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`EXHIBIT 1
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`EXHIBIT 1
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`Plaintiff.
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`Case No. 9:14-cv-80651-DMM
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`ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION
`SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`v.
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`LIFE360, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`PLAINTIFF ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.’S
`OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1
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`OVERVIEW OF THE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY ......................................................... 2
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`RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS .................................................................................... 3
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`TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................................... 5
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
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`H.
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`I.
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`J.
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`K.
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`L.
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`“entered items of interest” ........................................................................................... 5
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`“symbol generator” ...................................................................................................... 7
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`“CPU software for selectively polling other participants” ........................................ 8
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`“soft switch” ............................................................................................................... 10
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`“soft switch matrix” ................................................................................................... 12
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`“CPU software that causes the exchange of data with other
`participants with a cellular phone” ........................................................................... 13
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`“private . . . network” ................................................................................................ 15
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`“peer to peer network”............................................................................................... 16
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`“establishing, over a private remote server excluding a
`website or a web browser, a communications network” ......................................... 18
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`“SMS polling message”............................................................................................. 20
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`“automatically transmitting” ..................................................................................... 21
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`“without any selection criteria or manual input of
`relationship data” ....................................................................................................... 23
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`M.
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`“common interest network” ...................................................................................... 26
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 27
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`i
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`
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`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc.,
`132 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ....................................................................... 5, 9, 15
`
`Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys.,
`570 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ......................................................................... 5, 9, 14
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................... 3
`
`EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`No. 2013-1330 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2014) ................................................................................ 4
`
`Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams. Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 7, 9, 14
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ...........................................................................................4, 16
`
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
`382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................... 4, 7
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
`379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .........................................................................................9, 15
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................... passim
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................... 3, 4, 16
`
`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................... 3
`
`RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98840 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2013)........................................... 5, 9, 14
`
`SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................... 6
`
`ii
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`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ........................................................................................... 3, 6
`
`Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc.,
`2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128181 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013) ........................................... passim
`
`Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp.,
`122 F.3d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................26, 27
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.............................................................................................................................. 4
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`iii
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`
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`Exhibit A
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
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`United States Patent No. 7,031,728
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`Exhibit B
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`United States Patent No. 7,672,681
`
`Exhibit C
`
`United States Patent No. 7,764,954
`
`Exhibit D
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`United States Patent No. 8,126,441
`
`Exhibit E
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`Declaration of Dr. Benjamin Goldberg
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`Exhibit F
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`COMPUTER DICTIONARY 365 (2d ed. 1994)
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`Exhibit G
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`’441 Patent File History, Response and Amendment dated 2/23/2011
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`Exhibit H
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`’441 Patent File History, Amendment dated 3/29/2010
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`Exhibit I
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`’441 Patent File History, Response and Amendment dated 10/7/2011
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`Exhibit J
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`U.S. Patent No. 7,593,740 to Crowley
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`Exhibit K
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`U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2003/0093405 to Mayer
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`iv
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`Pursuant to the parties’ [Joint Proposed] Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 31-1), Plaintiff
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`Advanced Ground Information Systems, Inc. respectfully submits this opening brief in support of
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`its proposed claim constructions in the above-captioned case.
`
`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`This case involves four patents having the same inventor: U.S. Patent No. 7,031,728 (“the
`
`’728 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,672,681 (“the ’681 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 7,764,954 (“the
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`’954 patent”); and U.S. Patent No. 8,126,441 (“the ’441 patent”) (collectively the “asserted
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`patents,” attached as Exhibits A–D, respectively). The ’681 patent, ’954 patent, and ’441 patent
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`each are continuations-in-part of the ’728 patent. Plaintiff AGIS alleges that Defendant Life360
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`infringes claims 3, 7 and 10 of the ’728 patent; claims 1, 5 and 9 of the ’681 patent; claims 1 and
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`2 of the ’954 patent; and claims 1–8 of the ’441 patent. The asserted claims of the ’728 patent,
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`’681 patent and ’954 patent are independent claims. Asserted claims 1 and 4 of the ’441 patent
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`are independent claims.
