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Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 23174
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`T-MOBILE USA, INC. and T-MOBILE US,
`INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION

`

`Case No. 2:21-cv-00072-JRG

`(LEAD CASE)

`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED


`
















`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`LYFT, INC.,
`
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00024-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC’S SUR-REPLY
`IN FURTHER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT LYFT, INC.’S
`OPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
`FILE BILL OF COSTS AND MOTION FOR FEES (DKT. 356)
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 23175
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc.,
`940 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................1, 3
`
`CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C.,
`578 U.S. 419 (2016) ...............................................................................................................1, 3
`
`Lyft Inc. v. AGIS Software Development LLC,
`Case No. 21-cv-04653-BLF, Dkt. 61 (N.D. Cal., January 28, 2022) ....................................1, 2
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C § 285 .................................................................................................................................2
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ........................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ........................................................................................................................2
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 23176
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`
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`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“AGIS” or “Plaintiff”), by and through its
`
`undersigned counsel, hereby submits this sur-reply in further opposition to Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s
`
`(“Defendant” or “Lyft”) Opposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Bill of Costs and Motion
`
`for Fees (Dkt. 356) (the “Motion”).
`
`This is a dispute over whether the deadlines apply to Lyft. Lyft cannot show good cause
`
`for this extension because the deadlines do not apply to Lyft when it is not the “prevailing party”
`
`under the applicable rules. The Court should not endorse the applicability of this deadline to Lyft.
`
`In addition, Lyft expressly declines to address the question of whether it is a “prevailing party”
`
`and refuses to compare the instant facts to the circumstances of the cases it contends support its
`
`motion. Those two cases, CRST and B.E. Tech, involve exceptional circumstances where the
`
`district court specifically identified a defendant as a “prevailing party.” Those specific
`
`identifications invited the defendants to request costs and fees. It is undisputed that there are no
`
`such facts here. Lyft’s refusal to address the shortcoming of its own situation improperly shifts the
`
`burden of demonstrating good cause to the Court. Respectfully, the Court should decline to do the
`
`work for Lyft.
`
`As a preliminary matter, on January 28, 2022, the Northern District of California granted
`
`AGIS’s motion to dismiss Lyft’s declaratory-judgment complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
`
`Lyft Inc. v. AGIS Software Development LLC, Case No. 21-cv-04653-BLF, Dkt. 61 (N.D. Cal.,
`
`January 28, 2022). In that case, the Court “agree[d] with AGIS Software” and found that “Lyft has
`
`not alleged enough facts to indicate that this case involves a situation similar to the one in Trimble”
`
`which “involved a very specific set of facts.” Id. at 5-6. The Court found that “Lyft can only
`
`generally allege licensing negotiations between AGIS Software and California companies” and
`
`that “Lyft has failed to meet its burden of showing that AGIS Software purposefully directed its
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 23177
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`
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`activities at residents of the forum based on Trimble.” Id. at 5-6. The Court also rejected Lyft’s
`
`alter ego theory finding that “Lyft has alleged minimal facts. . .not sufficient to meet Lyft’s burden
`
`for showing that AGIS Software, AGIS, Inc., and AGIS Holdings had a unity of interest.” Id. at 7-
`
`8. Under Lyft’s interpretation of “prevailing party,” AGIS may now request costs and attorney
`
`fees for that case.
`
`In its Reply for this Motion, Lyft misleads the Court when it states that “AGIS failed to
`
`provide any basis for opposing the requested extension.” Reply at 3. But in the same paragraph,
`
`Lyft states that AGIS responded. Id. As explained in its briefing, AGIS responded that Lyft is
`
`unable to show that Lyft is the “prevailing party,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 35
`
`U.S.C § 285, and Lyft cannot obtain costs under L.R. CV-54 because there is no “final judgment
`
`or by judgment that a presiding judge directs be entered as final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).”
`
`Because neither deadline for costs nor fees applies to it, Lyft lacks sufficient cause to extend the
`
`deadline.
`
`Lyft’s Reply confirms that it lacks sufficient good cause required to receive relief under
`
`this Motion. Rather than explain the applicability of the deadline it seeks to extend, Lyft “defer[s]
`
`until the appropriate time to provide a fulsome analysis” and shifts the burden onto the Court to
`
`analyze the cases to find a reason to grant the extension. Lyft’s attempt to “correct certain
