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Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 7552
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00072-JRG
`(Lead Case)
`
`CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00026-JRG
`(Member Case)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`






`
` §
`
`





`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`v.
`
`T-MOBILE USA, INC., AND T-MOBILE
`US, INC.
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`v.
`
`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`d/b/a UBER,
`
`
`DEFENDANT UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED DISCLOSURE OF
`ASSERTED CLAIMS AND INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS (DKT. 172)
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 7553
`
`
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`In its opposition, AGIS fails to reconcile its two inconsistent infringement theories. Indeed,
`
`rather than reconcile the theories, AGIS conflates claim limitations from the ’100 Patent, which
`
`require anonymizing participant information, such as phone numbers, with claim limitations from
`
`the ’728 Patent,1 which, in contrast, require “providing and storing” each participant’s cellular
`
`telephone number. And try as it might, AGIS’s new doctrine of equivalents theory does not erase
`
`the inconsistency—it highlights the inconsistency by overtly importing an “identifier” limitation
`
`from the ’100 Patent into the ’728 Patent. Respectfully, the Court should reject AGIS’s attempt
`
`to sidestep the plain language of the claims.
`
`Without citing to anything other than attorney argument, AGIS argues that the “cellular
`
`phone telephone number” disclosed in the ’728 Patent is merely an “identifier[] that [is] used to
`
`call or message another user” and not the actual cellular telephone number associated with each
`
`participant. AGIS Br. at 4. This, according to AGIS, is different from the “phone number” found
`
`in the ’100 Patent. Id. According to AGIS, while Uber anonymizes cellular phone numbers,
`
`
`
`
`
` Id. And thus, based on this contrived discrepancy, AGIS argues that it (1) accused “Uber’s
`
`anonymous calling system, the purpose of which is not to share the identifying telephone numbers
`
`of each device,” and (2)
`
`
`
` Id. at 6. Regardless of what AGIS argues in its brief, the patents and AGIS’s
`
`infringement contentions tell a different story.
`
`Claim Language. Despite relying on the plain meaning of the “phone number” limitation
`
`
`1 In the Court’s Claim Construction Order, the Court found the term “using the IP address
`previously” indefinite and thus, claim 9 of the ’724 Patent is indefinite. Dkt. No. 213 at 28. This
`reply does not address AGIS’s inconsistent theories regarding the phone number and IP address
`limitations of claim 9 of the ’724 Patent because AGIS can no longer proceed on that claim.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 7554
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`
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`for the ’100 Patent, for the ’728 Patent, AGIS attempts to justify its inconsistent theories by
`
`importing a special meaning (that was never raised during claim construction) for “phone number.”
`
`Even worse, AGIS’s special meaning is completely divorced from the claim language because
`
`the ’728 Patent requires that the “cellular phone number” relate “to a different symbol of each of
`
`the participants in the communication network.” And this limitation in the ’728 Patent is critical
`
`because it is that symbol, as discussed below, that is touched to “automatically initiate[] a cellular
`
`phone call.” AGIS’s argument that
`
`
`
` simply highlights that it cannot, at the same time, assert claims that require
`
`providing and storing a cellular telephone number with claims that require the mobile device “not
`
`have access to a phone number associated” with other participants.
`
`Infringement Contentions. AGIS points to
`
` as the
`
`allegedly infringing feature that meets the limitations-at-issue for the ’728 and ’100 Patents. But
`
`AGIS’s infringement contentions apply
`
` inconsistently. For example, for limitation 1[B]
`
`of the ’100 Patent, AGIS asserts that
`
`
`
` Dkt. No. 197-4 (Ex. D to Third
`
`Amended Infringement Contentions) at D-14. In other words,
`
` As such, for limitation 1[K] of the ’100 Patent, AGIS asserts that
`
` Id. at D-47, D-49.
`
`But for limitation 7[B] of the ’728 Patent, AGIS cites that very same line of code
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 7555
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Dkt. No. 197-3 (Ex. C to Third Amended Infringement Contentions) at C-26-C-
`
`27.
`
` These
`
`inconsistencies permeate throughout AGIS’s contentions.
`
`Claim Construction Order. AGIS’s inconsistent theories are highlighted by the Court’s
`
`claim construction of other limitations in the ’728 Patent. The Court construed—and AGIS agreed
`
`at the Markman hearing—that the subsequent “providing initiating cellular phone calling
`
`software” limitation in claim 7 of the ’728 Patent was software “that is activated by touching a
`
`symbol on the touch display that automatically initiates a cellular phone call using the stored
`
`cellular phone number to the participant represented by the symbol.” Dkt. No. 213 at 37
`
`(emphasis added). AGIS did not seek a construction of the term “cellular phone number” during
`
`the claim construction process and should not now be permitted to inject a new construction—a
`
`cellular phone number is simply an “identifier”—to erase its plainly inconsistent infringement
`
`theories. Uber’s apps either operate by providing and storing the cell phone numbers or they do
`
`not—but they cannot do both and still meet the claim limitations of the ’728 and ’100 Patents.
`
`Respectfully, Uber’s motion should be granted, and the Court should (1) order AGIS to
`
`identify which infringement theory it will pursue as to the ’728 and ’100 Patents, and (2) strike the
`
`portions of AGIS’s contentions that are inconsistent with that theory.2
`
`
`
`
`2 That Uber agreed to AGIS’s amended infringement contentions is completely irrelevant to this
`motion. That joint motion is express that nothing about the parties’ agreement “should be
`construed as a waiver of challenges to the substantive merit of the other party’s contentions,
`including with respect to Uber’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Disclosure of Asserted
`Claims and Infringement Contentions (Dkt. 172).” Dkt. No. 195 at 2. Uber’s agreement to the
`joint motion was not a concession that the present motion was somehow moot, nor was it a
`concession that it understood AGIS’s theories.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 7556
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`
`/s/ Mark N. Reiter
`Mark N. Reiter
`Texas State Bar No. 16759900
`mreiter@gibsondunn.com
`Robert A. Vincent
`Texas State Bar No. 24056474
`rvincent@gibsondunn.com
`Nathan R. Curtis
`Texas State Bar No. 24078390
`ncurtis@gibsondunn.com
`Ashbey N. Morgan
`Texas State Bar No. 24106339
`anmorgan@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2100
`Dallas, TX 75201-6912
`Telephone: 214.698.3360
`Facsimile: 214.571.2907
`
`Melissa R. Smith
`Texas State Bar No. 24001351
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 South Washington Avenue
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: 903.934.8450
`Facsimile: 903.934.9257
`Email: melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Uber
`Technologies, Inc. d/b/a Uber
`
`
`4
`
`Dated: November 11, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 7557
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on November 11, 2021, the foregoing was electronically filed in
`
`compliance with Local Rule CV-5(a) and served via the Court’s electronic filing system on all
`
`counsel who have consented to electronic service on this 11th day of November, 2021.
`
`/s/ Mark N. Reiter
`Mark N. Reiter
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 7558
`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 215 Filed 11/15/21 Page 7 of 7 PagelD #: 7558
`
`

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