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`Claim construction is about (i) identifying words or phrases in the claims whose meaning
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`may not be clear to the court or jury, and (ii) supplying a meaning to those words in order to
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`clarify issues regarding the scope of the claims. Life360’s proposed constructions do not
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`accomplish this goal. Life360’s claim constructions add negative limitations and lengthy
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`narratives—some as long as 20 words for a single claim term—to limit the claims to exemplary
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`embodiments. And, many of Life360’s proposed constructions are at odds with not only the
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`intrinsic evidence, but also the language of the claims themselves.
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`AGIS’s proposed claim constructions closely track the specification and file history of
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`the asserted patents, comport with the understanding of a person of skill in the art, and are
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`presented only when necessary to clarify the scope of the claims.
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`1
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`II.
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`OVERVIEW OF THE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
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`The asserted patents each relate to a method and apparatus for establishing a
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`communication network for designated users (also called “participants”) of mobile devices, such
`
`as cellular telephones.
`
`The ’728 patent, to which the other three asserted patents claim priority, describes a
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`mobile device with a display screen. See, e.g., ’728 patent, 1:6–15, 11:10–42. The touch screen
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`display depicts the location and status of other participants in the communication network on a
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`map. Id. at 11:10–42. A participant in the communication network may initiate a telephone call,
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`send a text message, data or a picture, or exchange some other form of communication with
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`another participant on the network by touching a symbol representative of the other participant
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`on the screen of the mobile device. Id. In certain embodiments, the mobile device of one
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`participant may communicate with the mobile device of another participant in order to obtain
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`information such as, for example, the second participant’s location. Id. at 10:46–51.
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`The ’681 patent adds to the ideas of the ’728 patent, and claims a system and method for
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`creating and modifying the items displayed on the touch screen displays of participants’ mobile
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`devices. See, e.g., ’681 patent, 9:60–11:56.
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`The ’954 patent also adds to the ideas of the ’728 patent. In one embodiment, the ’954
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`patent claims a method wherein a participant’s mobile device may communicate with a computer
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`server from which the participants may download map information to their mobile devices. See,
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`e.g., ’954 patent, 7:25–64, 10:32–44. In another embodiment, the ’954 patent discloses a method
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`wherein soft switches are depicted on the touch screen display of the mobile device, but also may
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`be hidden in order to increase the available display area for other purposes. Id. at 10:56–11:16.
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`The ’441 patent further adds to the ideas of the ’728 patent. In one embodiment, the ’441
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`patent claims a “polling” method in which a first participant sends a polling message to a second
`
`2
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`participant which causes the second participant’s information, such as their location, to be
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`reported to other participants in the communications network. See, e.g., ’441 patent, 8:29–63. In
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`another embodiment, the ’441 patent claims a method for creating a communications network
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`wherein the participants share a common interest such as, for example, friendship. Id. at 9:19–
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`58.
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`III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
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`Claims should normally be construed in accordance with their plain meaning. Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). There is no reason to construe
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`claim terms that are clear and understandable to the court and jury, and it is improper to construe
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`claim terms in a way that changes their plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art,
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`unless the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, has expressly defined them differently, or
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`has expressly and unequivocally manifested an intent to disclaim certain subject matter within
`
`their scope. See, e.g., Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2010) (“The terms, as construed by the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the
`
`court’s claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.” (quotation
`
`omitted)); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
`
`claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer
`
`and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or
`
`prosecution history.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
`
`(“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to
`
`clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claim”).
`
`Claim terms have to be construed in accordance with plain and ordinary meaning, but in
`
`light of the specification and patent file history. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314–17;
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This does not mean that
`
`3
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`claim terms should be imported from the specification, see, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
`
`Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906–08 (Fed. Cir. 2004), nor should the scope of the claims be
`
`limited or restricted by language in the specification describing a particular embodiment. See,
`
`e.g., EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., No. 2013-1330, slip. op. at 7–15 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
`
`5, 2014); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Negative limitations in particular should not be imported
`
`from the specification absent a very clear disclaimer. See, e.g., Omega Eng’g Inc. v. Raytek
`
`Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322–24 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Moreover, it is axiomatic that the claims
`
`should not be construed in a manner that is inconsistent with the specification. See, e.g., Phillips,
`
`415 F.3d at 1315–18.
`
`Technical terms should be construed consistent with their meaning to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the relevant art. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. While courts should rely
`
`first on intrinsic evidence, i.e., the claim language itself, the specification and the file history,
`
`extrinsic evidence, such as technical dictionaries and expert testimony, can be helpful in
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`understanding how technical terms are understood by a person skilled in the art. Id. at 1317–18.
