Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 1 of 23 PageID #: 5689
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`
`T-MOBILE USA, INC. and T-MOBILE US,
`INC.,
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`LYFT, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`§
`
`§
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00072-JRG
`§
`(LEAD CASE)
`§
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`§
`§
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`§
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`§
`§
`§
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`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC’S
`REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00024-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Case No. 2:21-cv-00026-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
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`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a
`UBER,
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`Defendants.
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`
`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 2 of 23 PageID #: 5690
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`
`I.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
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`DISPUTED TERMS – ALL DEFENDANTS .................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`D.
`
`E.
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`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
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`SMS / SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS) MESSAGES ................................. 1
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`ESTABLISHING A CELLULAR PHONE COMMUNICATION
`NETWORK . . . / PROVIDING A CELLULAR PHONE
`COMMUNICATION NETWORK . . . ................................................................... 1
`
`“SIMILARLY EQUIPPED” TERMS..................................................................... 2
`
`SAID DATABASE INCLUDING . . . .................................................................... 3
`
`ACCESSING AN APPLICATION PROGRAM . . . ............................................. 4
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`USING THE IP ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY .......................................................... 5
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`MAP DISPLAY ...................................................................................................... 6
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`FREE AND OPERATOR SELECTED TEXT MESSAGE ................................... 6
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`PROVIDING INITIATING CELLULAR PHONE . . ........................................... 7
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`II.
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`DISPUTED TERMS – T-MOBILE .................................................................................... 7
`
`A.
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`MESSAGE .............................................................................................................. 7
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`III.
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`DISPUTED TERMS – LYFT AND UBER........................................................................ 9
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`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
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`“A FORCED MESSAGE ALERT SOFTWARE APPLICATION”
`TERMS ................................................................................................................... 9
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`A DATA TRANSMISSION MEANS THAT FACILITATES . . . ...................... 10
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`MEANS FOR ALLOWING A MANUAL RESPONSE . . . ................................ 11
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`TRANSMITTING A SELECTED REQUIRED RESPONSE FROM
`THE RESPONSE LIST . . . / REQUIRED RESPONSE LIST ............................ 12
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`EACH REPRESENTING A DIFFERENT PARTICIPANT . . . .......................... 13
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`RECEIVING ENTITY-OF-INTEREST DATA TRANSMITTED . . . ................ 14
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`OBTAINING A FIRST DATA PROVIDED BY A FIRST MOBILE
`DEVICE . . . .......................................................................................................... 14
`
`i
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 3 of 23 PageID #: 5691
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`H.
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`CONSISTING OF: A PORTION OF THE PARTICIPANT
`SYMBOL . . . TERMS.......................................................................................... 15
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`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15
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`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 4 of 23 PageID #: 5692
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`ACQIS LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc.,
`2015 WL 1737853 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2015) ...........................................................................3
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Alexam, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., Inc.,
`2012 WL 1188406 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2012) ...............................................................12, 13, 14
`
`Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
`2014 WL 5299320 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014) .......................................................................2, 3
`
`Bushnell Hawthorne, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`813 F. App’x 522 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................5
`
`Canon, Inc. v. TCL Elecs. Holdings Ltd.,
`2020 WL 2098197 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2020) .........................................................................6, 8
`
`Caritas Techs., Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,
`2006 WL 6112191 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006) ...........................................................................3
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)....................................................................................................1
`
`Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB v. Oticon Med. AB,
`958 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................1
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)................................................................................................10
`
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog., LLC,
`703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................1
`
`Effective Expl., LLC v. Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC,
`2017 WL 3193322 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 2017) .........................................................................13
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................3
`
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................12
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 5 of 23 PageID #: 5693
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`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................12
`
`Gree, Inc. v. Supercell Oy,
`2020 WL 2332144 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2020) .......................................................................6, 9
`
`Hill-Roms Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................13
`
`IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`Image Processing Techs., LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`2017 WL 2672616 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017) ...........................................................................7
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................13
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen. Ins. Corp.,
`2016 WL 125594 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) ..............................................................................6
`
`Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................14
`
`Konami Corp. v. Roxor Games, Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 725 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ...................................................................................1, 2
`
`LBS Innovations, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2020 WL 1929423 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2020) ...........................................................................7
`
`Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp.,
`2013 WL 2949959 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) .........................................................................13
`
`MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................6
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................12
`
`Realtime Data, LLC v. Actian Corp.,
`2016 WL 7325707 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2016) ............................................................................3
`
`Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`802 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................5
`
`Tech. Pharm. Servs., LLC v. Alixa Rx LLC,
`2016 WL 6397358 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2016) ...........................................................................8
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 6 of 23 PageID #: 5694
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`Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC,
`748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................10
`
`Trover Grp., Inc. v. Dedicated Micros USA,
`2015 WL 1263358 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2015) ..........................................................................5
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 7 of 23 PageID #: 5695
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`I.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS – ALL DEFENDANTS
`SMS / SHORT MESSAGE SERVICE (SMS) MESSAGES
`A.
