`
`/s/ Lisa K. Nguyen
`Michael E. Jones
`Texas State Bar No. 10929400
`Email: mikejones@potterminton.com
`Patrick C. Clutter
`Texas State Bar No. 24036374
`Email: patrickclutter@potterminton.com
`POTTER MINTON, PC
`10 North College, Suite 500
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Telephone: (903) 597-8311
`Facsimile: (903) 593-0846
`
`Richard G. Frenkel
`Email: rick.frenkel@lw.com
`Lisa K. Nguyen
`Email: lisa.nguyen@lw.com
`Clara Wang
`Email: clara.wang@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`140 Scott Drive
`Menlo Park, California 94025-1008
`Telephone: (650) 328-4600
`Facsimile: (650) 463-2600
`
`Alan M. Billharz
`Email: alan.billharz@lw.com
`Tiffany C. Weston
`Email: tiffany.weston@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 2000-1304
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`Facsimile: (202) 637-2201
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
`WHATSAPP, INC.
`
`/s/ Bethany Salpietra
`Jeremy Taylor
`Baker Botts L.L.P.
`Email: jeremy.taylor@bakerbotts.com
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`8
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 9 of 11 PageID #: 1959
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`101 California St., Suite 3600
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 291-6200
`Facsimile: (415) 291-6300
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`Bethany R. Salpietra
`Baker Botts L.L.P.
`Email: bethany.salpietra@bakerbotts.com
`2001 Ross Ave., Suite 900
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone: (214) 953-6500
`Facsimile: (214) 953-6503
`
`Deron R. Dacus
`The Dacus Firm, P.C.
`Email: ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`821 ESE Loop 323, Suite 430
`Tyler, Texas 75701
`Telephone: (903) 705-1117
`Facsimile: (903) 581-2543
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`ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT LYFT,
`INC.
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`9
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 10 of 11 PageID #: 1960
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`CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
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`I hereby certify that Plaintiff’s counsel has met and conferred with counsel for
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`Defendants, and all parties have agreed to submission of the proposed disputed order submitted
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`herewith.
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`
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`
`
`/s/ Vincent J. Rubino, III
` Vincent J. Rubino, III
`
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`10
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 76 Filed 06/02/21 Page 11 of 11 PageID #: 1961
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on June 2, 2021, all counsel of record who are
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`deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via
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`the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`
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`
`
`/s/ Vincent J. Rubino, III
` Vincent J. Rubino, III
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`11
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