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`A limitation in a claim can sometimes be defined in terms of its function in accordance
`
`with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, in which case the limitation is construed to cover only the structure
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`disclosed in the specification for performing the recited function plus reasonable equivalents.
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`See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. There is a strong presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply, however,
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`where the patentee does not use the terms “means for” and the language connotes sufficient
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`structure to persons skilled in the art. See, e.g., Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
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`382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the computer and software fields in particular, courts
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`have repeatedly held that terms like “computer software for . . .” and “computer code for . . .”
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`performing standard software functions connote sufficient software structure to persons skilled in
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`4
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`the art and should not be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. See, e.g., RLIS, Inc. v. Allscripts
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`Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98840, at *47–48 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2013)
`
`(holding that “computer software,” “computer system under software control,” “computer
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`executable database software,” “an editing software utility,” and “executable software” for
`
`performing a function did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6); Aloft Media, LLC v. Adobe Sys., 570 F. Supp.
`
`2d 887, 897–98 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that “computer code” for performing a function did
`
`not invoke § 112, ¶ 6); Affymetrix, Inc. v. Hyseq, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1232 (N.D. Cal.
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`2001) (“‘[C]omputer code’ is not a generic term, but rather recites structure that is understood by
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`those of skill in the art to be a type of device for accomplishing the stated functions.”).
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`IV.
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`TERMS FOR CONSTRUCTION
`
`A.
`
`“entered items of interest”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Claims
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
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`“items that have been added by, and are of interest to, one or more of the
`network participants” An “entered item of interest” is not a fixed location such
`as a business, house, hospital, or street location.
`’728 patent, claim 3
`’681 patent, claim 5
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`The phrase “entered items of interest” does not require construction, as its ordinary
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`English meaning is plain. The phrase appears in asserted claim 3 of the ’728 patent and in
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`asserted claim 5 of the ’681 patent, which claims recite that the databases associated with the
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`claimed cellular phone display contain “the geographical location of each of the symbols
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`representing participants in the communication network, fixed locations, and entered items of
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`interest.” ’728 patent, claim 3; ’681 patent, claim 5 (emphasis added). The phrase “entered
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`items of interest” does not have a specialized or technical meaning in the context of the asserted
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`patents. It refers to the items that can be entered on the map displayed on the participants’
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`5
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`devices. It is easily understood by its ordinary English meaning, and does not require
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`construction. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568.
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`Life360’s proposed construction of “entered items of interest” should be rejected both
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`because it contains a negative limitation, and because the negative limitation is inconsistent with
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`the patent specifications. The Federal Circuit has cautioned against reading negative limitations
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`into claims where there is no express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written
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`description or prosecution history that would justify adding that negative limitation. Omega
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`Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1322–1324. Here, there is no such disclaimer or lexicography, and Life360
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`does not suggest any. Nor does it suggest any other basis for its proposed negative limitation.
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`Moreover, Life360’s proposed construction, which seeks to exclude “fixed location[s],”
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`such as businesses, houses, hospitals, or street locations, directly contradicts the disclosure of the
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`patent specifications. The specifications of the ’728 and ’681 patents provide that each
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`participant may use their cellular device to “enter other entities (locations of people, vehicles,
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`buildings, facilities, and other entities) into its database.” ’728 patent, 3:48–52 (emphasis
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`added); see also ’681 patent, 7:19–25.
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`Life360’s attempt to exclude embodiments disclosed in the specification from the scope
`
`of this claim term by defining it with a negative limitation that is inconsistent with the
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`specification is legally impermissible. See Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1323. Life360’s proposed
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`negative limitation appears to be an attempt to create a noninfringement argument by simply
`
`adding claim limitations to distinguish accused products. Conducting claim construction in view
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`of the accused products is improper. See SRI Int’l. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d
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`1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
`
`Therefore, the Court should decline to construe this term.
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`6
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`B.
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`“symbol generator”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
`
`Does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)/112(f)
`Invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and is indefinite.