`AGIS agrees the Court should adopt its prior construction from the Google Case and
`
`construed as “cellular-based (rather than IP-based) messages of limited size consistent of text
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`and numbers.” Dkt. 145 (“Open.”) at 7-8.
`
`B.
`
`ESTABLISHING A CELLULAR PHONE COMMUNICATION
`NETWORK . . . / PROVIDING A CELLULAR PHONE
`COMMUNICATION NETWORK . . .
`Defendants contend the preamble is limiting because it “provides the antecedent basis for
`
`the claim terms.” The preamble merely states the purpose or intended use of the invention and
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`does not provide antecedent basis for any elements recited in the body of the claim and is not
`
`“necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v.
`
`Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Defendants contend the phrase “a
`
`cellular communication network” is the portion it contends provides the antecedent basis, but
`
`assuming arguendo this phrase were limiting, it does not follow that the other preamble language
`
`or the entire preamble is limiting.1
`
`“[If] the body of the claim ‘sets out the complete invention,’ the preamble is not ordinarily
`
`treated as limiting the scope of the claim.” Konami Corp. v. Roxor Games, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d
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`725, 729 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Here, the preamble “adds no limitation to those in the body of the
`
`claim,” and therefore “is irrelevant to proper construction of the claim” (Id.) and merely states a
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`“purpose or intended use of the invention” and provides a description of the limitations set forth
`
`in the claim.2 The body of the claims sets forth the complete invention, and thus “it is clear that
`
`
`1 See Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB v. Oticon Med. AB, 958 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
`(“A conclusion that some preamble language is limiting does not imply that other preamble
`language, or the entire preamble, is limiting.”).
`2 See Cochlear Bone, 958 F.3d at 1355 (“The preamble’s recitation . . . is merely a statement of
`intended use of the claimed hearing aid. It identifies no structure for the apparatus claimed.”);
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog., LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 8 of 23 PageID #: 5696
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`the claim drafter did not choose ‘to use both the preamble and the body to define the subject matter
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`of the claimed invention.’” Konami, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 731. Specifically, Defendants do not
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`explain “how the preamble term illuminates the meaning of terms within the body of the claims or
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`the context essential for understanding their meaning.” Id. Because “deletion of the preamble
`
`would not affect the structure of the claimed invention and the preamble does not provide a
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`necessary antecedent basis for the terms in the claims’ body,” the preamble is not limiting.
`
`“SIMILARLY EQUIPPED” TERMS
`C.
`Defendants’ arguments the “similarly equipped” claim terms are indefinite are unavailing.
`
`As submitted by AGIS’s expert, the intrinsic evidence describes permitting users of cellular phones
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`and PDA cellular phones to “communicate and share information with other users having similarly
`
`equipped cellular phones.” Open. at 10 (emphasis added). Defendants misleads this Court by
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`alleging Mr. McAlexander fails to identify the meaning of “similarly equipped,” where, Mr.
`
`McAlexander identifies exemplary disclosures in the ’728 Patent where “similarly equipped”
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`“pertains to common hardware and software features.” See id. (citing to McAlexander Decl. ¶ 36).