`
`mischaracterizations or inaccuracies in AGIS’s Response” is limited to the simple identification
`
`of three additional cases, none of which Lyft contends apply to the issue of whether Lyft can be a
`
`“prevailing party.” Reply at 3. Lyft does not compare or contrast any of the circumstances of the
`
`cases, and Lyft does not attempt to distinguish AGIS’s presentation of the cases. Lyft simply waves
`
`its hand and expects the Court to review the cases and make the arguments for it. Reply at 3.
`
`Lyft does not dispute that the Report and Recommendation did not identify a “prevailing
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 23178
`
`
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`party.” Dkt. 212 at 14. Disregarding that Lyft was not declared a “prevailing party” in this action,
`
`Lyft generally alleges that Defendant can seek costs and fees as a prevailing party. But whether
`
`the district court can ever find defendants to be prevailing parties is not the issue before the Court.
`
`The question is whether Lyft is the prevailing party in this case. It is not.
`
`It is undisputed that the Court did not declare Lyft a “prevailing party” in this action. The
`
`specific identification of a prevailing party in the motion to dismiss was a predicate requirement
`
`in both cases cited by Lyft. The reason why those disputes advanced to appeal was that the district
`
`court specifically identified the defendants as prevailing parties. Such cases are few and far
`
`between because, unlike this action, they involve exceptional circumstances. Regarding the first
`
`case, Lyft does not dispute that CRST involves “exceptionally rare circumstances” where an
`
`agency “wholly abandoned its statutory duties” to investigate and conciliate the claims of class
`
`members in a Title VII employment discrimination action. Lyft does not dispute that, in CRST, the
`
`district court specifically identified the defendant as a “prevailing party” and specifically invited
`
`the defendant to request costs after the agency. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S.
`
`419, 427 (2016) (“The District Court then dismissed the suit, held that CRST is a prevailing party,
`
`and invited CRST to apply for attorney’s fees.”). Regarding the second case, Lyft does not dispute
`
`that, in B.E. Tech, the district court’s order dismissing the action specifically identified the
`
`defendant as the “prevailing party” after the PTAB invalidated all asserted claims in a parallel
`
`administrative proceeding and the plaintiff did not withdraw its claims. B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v.
`
`Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Lyft does not dispute that both of these cases
`
`involve a specific finding in the district court’s order identifying a particular “prevailing party.”
`
`Other than generally showing that a defendant can be a prevailing party, Lyft provides no authority
`
`to show that it can proceed with its request for costs and fees without being declared a prevailing
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 23179
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`
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`party on a motion denied without prejudice.
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`Lyft does not dispute that Plaintiff filed a timely motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 258) and
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`Lyft did not file a motion for reconsideration on any grounds. Lyft does not dispute that it has been
`
`aware of the Court’s findings in the Report and Recommendation since November 10, 2021.
`
`Besides conclusory hand-waving (Reply at 4), Lyft provides no factual or legal basis to show that
`
`Lyft has not waived any rights to obtain the predicate findings necessary to request costs and fees.
`
`Because the Court did not identify any “prevailing party” and because the Court dismissed
`
`the case “without prejudice,” the record, as it stands, identifies no prevailing party. Dkt. 334
`
`(adopting Dkt. 212 at 14). In the absence of a “prevailing party,” the deadlines for costs and fees
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`do not apply to Lyft. Respectfully, AGIS requests that the Court deny Defendant’s Opposed
`
`Motion for Extension of Time to File Bill of Costs and Motion for Fees (Dkt. 356) in its entirety.
`
`
`Dated: February 15, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: ffabricant@fabricantllp.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@fabricantllp.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@fabricantllp.com
`FABRICANT LLP
`411 Theodore Fremd Avenue,
` Suite 206 South
`Rye, New York 10580
`Telephone: (212) 257-5797
`Facsimile: (212) 257-5796
`
`Samuel F. Baxter
`State Bar No. 01938000
`Email: sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 23180
`
`
`
`State Bar No. 24012906
`Email: jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 E. Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 923-9000
`Facsimile: (903) 923-9099
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF AGIS
`SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 360 Filed 02/15/22 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 23181
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on February 15, 2022, all counsel of record who
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`are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document
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`via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
` Alfred R. Fabricant
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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