`Structure: An undisclosed algorithm or software function
`Function: generate symbols that represent each of the participants’ cell phones in
`the communication network on the display screen (‘728 Patent, claim 3; ‘681
`Patent, claim 5);
`generate symbols on said touch display screen (‘728 Patent, claim 10; ‘681
`Patent, claim 9)
`’728 patent, claims 3, 10
`’681 patent, claims 5, 9
`
`The term “symbol generator,” as used in the claims of the ’728 and ’681 patents, does not
`
`require construction. The limitations of the asserted claims that include this claim term recite “a
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`symbol generator in said CPU that can generate symbols that represent each of the participants’
`
`cell phones in the communication network on the display screen,” (’728 patent, claim 3; see ’681
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`patent, claim 5), and “a symbol generator connected to said CPU and said database for
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`generating symbols on said touch display screen,” (’728 patent, claim 10; ’681 patent, claim 9).
`
`None of the claim limitations at issue recite the word “means”; thus, there is a “strong”
`
`presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See, e.g., Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA,
`
`Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128181, at *25 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013) (citing Lighting World, 382
`
`F.3d at 1358). The presumption can be overcome only if the claim language fails to connote any
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`structure and instead relies entirely on purely functional language. See Inventio AG v.
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`Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, this
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`exception is rarely applied and does not apply here.
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`Here, the term “symbol generator” itself connotes a definite structure to those skilled in
`
`the art. Thus, there is no basis for the application of § 112, ¶ 6. See Wi-LAN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 128181, at *118–19. A person of skill in the art would have understood structurally what
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`7
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`a “symbol generator” was from its ordinary English meaning. Declaration of Dr. Benjamin
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`Goldberg (“Goldberg Decl.”), attached as Exhibit E, ¶¶ 20-21. The structure of a symbol
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`generator is standard software code module that is well known in the art for simply creating
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`symbols to be placed on a display screen. Id. at ¶ 21. A person of skill in the art at the time of
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`the invention would have understood that there is a certain class of software subroutines that
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`programmers know to use to generate symbols on a display. Id..
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`Therefore, the Court should decline to construe this term.
`
`C.
`
`“CPU software for selectively polling other participants”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`
`Claims
`
`No separate construction necessary (see agreed-to construction of “selectively
`polling other participants” (Dkt. No. 45))
`
`Does not implicate 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)/112(f)
`Invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) and is indefinite.
`Structure: An undisclosed algorithm or software function residing in the CPU of
`the cellular phone
`Function: selectively polls other participants [see agreed-to construction of
`“selectively polling other participants”]
`’728 patent, claim 10
`
`The parties’ claim construction dispute focuses on the first portion of the phrase “CPU
`
`software for selectively polling other participants,” as the parties have agreed to a construction of
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`“selectively polling other participants.” (Dkt. No. 45.) The words “CPU software for” describe
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`the structure that selectively polls other participants. This is easily understood from the ordinary
`
`English meaning of the claim language, and this term does not require construction. Goldberg
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`Decl., ¶¶ 23-25.
`
`Life360’s proposed construction—i.e., that this phrase is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
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`6—is incorrect.
`
`As with the previous term, because this claim limitation does not recite the word
`
`“means,” there is a strong presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See, e.g., Wi-LAN, 2013
`
`8
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`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128181, at *25. Courts have repeatedly held that “computer” and “software”
`
`limitations with functional language do not invoke § 112, ¶ 6 simply because they contain
`
`functional language. See, e.g., RLIS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98840, at *47–48 (holding that
`
`“computer software,” “computer system under software control,” “computer executable database
`
`software,” “an editing software utility,” and “executable software” for performing a function did
`
`not invoke § 112, ¶ 6); Aloft, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 897–98 (holding that “computer code” for
`
`performing a function did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6). Again, no exception to this presumption
`
`applies because “CPU software” recites sufficient definite structure. See id.; see also Inventio,
`
`649 F.3d at 1360. Where a limitation refers to well-known types of software functions, such
`
`limitations have been held to connote sufficient structure to avoid construction under § 112, ¶ 6.
`
`See, e.g., Aloft, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (“[W]hen the structure-connoting term ‘computer code’ is
`
`coupled with a description of the computer code’s operation . . . sufficient structural meaning is
`
`conveyed to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also id. at FN 9 (referring to technical
`
`dictionaries and citing Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2004) in support of the proposition that “computer code” connotes structure); Affymetrix,
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`132 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (“‘[C]omputer code’ is not a generic term, but rather recites structure
`
`that is understood by those of skill in the art to be a type of device for accomplishing the stated
`
`functions.”). A CPU and software would have been sufficient disclosure of structure to one of
`
`skill in the art for polling other participants. Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 23-25. Thus, there is no basis
`
`for the application of § 112, ¶ 6. See Wi-LAN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128181, at *121.