`
`Similarly, the ’728 Patent also describes “similarly equipped cellular phone that includes a CPU,
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`GPS navigational system and a touch screen display.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, the specification
`
`and claims inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the phrase
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`“similarly equipped.” Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 2014 WL 5299320, at *24 (E.D.
`
`Tex. Oct. 16, 2014).
`
`Defendants allege “no guidance is provided on which or how many features devices must
`
`include to be similar,” and thus, a POSITA would not understand whether cellular phones or PDA
`
`cellular phones are “similarly equipped.” However, Defendants themselves list several features of
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`“similarly equipped” cellular phones, including both software and hardware features. See Dkt.
`
`156 (“Resp.”) at 6-7. Defendants appear to argue, on the one hand, that a POSITA would not
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 9 of 23 PageID #: 5697
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`understand what devices are “similarly equipped,” and on the other, identify exemplary features
`
`which renders the term “superfluous.” Id. at 6. “[I]ndefiniteness must be assessed in light of the
`
`particular patent specification and prosecution history.” Realtime Data, LLC v. Actian Corp., 2016
`
`WL 7325707, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2016). The disclosures of the patents demonstrate “how the
`
`term . . . is used and understood in the context of the patent.” Realtime Data, LLC, 2016 WL
`
`7325707, at *2. Accordingly, a POSITA would understand with reasonable certainty the scope of
`
`the term “similarly equipped” and Defendants’ arguments should be rejected.3
`
`SAID DATABASE INCLUDING . . .
`D.
`Defendants allege this claim term is indefinite by divorcing the claim terms from the
`
`surrounding limitations, claims, and patent. However, “the Federal Circuit stressed the importance
`
`of recognizing the person of ordinary skill in the art ‘is deemed to read the claim term not only in
`
`the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the
`
`entire patent, including the specification.’” Caritas Techs., Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 2006
`
`WL 6112191, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006).
`
`Defendants allege the specification is silent regarding the generation of symbols, yet the
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`specification of the ’724 Patent discloses “causing a symbol to be generated on the screen and
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`entered,” “a display symbol that is generated on each user phone display,” “symbols are generated
`
`on the operators’ displays based on the participants’ latitude and longitude,” “the cell phone
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`software program generates the moving symbol,” and “symbol that was generated.” Dkt, 145-1,
`
`
`3 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Because the
`intrinsic evidence here provides ‘a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of
`ordinary skill in the art to determine [the scope of the claims],’ the claims are not indefinite. . . .”)
`(internal citations omitted). The case law relied upon by Defendants, ACQIS LLC v. Alcatel-Lucent
`USA Inc., is inapposite. Resp. 156 at 8. In ACQIS, the parties disputed, not only the construction
`of what constituted “similar,” but what the meaning of “design” would be to a person of ordinary
`skill in the art. 2015 WL 1737853, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2015) (“the claims and specifications
`do not provide guidance as to specifically which aspects of the ‘design’ of a module should be
`evaluated” and “the meaning of ‘design’ would be understood by one of skill in the art”). Here,
`Defendants do not posit that the term “equipped” is disputed.
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 10 of 23 PageID #: 5698
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`“’724 Patent” at 3:40-41; 6:46; 15:2-3; 16:34-35; 16:39. Nonetheless, Defendants ignore the
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`disclosures of the specification. Moreover, Defendants offer no basis for their argument that both
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`the database and application program can generate symbols, particularly where the claims disclose
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`generation of symbols by both the application program and database. See Resp. at 9-10. The
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`specification supports such a disclosure and Defendants offer no reason for deviating from the
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`explicit disclosures of both the claims and specification. Accordingly, a POSITA would
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`understand this claim term with reasonable certainty and thus, is not indefinite.
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`ACCESSING AN APPLICATION PROGRAM . . .
`E.
`This claim term is not subject to § 112, ¶ 6 and should be given its plain and ordinary
`
`meaning. Defendants appear to argue a portion of the claim term “generating one or more symbols
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`representative of one or more participant users, each of whom have a similarly equipped cellular
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`phone” lacks a structure. However, Defendants omit the beginning of this claim term: “accessing
`
`an application program.” Resp. at 10-11. While Defendants point to their arguments regarding the
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`“a forced message alert software application” terms (Open. at 10 n. 6), Defendants did not argue
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`these claim terms are indefinite.4 Defendants appear to take contrary positions regarding the two
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`terms.