`
`Therefore, the Court should decline to construe this term.
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`9
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`D.
`
`“soft switch”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Claims
`
`“a temporary or changeable switch”
`
`“A virtually displayed switch on a touch screen that, when activated, performs a
`function.” A soft switch associated with a symbol is different than the symbol
`itself.
`’681 patent, claims 1, 5, 9
`’954 patent, claims 1, 2
`
`AGIS’s proposed construction of “soft switch” closely tracks, and covers, the various
`
`inventive embodiments in the specifications of the ’681 and ’954 patents, and is consistent with
`
`the ordinary artisan’s understanding of “soft” in the context of switches.
`
`One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the prefix “soft” means
`
`“temporary or changeable.” See, e.g., Exhibit F, COMPUTER DICTIONARY 365 (2d ed. 1994)
`
`(defining the prefix “soft” in the computing context as “an adjective meaning temporary or
`
`changeable”); Goldberg Decl., ¶¶ 28-29. And, the ’681 and ’954 patent specifications repeatedly
`
`describe soft switches as temporary or changeable switches, implemented in software.
`
`The specifications describe temporary or changeable switches on a touch screen that may
`
`be represented by symbols at their physical locations, or that may be separate from those
`
`symbols (e.g., a “call” switch). See, e.g., ’681 patent, 2:22–46; ’954 patent, 10:9–25; 6:25–34.
`
`The purpose of these switches is to provide a way for users to call different software subroutines
`
`for performing various functions and actions, such as placing a call, sending a message, or
`
`viewing a geographic location. For example, when communicating in a firefighter network, the
`
`inventive system and methods employ one set of symbols and switches—these switches change
`
`when communicating in a family network or in a network of golfing companions. See, e.g., ’681
`
`patent, 4:15–24; ’954 patent, 10:9–25. The ’681 and ’954 patents also explain that the soft
`
`switches may activate other soft switches, and that they may be temporarily displayed or,
`
`10
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`
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`alternatively, hidden in order to make room on the display screen to view other objects. See,
`
`e.g.,’681 patent, 5:55–56, 9:29–42; ’954 patent, 5:19–21, 8:50–64. Thus, the specifications of
`
`the ’681 and ’954 patents contemplate soft switches of a temporary or changeable variety.
`
`Life360’s proposed construction, on the other hand, appears to impermissibly exclude
`
`those embodiments where the soft switch appears at the same physical location on the screen as a
`
`symbol.
`
`In addition, Life360’s proposed limitation that a “soft switch associated with a symbol is
`
`different than the symbol itself” is vague and ambiguous and lacks support in the specification.
`
`The specifications explain that the touch display screen may include symbols (30, 34) that can
`
`represent, in one embodiment, the location of other participants in the communication network.
`
`See, e.g., ’681 patent, 6:15–22, Fig. 1; ’954 patent, 5:46–55.
`
`’681 patent, Fig. 1. In this embodiment, the symbols each define a soft switch representative of
`
`the other participant (30, 34). See, e.g., ’681 patent, 6:36–59, Fig. 1; ’954 patent, 5:63–6:17.
`
`
`
`11
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`
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`
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`Touching this soft switch activates a second soft switch that can be used to call another
`
`participant. Id. Thus, the ’681 and ’954 patents clearly contemplate both soft switches co-
`
`located with an associated symbol, as well as additional soft switches. Life360’s negative
`
`requirement that “a soft switch associated with a symbol is different than the symbol itself” is
`
`incorrect and would only result in confusion.
`
`Additionally, the specifications of the ’681 and ’954 patents describe soft switches as
`
`performing both “functions” and “actions.” See, e.g., ’681 patent, 9:29–42; ’954 patent, 8:50–
`
`64. Life360’s proposed construction limits the claims to the embodiments where soft switches
`
`only perform a “function.”
`
`Thus, the Court should adopt AGIS’s proposed construction.
`
`E.
`
`“soft switch matrix”
`
`AGIS’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Life360’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Claims
`
`No separate construction necessary (see “soft switch” above)
`
`Ordinary English meaning, no construction necessary
`“a collection of soft switches presented in a series of rows and columns”