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`Defendants equate this claim term to “symbol generator” from a prior litigation. However,
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`Defendants fail to explain how “application program” is the same as “symbol generator,”
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`particularly where the district court held “’symbol generator’ is analogous to a ‘means for
`
`generating symbols’ because the term is simply a description of the function performed.”
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`
`4 See Resp. at 25 (arguing “a forced message alert software application” and “a forced message
`alert software application program” should be construed as “software application requiring a
`manual response from the recipient of a forced message alert sent by an operator before the
`recipient’s display is cleared and/or the voice message stops repeating.”).
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 11 of 23 PageID #: 5699
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`Defendants submit no such argument here, and nonetheless, Defendants ignore the recitation of
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`“application program” at the beginning of this limitation. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the
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`district court’s finding the term “is not used in ‘common parlance or by persons of skill in the
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`pertinent art to designate structure.’” Id. at 1348. Again, Defendants do not submit “application
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`program” is indefinite. Moreover, Defendants have submitted in the context of their IPR petition
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`that the term is not indefinite and not subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Open. at 13. Accordingly, the Court
`
`should find this claim term is not governed by § 112, ¶ 6 and is not indefinite.
`
`USING THE IP ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY
`F.
`This claim term should be read in the context of the entire claim.5Reading this claim term
`
`in the context of the entire claim, this claim term is not indefinite. The term “using the IP address
`
`previously” refers to the “exchang[ed] IP addresses” referred to in the beginning of the same
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`limitation.6 Defendants do not, and cannot, contend this claim term lacks an antecedent basis,
`
`where the “previously” in the claim term indicates this portion of the claim limitation is a reference
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`back to the previously claimed “IP address.” See Open. at 15.7 Accordingly, the claim language
`
`is reasonably certain to a POSITA who would readily understand the meaning of the claim.8 This
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`is consistent with the specification of the ’724 Patent which discloses “the server receives each
`
`network identifier . . . along with its dynamic IP address . . .” Open. At 15. The Court should reject
`
`Defendants’ arguments and accord this term its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`5 IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We caution that claim
`language must be construed in the context of the claim in which it appears. . . . Claim language
`must be construed in the claim in which it appears.”).
`6 See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“This is
`not a step in the claimed method. It is, instead, a phrase that characterizes the claimed pre-
`processing parameters.”).
`7 Defendants’ reliance on Bushnell Hawthorne, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., is unavailing, where the
`Court stated the claim describes “three classes of IP addresses prior to the ‘said different IP
`Address’ limitation.” 813 F. App’x 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
`8 See, e.g., Trover Grp., Inc. v. Dedicated Micros USA, 2015 WL 1263358, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
`19, 2015) (“From the context, it is obvious that that term ‘second images’ is meant to refer to the
`‘new digitized image’ . . . stored in digital storage and retrievable from digital storage.”).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 12 of 23 PageID #: 5700
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`G. MAP DISPLAY
`Defendants cannot point to any lexicography, disclaimer, or disavowal to indicate the
`
`additional limitation alleged by Defendants is required. “Absent such restrictions, the plain
`
`meaning should control.” Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen. Ins. Corp., 2016 WL
`
`125594, at *23 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016).
`
`Defendants argue because the specification uses both “display” and “map display,” this
`
`necessitates the more restrictive construction of “map display.” Resp. at 15. Defendants’
`
`arguments merely highlight the non-infringement positions they attempt to build into the
`
`construction of this term. However, Defendants’ arguments are not supported by the specification
`
`and claims.9 Defendants’ reference to dictionary definitions is not “necessarily helpful or
`
`warranted as to a construction to this term.” Canon, Inc. v. TCL Elecs. Holdings Ltd., 2020 WL
`
`2098197, at *12 (E.D. Tex. May 1, 2020). Additionally, Defendants’ use of ellipsis to omit
`
`portions of the limitation to support its non-infringement argument are unavailing. The remaining
`
`portion of the limitation reveals that it is unnecessary to build additional limitations into this claim
`
`term. A POSITA would understand this claim term is based upon the specification and the claims.
`
`and this claim term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.10
`
`FREE AND OPERATOR SELECTED TEXT MESSAGE
`H.
`This claim term is not indefinite. Defendants assert “free” and “operator selected” are
`
`“unclear, indefinite, and ambiguous.” Resp. at 16. However, Defendants read these terms in
`
`isolation and not within the context of the patent. As submitted by AGIS’s expert, the claims and
`
`
`9 See MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[P]atent
`coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like the ones in the figures.”).
`10 See Canon, 2020 WL 2098197, at *11 (“The Court will not substitute one set of commonly
`understood terms with another set of commonly understood terms when a plain and ordinary
`meaning construction is sufficient.”); see Gree, Inc. v. Supercell Oy, 2020 WL 2332144, at *11
`(E.D. Tex. May 11, 2020). (“Even if all the embodiments in the ’137 and ’481 Patents describe
`selecting as including touching and playing, this is not enough to read a touch-and-play limitation
`into ‘selecting’ or variants.”).
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 13 of 23 PageID #: 5701
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`specification of the ’728 Patent disclose a POSITA would understand “the user (or operator) would
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`encounter limitations on the display interface that would make it difficult to compose and send a
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`text message” and sending different types of messages, including text messages. Open. at 18.
`
`Based on these disclosures a POSITA would understand “there are different types of data or text
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`and methods for inputting text messages,” “text can be free text (also known as free-form text) as
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`opposed to structured text,” and “operator selected” means the free text is “of the kind input by an
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`operator, i.e., via user input.” Id. at 18-19. Accordingly, “free and operator selected text messages”
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`should be construed as “messages comprising free text via user input.”
`
`PROVIDING INITIATING CELLULAR PHONE . . .
`I.
`Defendants do not offer any explanation regarding why this additional limitation, “that
`
`represents the location of a participant.” is “a necessary part of the construction of the term besides
`
`the mere fact that it disclosed in the specification.” LBS Innovations, LLC v. Apple Inc., 2020 WL
`
`1929423, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2020). Defendants’ proposed construction rearranges,
`
`repeats, and renders superfluous other phrases within this limitation. Nothing in the claim
`
`indicates the patentee intended to limit this term to a particular embodiment. See Open. at 22.
`
`Because Defendants’ proposed construction is not necessary or appropriate based on the intrinsic
`
`record, this claim term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.11
`
`II.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS – T-MOBILE12
`A. MESSAGE
`Defendant’s proposed construction is contrary to the disclosures of the specifications of
`
`the ’251 and ’838 Patents. The term “message” can be readily understood in the context of this
`
`
`11 See Image Processing Techs., LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2017 WL 2672616, at *9 (E.D. Tex.
`June 21, 2017) (“[T]he terms have no meaning other than their plain and ordinary meaning and
`that the surrounding claim language provides sufficient meaning to the words in the claim terms.”).
`12 AGIS confirms Defendants’ withdrawal of the claim terms “database” and “receiving a message
`from a second device” and agrees that these claim terms should be accorded their plain and
`ordinary meaning. Resp. at 23 n. 11.
`
`7
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 14 of 23 PageID #: 5702
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`claim. See Tech. Pharm. Servs., LLC v. Alixa Rx LLC, , 2016 WL 6397358, at *19 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
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`28, 2016). Based on the claim and surrounding language, a POSITA would not confuse the
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`disclosure of “message” as “snail mail” or some other “rudimentary communication” in the context
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`of the claim. 13
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`Defendant points to the disclosure of “a communications method and system using a
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`plurality of cellular phones.” Resp. at 23. The specification also states “[t]he purpose of a
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`communication system is to transmit digital messages from a source” and “[t]he server also acts
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`as a forwarder of data addressed from one participant to one or more addressed participants, thus
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`permitting the transmission of free text, preformatted messages, photographs, video, Email and
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`Uniform Resource Locator (URL) data.” Ex. I, ’838 Patent at 1:50-51; 3:25-30. Whether
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`Defendant’s proposed construction encompasses all such exemplary embodiments would require
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`further construction as Defendant’s proposed construction introduces ambiguity rather than
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`provides clarification. Moreover, Defendant’s reference to dictionary definitions is not
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`“necessarily helpful or warranted as to the construction to this term.” Canon, 2020 WL 2098197,
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`at *12. Nonetheless, the construction of this term does not require exclusion of certain types of
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`“messages.” Accordingly, “one of ordinary skill in the art, based upon the specification and the
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`claims, would understand the disputed term to have its plain and ordinary meaning.”14 Defendant’s
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`proposed construction “adds increased ambiguity to the claim.” Id. Accordingly, this claim term
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`should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning and Defendant’s proposed construction should
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`13 For example, claim 54 of the ’838 Patent discloses “A system comprising: a first device
`programmed to perform operations comprising: joining a communication network corresponding
`to a group, wherein joining the communication network comprises transmitting a message
`including an identifier corresponding to the group.” Ex. I, ’838 Patent, claim 54.
`14 Canon, 2020 WL 2098197, at *10-*11 (“Overall, the ’130 patent provides no special meaning
`to the term ‘broadcast’ or ‘broadcast signal’ in the context of a conventional television broadcast.
`The Court finds that there is no express limitation, definition, or disavowal in the specification
`regarding a ‘television broadcast’ or a ‘broadcast signal.’”).
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`8
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 15 of 23 PageID #: 5703
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`be rejected.
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`III. DISPUTED TERMS – LYFT AND UBER15
`“A FORCED MESSAGE ALERT SOFTWARE APPLICATION”
`A.
`TERMS
`Defendants propose insertion of similar, additional limitations that have already been
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`rejected by this Court.16 This Court stated “Defendants have not identified any definition or
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`disclaimer in this regard or otherwise shown that the patentee limited the disputed term to require
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`all of the cited details of how the claimed invention may be ‘embodied.’” Huawei CC Order at 38
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`(“[T]here are specific features of particular disclosed embodiments that should not be imported
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`into the construction of ‘a forced message alert software application program.”). The same applies
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`here. Defendants cannot point to any disclosures in the specification sufficient to demonstrate
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`disavowal or disclaimer and Defendants disregard other claim limitations within the same claim
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`include the requirement of a “required manual response,” (see Ex. C at 9:24-26) such that inclusion
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`of this additional limitation into the claim term would render those claim limitations superfluous.17
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`In light of the remaining limitations, Defendants offer no reasoning for why the Court should
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`depart from its prior construction.18 As noted by Defendants, claim 2 recites similar limitations,
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`such as “means for allowing a manual response” and “means for clearing the text message and a
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`response list.” Resp. at 25. Construing this claim term to incorporate requirements in dependent
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`15 AGIS confirms it agrees to Defendants’ proposal “manual response” be construed as “recipient-
`selectable response message,” consistent with this Court’s construction in the Huawei CC Order,
`and “event / event symbol” be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. Resp. at 25 n.16.
`16 Specifically, the Court rejected Defendants’ construction: “application software that allows an
`operator to create and transmit forced message alerts, automatically transmit an acknowledgment
`of receiving them, periodically resent them when no acknowledgement is received, indicate on a
`display which recipient devices have acknowledged the forced message alert, provide a manual
`response list on the display of the recipient device, and provide an indication of the status and
`content of the manual response selected by the recipient devices.” See Resp. at 25.
`17 See Gree, 2020 WL 2332144, at *7 (“[T]he limitation Defendant advocates is otherwise found
`in the claims and should not be read as an inherent attribute of ‘player character.”).
`18 See id. at *11 (“[T]he Court again rejects Defendant’s attempt to incorporate limitations
`elsewhere expressed in the claims as inherent attributes of the . . . terms.”).
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`9
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`Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 166 Filed 10/12/21 Page 16 of 23 PageID #: 5704
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`claims would “render the term redundant and offend[] principles of claim differentiation.”19
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`Defendants also point to disclosures in the specification. However, “‘[a]lthough the
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`specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular
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`embodiments and examples appearing the specification will not generally be read into the claims.’”
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`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Defendant